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Yevamos 97

YEVAMOS 96, 97 - These Dafim have been sponsored through the generous donation of Reb Uri Wolfson of Yerushalayim, a true Ohev Torah.


(a) How do we reconcile our Mishnah, which equates the Din of a ben Esrim who did not yet bring signs of Gadlus with that of a ben Tesha, and the Beraisa, which states that a ben Esrim needs only to prove that he has reached the age of twenty, and he has the Din of a Saris (who is a Gadol)?

(b) Rava proves this from the last two words of the statement in the Beraisa.
What are they?

(c) Up to what age will a person who has neither the signs of a Gadol nor those of a Saris remain a Katan?

(d) What would Rava advise someone to do, if he had reached the age of twenty and the signs of Gadlus had not yet appeared?

***** Hadran Alach ha'Ishah Rabah *****

***** Nos'in al ha'Anusah *****


(a) What are the ramifications of the Mishnah 'Nos'in al ha'Anusah?

(b) Is one Chayav for raping one's wife sister, daughter or mother?

(c) The Tana Kama permits a person to marry a woman who was raped by his father or by his son.
What does Rebbi Yehudah say?

(d) To whom else will these Halachos apply besides a woman who was raped?

(a) How do we reconcile our Mishnah (which permits a man to marry the relatives of a woman whom he raped) with the Beraisa, which forbids him to marry the relatives of the woman whom he purportedly raped?

(b) Then why does the Tana of our Mishnah say 'Nos'in' (Lechatchilah)?

(c) What does the Beraisa learn from the fact that, by all the blood-relatives listed in Kedoshim, the Torah uses a Lashon of 'Shechivah', whereas by those relationships that come about through marriage, it uses a Lashon of 'Kichah'?

(d) Rav Papa asked Abaye from Achoso, where the Torah uses the Lashon of 'Kichah'.
What did Abaye answer?

(a) Rava learns 'Nos'in al ha'Anusah' from a contradiction between two Pesukim.
What does he infer from the Pasuk in Acharei-Mos "Ervas bas Bincha O bas Bitcha Lo Segaleh" that clashes with the other Pasuk there "Ervas Ishah u'Vitah Lo Segalei, es bas B'nah ve'es bas Bitah Lo Sikach"?

(b) How does he reconcile the two Pesukim?

(c) How does he know that the reverse is not the case (that rape or seduction will forbid the relatives, but marriage does not)?

(a) Rebbi Yehudah learns from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "Lo Yikach Ish es Eishes Aviv, *ve'Lo Yegaleh K'naf Aviv*" that Anusas Aviv is forbidden. How does he know that the Pasuk is speaking about Anusas Aviv?

(b) The Rabbanan disagree with Rebbi Yehudah's source on the grounds that the phrase "Lo Yikach Ish es Eishes Aviv" interrupts between the two phrases, so that they are not really Samuch. In fact, they Darshen the Pasuk like Rav Anan Amar Shmuel.
How does he Darshen it? What does "K'naf Aviv" mean according to him?

(c) Why do we need a Pasuk for that, seeing as she is anyway Dodaso (his uncle's wife)?

(d) He might even transgress a third La'av, because of Yevamah le'Shuk. How do we reject this contention? Why might he only be Chayav *two* La'avin?

Answers to questions



(a) To demonstrate to the Minim that the Torah contains all forms of Chochmah (see Tosfos DH 'Ach' and Hagahos Maharshal), Chazal inserted a number of riddles into the Sugya.
To which case does each of the following statements refer:
1. 'He is my paternal father as well as my mother's husband'? Why can this case not go according to Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah?
2. 'He is my brother and my son. I am the sister of the child whom I carry on my shoulders'?
3. ... 'Good morning to you my son, I am your sister's daughter'?
4. ... 'The child I am carrying on my shoulders is my son and I am his brother's daughter'? To whom was this riddle addressed?
(b) Why does the first of these cases pertain to a Jew and the others to a Nochri?

(c) And to which case do the these statements pertain:

1. ... 'I lodge a complaint about my (maternal) brother who is my husband as well as the son of both my husband and the husband of my mother. And I am his wife's daughter, who refuses to give a piece of bread to the orphaned children of his daughter?
2. ... 'You and I are brother and sister; your father and I are brother and sister, and your mother and I are sisters?
(d) How is this last case possible even if all those involved are Jews?
(a) If the sons of a Nochris converted together with her, they perform neither Yibum nor Chalitzah with each other's wives.
Why not?

(b) What will be the Din if one of them was conceived before the conversion but born after it, and the other one was both born and conceived after it?

(c) And what will be the Din if a Shifchah together with her sons converted in the same circumstances?

(a) Rav Acha bar Ya'akov permitted the sons of Yudan, a Shifchah Meshuchreres, to marry each other's wives.
What did he retort when Rav informed him that Rav Sheishes forbade it?

(b) Both Rav Sheishes and Rav Acha bar Ya'akov agree that paternal (but not maternal) brothers are permitted (as we explained in our Mishnah). In the first Lashon, they also agree that maternal brothers are forbidden.
Why is that?

(c) Why did Chazal decree by maternal brothers but not by paternal ones?

(d) What, in fact, is the Machlokes between Rav Sheishes and Rav Acha bar Ya'akov in the first Lashon?

9) In the second Lashon, Rav Acha bar Ya'akov is even more lenient.
What does he say?


(a) How does our Mishnah 'ha'Giyores she'Nisgayru Banehah Imah, Lo Choltzin ve'Lo Misyabmin' seem to pose a Kashya on the second Lashon of Rav Acha bar Ya'akov? How do we initially interpret 'Lo Choltzin ve'Lo Misyabmin'?

(b) This Kashya is strengthened by the word 'Afilu' ('*Afilu* Horaso shel Rishon she'Lo bi'Kedushah ... ve'ha'Sheini Horaso ve'Leidaso bi'Kedushah'). What does 'Afilu imply' in this context?

(c) And what does it imply according to Rav Acha bar Ya'akov, who permits them in all cases (and who interprets 'Lo Choltzin ve'Lo Misyabmin' to mean that Yibum and Chalitzah are not necessary)?

(d) In the second Lashon, we try to prove Rav Acha bar Ya'akov's second Lashon to be correct from 'Afilu', which implies that even though they were both born bi'Kedushah, they are forbidden.
On what grounds do we refute this proof?

(a) The Tana of the Beraisa forbids (or does not obligate) two twin brother converts to perform either Chalitzah or Yibum with each other's wives.
Why does he speak specifically about twins?

(b) They are not Chayav because of Eishes Ach (even if they are maternal brothers too).
Why not?

(c) How will the Din differ if they were ...

  1. ... born after their parents' conversion?
  2. ... both conceived and born after the conversion?
(d) On what grounds do we refute the inference from the Reisha of the Beraisa (which serves as a Kashya on Rav Acha) 'Ein Chayavin Mishum Eishes Ach', Chiyuva Leika, Ha Isura Ika?
Answers to questions

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