(Permission is granted to print and redistribute this material
as long as this header and the footer at the end are included.)


prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

Previous daf

Yevamos 100



(a) Rav Papa and Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua argue over the reason for not giving a Kohenes Terumah in the granary. According to one of them, it is because her husband may have divorced her (a fact that is not necessarily public knowledge), in which case she is a Zarah - according to the other, because we are worried that this may lead to Yichud.

(b) One difference between the two answers is when the granary is close to the town (so that everyone knows about the marital status of the Kohanos who arrive there for their Terumah), but which is ill-frequented (so that the suspicion of Yichud remains). The other difference is the reverse case - when the granary is far from town (so many people do not know about the marital status of all the Kohanos), but when it is well-frequented (in which case, there is no suspicion of Yichud).

(a) One of the only two Kohanim who do not receive Terumah at all is a Kohen who is Tamei. The difference between him and an Areil, to whom one *does* send (because he is an A'nus) is - that whereas an Areil is a *complete* A'nus (seeing as his two brothers died through the Milah), a Tamei is *not* (because, had he been more careful, he could have avoided becoming Tamei).

(b) The Tana of the Beraisa, after stating that one does *not give* an Eved or a woman a portion of Terumah in the granary, goes on to discuss an occasion that one *does* - referring to Ma'aser Ani.

(c) The reason that he gives precedence to a woman there is - because the embarrassment of a woman (to have to linger in a public area - particularly in view of the Pasuk in Tehilim that we cited above "Kol K'vudah bas Melech P'nimah") is greater than that of a man.

(d) For the same reason, Rava used to deal with the Din Torah of a woman before that of a man. Initially however, he would give precedence to the Din Torah of a man - because of the various time-related Mitzvos (as well as Talmud-Torah) which a man is Chayav and a woman is not (which means that the time of a man is more precious than that of a woman).

(a) Our Mishnah, discussing the Din of the ben Kohen and the ben Eved who became mixed-up, speaks about 'Higdilu ha'Ta'aruvos, ve'Shichreru Zeh es Zeh'. Our objection to this Lashon - lies in the implication that setting each other free was a voluntary act on their part, whereas in fact (like in the case of an Eved who is half free) it is obligatory to complete the process, so that they should be able to fulfill the Mitzvah of 'P'ru u'R'vu'.

(b) So we amend it to read - 'Kofin Oso u'Meshachrerin Zeh la'Zeh'.

(a) The two distinctions between the Minchah of a Yisrael and of a Kohen are - that whereas the Minchah of a Yisrael requires Kemitzah (the separating of a fistful) and the remainder is eaten, the that of a Kohen does not require Kemitzah and is entirely burnt.

(b) A Kemitzah is not taken from the Minchah of a Kohen - precisely because it has to be burned (so what is the point of the Kemitzah?).

(c) When the Tana of our Mishnah writes 'Nosnin Alav Chumrei Kohanim ve'Chumrei Yisre'eilim' he means - that a Kemitzah must be taken from it (like the Minchah of a Yisrael), but it is not eaten (like that of a Kohen).

(d) They then burn the Kemitzah independently and the remainder of the Minchah independently.

(a) The problem with burning the remainder of the Minchah is - that whenever a part of a Korban has to be burned on the Mizbei'ach, there is a La'av to burn the remainder (which is meant to be eaten) on the Mizbei'ach.

(b) We answer according to Rebbi Elazar, who learns from the Pasuk "ve'El ha'Mizbei'ach Lo Ya'alu le'Rei'ach Nicho'ach" - that although one is not permitted to bring it on the Mizbei'ach as a Rei'ach Nicho'ach (as an official Korban), one may however, bring it as if it was a piece of wood (i.e. as fuel).

(c) But the Rabbanan disagree with Rebbi Elazar. So we deal with our problem by establishing the case like Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon. According to him, the Minchas Chotei of a Kohen (and the Minchah in our case) - must be scattered on the Beis ha'Deshen besides the ramp of the Mizbei'ach.

(d) The Rabbanan (alias Rebbi Shimon) disagree with Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon by the Minchas Chotei of a Kohen. They say ...

1. ... there - that the Kometz is brought independently and so is the rest of the Minchah (which is not meant to be eaten anyway).
2. ... in our case - like with Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon (because maybe the Safek is a Zar, his Korban needs to be eaten and the La'av of bringing it on the Mizbei'ach therefore applies).
(a) Seven months after remarrying (within three months of losing her husband - which will be discussed later), a woman bore a son. In the event of that son's death - her other sons from both marriages perform Chalitzah but not Yibum (in case he is their maternal brother, and they will transgress the Isur of Eishes Achiv).

(b) The same applies to that son - who will perform Chalitzah with *their* wives, in the event of their death.

(c) If he has brothers from both fathers but not from his mother - he is permitted to perform Yibum, should he so please.

(d) And if he dies, a son of one of the two men must first perform Chalitzah, after which one of the sons of the second man may perform Yibum.




