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Menachos, 3


QUESTIONS: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah later (102b) that teaches that one who pledges to bring a Machavas offering, but he brings instead a Marcheshes offering, or vice versa, has not fulfilled his Neder, but his offering is valid. Rebbi Shimon says that he has even fulfilled his Neder, because the type of utensil in which the Minchah offering is prepared is inconsequential.
(a) According to Rebbi Shimon, why does this person fulfill his Neder? He pledged to bring one type of Minchah offering, and now he is bringing a different type. He should still be obligated to fulfill his Neder! Why is this case different than a case in which one accepts upon himself to bring a Korban Olah, and he brings instead a Korban Shelamim? He certainly remains obligated to fulfill his Neder and to bring a Korban Olah! (MINCHAS AVRAHAM)

(b) The Mishnah later (102b) says that if one pledges to bring a black animal as a Korban Olah, but he brings instead a white animal, he has not fulfilled his Neder. Why is bringing a different type of Minchah than the type that one pledged different from the case of bringing a different color animal than what one pledged to bring? (Ibid.)

(a) The answer to the first question is that a Minchas Machavas and a Minchas Marcheshes are both types of fried Menachos. They both fall into the category of fried Menachos, in contrast to the categories of baked Menachos (Ma'afeh Tanur) and Menachos offered as plain flour (Minchas Soles). Although these two types of fried Menachos are considered to be two separate types with regard to Shinuy Kodesh (as we see from the fact that one who brings a Minchas Machavas with intent that it is a Minchas Marcheshes is considered to be making a Shinuy Kodesh (2a; see Insights there), or, according to Rebbi Shimon (2b), from the fact that he needs to give a special reason ("Ma'aseha Mochichin Aleha") for why there is no Shinuy Kodesh), nevertheless, with regard to one's *Neder*, they are considered to be one type of Minchah (i.e. a fried Minchah). Rebbi Shimon maintains that one cannot obligate himself to bring specifically a Minchas Machavas or a Minchas Marcheshes; his Neder is to bring a fried Minchah, regardless of whether he said that he would bring a "Minchas Machavas" or a "Minchas Marcheshes," and it can be fulfilled by bringing either type. The difference is merely the type of utensil that will be used for the Minchah, and it is not an intrinsic difference in the Minchah itself. After the Minchah is placed in one of the two different types of utensils, the sub-division is established and it can no longer be changed (see SHITAH MEKUBETZES #15), but until that time, the title of the Korban remains the same, whether he pledged to bring a Machavas or a Marcheshes.

(b) In order to answer the second question, we must better understand the Mishnah later (102b). Every Neder to bring a Korban includes two parts. The first part is which type of Korban the person wants to bring. He may bring an Olah, Shelamim, Todah, or one of the Minchos Nedavah. The second part is which type of animal, or which type of flour, will be used for his Korban. He may bring a white animal or a black animal for his Zevach, or whole-wheat flour or finely-sifted flour for his Minchah.

Rebbi Shimon's ruling that one fulfills his Neder when he brings a Minchas Machavas, even though he said in his Neder that he would bring a Minchas Marcheshes, refers to the first part of the Neder. With regard to the name of this Korban, there is no difference between a Machavas and a Marcheshes, as explained above; the Neder is that he must bring a fried Minchah offering, and thus he may fulfill that element of his Neder with either type.

The Mishnah (102b), on the other hand, is referring to the second part of the Neder, in which the person establishes what type of animal he wants to bring. He may obligate himself to bring whatever type he wants. It does not matter to us that both a black animal and a white animal are the same type of Korban with the same title, because when the person specified that he would bring a black or white animal, he was not referring to the title of the Korban. He was referring merely to what type of animal he would use for the Korban.

Accordingly, one who says that he will bring a Minchas Machavas and he brings instead a Marcheshes should be considered the same as bringing a white animal when he said that he would bring a black one. Why, then, does one fulfill his Neder, according to Rebbi Shimon, when he brings a different type of Minchah?

The answer is that we assume that when the person said that he would bring a Minchas Machavas, he was referring to the *title* of the Korban, and not to the type of item he wants to bring as that Korban. He does not have intention to bring specifically a deep-fried or shallow-fried Minchah offering; he just wants to bring the *type of Korban* called a Minchas Machavas. Since there is no primary category of Korban called a Minchas Machavas (since the primary category is a fried Minchah, regardless of how it is prepared), he fulfills his Neder with whatever type of fried Minchah that he brings. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)


QUESTIONS: The Gemara quotes Rava who says that when a Korban Chatas is slaughtered with intention that it serve as a Chatas for a different sin that the owner did, the Chatas remains valid. Rav Acha brei d'Rava maintains that if the Chatas was slaughtered with intent that it serve as a Chatas for a different sin, then it is Pasul. He derives this from the verse, "v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas" -- "he shall slaughter it for a Chatas" (Vayikra 4:33), which teaches that it is a valid Chatas only when slaughtered with intent that it serve as the Chatas for which it was designated.

