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Menachos 2

MENACHOS 2 - dedicated anonymously in appreciation of D.A.F.'s work by a subscriber in the Upper West Side of Manhattan.


QUESTION: The Mishnah states that any Minchah offering that had its Kemitzah taken she'Lo Lishmah is valid, but does not fulfill the owner's obligation. What is a case of taking the Kemitzah of a Minchah offering she'Lo Lishmah? RASHI explains (based on the Gemara later on 2b), "Such as when one pledged to bring a Minchas Marcheshes, and he brought it and the Kohen separated a Kemitzah and said, 'I am hereby taking a Kemitzah for the sake of a Minchas Machavas.'" This is the Shinuy Kodesh of a Minchah offering to which the Mishnah refers.

The KEREN ORAH explains why the example of a Shinuy Kodesh for Menachos is different than the Shinuy Kodesh for Zevachim (animal offerings), as discussed at the beginning of Zevachim. The Shinuy Kodesh for Zevachim is when one offers a Korban Olah, for example, with intention that it is a Korban Shelamim. That is, there is a change in the essence of the Korban. Each Korban has its own unique Kedushah and purpose, and intending that one type of Korban should serve as a different type is a Shinuy Kodesh. This form of Shinuy Kodesh, however, does not apply to Menachos, because the four types of Minchah offerings are essential the same, with the same Kedushah. The difference between them is merely the type of utensil which is used and how the flour is cooked or fried. Despite this significant difference between offerings of Zevachim and offerings of Menachos, we learn from a Hekesh that the same Halachah of Shinuy Kodesh that applies to Zevachim applies also to Menachos, and, therefore, intent to offer one type of Minchah as another type of Minchah, even though the only difference between them is the means of preparation, still constititutes a Shinuy Kodesh.

However, it seems that there *is* a case of Shinuy Kodesh of Menachos that is exactly the same as Shinuy Kodesh of Zevachim! This case is when the Minchah is brought not as an independent offering (a Minchas Nedavah), but rather as a Minchah that comes together with a normal Korban -- a Minchas Nesachim. If one offers a Minchas Nesachim of a Korban Olah with intent that it is a Minchas Nesachim of a Korban Shelamim, this should constitute the same type of Shinuy Kodesh that Zevachim have! Since each Minchas Nesachim has the Kedushah and provides the Kaparah of the Korban with which it is offered, a Shinuy Kodesh of this type of Minchah is exactly like a Shinuy Kodesh of the Korban itself! Why does Rashi (or the Gemara) not give this case as an example of Shinuy Kodesh of Menachos? Why are we forced to learn that there is a new type of Shinuy Kodesh, wherein even a change that does not affect the Kedushah of the offering (but changes the offering to another type of Minchah that merely was prepared differently) is also considered a Shinuy Kodesh? (NEZER HA'KODESH)


(a) The NEZER HA'KODESH) answers that since a Minchas Nesachim is brought together with a Korban and is subordinate to the Korban, it is not subject to independent intentions. That is, when the Korban itself is offered with the proper intent, Lishmah, that intent establishes the purpose of the Minchah as well and it can no longer be changed. Therefore, there is no case of a Shinuy Kodesh for a Minchas Nesachim (whether from a Minchas Nesachim of one type of Korban to that of another type of Korban, or from a Minchas Nesachim to a Minchas Nedavah).

(b) The CHAZON ISH (Teshuvos #32) argues with the Nezer ha'Kodesh. According to the Chazon Ish, a Minchas Nesachim does *not* acquire the Kedushah of the Korban with which it is offered, and it is not considered part and parcel of that Korban. The Korban is the cause for bringing it, but the Minchas Nesachim itself is an independent Korban and it has its own unique Kedushah of Minchas Nesachim.

Therefore, if one brings a Minchah of a Korban Olah with intent that it is a Minchah of a Korban Shelamim, this does not constitute a Shinuy Kodesh, because all of the Menachos that are brought with the different Korbanos have the same Kedushah of Minchas Nesachim, and they are prepared in exactly the same manner. This is why the Gemara is forced to say that there is a new type of Shinuy Kodesh, wherein having intent to offer one type of Minchas Nedavah as another type of Minchas Nedavah indeed constitutes a Shinuy Kodesh, even though the only difference between the various types of Minchas Nedavah is their manner of preparation.

(We may ask, though, that according to the Chazon Ish, why does the Gemara not say that the case of Shinuy Kodesh of Menachos is bringing a Minchas Nedavah with intent that it is a Minchas Nesachim, or vice versa.) (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)


QUESTION: RASHI (DH Aval Machshavah) explains that a Machshavah, intent to offer a Korban as a different type of Korban than the one for which it was originally designated, that is recognizable to everyone as being false is not considered a Machshavah and does not disqualify a Korban Minchah. Rashi adds that when we discuss a "Machshavah" with regard to Kodshim, this refers to a verbal expression of a thought.

Rashi points out that from the fact that the Gemara calls an obviously false Machshavah a "Machshavah that is recognizable," we see that with regard to Kodshim, a Machshavah means a verbal declaration of the thought, because it is the verbal declaration that makes the falseness of a Machshavah to be recognizable.

Other Rishonim (TOSFOS SHANTZ cited by the SHITAH MEKUBETZES to Bava Metzia 43b, and SEFER HA'ESHKOL, Hilchos Shechitas Chulin #13) also prove from the Gemara here that a Machshavah with regard to Kodshim must be verbally expressed in order to be considered an effective Machshavah.

However, there are other Rishonim (RAMBAM, SEFER HA'CHINUCH; see Insights to Zevachim 2:1) who seem to maintain that a thought alone suffices as a valid Machshavah with regard to Kodshim, and it does not need to be expressed verbally. How do those Rishonim understand the Gemara here? If the Machshavah is merely a cognition, and not an articulated expression, in the Kohen's mind, then how can it be considered a "Machshavah that is recognizable?" Even if it needs to be recognizable only to the Kohen who has the Machshavah, how is a mental cognition without any verbal expression recognizable?

ANSWER: The answer seems to be that even the Rishonim who maintain that Machshavah alone suffices agree that the Machshavah is valid only because it has the strength and validity of a Dibur, a spoken statement. The STEIPLER GA'ON (Zevachim 1:2) proposes that even if a Machshavah alone is effective, it is not effective if the Kohen had an unarticulated thought in his mind that he is offering this Korban for a different purpose than that for which it was designated. Rather, the Kohen must *mentally articulate* the words in his mind in order for the thought to be effective. He must say *in his mind* the words, "I hereby am slaughtering this animal for the sake of a Korban Olah," for example, or "I hereby am slaughtering this animal for the sake of Shimon." This is similar to the other places in the Torah where Machshavah is effective, such as when making an animal a Temurah, or when separating Terumah. In those cases, one certainly must mentally articulate his intention in his mind. Accordingly, the power of the Machshavah is that it is considered as if words were actually spoken. Therefore, the Rishonim who maintain that a Machshavah alone suffices will agree that the Machshavah must be comprised of acceptable words in order for it to have validity.

The necessity for the Machshavah to be expressed in words (either mentally or orally, according to the different views of the Rishonim) can be understood as follows. The Gemara in Zevachim (2b) says that a Korban that is offered without specific intent is considered to have been offered Lishmah and is valid. Even when there is a mere thought of Lo Lishmah, that Machshavah does not change the "Setama Lishmah" status of the Korban. Only when he articulates the Lo Lishmah intention (either mentally or orally, depending on the views of the Rishonim) does the Torah then say that his Dibur has the power to invalidate the Korban. (See footnotes to Shitah Mekubetzes to Menachos 2b, #6.) (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)

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