(a) If one of the husbands was a Kohen and the other one a Yisrael, then all the Dinim of the previous Mishnah will apply here too. Should one of them die, he will ...
1. ... be obligated to practice the laws of Aninus - which entails a prohibition to perform the Avodah and to eat Kodshim or Ma'aser Sheini.
2. ... not be permitted to bury him.
(b) The same will apply with regard to *them* should *he* die. Neither does he inherit them - because the other heirs of each man can 'push him away' by demanding that he prove himself to be an heir.

(c) But *they* inherit *him* - as who is to stop them?

(d) He is Patur for striking or cursing either of them. On the other hand, he serves in the Mashmar of both of them, but without receiving a portion of the Korbanos - though he will receive a portion if both men are from the same Mishmar (this too, will be qualified later).

(a) Shmuel learns from the Pasuk (regarding the Kehunah) "ve'Haysah Lo u'le'Zar'o *Acharav*" - that a Kohen who does not know who his father is, may not perform the Avodah ('Ba'inan Zar'o Meyuchas Acharav').

(b) This does not incorporate a prohibition to marry a Kasher Jewess.

(c) Shmuel cannot mean 'Meshaskin Oso mi'Nechsei Aviv' - because, seeing as we do not who his father is, that is obvious.

(d) He explains the Pasuk "Liheyos Lecha l'Elokim u'le'Zar'acha *Acharecha*" (said to Avraham, who was not a Kohen) - as a warning for a Jew not to marry a Nochris or a Shifchah, since the child will then be Meyuchas after her.

(a) Shmuel establishes the Beraisa (quoted above on 37a. - with regard to a child that is born to a Yavam who performed Yibum within three months of the death of his brother) 'Safek ben Tish'ah le'Rishon, ben Shiv'ah le'Acharon, Rishon Ra'uy Lihyos Kohen Gadol' - by the Din d'Oraysa, whereas he is speaking mi'de'Rabbanan (and the Pasuk that he quoted is only an Asmachta - a support).

(b) The Tana does not even invalidate him Lechatchilah - because the Beraisa speaks when she married legally, and the decree only pertains to a woman who has illicit relations.

(a) Our Mishnah speaks about a woman who married within three months of losing her husband and who bore a child who was a Safek. Presuming that her first husband *died* (and bearing in mind that the first husband died many years earlier), we would explain 'Hu Onein Aleihem' - to refer to the Mitzvah of 'Likut Atzamos' (collecting the man's bones, which obligates Aninus for one day just like the burial itself).

(b) Since it is impossible to explain the Seifa 've'Heim Onenim Alav' in a case when his mother's first husband *died* - we initially establish it when he divorced her.

(a) If our Mishnah speaks when her first husband divorced her, the problem with the Seifa 'Hu Ein Mitamei Lahem' is - the prohibition to bury the first husband. 'Mah Nafshach', if he is his son, even a Kohen is obligated to bury his father; and if he is the son of the second husband, then, seeing as his mother was divorced when he married her, she became a Chalalah, and he (the son, a Chalal), in which case, he is also permitted to bury him?

(b) So we establish the Mishnah when she had not married the first man, but had relations, first with one of them, and then with the other (or even if she married the second one - see Maharsha). When the Tana writes 'Mi she'Lo Shahasah Achar *Ba'alah*' - he really means to say 'Mi she'Lo Shahasah Achar *Bo'alah*'.

(c) The problem with Shmuel from the Seifa 'Oleh be'Mishmaro shel Zeh ve'Shel Zeh' is - that since we do not know who his father is, he ought to be invalidated from doing the Avodah altogether.

(d) To answer the Kashya on Shmuel - Rav Sh'maya establishes the Mishnah by a Mema'enes; she made Miy'un and then, without waiting three months, she married the second husband. There is no problem with her son doing the Avodah, seeing as the Miy'un negated the first marriage, in which case the second marriage was legal, and Shmuel's decree does not apply.

(a) Establishing the case by a Mema'enes however, leaves us with a Kashya from Rav Bibi's Beraisa 'Shalosh Nashim Meshamshos be'Moch ... " (quoted above 12b.). The three age groups discussed by the Tana are - less than eleven, when she cannot even become pregnant; between the ages of eleven and twelve, when pregnancy will lead to her death (which is the only time when she is permitted to use a cloth during Tashmish), and above the age of twelve, where there is no life-danger. In that case, if our Mishnah speaks by a Mema'enes (which only applies to a Ketanah), how can she possibly have given birth?

(b) We finally establish our Mishnah like Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel - who learns from the Pasuk (regarding a Sotah) ...

1. ... "ve'Hi Lo Nispasah" - that if she was raped, she is permitted to remain with her husband.
2. ... the word "ve'Hi" - that there is another case where, even if she was not raped, she remains permitted to her husband, and that is a woman whose first Kidushin turned out to be invalid.
(c) So we finally establish the case of 'Mi she'Lo Shahasah Achar Ba'alah Sh'loshah Chodashim' - when the woman's first Kidushin turned out to be a mistake, and she then went and married another man within three months.
Next daf


For further information on
subscriptions, archives and sponsorships,
contact Kollel Iyun Hadaf,