ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 116
YEVAMOS 116-119 - have been sponsored through the generous contribution of
Mr. Uri Wolfson and family
(a) They found a Get in Sura on which there was written 'I, Anan bar Chiya
the Neherdean divorced my wife', and there was nobody else with that name
from Sura to Neherda'a, except for Anan bar Chiya from Chigra. Witnesses
testified however - that Anan bar Chiya from Chigra was with them in
(b) Abaye said that even *he* would concede that, in this case, the Get
would be Kasher - since they *had* searched, and the only other person with
the name Anan bar Chiya was now known to have been in Neherda'a at the time
when the Get was written in Sura.
(c) Rava, on the other hand said that - even he would concede that, in this
case, the Get would not be Kasher, since they now knew that there *was*
another Anan bar Chiya.
(d) Rava contends with the possibility that he may have flown from Neherda'a
to Sura on a flying camel, or that he may have jumped from Neherda'a to
Sura - by uttering one of Hashem's Name.
(a) Alternatively, 'he may have handed him words' - meaning that he may have
instructed the Sofrim in Neherda'a to write the Get in Sura when they got
(b) Rav and Rav Huna used to tell the Sofrim, that when they were in Shili -
they should describe the divorce as having taking place in Shili, even
though, they received their instructions in Hini, and vice-versa?
(c) Regarding the case with the sesame-seeds, Rav Yeimar does not contend
with the contents of the box having been changed, Ravina does. The
Halachah - is like Ravina (in which case Shimon was Patur - like Rava ruled
(a) We refute Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel, who explains the quarrel between the
husband and wife in our Mishnah as being when she asks him for a divorce -
on the grounds that all women say that (and that it does not therefore
constitute a quarrel).
(b) We therefore amend Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel. What he really said was -
that she claimed that her husband had divorced her (and he denied it).
(c) Rav Hamnuna rules that if a woman claims that her husband divorced her,
she is believed - because she would not have the Chutzpah to make such a
claim if it was not true.
(d) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel, who just explained the quarrel in our Mishnah
regarding this very point (and it is clear there that she is not believed) -
he is speaking when the witnesses before whom she claims her husband
divorced her, deny it.
(a) According to Rav Chanina, the reason that we do not believe the woman
when they have been quarreling is because she will lie - according to Rav
Shimi bar Ashi, it is because she testifies inaccurately.
(b) Rav Chanina means - that seeing as they quarreled, she hates him and
will deliberately lie in order to become forbidden to him; whereas Rav Shimi
bar Ashi means - that she will easily jump to the conclusion that he is
dead, without verifying it.
(c) The difference between the two reasons - will be when it is *the
husband* who initiated the quarrel. She will not lie, because, since it was
not she who initiated it, she does not hate him as much as to lie; she will
however, still be sufficiently put-off to testify that he is dead, even when
she is not a hundred-per-cent sure.
(a) We ask whether one witness is believed when the husband and wife
quarreled. The She'eilah is - whether one witness is believed because he
will not lie over something that is destined to become revealed (in which
case, the fact that they quarreled *will not make a difference*); or whether
it is because we rely on the extensive enquiries that the woman will make
before remarrying, in which case, it *will*.
(b) The outcome of the She'eilah is - Teiku.
(c) Rebbi Yehudah permits a woman to marry by her own testimony only if she
enters the Beis-Din weeping and with rent clothes. The Chachamim object to
Rebbi Yehudah's explanation - on the grounds that, if that it so, a Shotah
(a simple woman) will not be able to remarry, since, whereas a Pikachas will
put on a show for the sake of Beis-Din (this is what *they* maintain) she
will not be smart enough to do that.
(d) Despite the fact that, according to Rebbi Yehudah, one gauges whether a
woman is telling the truth or not, by the way she enters Beis-Din, they
nevertheless instructed that woman who was on her way to the Beis-Din of
Rebbi Yehudah to put on the whole 'Spiel' - because they held like the
Rabbanan, in whose opinion the whole thing is a 'Spiel' anyway.
