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Yevamos 118

YEVAMOS 116-119 - have been sponsored through the generous contribution of Mr. Uri Wolfson and family



(a) We have learned that a woman is not believed to permit her Tzarah to marry. The reason that, in the Reisha of our Mishnah, the second Tzarah needs to contradict the first one and testify that her husband did not die, in order to be forbidden to marry, is not to preclude a case where she is silent - but for the Chidush of 'Lo Meis', to teach us that, despite the fact that she is clearly coming to upset her Tzarah, we do not say that really, her husband *did* die, only she said that he did not, in order to forbid her Tzarah to remarry (even if it meant forbidding herself, too).

(b) We learn that a person will give a false testimony to implicate others, even though it means implicating oneself in the process - from Shimshon who, in Sefer Shoftim, declared "Tamos Nafshi im P'lishtim" as he pulled the pillars, bringing the house down on the P'lishtim and on himself.

(a) Rebbi Meir argues with Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon in the second case in the Mishnah (when one of the Tzaros testified that their husband had died, and the other, that he was killed). Rebbi Elazar (ben P'das) establishes the Reisha, where there is no Machlokes, and where the Tana permits the Tzarah who says that he died, to marry - like Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon.

(b) According to Rebbi Yochanan - even Rebbi Meir will agree in the Reisha, that she is permitted to marry, because 'Lo Meis' is not considered evidence at all (since the Rabbanan believed the one who said 'Meis').

(c) We establish the Seifa of the Mishnah 'Ishah Omeres Meis, ve'Ishah Omeres Lo Meis, Lo Tinasei' - a S'tam Mishnah, like Rebbi Meir (according to Rebbi Elazar). According to Rebbi Yochanan, who will be the author?

(a) Rebbi Tarfon even permits the woman who insisted that their husband was still alive, to eat Terumah - because we might have thought that, even though we do not believe her Tzarah (who testified that he had died) regarding allowing her to marry (le'Kula), we will perhaps believe her regarding disqualifying her from eating Terumah 'le'Chumra).

(b) Rebbi Akiva says - that we do accept the Tzarah's evidence with regard to Terumah.

(c) Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva engage in the same dispute with regard to a woman who testifies that her husband died first and then her father-in-law. In spite of having already permitted the Tzarah to continue eating Terumah in the case of the Tzarah, Rebbi Tarfon nevertheless found it necessary to repeat it in the case of the mother-in-law (where the hatred is less acute due to the fact that it is not personal like it is by the Tzarah, as we explained above). Perhaps here, we will not discredit her testimony completely, and at least believe her le'Chumra.

(d) And in spite of having refused to believe the woman who testified that her husband died, in the case of her mother-in-law, Rebbi Akiva nevertheless found it necessary to repeat it in the case of the Tzarah - where we might otherwise have thought that he will agree with Rebbi Tarfon that the one Tzarah (who hates the other one for personal reasons), will not be believed at all, even with regard to Terumah.

(a) The Mishnah on Amud b. rules, that if a woman testifies that she bore her first son overseas, and that after *he* died, her husband died too, she is believed and is permitted to perform Yibum - because she is merely corroborating her Chazakah (and she could just as well have remained silent).

(b) If, in the same circumstances, she inverts the order of her son's and husband's deaths - she is not believed and she cannot perform Yibum, though she is obligated to perform Chalitzah.

(c) We infer from the Lashon 've'Chosheshin *li'D'varehah*' - that we only believe a woman regarding herself, but not regarding her Tzarah, even le'Chumra (to require Chalitzah).

(d) Abaye goes on to prove from there - that the Halachah is like Rebbi Tarfon, who permits the Tzarah to continue eating Terumah, in spite of her Tzarah's testimony (seeing as it is a 'Machlokes, ve'Achar-Kach S'tam' - which is generally Halachah).




(a) According to Rebbi Tarfon - if a man betrothed one of five women, but who does not recall which one, if each of them claims to be the one whom he betrothed (and he does not want to marry all five) - he must give each one a Get, but he pays only one Kesubah.

(b) Rebbi Akiva disagrees. In his opinion - he must pay each one a Kesubah?

(c) They engage in exactly the same dispute regarding theft, the case being - if a man stole from one of five people. He does not remember from which one, and each one claims that he is the owner.

(a) We can infer from the fact that the Tana mentions specifically ...
1. ... 'Kidesh' (which infers Kidushei Kesef) in the Reisha - that had he betrothed one of five women with Bi'ah (which is humiliating [should the betrothal turn out to be invalid]), Rebbi Tarfon would agree that he must pay each woman a Kesubah.
2. ... 'Gazal' (and not 'Lakach') in the Seifa - that, had he bought from one of five men (where no sin is involved), then even Rebbi Akiva would agree that he only needs to put down one payment.
(b) According to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, the dispute between Rebbi Tarfon and Rebbi Akiva is by Bi'ah in the Reisha, and by Lakach in the Seifa. In a case of Kidesh or Lakach - even Rebbi Akiva will agree that he only needs to pay one Kesubah and one payment (respectively).

