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Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Yevamos 90

YEVAMOS 86-90 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.



(a) The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk "ve'Nasan la'Kohen es ha'Kodesh" (with regard to a Zar who ate Terumah be'Shogeg) - that the payment must consist of a commodity that is fit to become Kodesh.

(b) According to Sumchus quoting Rebbi Meir, if he ate Terumah Tehorah and paid Chulin Temei'im, ''be'Shogeg Tashlumav Tashlumin, be'Meizid, Ein Tashlumav Tashlumin'. According to the Rabbanan - either way, his payment is accepted, but he remains obligated to pay Chulin Tehorim.

(c) The problem with saying 'be'Meizid, Ein Tashlumav Tashlumin' is - that if he ate Terumah Temei'ah, which the Kohen is *not permitted to eat when he is Tamei*, and he paid him Chulin Temei'im, which he *is*, then surely, he is merely benefiting the Kohen. Why then, should he be penalized? Why did Chazal negate the Terumah that he gave?

(d) The statement 've'ka'Meshalem Midi de'Chazi Lei bi'Yemei Tum'aso' is not fully correct - because, in fact, the Chulin that he pays becomes Terumah, and is therefore forbidden to the Kohen when he is Tamei. What we mean to ask is that, seeing as he *intended* to repay the Kohen something that he is able to eat when he is Tamei, why does he deserve to be penalized?

(a) Rava or Kadi therefore amend the Beraisa. According to the new text, someone who eats Terumah Temei'ah, may pay Terumah Temei'ah - and Rebbi Meir and the Rabbanan are arguing over a case where someone ate Terumah *Tehorah*, and paid with Chulin Temei'im.

(b) min ha'Torah, the Chulin Temei'im that one pays for eating Terumah Tehorah is considered a good payment, as we learned on the previous Amud. The problem with Sumchus Amar Rebbi Meir's ruling therefore is - that, seeing as min ha'Torah, the Chulin Temei'im that he paid is valid and a woman that the Kohen subsequently betrothed with it would be betrothed, how can Chazal negate the Terumah, together with the betrothal (thereby permitting an Eishes Ish to get married)?

(c) We initially refute the answer that what Sumchus means is that he must give a second time, despite the fact that the first one is valid (so that any woman whom the Kohen betrothed will remain betrothed) - because that is what the Rabbanan say.

(d) We ultimately establish the Machlokes between Sumchus and the Rabbanan - whether Chazal decreed Shogeg because of Meizid (the Rabbanan) or not (Rebbi Meir).

(a) The Tzitz atones min ha'Torah for the blood, the flesh or the Cheilev that became Tamei, irrespective of whether the Korban was subsequently brought be'Shogeg or be'Meizid, be'O'nes or be'Ratzon be'Yachid or be'Tzibur.

(b) The problem with the Beraisa 'Dam she'Nitma, u'Z'rako be'Shogeg Hurtzah; be'Meizid, Lo Hurtzah' (mi'de'Rabbanan) is - that min ha'Torah, he has fulfilled his obligation, and Chazal decreed that the owner is obligated to bring a new Korban, thereby forcing him to bring Chulin to the Azarah?

(c) So Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina interprets 'Lo Hurtzah' - to mean with regard to permitting the meat to be eaten (but not with regard to obligating the owner to bring another Korban).

(a) We learn from the Pasuk "ve'Achlu Osam Asher Kupar Bahem" - that the Kohen eating the meat of Kodshei Kodshim (e.g. a Chatas) causes the owner's atonement.

(b) Rabah accounts for the fact that, when all's said and done, Chazal negated the Mitzvah of eating the meat of the Korban - by differentiating between Kum Asei (which Chazal have no authority to institute - such as negating the Terumah that one gave, and obligating him to give again), and Shev ve'Al Ta'aseh (such as this case, where they merely decreed that the Kohanim should refrain from eating the meat of Kodesh Kodshim).




