THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
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1) PERFORMING "LEKICHAH" WITH ONE'S HAND
OPINIONS: The Gemara earlier (13b) cites two apparently contradictory
Beraisos. The first Beraisa states that Pigul can take effect during Tevilas
Etzba, dipping the finger into the blood before Zerikah, of a Korban Chatas.
The second Beraisa states that Pigul cannot take effect during Tevilas
Etzba. The Gemara (14a) concludes that the Tana of both Beraisos is the
Rabanan, and the first Beraisa is discussing a Chatas Penimis, while the
second Beraisa is discussing a Chatas Chitzonah. The Gemara asks why the
Rabanan needed to teach that Tevilas Etzba of a Chatas Chitzonah is not
subject to Pigul. It is obviously not subject to Pigul, because the Torah
does not write the word "v'Taval" with regard to Chatas Chitzonah, showing
that Tevilas Etzba is not an essential part of the Avodah. The Gemara
answers that we might have thought that Tevilas Etzba of a Chatas Chitzonah
*is* subject to Pigul, because the verse says, "v'Lakach" (Vayikra 4:30),
teaching that the Kohen must take the blood himself, as opposed to having a
monkey take the blood from the vessel and place it on the Kohen's hand.
Since the Torah says that the Kohen must take the blood himself, we might
have thought that Pigul will take effect during the procedure (see Insights
to 13b). Therefore, the Rabanan teach us that a Chatas Chitzonah is not
subject to Pigul during this stage of the Avodah.
2) OFFERING THE KORBAN PESACH ON A "BAMAH"
The Gemara seems to be teaching that the word, "v'Lakach," teaches that one
must take the object himself, and not be given the object by someone else.
Does this also apply to other Mitzvos for which the Torah uses the word
"v'Lakach? For example, the Torah says with regard to the Mitzvah of the
Arba'as ha'Minim, "u'Lekachtem" (Vayikra 23:40). Does this mean that one
must pick up the Lulav and Esrog himself in order to fulfill the Mitzvah,
while if someone else places it in his hands, he does not fulfill the
(a) The MEROMEI SADEH writes that some authorities learn from this Gemara
that a person should pick up the Lulav from the surface on which it is
resting, and not have it handed to him by someone else, in order to fulfill
the Mitzvah of "u'Lekachtem." The CHAZON ISH (OC 149:3) quotes this view in
the name of the BINYAN SHLOMO (#48, and Hashmatos) who quotes it in the name
of the "Gedolei Acharonim."
(b) The Meromei Sadeh himself says that this is a mistaken conclusion. He
proves that TOSFOS in Pesachim (7b, DH la'Tzes) definitely does not learn
this way. Tosfos says that one may hold an object of Mitzvah and have in
mind not to fulfill the Mitzvah until after some time has passed, such as
until he is ready to make the blessing. If the main part of the Mitzvah is
picking up the Lulav with one's hand, then how can one have in mind to delay
the fulfillment of the Mitzvah when one picks it up? When one later has in
mind to fulfill the Mitzvah, he is already holding the Lulav and is no
longer actively picking it up!
The Meromei Sadeh explains that there is a significant logical difference
between the case of our Gemara (the Kohen's act of taking the blood in his
hand) and the case of Lulav. In the case of our Gemara, where the monkey
places the blood on the Kohen's fingers, the Kohen did not exert any of his
own effort at all to get the blood on his fingers, and thus he did not
fulfill the requirement of "v'Lakach." In contrast, the very act of holding
a Lulav requires that the person use his strength in order to continue
holding it and not let it slip out of his hand. This act of holding the
Lulav (and not merely the act of picking it up in the first place) is what
the Torah calls "u'Lekachtem."
The Chazon Ish (ibid.) comes to the same conclusion. He discusses the case
of a person who took hold of a Lulav before the time of the Mitzvah arrived
(that is, before Alos ha'Shachar) and held it in his hand until the time of
the Mitzvah arrived. Does he need to put it down and pick it up again, since
his initial act of picking up the Lulav was done before the Mitzvah could be
fulfilled? The Chazon Ish writes that this is not necessary, and the case of
our Gemara does not conflict with this ruling. In the case of our Gemara,
there is a Mitzvah for the Kohen to take the blood specifically from the
vessel. Accordingly, even if he actively took the blood from the monkey who
took it from the vessel, he did not fulfill the requirement to take it
directly from the vessel! In contrast, in the case of Lulav, holding onto
the Lulav is called "u'Lekachtem." (Y. Montrose)
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses how Rebbi Shimon learns that a thought of
"Chutz l'Mekomo" invalidates a Chatas Penimis. The Gemara explains that he
cannot learn it from the fact that a thought of she'Lo Lishmah invalidates a
Korban, because the Pesul of a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah applies to a
Korban brought upon a Bamah, while a Machshavah of Chutz l'Mekomo does not
apply (since there is no limited Makom for the Korban when it is offered on
a Bamah). The Gemara answers that the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo indeed may be
learned from Lo Lishmah, because, in truth, the Pesul of Lo Lishmah also
does not exist on a Bamah. The only Korbanos that become Pasul with a
thought of she'Lo Lishmah is the Korban Pesach and Korban Chatas (all other
Korbanos remain valid when offered she'Lo Lishmah). Those two Korbanos,
though, cannot be offered on a Bamah, and therefore there is no situation in
which a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah will invalidate a Korban offered on a
Bamah. Therefore, Rebbi Shimon can learn from the Pesul of she'Lo Lishmah
that Chutz l'Mekomo is also Pasul.
