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Yevamos 108

YEVAMOS 108 - generously sponsored by Mr. Morris Smith of Yerushalayim



(a) There is no difference whether the Ketanah declares that she no longer wishes to live with her husband or whether she declares that she no longer wishes to maintain the Kidushin that her mother and brothers initiated on her behalf - both are considered Miy'un.

(b) According to Rebbi Yehudah, Miy'un is effective even if she makes her declaration whilst sitting in the carriage on the way to the Chupah - and even if she later makes it to her guests (even though it is not said in Beis-Din and in addition, the guests do not inform the Beis-Din).

(c) He even goes so far as to validate a declaration that she makes to a storekeeper from whom she is collecting an article belonging to her husband - although we might have taken that to be no more than a bee in her bonnet because her husband troubled her to perform that errand.

(a) According to Rebbi Chanina ben Antignos, a Ketanah who is unable to look after her Kidushin does not even require Miy'un - The Halachah is like him, because that is how Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules.

(b) According to Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseira, if a Ketanah marries another man, there is no bigger Miy'un than this. We query whether that applies even where she only accepted Kidushin from him, but did not actually marry him - and prove from a Beraisa that he does not differentiate between marriage and Kidushin.

(c) The B'nei Yeshivah asked whether the Rabbanan argue with Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseira or not. This is followed by three She'eilos: whether, assuming that they do, do they even argue by Nisu'in, or only by Kidushin? whether the Halachah is like him? and, if it is, is it like him only in the case of Nisu'in, or even by Kidushin?

(d) Based on a Beraisa, we conclude that the Rabbanan argue with him in both cases, and that the Halachah is like him in both cases.

(a) The daughters-in-law of Avdan told the two Rabanim (who had come to ascertain whether they still wished to make Miy'un or whether they had retracted from their stated intention of doing so) - that they wished that *they* were their husbands.

(b) Rebbi rule there - that their statement was in itself, a good Miy'un.

(c) Presuming that the daughters-in-law of Avdan had been *married* to his sons - we try to prove from there that all of the above types of Miy'un will apply even if the girl had been married to her husband (and not just betrothed).

(d) We reject this proof however, on the grounds that we do not really know that they *were* married (perhaps they were only betrothed). The Halachah however, is - that even if they were married to their husbands, all the above types of Miy'un are effective.

(a) Rebbi Eliezer compares a Ketanah who was married off by her mother and brothers to a Mefutah (a woman who has been seduced): Her husband may take neither what she finds nor what she produces, nor may he nullify her vows. Neither does he have the Din of a married man - with regards to inheriting her and being obligated to bury her in the event of her death.

(b) It is only with regard to the need to make Miy'un, that he is considered married to her, according to Rebbi Eliezer. According to Rebbi Yehoshua - he is her husband in every regard, except for the fact that she can leave him through Miy'un.

(c) Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel is impressed with Rebbi Eliezer's opinion. Rebbi too, prefers it to that of Rebbi Yehoshua. The problem with Rebbi Yehoshua's opinion is - that, if they are considered married, how can Miy'un be effective?

(d) There is no problem with the fact that Rebbi Eliezer requires even Miy'un - because one cannot expect a woman who was living with a man (whatever her status), to be able to just walk out without some sort of ceremony.

(a) Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov in our Mishnah states 'Kol Akavah she'Hi min ha'Ish, ke'Ilu Hi Ishto; ve'Chol Akavah she'Eino min ha'Ish, Ke'ilu Eino Ishto'. Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel explains this to mean - that if, when she is offered a Shiduch, she declines on the basis of her being already married, then it is called 'Akavah she'Hi min ha'Ish'; whereas if she declines because the prospective Chasan is not a nice guy, then it is called 'Akavah she'Eino min ha'Ish'.

(b) According to Abaye bar Avin, 'Akavah she'Hi min ha'Ish' refers to when her husband gave her a Get, and 'Akavah she'Eino min ha'Ish', to when she performed Miy'un. This distinction manifests itself - with regard to whether he becomes forbidden to marry her relations, whether she becomes forbidden to marry his relations and whether she becomes Pasul li'Kehunah or not.

(c) According to Abaye bar Ravin, this exact distinction appears in the very next Mishnah - because the Tana there is coming to explain the meaning of 'Kol Akavah she'Hi min ha'Ish, ke'Ilu Hi Ishto; ve'Chol Akavah she'Eino min ha'Ish, Ke'ilu Eino Ishto' of the previous Mishnah.

(a) If, after ...
1. ... her first husband divorces his wife who is a Ketanah and takes her back, she makes Miy'un, and someone else marries her and dies or divorces her - he is permitted to take her back.
2. ... she makes Miy'un with him, he takes her back and divorces her, someone else marries her and dies or divorces her - he may not.
(b) The principle that governs this Halachah is - that, as long as she left him the last time through Miy'un, he is permitted to take her back, but if it was through a Get, he is not.

(c) In a case where she makes Miy'un with her first husband, marries again and her second husband divorces her; then she marries again and makes Miy'un with him, and a fourth husband divorces her - the Tana says that those whom she left through a Get, may not take her back, whereas those whom she left through Miy'un, may.