The ruling of Rav Acha applies only when a Chatas Chelev (a Chatas being brought as atonement for the sin of eating Chelev) is slaughtered with intent that it be a Chatas Dam (a Chatas for the sin of eating blood). Rav Acha does not disqualify a Chatas Chelev designated for a sin of Chelev that was committed yesterday that is slaughtered for the sake of a Chatas for a sin of Chelev that was committed today. This is not considered a Shinuy Kodesh, since the sins for which both Korbanos are being brought are identical (see Zevachim 9b).

The Acharonim point out that this Gemara seems to refute the view of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Shegagos 3:3), who rules that if one brings a Chatas that was designated for a sin of eating Chelev with intention that it serve as a Chatas for a sin of desecrating Shabbos or eating blood, the Korban is Pasul. He writes that the source for this is the verse, "[v'Chiper Alav ha'Kohen] Al Chataso Asher Chata" -- "[The Kohen will provide atonement for him] for his sin which he transgressed" (4:35), from which we learn that the Chatas is valid only when the Korban is brought for the sin for which it was designated, and not for a different sin. The Rambam continues and says that one should not even bring a Chatas designated for one transgression of eating Chelev for a different transgression of eating Chelev, but, b'Di'eved, the Chatas is valid and atones for the second transgression.

(a) Why does the Rambam record a different verse as the source for this law? Our Gemara says that the source is the verse, "v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas" (Vayikra 4:33), while the Rambam quotes the verse, "Al Chataso" (Vayikra 4:35)!

(b) In addition, why does the Rambam rule that one may not bring a Chatas that was designated for one sin for the sake of another, identical sin? Our Gemara says only that one may not change the Chatas from one type of sin (e.g. Chelev) to another type of sin (e.g. Dam). What is the Rambam's source for this?

ANSWER: RAV SHACH zt'l (in AVI EZRI) answers as follows. Our Gemara is discussing the issue of what constitutes a Shinuy Kodesh, such that when the Kohen slaughters the Korban with intent that it serve as a different Korban, the owner does not attain atonement from the Korban. With regard to Shinuy Kodesh, the difference between a Chatas brought for one type of sin and a Chatas brought for a different type of sin is significant. The difference between a Chatas brought for one incident of a sin and a Chatas brought for a separate incident of the identical sin is not significant with regard to Shinuy Kodesh. In the latter case, the Kedushah of the Korban is exactly the same and it cannot be considered a Shinuy Kodesh, and thus the owner attains atonement. Our Gemara learns from "v'Shachat Osah l'Chatas" that only when the Chatas is slaughtered for the sake of a different type of Chatas (such as a Chatas Dam instead of a Chatas Chelev) is it considered a Shinuy Kodesh and it cannot serve its purpose.

The Rambam, though, is discussing a different issue. The Rambam is discussing whether or not a Chatas designed for one sin may be *changed* to atone for a different sin. Perhaps since the title of the Korban -- "Chatas" -- remains the same, the sin for which it was designated is not important. As long as it is slaughtered for the sake of a Chatas, it does not matter whether the sin for which it is now being slaughtered (e.g. Dam) is the same as the sin for which it was initially designated (e.g. Chelev). We learn from a different verse that, nevertheless, the Chatas is Pasul. The verse of "Al Chataso" teaches that the designation for a specific sin becomes part of the essence of the Korban. Thus, a Chatas Chelev cannot be changed to a Chatas Dam. This explains why the Rambam cites a different verse than the verse cited by our Gemara; the verse he cites teaches that two Chata'os for two different types of sins are not interchangeable.

This also answers the second question. It is obvious that a Shinuy Kodesh is only when the sins are different (Chelev and Dam). When the sins are different, the Kedushah of their Korbanos is different. In contrast, to *change* the designation of the Korban -- and have it atone for a sin other than the sin for which it was initially designated -- is problematic even when the second sin is identical to the first sin but was just committed at a different time. Hence, one may not *change* a Korban designated for a sin of Chelev that was committed yesterday for a sin of Chelev that was committed today.

(The reason why the Rambam says that b'Di'eved one attains atonement when one changes the Chatas to serve as the Korban for the second sin of Chelev is based on a Sugya in Kerisus, as the Lechem Mishneh discusses.) (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)

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