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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Yevamos 114

YEVAMOS 113 (Purim in Yerushalayim) and YEVAMOS 114 - have been generously dedicated by Dick and Beverly Horowitz of Los Angeles. May they be blessed with a life of joy and much Nachas from their very special children and grandchildren.


(a) Rav Yitzchak bar Bisna lost the keys of the Beis-ha'Medrash in the street.
What did Rebbi Pedas instruct him to do when he came to him on Shabbos for advice?

(b) What can we extrapolate from Rebbi Pedas' ruling?

(c) The Beraisa states 'Lo Yomar Adam le'Tinok Havei Li Miftei'ach, Havei Li Chosem, Ela Manicho Tolesh, Manicho Zorek'.
What is the basic difference between the Reisha of the Beraisa and the Seifa?

(d) Why is there no proof from the Seifa of the Beraisa for Rebbi Pedas?

(a) How will Rebbi Pedas explain the Beraisa, which requires one to tell a child to desist from extinguishing a fire on Shabbos?

(b) Why, under the same circumstances, do we permit a Nochri to extinguish the fire?

(c) Under which circumstances may one not use the services of a Nochri to light a fire or to extinguish one?

(a) Is there a proof for Rebbi Pedas from the Beraisa, which not only permits a Chaver (a Talmid-Chacham who is particular about separating all tithes and about Tum'ah and Taharah) to send his son to his maternal grandfather (who is an Am ha'Aretz - who is not) to eat, but who does not require his father to confiscate fruit that they gave him there (even though he knows that his grandfather may not have Ma'asered his produce)?

(b) How do we reconcile Rebbi Yochanan, who establishes this Beraisa by D'mai, whereas earlier, he was lenient even with regard to a child lighting a fire or extinguishing one (Melachos d'Oraysa), as long as the child was doing it of his accord?

(c) Is there a proof for Rebbi Pedas from the Beraisa, which not only permits a Kohen Chaver to send his son to his maternal grandfather (who is an Am ha'Aretz) to eat Terumah, but who does not even require his father to confiscate fruit that they gave him there?

(d) What do we learn from the Pasuk in Re'ei "bi'She'arecha Tochle*nu*, ha'Tahor ve'ha'Tamei Yachdav ... "?

(a) How do we refute the proof for Rebbi Pedas, from the Beraisa which does not even require one to stop a young child from drinking from a Nochris or from a non-Kasher animal?

(b) If it is a question of life-danger, why does the Tana then forbid a Gadol to do likewise?

(c) Under which circumstances would even a Gadol be permitted to drink from a non-Kasher animal? Then what is the difference between a Katan and a Gadol in this regard?

(a) Aba Shaul testified that (even as grown-ups) they used to drink from a Kasher animal on Yom-Tov.
What Melachah is involved here?

(b) Why did they ...

  1. ... permit it on Yom-Tov?
  2. ... not permit it on Shabbos too?
(c) What do the following three Pesukim have in common: "Lo Sochlum" (regarding the prohibition of eating insects); "Kol Nefesh Mikem Lo Sochal Dam"; "Emor ve'Amarta" (regarding the prohibition of Tum'as Kohanim)?

(d) Why is there no proof from all these Pesukim that 'Katan Ochel Neveilos, Beis-Din Metzuvin Lehafrisho'?

Answers to questions



(a) Having taught us the prohibition of feeding a child ...
  1. ... insects, why does the Torah need repeat it regarding blood?
  2. ... blood, why does the Torah need to repeat it regarding insects?
(b) Having taught us the prohibition of ...
... feeding a child insects and blood, why does the Torah then find it necessary to repeat the prohibition with regard to Tum'as Kohanim? ... being Metamei a young Kohen, why does the Torah find it necessary to repeat it with regard to feeding a child insects and blood?
(a) Does the principle 'Katan Ochel Neveilos Ein Beis-Din Metzuvin Lehafrisho' apply to a Cheresh, too?

(b) Then why does the Tana in the Mishnah (on 112b.) instruct the Cheresh Ba'al Pikachas to divorce his wife (because of the Zikah of her sister the Pikachas whose husband the Pikei'ach, died)?

(c) What will be the Din if a Pikei'ach Ba'al Pikachas dies, and his wife falls to the Yavam, a Cheresh who is married to her sister, a Chareshes?

(d) Why is there no proof from here that 'Katan Ochel Neveilos ... Beis-Din Metzuvin Lahafrisho' (a Kashya on Rebbi Pedas)?

***** Hadran Alach Cheresh *****

***** Perek ha'Ishah *****


(a) A woman who returns from overseas and announces that her husband died, is permitted to marry (if she has children) or to perform Yibum (if she does not).
Under which two conditions is she believed?

(b) Why is she not believed if ...

  1. ... it was a time of war?
  2. ... if they were on bad terms?
(c) Rebbi Yehudah is more stringent than the Tana Kama.
Under which conditions is she believed according to him?
(a) Why does the Tana find it necessary to tell us in the Reisha that there was peace between the husband and wife and that there was peace in the world (see Tosfos DH 'Tana')?

(b) Rava explains that in time of war, the woman easily presumes her husband dead (as we explained in the Mishnah).
But surely, if she loves him, she will wait until he actually dies?

(c) Initially, Rava thought that famine is not like war (and that the woman is believed).
What happened that caused him to change his mind?

(d) As a matter of fact, he went the whole circle, and declared famine to be even worse than war.
In which respect did he say this?

10) A plague of snakes or scorpions has the same Din as war, because in her state of terror, she will be too frightened to wait for her husband to actually die. Some consider pestilence (a death epidemic) like war.
On what grounds do others disagree? Why might the woman not just assume her husband dead?

Answers to questions

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