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Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Yevamos 117

YEVAMOS 116-119 - have been sponsored through the generous contribution of Mr. Uri Wolfson and family



(a) 'If they (Beis Shamai) can extrapolate from the Kesubah, then why should we not extrapolate from the Torah', said Rav Chisda. From the Pasuk "Yakum al-Sheim Achiv" - he extrapolated that any Yavam who performed Yibum inherits his brother, even one who did so on the basis of the Yevamah's testimony.

(b) Rav Nachman teaches that, depending upon what she says, a woman who testifies that her husband has died, is not always believed. Beis-Din will not believe her - if she testifies exclusively n order to claim her Kesubah (without alluding to marriage).

(c) However, should she ask for permission both to remarry and for her Kesubah, she is probably believed - because a person tends to take advantage of opportunities that avail themselves (like the Hebrew saying 'Im K'var Az K'var') and, once she is putting in a request for permission to marry, she asks for her Kesubah too.

(d) Even if she puts her Kesubah first we are not sure whether she is believed or not. She may be believed even then - because for all we know, she thinks that claiming her Kesubah is what will grant her permission to marry (provided she also mentions marriage).

(a) Anyone who testifies that a man died, permits the man's wife to the Yavam. There are only five exceptions. The basic reason that covers all five is - the fear that each of them hates the woman concerned and set out to make her sin.


1. Her mother-in-law hates her - because, she says to herself, 'This woman comes and eats up all my hard work' (the money and property that she brought into the marriage - Nichsei mi'Lug and Nechsei Tzon Barzel, part of which they gave to their son).
2. Her mother-in-law's daughter - because *she* says 'This woman comes and eats up all the hard work of my parents, and I get nothing'.
(c) We know that her Tzarah hates her. Her Yavam's ...
1. ... wife - hates her because she anticipates becoming her Tzarah.
2. ... daughter - hates her for the same reason, because she foresees her becoming her mother's Tzarah and eating up all of her mother's work.
(d) All of these women are nevertheless believed to bring her Get from overseas. We are not afraid that there too, they will set out to cause her to sin - because, unlike here, where we rely entirely on their testimony, there, we rely mainly on the Get itself.
(a) We are not sure whether the daughter of her husband's *father* (who is not the daughter of his mother) hates her too. She might ...
1. ... be different than the daughter of her husband's *mother* - because in the latter case, it may well be that the daughter only hates her sister-in-law, because her mother does ('like mother, like daughter').
2. ... nevertheless hate her, too - because of the money and property that would be available to her, if not for this woman, who is already married to one of her brothers.
(b) We reject the proof that the Tana of the Beraisa, who says that there are only five women who are not believed (and not six) comes to preclude the daughter of her husband's father - on the grounds that the reason for the daughter of her mother-in-law might be the same as that of the daughter of her father-in-law (because she accuses her of eating-up all the property of her mother), in which case the two of them are really one.
(a) Rebbi Yehudah (in a Beraisa) adds Eishes Av (her step-mother) and Kalah (her daughter-in-law) to the five. The Rabbanan do not list them - because Eishes Av is included in bas ha'Ba'al, and Kalah, in Chamosah (both of which are opposites and which are already included).

(b) According to Rebbi Yehudah, a woman tends to hate ...

1. ... her mother-in-law - because she (the mother-in-law) always informs on her to her son.
2. ... step-daughter - because she always informs on her to her father.
(c) Nevertheless, the Rabbanan list only five and not seven - because, in their opinion, a woman hates her mother-in-law because her mother-in-law hates her, and she hates her stepdaughter because her stepdaughter hates her (as we explained earlier). The basis for this is the Pasuk in Mishlei "ke'Mayim ha'Panim le'Panim".

(d) According to Rebbi Yehudah - "ke'Mayim ha'Panim le'Panim" refers to Torah-study (similar to the Mishnah in Pirkei Avos 'le'Fum Tza'ara Agra'); or that one's success in Torah depends upon the warmth that his Rebbe displays when teaching him.

(a) 'Chamosah ha'Ba'ah le'Achar mi'Ka'an' is - the mother of the Yavam who is not the mother of her husband (i.e. the second wife of her father-in-law).

