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Menachos, 81


QUESTION: The Gemara discusses a case in which a Todah became mixed up with the animal that was designated as its Temurah, and one of them died. The Gemara says that the remaining animal cannot be brought, because if the remaining animal is the original Todah, then it requires Lachmei Todah, but if it is the Temurah, then it does not require Lachmei Todah. The Gemara earlier (80b) established that it would not help to bring Lachmei Todah and stipulate that if the remaining animal is the original Todah, then the loaves are its Lachmei Todah, while if the animal is the Temurah, the loaves are Chulin. Such a stipulation would not work, because one may not bring Chulin into the Azarah.

Abaye and the Rabanan attempted to solve this dilemma. They proposed that according to Rebbi Yochanan, who says that the loaves of a Korban Todah become Kadosh at the moment the Todah is slaughtered even when the loaves are outside of the Azarah at that moment, there is no reason to bring the loaves into the Azarah! According to Rebbi Yochanan, the Gemara's proposed stipulation should work!

The Gemara explains that the Lachmei Todah must be brought into the Azarah in order to perform the Tenufah with them. The Tenufah cannot be done outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash, because the verse says that it must be done "Lifnei Hashem" -- "before Hashem" (Vayikra 7:30; see RASHI DH Lifnei Hashem Kesiv). As we noted above, the loaves in this case cannot be brought into the Azarah because of the possibility that they are Chulin.

The Gemara's words need explanation. The verse of "Lifnei Hashem" refers only to the Tenufah of the *meat* of the Korban. How do we know that the Tenufah of the Lachmei Todah must also be "Lifnei Hashem"?

ANSWER: RASHI (KESAV YAD and RASHI DH Mishum) explains that we know that Tenufah must be done with the Lachmei Todah. We also know that the Gemara earlier (62a) says that whenever Tenufah is performed with multiple items including loaves of bread, the loaves are always placed on top. This implies that when bringing a Korban that requires that Tenufah be done with multiple items, the Tenufah is done with all of the items together. Accordingly, once we know that the Tenufah of the meat must be done "Lifnei Hashem," we also know that the Tenufah of the loaves must also be done "Lifnei Hashem."

The RASHASH (94a) says that the Gemara there (62a) is also the source for the ruling of the RAMBAM (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 9:7) that Tenufah is done with the loaves and meat together.

However, the Rashash points out that this approach is not consistent with an earlier statement of the Gemara (15a). The Gemara there explicitly states that the loaves and the Todah do not affect each other's Tenufah (that is, if one is missing, the Tenufah of the other is still valid). If the Tenufah must be done with both of them together, then how can the Gemara earlier say that the Tenufah of one can be done without the other? The Rashash answers that when the Gemara says that they do not have to be together, it means that the Tenufah done while the animal is still alive does not have to include both the animal and the loaves. The Gemara there agrees, though, that after Shechitah the Tenufah must be done with both the loaves and the meat together. (See also MEKOR BARUCH 2:23:2.) (Y. Montrose)


QUESTION: The Mishnah states that if one says that he is going to bring a Korban Todah from Chulin and the accompanying Lachmei Todah from Ma'aser, he must bring both the Todah and the Lachmei Todah from Chulin.

TOSFOS (DH Todah) explains that this is because he first said that he will bring the Todah from Chulin. Once his pledge took effect and he is obligated to bring a Korban Todah, he must bring all of the parts of the Korban (including the Lachmei Todah) from Chulin, since one may not use items of Ma'aser to fulfill pledges that he made.

(See RASHI DH v'Im Amar and RABEINU GERSHOM who explain differently. They explain that he must bring the Lachmei Todah from Chulin because the Lachmei Todah is subordinate to the main part of the Korban, the animal. Since the animal must come from Chulin, so, too, the Lachmei Todah must come from Chulin.)

Tosfos continues and says that the person making the pledge cannot retract his words "Toch Kedei Dibur" as one normally may do, because of the principle, "Amiraso l'Gavo'ah k'Mesiraso l'Hedyot" -- verbally proclaiming an object as Hekdesh accomplishes the same thing as physically handing over an object to an ordinary person, and thus one's spoken word causes the object to be acquired by Hekdesh. In addition, we find that the Gemara in Nedarim (87a) lists Hekdesh as one of the exceptions to the rule of Toch Kedei Dibur. The RAMBAM (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 15:1) also rules that "there is no retraction [of one's word] for Hekdesh, even when one retracts Toch Kedei Dibur."

Tosfos words are difficult to understand. Why should the principle of "Amiraso l'Gavo'ah" remove one's ability to retract within a period of Toch Kedei Dibur? When one gives an object to an ordinary person, he is still able to retract within Toch Kedei Dibur (see SHULCHAN ARUCH CM 195:7)! Why, then, when one gives an object to Hekdesh through a verbal commitment can he not retract his word?


(a) The KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN (255:2) explains that every time one person acquires an object from another person, the Kinyan requires a verbal expression of consent from the original owner, in addition to the physical act of Kinyan. An act of Kinyan without the verbal expression of consent, and an expression of consent without an act of Kinyan, is not a valid, binding Kinyan. Consequently, one is able to retract an act of giving by revoking his consent Toch Kedei Dibur, since he thereby revokes his verbal consent which is an essential aspect of the Kinyan.

In contrast, when one makes a pledge to Hekdesh, the principle of "Amiraso l'Gavo'ah" teaches that his words are like a finalized act of giving, and not like the verbal aspect of a normal Kinyan. That is, his words contain both an expression of consent *and* an act of giving.

The EIZEHU MEKOMAN understands that the intention of the Ketzos ha'Choshen is that since the pledge is considered an act of giving, the rule of "Lo Asi Dibur u'Mevatel Ma'aseh" -- "words cannot annul an action" -- takes effect.

It is important to note that the Ketzos ha'Choshen says that this applies only to Hekdesh, and not to pledges of giving Tzedakah, where the reason why one must fulfill his pledge is because he has made a Neder, and not because of "Amiraso l'Gavo'ah." The Ketzos says that it is clear to him that one who makes a pledge to Tzedakah may retract it Toch Kedei Dibur.

(b) The KARNEI RE'EM answers that although Tosfos mentions the principle of "Amiraso l'Gavo'ah," the truth is that one's pledge to Hekdesh is *stronger* than giving an object to an ordinary person. Therefore, one cannot retract Toch Kedei Dibur. This approach is also suggested by the RAN in Nedarim (28b).

(c) The SEFER V'SHAV HA'KOHEN (#18) and the AVNEI MILU'IM (27:9) in the name of the SEFER HA'MIKNAH say that Tosfos argues that Kinyanim that involve an action done to the item (such as Meshichah) cannot be retracted Toch Kedei Dibur. Accordingly, since "Amiraso l'Gavo'ah" is like physically handing an object to the recipient, it makes sense that one cannot retract Toch Kedei Dibur.

However, the Avnei Milu'im himself and the aforementioned Ketzos ha'Choshen argue that Tosfos agrees that all Kinyanim can be retracted Toch Kedei Dibur. (Y. Montrose)

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