ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 114
YEVAMOS 113 (Purim in Yerushalayim) and YEVAMOS 114 - have been generously
dedicated by Dick and Beverly Horowitz of Los Angeles. May they be blessed
with a life of joy and much Nachas from their very special children and
(a) Rav Yitzchak bar Bisna lost the keys of the Beis-ha'Medrash in the
When he came before Rebbi Pedas on Shabbos to ask for advice - he
instructed him to bring children there to play, in the hope that they would
find them and bring them home.
(b) We can extrapolate from Rebbi Pedas' ruling - that (he holds) 'Katan
Ochel Neveilos, Ein Beis-Din Metzuvin Lahafrisho'.
(c) The Beraisa states 'Lo Yomar Adam le'Tinok Havei Li Miftei'ach, Havei Li
Chosem, Ela Manicho Tolesh Manicho Zorek'. The basic difference between the
Reisha of the Beraisa and the Seifa is - that in the Reisha, the child will
be doing it for the sake of a grown-up (and the Torah writes in Yisro "Lo
Sa'aseh Kol Melachah Atah, u'Vin'cha u'Vitecha'), whereas in the Seifa, he
is doing it purely for his own benefit.
(d) There is no proof from the Seifa of the Beraisa for Rebbi Pedas -
because it could be speaking about detaching from an pot without a hole, and
throwing in a Karmelis (which are both only Asur mi'de'Rabbanan - whereas
the Chidush of Rebbi Pedas is that we say 'Ein Beis-Din Metzuvin Lehafrisho'
even by an Isur d'Oraysa.
(a) Rebbi Pedas establishes the Beraisa which demands that one tells a child
to desist from extinguishing a fire on Shabbos - when the child wants to
extinguish it on behalf of his father.
(b) Under the same circumstances, we permit a Nochri to extinguish the
fire - because *he* does so for personal gain (because he expects some sort
of reward for his services).
(c) One may not use the services of a Nochri to light a fire or to
extinguish one - by asking him specifically to do so (without any mention of
(a) There is no proof for Rebbi Pedas from the Beraisa, which not only
permits a Chaver to send his son to his maternal grandfather (who is an Am
ha'Aretz) to eat, but which does not even require his father to confiscate
fruit that he returns with from there (even though he knows that it may not
be Ma'asered) - because Chazal are often very lenient by D'mai (and, in any
event, we already explained above, that everyone agrees by de'Rabbanan's.
(b) Rebbi Yochanan is the one to establish this Beraisa by D'mai, whereas
earlier, he permitted the child even to light a fire or to extinguish one,
as long as he was doing it of his own accord - because he is himself
uncertain whether 'Beis-Din Metzuvin Lehafrisho' or 'Ein Metzuvin ... '.
Consequently, whatever proof the Gemara brings, Rebbi Yochanan brings a
(c) There is no proof for Rebbi Pedas from the Beraisa, which not only
permits a Kohen Chaver to send his son to his maternal grandfather (who is
an Am ha'Aretz) to eat Terumah, but who does not even require his father to
confiscate fruit that he returns with from there (even though his
grandfather is not particular about guarding his Terumah against Tum'ah) -
because the Tana is speaking about Terumah de'Rabbanan.
(d) We learn from the Pasuk "bi'She'arecha Tochle*nu*, ha'Tahor ve'ha'Tamei
Yachdav ... " - that one is permitted to eat *Pesulei ha'Mukdashin* (Kodshim
that became blemished and were redeemed) when they are Tamei, but not
*Terumah* when it becomes Tamei.
(a) We refute the proof from the Beraisa which does not even demand us to
stop a young child from drinking from a Nochris or from a non-Kasher
animal - by establishing it by a case of life-danger.
(b) The Tana nevertheless forbids a Gadol to do likewise - because the need
to drink milk constitutes life-danger for a small child but not for a
(c) Even a Gadol will be permitted to drink from a non-Kasher animal - if a
doctor assesses that it is crucial for him to do so. The difference between
a Katan and a Gadol in this regard is - that a Katan does not require
assessment, whereas a Gadol does.
(a) Aba Shaul testified that they used to drink from a Kasher animal on
Yom-Tov - involving the Melachah of Mefarek (extracting), which, in turn, is
a Toldah of Dash (threshing).
(b) They ...
1. ... permitted it on Yom-Tov - because drinking directly from the animal
is k'le'Achar-Yad (an unusual way of performing the Melachah), for which one
is not Chayav. Consequently, Yom-Tov, which is no more than a La'av, Chazal
permitted it in order to alleviate pain?
(c) What the following three Pesukim have in common - is that they all come
to forbid a Gadol to encourage a Katan to transgress: "Lo Sochlum"
(regarding the prohibition of eating insects); "Kol Nefesh Mikem Lo Sochal
Dam"; "Emor ve'Amarta" (regarding the prohibition of Tum'as Kohanim).