(a) Now that Rabah differentiated between 'Kum Asei' and 'Shev ve'Al Ta'aseh', Rav Chisda was spared from asking him from Areil, Haza'ah, Izmel, Sadin be'Tziztis, Kivsei Atzeres, Shofar and Lulav, all of which are Mitzvos and which Chazal negated with their decrees. The case of ...
1. ... 'Areil' is - when a Nochri converts on Erev Pesach (or within seven days of Pesach), on whose behalf we do not bring the Korban Pesach (to enable him to eat it at night), because Beis Hillel decreed that a Nochri who detaches himself from the Orlah is considered as if he had detached from the grave; he requires seven days of Tum'as Meis and cannot bring the Pesach (even though this is only a Tum'ah mi'de'Rabbanan).
2. ... 'Haza'ah' is - the prohibition of a Tamei Meis whose seventh day falls on Shabbos, and whom Chazal forbade to make Haza'ah despite the fact that this will render him unfit to eat the Pesach.
3. ... 'Izmel' is - the Chachamim's prohibition of bringing the knife for the Milah on Shabbos via the roofs and enclosures, thereby preventing the Milah from being performed on the eighth day.
4. ... 'Sadin be'Tziztis' is - where they decreed on fixing T'cheiles (the blue woolen strand that is part of the Mitzvah of Tzitzis) on a linen garment).
5. ... 'Kivsei Atzeres is - if the two lambs of Shavu'os were Shechted she'Lo Lishmah on Shavu'os that fell on Shabbos, Chazal forbade the Zerikas ha'Dam to be performed, with the result that they could also not perform the Mitzvah of burning the fat pieces and that of eating the meat.
(b) A Korban that is brought she'Lo li'Sh'mah - is considered a Kasher Korban, but the person who brought it has not fulfilled his obligation.

(c) We learn from the Pasuk "Eilav Tishma'un" - that one is obligated to listen to the Navi, whatever his command. Eliyahu contravened both the Isur of Shechting a Korban and of sacrificing it, on a Bamah at the time when Bamos were forbidden.

(d) Rabah reconciles this Beraisa with his previous statement, that Chazal only have the right to negate Torah law be'Shev ve'Al Ta'aseh, but not be'Kum va'Asei - by adding that Chazal do have the right to go to any lengths to prevent the people from sinning (like Eliyahu, whose intention was to root out idolatry from Yisrael).

(a) Initially, a husband was able to negate the Get that he had sent his wife through a Sh'li'ach in front of a Beis-Din. Raban Gamliel made a Takanah forbidding it - because it would sometimes happen that the woman, not knowing about the negation of the Get, would get married, and her children would then be Mamzeirim.

(b) According to Rebbi, if a husband contravened Raban Gamliel's Takanah and negated the Get that he sent his wife through a Sh'li'ach, the Get is nevertheless canceled. Raban Shimon ben Gamliel say that it is not - because, otherwise, it is a mockery of Beis-Din, who decreed not to do it.

(c) Chazal have the right to validate the Get (despite the fact that min ha'Torah, it is negated) - because when a couple become betrothed, they do so at the whim of the Rabbanan. Consequently, it is as if the couple themselves authorized them to nullify the Kidushin at any time, retroactively. So what happens here according to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, is not the withdrawal of the negation of the Get, but a negation of the original Kidushin.

(d) This concession applies to ...

1. ... Kidushei Kesef - because they declared the money of Kidushin Hefker.
2. ... Kidushei Bi'ah - because they declared his Bi'ah a Bi'as Z'nus.
7) The text that reads that Kidushei Kesef is Bateil because it is only mi'de'Rabbanan, but what about Kidushei Bi'ah? - is wrong for two reasons: first of all, it is a fallacy to refer to Kidushei Kesef as being mi'de'Rabbanan, seeing as it is learned from a 'Gezeirah-Shavah'; and secondly, because, according to that text, the Gemara's answer 'Shavyuhah Rabbanan li'Be'ilaso Be'ilas Z'nus' makes no sense, seeing as Kidushei Bi'ah is d'Oraysa, like we asked.


(a) Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov heard that Beis-Din have the authority to beat and to punish (in any way), even unofficially - as we find when they once killed someone for riding a horse on Shabbos (even though he had only contravened an ordinary La'av), and when they delivered Malkos to someone who had relations with his wife under a fig-tree (in public view), a breach of Tz'ni'us, but not a La'av that merits Malkos.

(b) Rabah explain this (despite the fact that these were not Shev ve'Al Ta'aseh) - in the same way as he answered above: namely, that the Rabbanan do have the authority to repair a breach (and here Shabbos and the laws of modesty needed strengthening).

9) We learn from the Pasuk ...
1. ... in connection with burial "Ki Im li'She'eiro ha'Karov Eilav" - that a man is obligated to bury his wife.
2. ... "Lo Yitamei Ba'al be'Amav le'Heichalo" - that that obligation is confined to a wife who is Kasher, but not one who is Pasul.
10) We learned in our Mishnah that neither man is entitled to her findings, to what she produces or to nullify her vows. They are not entitled to ...
1. ... her findings is - because the reason that a husband is normally entitled to them is in order to prevent strife between them; whereas in our case, that is precisely what we want (in order to encourage them to separate).
2. ... to what she produces is - because he receives what she produces as against his obligation to sustain her. In our case, seeing as he does not need to sustain her, he is not entitled to the work of her hands.
3. ... to nullify her vows is - because the reason that a man may generally nullify his wife's vows is in order that he should not get to loathe her (when she takes vows such as not bathing or not adorning herself). But in our case, we want him to loathe her, in order to induce him to send her away.
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