(a) We see from the Reisha (where, as long the last time the Ketanah leaves her husband, it is through Miy'un, she is permitted to return to him after marrying someone else), that Miy'un negates all previous Gitin. The Seifa of the Mishnah appears to contradict the Reisha however - because, as we just saw (in the previous question), each husband whom she left through a Get, is forbidden to take her back, even though she left the last husband through Miy'un.

(b) According to Shmuel, this is a Machlokes Tana'im. Rava resolves the Seifa with the Reisha - by stressing the fact that the Reisha speaks in the case of one husband (where the final Miy'un *negates any previous Gitin*), whereas the Seifa speaks where there are a number of husbands (where it does *not*).

(c) The S'vara for this distinction is that - when it is with a *second* husband that she made Miy'un, Chazal are afraid that, seeing as the first husband left her with a Get, he might try to lure her back sing sign-language (which she recognizes from their previous marriage); whereas when it is with the same husband who had previously given her a Get (or whom she is leaving for the first time through Miy'un), there is nothing to be afraid of, considering that he already tried once to pacify her, and it did not work (because she left the marriage through Miy'un).

(a) We infer from the Reisha itself which, speaking about a girl who made Miy'un, remarried and whose husband then divorced her, concludes 'Nis'eis le'Acher *ve'nis'Armelah O nis'Garshah*, Asurah Lachzor Lo' - that had she left the second marriage through Miy'un, she would have been permitted to return to her first husband.

(b) This negates what we just wrote - inasmuch as it implies that we are *not afraid* of her previous husband trying to lure her away from her husband, whereas we just proved from the Seifa that we *are*.

(c) Rebbi Elazar now replies what Shmuel replied earlier ('Tavra, Mi she'Shanah Zu Lo Shanah Zu'). Ula establish the Seifa - when she separated from three husbands through a Get, and the reason that she is forbidden to return to all of them is because having divorced three times, she gives the impression of being a Gedolah (otherwise, a later Miy'un always negates the Get, even by a number of husbands).

(a) To explain the Pasuk in Eichah "Meimeinu be'Kesef Shasinu ... " - Rav Yehudah Amar Rav cites the incident when, due to the Romans' decree not to study Torah, they were sometimes forced to pay huge sums of money to obtain important Torah information. They once paid a Sh'liach four hundred Zuz in order to pass on a She'eilah to Rebbi Akiva in prison and to Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseira in Netzivin.

(b) According to Rav, Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseira both ruled - that, when there are two husbands, the girl is forbidden to return to the husband who gave her a Get, even after leaving her second husband through Miy'un.

(c) Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yossi commented on Rav's testimony - that, in that case, she would be permitted to return to him (as Rava explained earlier), because, if Miy'un permits an Isur Kareis (i.e. Eishes Ish), then it should certainly permit an Isur La'av (taking back one's G'rushah).

(d) The Tana'im who are now involved in the Machlokes Tana'im of which Rebbi Elazar just spoke - are Rav (who is considered a Tana) and Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yossi.

(a) According to Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yossi, the She'eilah that they asked Rebbi Akiva in prison and Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseira in Netzivin concerned the case of someone whose paternal brother married his mother's brother's ex-wife. Chazal declare a *mother's* brother's wife a Sh'niy'ah - because of the similarity to his *father's* brother's ex-wife, for whom one is Chayav Kareis.

(b) The She'eilah that they now asked Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseira, according to Rebbi Yishmael b'Rebbi Yossi was - whether Miy'un would help to remove her marriage to the Yavam's mother's brother, permitting him to perform Yibum with her.

(c) They ruled that it is forbidden.

(a) We learned earlier that Rav forbids a girl who made Miy'un with her second husband to return to a previous husband from whom she was divorced. Rav Yitzchak bar Ashi'an quoted in his name - that, this prohibition does not extend to his brother.

(b) The reason for this is - because seeing as even the initial prohibition is only an Isur de'Rabbanan, to prohibit marrying his brother would be a 'Gezeirah li'Gezeirah'.

(c) This is not obvious, despite the fact that the S'vara that she recognizes his signs and might be lured back to him, does not apply to his brother - because we might have decreed his brother on account of him.

(d) In the second Lashon - Rav Yitzchak bar Ashi'an does indeed extend the prohibition to her husband's brother, because he decrees her husband's brother on account of her husband.

(a) According to the Tana Kama, someone who divorces his wife and takes her back, is permitted to the Yavam when her husband dies. We might otherwise have thought - that it is the *first* marriage that creates the tie with the Yavam, and that consequently, when her husband divorced her, she became forbidden to him.

(b) Rebbi Elazar - forbids her to the Yavam (though not for the reason that we just cited in refuting the Tana Kama. His reason will be explained later).

(c) Rebbi Elazar and the Chachamim - also argue in the case of a girl whose mother and brothers married her off and whose husband divorced her and took her back.

(a) The case of a girl who is like a 'Yesomah be'Chayei ha'Av' - is when her father married her off, and her husband then divorced her whilst she was still a Ketanah and took her back.

(b) In this case, the Rabbanan agree with Rebbi Elazar that she *is* forbidden to the Yavam - because although her Get is valid by Torah law, her second Kidushin (performed without her father whilst she was still a Ketanah) was not, and she remains a G'rushah.

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