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Yevamos 88

YEVAMOS 86-90 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.



(a) We suggest that accepting the testimony of one witness to permit a woman to remarry is a S'vara. It is obvious that a piece of fat which is Safek Cheilev, Safek Shuman becomes permitted if someone testifies that it is indeed Shuman - because otherwise, nobody would ever be permitted to eat by his friend.

(b) We reject the comparison between the two cases however - on the grounds that in the case of Safek Cheilev ... , no Isur was ever established, whereas in our case, it was.

(c) If one witness testifies that a piece of fat that we know to be Cheilev, is Shuman - he is not believed.

(d) And we reject the comparison of our case to *that* case too - because whereas there, even *two* witnesses would not be believed, in our case, they certainly would (so perhaps *one* witness will be believed too).

(a) So we try and compare our case to Tevel, Hekdesh and Konamos. A person is believed to say that his Tevel has been rectified - because it lies within his control to rectify it.

(b) He might not be believed however, if he testifies that someone else's Tevel has been rectified - because that does not lie within his control to rectify.

(c) If he says that his Hekdesh which was ...

1. ... Kedushas Damim is now Chulin - he is believed, because he is able to redeem it.
2. ... Kedushas ha'Guf (Mizbei'ach) is now Chulin - he is believed because he is able to have the Neder of Hekdesh revoked.
(d) As for testifying that someone else's animal that was Kedushas ha'Guf is now Chulin, because the owner had the Hekdesh nullified - that is no different than She'eilah we are currently asking with regard to one witness being (intrinsically) believed when he testifies that someone ate Cheilev.
(a) Konamos are - a form of Neder where a person renders something forbidden by declaring 'Konem Alai Davar Zeh ke'Hekdesh'.


1. 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos' - means that Konamos not only cause the object to become forbidden, but also render it Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis, and is therefore subject to the Dinim of Me'ilah.
2. 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos' - means that Konamos are not subject to Me'ilah, because the object becomes forbidden, but not Hekdesh.
(c) The owner would be believed to say that the object was no longer forbidden, were we to hold ...
1. ... 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos - because it lies within his power to redeem it.
2. ... 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos' - because it lies within his power to have the Neder revoked.
(d) Assuming that we hold 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos' - we do not know whether he is believed to say that someone else's object is no longer forbidden, any more than we know whether one witness is (intrinsically) believed to testify that someone ate Cheilev.
(a) Rebbi Zeira explains that all the above Mishnahs accept the testimony of one witness, in spite of the fact that it does not lie in his power to rectify matters, and it is a Davar she'be'Ervah (a matter concerning marriage) - because of the Chazakah that, due to the stringencies that the woman will come up against at the end, she will not dare to get married before she has made extensive enquiries and fully ascertained that her husband is indeed dead.

(b) Chazal took such a lenient view with regard to Eishes Ish - in order to prevent the woman from becoming an Iguana.

(c) So powerful is the Chazakah that the woman will make a double check before getting married, that it renders their ruling d'Oraysa (see Tosfos DH 'Mitoch' and Tosfos Yeshanim 'Mishum') - in which case, they are not in fact, overruling Torah law, but endorsing it. (Nevertheless, they would have issued a decree forbidding her to do so, were it not for the concern that she might then become an Iguana).

(a) When the people of Eretz Yisrael heard of Rav's ruling (that if the woman remarried on the basis of the testimony of *two* witnesses, and the husband returned, then she may remain with her second husband) - they laughed (because they considered it ridiculous).

(b) We justify Rav's statement however - by establishing it in a case when they did not recognize him upon his return (and claimed that he was someone else).

(c) In order to differentiate between one witness (in which case she must leave the second marriage) and two (when she may remain) - we establish Rav when two witnesses testify that they remained with him from the moment that he left until his return. Consequently, they are believed against one witness who says that he died, but not against two (under the circumstances that we are about to describe).

(d) We base the phenomenon of not recognizing a close acquaintance - on none other than Yosef, whose brothers did not recognize him (as the Torah explicitly writes in Mikeitz), because he had grown a beard since they saw him last.




(a) The penalty for living with a Safek Eishes Ish - is an Asham (Taluy).

(b) Rav permits the woman (despite the fact that she is a Safek Eishes Ish), to remain with the second man - when she claims that she is sure that her husband died and she also married one of the witnesses who testified that he was (see Tosfos Yeshanim DH 'le'Echad').

(c) Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yossi in a Beraisa, rules that if two witnesses testify that a woman's husband died or that he divorced her, and two other witnesses testify that he did not, then, even after the woman subsequently marries one of the first pair, she is forbidden to remain with him. The Rabbanan say - that he may.

