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Yevamos 94

YEVAMOS 91-95 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.



(a) In the second Lashon, Rav Sheishes takes for granted that a woman is permitted to perform Yibum on the testimony of one witness testifying that her husband died. He does so on the basis of a Mishnah in Cheresh she'Nasa - 'ha'Ishah she'Amrah Meis Ba'ali, Tinasei, *Meis Ba'ali Tisyabem'*.

(b) According to this Lashon, the She'eilah that one ought to ask, says Rav Sheishes, is whether we can believe one witness to permit her to marry le'Shuk - whether the (main) reason that we believe one witness is because a person will not lie in matters that are destined to become exposed, in which case, she will not lie here either; or whether it is solely on the basis of the extensive enquiries that the woman is bound to make, a reason that will not apply here, because we are afraid that her possible dislike of the Yavam will override that.

(c) Rav Sheishes proves Assuming that our Mishnah 'Meis Ba'alech ve'Achar-Kach Meis B'nech, ve'Achar-Kach Amru Chiluf ha'D'varim, Teitzei ... ', speaks about two witnesses following one witness, Rav Sheishes proves from the inference ('Meis Ba'alech ve'Achar-Kach Meis B'nech, ve'Achar-Kach Amru Chiluf ha'D'varim, Teitzei ... ') - that if the second witnesses had not come, the first witness would be believed.

(d) Rav Sheishes declines to establish the Mishnah by two against two witnesses for the same reasons as he gave earlier (on the previous Amud). We cannot say that perhaps the Tana only omits 'Safek' because he is not particular about the Lashon - because we see from the Seifa 'ha'Rishon Mamzer, ve'ha'Acharon Eino Mamzer', that he is very careful about the Lashon he uses.

(a) We refute this proof (that the Tana must be talking about two witnesses who overrule *one*) and the two problems that we had with learning this way, by establishing the Mishnah like Rav Acha bar Minyumi - who establishes a similar Mishnah in Kidushin by Eidei Hazamah, when the second pair render the first, Zomemin (by testifying that they could not have witnessed whatever they claim to have seen, because they were with them in a different location at the time). And there we have a 'G'zeiras ha'Kasuv that the second pair *are* believed.

(b) The Mishnah in ha'Ishah Shalom states 'Ein ha'Ishah Ne'emenes Lomar Meis Yevami she'Enasei, ve'Lo Meisah Achosi, she'Ekaneis le'Beisah', from which Rav Mordechai or Rav Acha infers - 'Hi Nihi, de'Lo Meheimna, Ha Eid Echad Meheiman' (resolving Rav Sheishes' She'eilah).

(c) Rav Ashi counters this proof however, from the Seifa of the Mishnah, which makes a similar statement with regard to a man who wants to perform Yibum with his brother's wife or to marry his wife's sister, and, if we believe one witness to allow a woman to remarry so that she should not become an Igunah, on what basis would we do the same to allow a man to marry another woman (seeing as he can have as many wives as he wishes)?

(d) So we establish the Mishnah like Rebbi Akiva, who declares the children of Chayvei La'avin (including a Yevamah le'Shuk), Mamzeirim. In that case, we need the Mishnah for itself (without any inference) - to teach us not to say that the woman should be believed regarding herself, seeing as she will be considered a Zonah, and her children, Mamzeirim, she will make extensive enquiries before remarrying, just like she does before marrying another man in the first Mishnah in the Perek.

(a) The reason that the witness is not believed to testify that the *Yavam* died - is because we are afraid that the woman harbors an intense dislike towards the Yavam, which will prevent her from making the extensive enquiries that she makes when she is told that her husband died (where we do not contend with such a dislike).

(b) The text that attributes believing her when she testifies that her husband died because it is *she* who stands to suffer should her husband return, but not that her Yevamah died, because it is only *her children* who will suffer, according to Rebbi Akiva is wrong - because, according to Rebbi Akiva, she too, becomes invalidated, as is clearly stated in the Mishnah in Gitin, which we quoted above on Daf 91b.).

(c) Nor would it be necessary to mention the case at all, if it was not her who stood to suffer - because we know already from the Seifa ('Einah Ne'emenes Lomar Meisah Achosi, she'Ekaneis le'Beisah'), that a woman is not believed if it is only her children who will be invalidated.

(a) Rava maintains that one witness is certainly believed to permit a Yevamah le'Shuk from a 'Kal va'Chomer' - if he is believed to permit a Chiyuv Kareis (a married woman), then he should certainly be believed to permit an ordinary Chayvei La'avin.

(b) That member of the Rabbanan refuted Rava's proof from the case of the woman herself - who is believed to testify that her husband died, but not, that the Yavam died.

(c) We therefore believe neither the woman herself nor another witness, when they testify that the Yavam died - because, due to the strong dislike of which we suspect her, she will probably not make the necessary enquiries before marrying le'Shuk, as we explained earlier.

(d) Rebbi Elazar ben Masya Darshened from "ve'Ishah Gerushah mei'Ishah" that a woman who is divorced by a man other than her husband, is not forbidden to marry a Kohen. According to Rav Yehudah Amar Rav - he should rather have Darshened that even if she is only divorced from her husband (i.e. that as her husband gave her the Get he stipulated that she is divorced from him, but not permitted to anyone else), she becomes forbidden to marry a Kohen, even if her husband subsequently dies. And this is known as 'Rei'ach ha'Get'.