(a) Beis Hillel initially restricted the concession of believing the woman
that her husband died - to a woman who returned from the harvest, and only
if her husband died in the country in which the Beis-Din is situated.
(b) Beis Shamai say that Chazal only mentioned those details - because the
case that sparked off the Halachah happens to have occurred in those
(c) The Halachah is like Beis Shamai in this particular case - because Beis
Hillel themselves yielded to Beis Shamai.
(a) Beis Shamai try to prove to Beis Hillel that Chazal cannot have confined
their concession to the same country - because if everything had to conform
with the original circumstances, then the concession should also be
restricted to harvesting a *wheat*-field. How did they know that it would
apply even when she returned from harvesting barley, grapes, olives, dates
(b) Beis Hillel insist that they nevertheless did restrict the concession -
because as long as the woman remains in the same country, she will be afraid
to lie or to give inaccurate testimony (due to the fact that there are
always people around who will testify the truth); whereas that is not the
case from one country to another.
(c) Beis Shamai counter their argument however - on the grounds that there
are regular caravans traveling from one country to another, so that, even
there, she will be afraid to lie.
(d) The original story on which Chazal based their ruling (as related by Rav
Yehudah Amar Shmuel) - took place at the end of the wheat-harvest, when ten
men went to reap the wheat. After one of them was bitten by a snake and
died, his wife came and informed Beis-Din, who sent a messenger to check on
her testimony, which they found to be correct. That is when they declared
that a woman is believed (to permit herself to marry or to perform Yibum).
(a) The Tana Kama of a Beraisa in Chagigah forbids carrying Mei Chatas or
Eifer Chatas even by throwing them, or handing them across a stretch of
water. The prohibition - extends to carrying them ...
We reconcile ...
1. ... riding on the back of his friend or of an animal.
(b) Rebbi Chananyah ben Akavya says there - that Chazal confined the decree
to the Jordan River and to transporting the Mei Chatas by boat.
2. ... on foot across a bridge.
(c) What happened there (as related by Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel) - was that
someone was transporting Mei Chatas and Eifer Chatas by boat across the
Jordan River - when a k'Zayis of human corpse was found sticking to the
floor of the boat.
(d) We try and establish ...
1. ... the Rabbanan - like Beis Shamai (who, in similar vein, extend the
concession to all circumstances).
2. ... Rebbi Chananyah ben Akavya - like Beis Hillel (who also restrict it
to the circumstances in which the original episode took place).
1. ... the Rabbanan with Beis Hillel - by pointing out that Beis Hillel
restrict the concession because, whereas in the same country she is afraid,
from one country to another she is not (as we explained earlier), whereas in
the case of the Mei Chatas, where there is no reason to differentiate
between different kinds of transport or different rivers, even Beis Hillel
will agree with the Rabbanan.
2. ... Rebbi Chananyah ben Akavya with Beis Shamai - because there, we
believe the woman on account of the S'vara that a woman makes extensive
enquiries before remarrying (which applies equally if she came from a
distant land as to when she came from the same country); whereas in the case
of Mei Chatas, which they decreed because of the episode that took place,
even Beis Shamai will agree with Rebbi Chananyah ben Akavya.
(a) According to Beis Hillel, the woman may marry by her own testimony, but
does not receive her Kesubah. Beis Shamai disagree with them on the basis of
a 'Kal va'Chomer' - if she is believed to permit the stringent Isur of
Eishes Ish, she should certainly be believed to extract her Kesubah from her
(b) Beis Hillel counter the 'Kal va'Chomer' - by pointing out that she is
not believed to permit the brothers to inherit their father's property
either (because it is only to permit her to remarry that Chazal believed
her, but, as far as extracting money is concerned, two witnesses are
(c) Beis Shamai have the last word however, and here too, Beis Hillel yield
to their opinion. They refer to the wording on a woman's Kesubah, where it
specifically states that whenever a woman remarries, she received her
Kesubah, and that incorporates our case.