(d) Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yossi concedes that if they were already married, she may remain with him. Rav's Chidush, according to ...

1. ... the first Lashon is - that even if she married only *after* the testimony of the witnesses, she is permitted to remain (contrary to the opinion of Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yossi).
2. ... the second Lashon - that only if she was already married to him before they testified, may she remain, to conform with Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yossi's opinion.
(a) The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk "ve'Kidashto" - that if a Kohen refuses to adhere to the laws of Tum'ah or of forbidden marriages (of Kehunah e.g. a Kohen Hedyot marries a Gerushah or a Kohen Gadol an Almanah, and refuses to divorce her, Beis-Din will force him (physically, if need be) to do so.

(b) The Tana must be referring to a case of Safek (as above) where she married one of her witnesses - because otherwise, what is the Chidush, seeing as Beis-Din are always obligated to prevent the people from sinning (even by force, where necessary)?

(c) Initially, in order to reconcile this Beraisa with Rav, we differentiate between ordinary Arayos and Isurei Kehunah, where the Torah is more stringent. Alternatively, we interpret 'Dafno' to mean - that Beis-Din make efforts to force him at the outset not to marry the Safek (by bringing two witnesses to counter the first pair).

(d) In the third answer, we establish the Beraisa like Rebbi Menachem b'Rebbi Yossi - who forbids the woman to remain with the man if she married him after the witnesses testified (and Rav holds like the Chachamim - like the first of the two explanations that we just cited).

(a) Rav Ashi offers a new slant to the Sugya by reinterpreting Rav's statement 'Lo Seitzei' - according to him, 'Lo Seitzei' means that she does not leave her original Heter (to go back to her *first* husband).

(b) Indeed, Rav Ashi already taught us *that*, when he ruled like the Tana of our Mishnah who said 'Niseis she'Lo bi'R'shus, Muteres Lachzor Lo'. In fact - he made only one of the two statements; the other one, we deduced from the first one.

(a) According to Shmuel, when our Mishnah rules 'Teiztei', that is only as long as she does not contradict the witness; if she does, she may remain with her second husband. The Tana can only be talking about one witness, and not two - because how can anybody contradict two witnesses?

(b) A second witness is not believed to contradict the testimony of the first witness who said that her husband died because, as Ula said - whenever the Torah believes one witness, it is considered as if *two* witnesses had testified, in which case, he cannot possibly be believed to counter his testimony.

(c) So, according to Shmuel, we establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Nechemyah in a Beraisa - who says that, whenever the Torah believes one witness, then we follow the majority of opinions (even if it is two women [say] against one man). Consequently, our Mishnah speaks when the two witnesses were P'sulei Eidus (e.g. women). Consequently, if the woman remains silent, then there are two witnesses against one, and she must leave her second husband; whereas, if she contradicts them, then her opinion will combine with that of the first witness, and she may remain married to him (Rambam, not like Rashi).

(d) According to the second Lashon - Rebbi Nechemyah only follows the majority opinion when the first witness is a woman (a P'sul Eidus) - but when it is a man (who is a Kasher witness), then no amount of P'sulei Eidus can possibly counter his testimony.

(a) It is obvious that the return of the woman's husband automatically invalidates the second marriage. Rav Huna therefore explains that our Mishnah requires a Get from the second man - because we are afraid that otherwise, people may think that the first husband divorced her, the second one married her, and we are now sending out a woman married woman without a Get.

(b) Initially, we establish that the Seifa, which permits the woman to return to her husband if the second man only betrothed (but did not marry) her - speaks when the second man actually gave her a Get.

(c) This Tana, who permits a man to take back his wife, once she has been betrothed to somebody else - holds like Rebbi Yossi ben Kipar, in whose opinion only a woman who married after her divorce, is forbidden to return to her first husband, but not one who was only betrothed.

(d) We refute the current interpretation of the Seifa (that she does indeed require a Get) - because of the Seifa, which states 'Af-al-Pi she'Nasan Lah Acharon Get, Lo Paslah min ha'Kehunah, in which case the Get cannot have been necessary, because if it had, she would have been Pasul (due to the ruling 'Afilu Rei'ach ha'Get Posel').

(a) So we finally explain that the Seifa permits the betrothed woman to return to her husband without a Get from the second man - because we assume that people will know that the betrothal was erroneous.

(b) We do not say this in the Reisha however - where she transgressed the Isur of Eishes Ish (by actually living with the second man). Consequently, we fine her by accepting the possibility that people will not know ... , requiring her to accept a Get and become forbidden to her husband.

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