(a) We learn from the Pasuk in Naso "ve'Shachav Ish *Osah* - that it is the married woman herself who becomes forbidden to her husband by having forbidden relations with another man, but she does not become forbidden to him through the forbidden relations of her sister (with her husband). Consequently, if two witnesses testified that a woman had died, and she returned after her husband had already married her sister, she is permited to return to him.

(b) The Bi'ah with his wife's sister - does not forbid him to marry her daughters or vice-versa (as we learned in Perek Nos'in al ha'Anusah).

(c) If initially, they informed him that his wife had died and then, after he married her sister, they told him that she had been alive then but had since died, the Tana Kama says - that the children born before the second testimony are Mamzeirim, whereas those born after it are Kasher.




(a) In a case where the witness testified that his wife and her sister's husband had both died overseas, and after both he and his sister-in-law remarried, the two appeared - then he is permitted to take his wife back, whereas his brother-in-law is not.

(b) The Tana Kama of a Beraisa states that the only case of Arayos who requires a Get, is a woman who married through Beis-Din - due to the fear that people will say that her husband divorced her, the second man married her, and she is now leaving him without a Get.

(c) Rebbi Akiva adds - Eishes Ach and Achos Ishah, for which we know no reason, seeing as in the former case, even if her first husband gave her a Get, she would not be permitted to his brother; and in the latter case, when the man's wife returns, it is clear to all that the Kidushin of her sister is invalid (yet Rebbi Akiva requires a Get).

(d) In that case, the author of our Mishnah does not appear to be Rebbi Akiva - because, seeing as he requires the man to give the sister-in-law with whom he had relations a Get, how can he take back his wife, who is now Achos Gerushaso?

(a) Rav Gidal Amar Rav Chiya bar Yosef Amar Rav establishes Rebbi Akiva's previous ruling - when the man married, not the *wife* of the brother whom he thought to have died, but the *betrothed*; and the brother and sister-in-law who went overseas too, were not married, but only betrothed.

(b) The reason for that is - because if they were only betrothed, we are afraid that people will assume that there must have been a condition stipulated in the Kidushin, which subsequently did not materialize and which invalidated the Kidushin. Consequently, if they now see the husbands taking back their wives, they will think that a married woman may leave her husband without a Get.

(c) That now enables us to establish our Mishnah even like Rebbi Akiva - seeing as our Mishnah is speaking about a case when the man was *married* to the first woman, not just *betrothed*.

(d) If he was *married* to the first woman, then her sister would not require a Get - because there is no such thing as a stipulation in the marriage (and no-one will suspect this of having happened), since a man does not like to turn all his Bi'os into immoral acts.

8) Having established our Mishnah even according to Rebbi Akiva, Rav Ashi asked Rav Kahana why the Tana did not insert Chamoso in the Mishnah, too - because according to him, after the death of his wife, there is no Chiyuv S'reifah for having relations with a mother-in-law (in which case, Chamoso is similar to Achos Ishto, whom the Tana is able to insert in the Mishnah, because she is permitted after the death of his wife).


(a) The Pasuk writes "be'Eish Yisrefu Oso ve'Es'hen" (referring to a mother and daughter), implying that his wife too, is Chayav S'reifah, should he 'marry' her mother - but how is that possible? What has the poor woman done wrong?

(b) When Rebbi Yishmael explains 'Oso ve'Achas Meihen' - he means that one is only Chayav S'reifah for one of the two women (whichever he married last). That is - because the word "Hen" (contained in "Mei*hen*") means 'one' in Greek.

(c) According to Abaye, who says 'Mashma'os Dorshin Ika Beinayhu', Rebbi Akiva implicates both women ("Oso" 've'es Sh'teihen') - on the grounds that the Pasuk speaks when one of the women was his mother-in-law, and the other, her mother.

(d) 'Mashma'os Dorshin Ika Beinayhu' means - that they do not argue in Halachah, only in how to explain the Pasuk.

(a) According to Rava, when Rebbi Akiva said 'Oso ve'es Sh'teihen' - he means that he is only Chayav Misah for having relations with his mother-in-law as long as his wife is still alive too.

(b) Rebbi Yishmael says - that he is Chayav even if she is not (because, as we explained earlier, 'Hen' means 'one', so he is Chayav even if only one of them is alive).

(c) According to Rava, even if the author of our Mishnah is Rebbi Akiva, he cannot insert the case of Chamoso in the Mishnah - because even though the Torah precludes Chamoso after his wife's death from S'reifah, it does not preclude her from the Isur (although until now, we thought that, like Achos Ishto, Rebbi Akiva precludes her from the Isur too).

11) Chazal did not forbid the husband to return to his wife through the Bi'as Shogeg with her sister, like they forbade his wife to return to him through the Bi'as Shogeg with another man - because by Achos Ishto (unlike by Eishes Ish) the Torah permits him to return even after a Bi'ah be'Meizid, as we saw already (in 5a.).

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