2. ... did not however, permit it on Shabbos - because Shabbos involves a
(d) There is no proof from all these Pesukim that 'Katan Ochel Neveilos,
Beis-Din Metzuvin Lehafrisho' - because it speaks, not about telling the
child to desist, but about the prohibition of feeding him the Isur.
(a) Despite having taught us the prohibition of feeding a child ...
1. ... insects, the Torah nevertheless needs to repeat it regarding blood -
which is more lenient in respect of Shiur (because the Shiur of the former
is a Mashehu (the smallest amount), whereas the Shiur of the latter is a
Revi'is (a quarter of a Lug).
(b) Despite having taught us the prohibition of ...
2. ... blood, the Torah nevertheless needs to repeat it regarding insects -
which is more lenient with respect of punishment (Malkos, as opposed to
Kareis for drinking blood).
1. ... feeding a child insects and blood, the Torah nevertheless finds it
necessary to repeat the prohibition with regard to Tum'as Kohanim - which
(unlike the former two) is not applicable to all sections of the community,
whereas they are.
2. ... being Metamei a young Kohen, the Torah nevertheless finds it
necessary to repeat it with regard to feeding a child insects and blood -
because we would otherwise have thought that this is just another of the
special Chumros pertaining to Kohanim.
(a) The principle 'Katan Ochel Neveilos, Ein Beis-Din Metzuvin Lehafrisho'
applies to a Cheresh, too - seeing as, he, like a Katan, does not have
***** Hadran Alach Cheresh *****
(b) The Tana in the Mishnah (on 112b.) instructs the Cheresh Ba'al Pikachas
to divorce his wife (because of the Zikah of her sister the Pikachas whose
husband the Pikei'ach, died) - not because of the sin of the Cheresh, but
because of that of the Pikachas.
(c) If a Pikei'ach Ba'al Pikachas dies, and his wife falls to the Yavam, a
Cheresh who is married to her sister, a Chareshes - he must divorce his
wife, and his Yevamah remains Asur to remarry forever.
(d) There is no proof from here that 'Katan Ochel Neveilos ... Beis-Din
Metzuvin Lahafrisho' (a Kashya on Rebbi Pedas) - because the reason that the
Cheresh is obligated to divorce his wife is due to a decree; we are afraid
that (unless we instruct the Cheresh to divorce the Chareshes) people will
assume their marriage to be valid in which case, it will push away the Zikah
of her sister. Consequently, they will then go on to permit the Yevamah to
get married, thinking that she is Achos Ishto.
***** Perek ha'Ishah *****
(a) A woman who returns from overseas and announces that her husband died,
is permitted to marry (if she has children) or to perform Yibum (if she does
not). She is believed - provided she is on good terms with her husband and
that it is not a time of war.
(b) She is not believed if ...
1. ... it is a time of war - because then, due to the prevailing conditions,
she testifies inaccurately; she will say, for example, that, since he did
not return home for a long time, he must have been killed.
(c) Rebbi Yehudah is more stringent than the Tana Kama. According to him,
she is believed only - if she comes into Beis-Din sobbing and with rent
2. ... if they quareled - because then, she hates him, and will lie
deliberately in order to become forbidden to him.
(a) The Tana finds it necessary to tell us in the Reisha that there is peace
between the husband and wife and that there is peace in the world - in order
to balance with the Seifa, where he wants to tell us what the Din is when
there is not.
A plague of snakes or scorpions has the same Din as war, because in her
state of terror, she will be too frightened to wait for her husband to
actually die. Some consider pestilence (a death epidemic) like war. Others
disagree - on the grounds that she relies on the old folk-saying that, even
if a plague of pestilence lasts for seven years, nobody will die before his
(b) Rava explains that in time of war, the woman easily presumes her husband
dead (as we explained in the Mishnah). In spite of the fact that she loves
him, sometimes he may be pierced with an arrow or with a sword, and she is
convinced that he cannot possible live.
(c) Initially, Rava thought that famine is not like war (and that the woman
is believed) - until one day, when a woman came before him and testified
that her husband had died of starvation. To test her, he told her that she
was very smart to have run away and saved her own skin, because, in those
few extra minutes he was unlikely to have survived. To which she expressed
surprise that he knew so accurately what had happened (proving that, in time
of famine, a woman *does* speak inaccurately - testifying without actually
knowing that her husband has died).
(d) As a matter of fact, Rava went the whole circle, and declared famine to
be even worse than war - because, in war, she is believed if she testifies
that he died in his bed; whereas in time of famine, she is only believed if
she testifies that he died and she buried him.