The TZON KODASHIM asks that this Gemara does not seem to be taking into
account that we are dealing specifically with the view of Rebbi Shimon. The
Gemara later (114b) quotes Rebbi Shimon as saying that a Korban Pesach *may*
be offered on a Bamah -- on a Bamas Tzibur (public Bamah), but not on a
Bamas Yachid (private Bamah)! How, then, can the Gemara here say, in
explaining the view of Rebbi Shimon, that a Korban Pesach is not offered on
ANSWER: The KEREN ORAH and SEFAS EMES answer that when bringing a Korban
Pesach on a Bamas Tzibur, there would also be a Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo, as
the Korban would be limited to the area of the Bamas Tzibur! Hence, the
Gemara does not ask that there is a Chumra which applies to she'Lo Lishmah
that does not apply to Chutz l'Mekomo. The Gemara only questioned the Limud
from a Bamas Yachid, where Chutz l'Mekomo certainly does not apply. (This
seems to be the intention of RASHI in DH she'Lo Lishmo.) (Y. Montrose)
3) THE ARGUMENT CONCERNING "HOLACHAH" PERFORMED BY A "ZAR"
OPINIONS: Rabah and Rav Yosef state that the validity of Holachah performed
by a Zar is subject to the Machlokes between Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan in
the Mishnah (13a). Rebbi Shimon maintains that a Zar's Holachah is valid,
because he says that any Avodah which is not absolutely necessary is not
called an Avodah which must be done by a Kohen. The Rabanan, who argue with
Rebbi Shimon in the Mishnah, maintain that a Zar's Holachah is Pasul.
Abaye questions Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion that Rebbi Shimon and the
Rabanan argue about a Zar's Holachah. Abaye asks, "Shechitah is an
indispensable Avodah, and yet it is valid when done by a Zar!" They answer
that Shechitah is not considered an Avodah (and that is why it is valid when
done by a Zar).
How exactly is Abaye trying to refute the assertion of Rabah and Rav Yosef
from the law of Shechitah done by a Zar?
(a) RASHI (DH v'Ha Shechitah) explains that Abaye is refuting Rabah and Rav
Yosef's assertion by questioning their opinion of what the Rabanan hold.
Rabah and Rav Yosef say that Rebbi Shimon's reason for why a Holachah done
by a Zar is valid is because the Holachah is an Avodah which does not need
to be done, which implies that the Rabanan hold that Holachah *does* need to
be done, and therefore a Zar may not perform it. Abaye asks that we know
that Shechitah is valid when done by a Zar, even though it certainly is a
necessary Avodah. It must be, asks Abaye, that whether or not an Avodah is
necessary does *not* affect whether or not it may be done by a Zar. Rabah
and Rav Yosef answer that no proof can be brought from the laws of
Shechitah, because Shechitah is not called an Avodah (since, as Rashi
explains, it may be performed by those people who are unfit to perform any
of the other Avodos of a Korban). Holachah, however, *is* called an Avodah,
and since, according to the Rabanan, it is absolutely necessary, it is Pasul
when done by a Zar.
The KEREN ORAH and MEROMEI SADEH have difficulty with Rashi's explanation of
the answer. Rashi says that Shechitah is not called an Avodah, as is
indicated by the fact that all who are normally unfit to perform other
Avodos may perform the Shechitah. According to Rebbi Shimon, though, the
same is true for Holachah -- anyone may do it! How, then, can Rashi say that
this is the factor that determines whether or not a certain procedure is
considered an Avodah?
The Keren Orah answers that we do find an exception with regard to Holachah.
We know that the dipping of the Kohen's finger in the blood of a Korban
Chatas, which is called Holachah (see 13b, and Rashi there, DH Ela) cannot
be done by a Zar. This shows that Holachah *is* an Avodah, unlike Shechitah
(see also Meromei Sadeh).
TOSFOS (DH v'Ha) argues with Rashi's approach. Abaye cannot be challenging
Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion from the opinion of the Rabanan. It is
obvious that the Rabanan's reasoning has nothing to do with whether or not
an Avodah is necessary. That factor -- whether or not an Avodah is
necessary -- makes a difference only according to Rebbi Shimon. The Rabanan
maintain simply that every procedure from the time of accepting the blood
(Kabalah) and on must be done by a Kohen, as the Gemara later (32a) states.
(b) Tosfos explains that Abaye is refuting Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion
by questioning their opinion of what Rebbi Shimon holds. How can Rabah and
Rav Yosef say that the reasoning of Rebbi Shimon, for permitting a Zar to
perform Holachah, is because Holachah is not necessary? That reasoning is
illogical, as we see that Shechitah -- which *is* necessary -- may also be
done by a Zar! Rabah and Rav Yosef answer, as Rashi explains, that no proof
can be brought from Shechitah, because Shechitah is not considered an
The Meromei Sadeh explains that the argument between Rashi and Tosfos is
based on whether or not everyone agrees that Holachah is unnecessary. Rashi
learns like the Toras Kohanim (Parshas Tzav 8:5) which says that this is the
argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Shimon. Rebbi Meir says that a
wrongful thought during the Holachah can invalidate a Korban, because it is
impossible for a Korban to be offered without Holachah. Rebbi Shimon argues
and says that a Korban cannot become Pasul as a result of a wrongful thought
during Holachah, as it is unnecessary for a Korban to have Holachah.
According to the argument as recorded in the Toras Kohanim, we may assume
that the Rabanan maintain that a Zar's Holachah is Pasul for the same reason
that Rebbi Meir maintains that a Korban can become Pasul during Holachah.
Tosfos understands that everyone agrees at this point in the Gemara that
Holachah is unnecessary (unlike Rashi's explanation of the question). (Y.