(c) From the words of Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, we can infer what the Tana Kama of the Beraisa holds. According to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, our Tana should have mentioned 'Ba'al' in the Reisha together with 'Gazal' of the Seifa - according to the Tana Kama, he should have mentioned 'Lakach' in the Seifa together with 'Kidesh' of the Reisha.

(d) We establish the Mishnah like Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar. 'Kidesh' does not refer to Kidushei Kesef (as we mistakenly believed until now), but to Kidushei Bi'ah.

7) The Tana now finds it necessary to mention both cases (Kidesh and Gazal). He needs to mention ...
1. ... Kidesh - to demonstrate the strength of Rebbi Akiva (who holds that Chazal penalized him even though he only transgressed an Isur de'Rabbanan (betrothing with Bi'ah - as we learned above on Daf 52a.)
2. ... Gazal - to demonstrate the strength of Rebbi Tarfon, who does not penalize him, even though he transgressed an Isur d'Oraysa.
(a) The Tana of our Mishnah states that if a woman who travelled overseas with her husband and son, returns with the news that first her husband died and then her son, she is believed, but not if she inverts the order - because, whereas in the former case, she is merely corroborating the Chazakah (that she is Mutar le'Shuk), in the Seifa, she is contradicting the Chazakah (in permitting herself to perform Yibum - though she is obligated to perform Chalitzah, because, due her statement, she created the prohibition of marrying le'Shuk without it, and she must bow adhere to it [though Rav Nachman in the Sugya seems to explain the Mishnah differently - see 11a. 1.]).

(b) If, she left home without children, and she then returns with the news that she bore a son overseas, but that first ...

1. ... he died and then her husband - she is believed (and is permitted to perform Yibum), because she corroborates the Chazakah.
2. ... her husband had died, and then, her son - she is not believed, though she does have to perform Chalitzah.
(c) If she testifies that her mother-in-law bore a son (a Yavam) overseas, and that ...
1. ... her husband died first and then her son - she is believed, because of the principle 'ha'Peh she'Asar Hu ha'Peh she'Hitir' (in the same statement as she forbade, she permitted), and she is merely corroborating her original Chazakah.
2. ... her son died first and then her husband - she is also believed.
(a) A woman is not believed to testify that her Yavam died, so that she may marry le'Shuk, or that her sister died so that she may marry her husband.

(b) Nor is a man believed to testify that his brother died so that he may perform Yibum with his wife, or that his wife died so that he may marry her sister.

(a) A man cannot normally appoint a Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah - because the moment the Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah (who acts on behalf of the woman) receives the Get, she is divorced, even though she is not present, and seeing as a Get is normally to the woman's disadvantage (because she loses various monetary benefits), we apply the principle 'Ein Chavin le'Adam Ela be'Fanav'.

(b) Rava asked Rav Nachman whether, if a man who had a brother, appointed a Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah, the Get would be valid. It might be ...

1. ... valid - because of the strong likelihood of her disliking the Yavam.
2. ... invalid - because sometimes, she is fond of him.
(c) By giving her a Get through a Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah - she will be divorced immediately (as we explained earlier), in which case, should her husband die (a fact which he is clearly anticipating), she will be spared having to perform Yibum.
(a) Rav Nachman answered him from our Mishnah. He proves from the Mishnah where, when she left ...
1. ... with a child, the Tana said 'Choletzes' and not 'Tinasei' - that, when she obligates herself to perform Yibum, we do not take for granted that she is lying, because she is fond of the Yavam.
2. ... without a child, he said 'Choletzes' and not 'Tisyabem' - that, when she exempts herself from Yibum, we do not take for granted that she is lying, because she dislikes him.
(b) Based on these two rulings, Rav Nachman resolved Rava's She'eilah (with regard to a man who has a brother, who appoints a Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah and dies) - by ruling that, here too, she requires Chalitzah (because it is neither certain that it is to her advantage nor that it is to her disadvantage).

(c) When Ravina asked Rava whether, if a man who is currently quarreling with his wife, appoints a Sh'li'ach le'Kabalah, it is considered to her advantage or to her disadvantage, Rav Nachman replied with a principle from Resh Lakish - that a woman will do anything to avoid remaining single and get married.

(d) Abaye says that a woman whose husband is as small as an ant, proudly places her seat among the marrieds.

(a) Rav Papa says in this regard - that if a man whose profession is combing wool calls a woman to come and sit at his gate, she will (because she wants to get married at all costs).

(b) Rav Ashi says in this regard - that she will even marry a man whose family is stigmatized, just in order to be married, and she will not even ask him for a lentils.

(c)The last word however, goes to the Tana of the Beraisa. He says - that a woman who marries any of the above will commit adultery, whilst insisting that her children are her husband's.

***** Hadran Alach ha'Ishah Shalom *****

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