(b) Rav Acha bar Ivya cites the B'nei Eretz Yisrael, who asked whether 'Chamosah ha'Ba'ah le'Achar mi'Ka'an' is believed or not. She might be believed - because she is not yet his mother-in-law, and does not therefore feel any hatred towards her at this stage.

(c) She would be believed, more than a 'Tzarah ha'Ba'ah le'Achar mi'Ka'an' - because in the case of the latter, where the cause for the hatred is personal, we have no doubts that the Tzarah anticipated the future, whereas a mother-in-law, whose hatred is not personal, but based on monetary considerations, may well only contend with the present.




(a) If a woman testifies that first her husband died overseas and then her father-in-law, she is ...
1. ... believed vis-a-vis herself ...
2. ... but not vis-a-vis her mother-in-law.
(b) The Chidush of this Beraisa is - that even though she also testifies that her husband died, in which case the relationship with her mother-in-law has terminated, she is nevertheless not believed.

(c) She is not believed vis-a-vis her mother-in-law - because we suspect that, in fact, her husband did not die either, and that she only said that he did in order to cause her mother-in-law to sin.

(d) Assuming that she is lying and that both men are still alive, in spite of the fact that her husband is still overseas and that her mother-in-law cannot currently inform him about her misdeeds (according to Rebbi Yehudah?), there is nevertheless no proof from there that a person contends with the future and that therefore, a 'Chamosah ha'Ba'ah le'Achar mi'Ka'an' should not be believed either - because the hatred towards a current Chamosah, from whom the daughter-in-law has already suffered, is different than that of a woman who has yet to become her mother-in-law.

(a) The Tana of our Mishnah says, that if one witness testifies that the man died, and ...
1. ... one witness testifies that he is still alive - she may remain with her husband to whom she is already married.
2. ... two witnesses testify that he is still alive - she must leave her husband, even if she is already married to him.
(b) And when two witnesses testify that he died, and one testifies that he is still alive - then she is even permitted to marry Lechatchilah.
(a) In light of what Ula said, it is difficult to understand why (in the first of the above cases) the Tana says that it is only if she is already married that she may remain with her husband, and why she is not permitted to marry Lechatchilah. Ula said - that whenever the Torah believed one witness, he has the power of two witnesses, and any witness who subsequently contradicts him is not believed.

(b) So, in order to conform with Ula's statement, we establish the Mishnah when Beis-Din permitted her to marry before the second witness arrived, and it concludes 'Lo Seitzei me'Heteirah ha'Rishon'.

(c) We establish the middle case (when *two* witnesses testify that the man is still alive) like Rebbi Nechemyah. Otherwise, it would not be necessary to inform us that one witness is not believed against two. According to the first Lashon - Rebbi Nechemyah says wherever the Torah believed one witness, we nevertheless follow the majority opinion (always). Consequently, the testimony of two women following the testimony of one witness (even if it is that of a man), is like the testimony of two men that follows that of one man. Consequently, our Mishnah speaks even when two women testified after one man (and she must leave her husband).

(d) In the second Lashon, had the first witness been a *man*, even Rebbi Nechemyah would concede that even a hundred women who came afterwards to contradict his testimony would be considered like one witness (who cannot uproot the testimony of the first witness). Our Mishnah therefore speaks - when two women testify after one *woman*.

9) We learned in the Seifa of our Mishnah that, if two witnesses testified that the man died, and one testified that he is still alive - we believe the two, and permit the woman to marry Lechatchilah. Assuming that the author of the Seifa too, is Rebbi Nechemyah, the Tana is coming to teach us here that not only do we follow the majority to go le'Chumra (like we saw in the middle case - where the one witness testifies that he died and the two, that he did not), but we even follow them to go le'Kula.


(a) If two Tzaros arrive from overseas, one of whom testifies that their husband died, and the other, that he is still alive - then the former is permitted to marry, whereas the latter is not.

(b) According to Rebbi Meir, if one of the Tzaros testifies that their husband died naturally, and the other, that he was killed - neither of them is permitted to marry (seeing as they contradict each other).

(c) Due to the fact that each of the women testifies that their husband died, Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon permit them both to marry.

(a) The Seifa of the Mishnah says that, if one witness testifies that he died and the other one, that he did not (even if the two witnesses were women) - they are not permitted to marry.

(b) The Seifa speaks - when the second woman arrived in Beis-Din before they had permitted the first one to marry.

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