(Permission is granted to print and redistribute this material
as long as this header and the footer at the end are included.)


prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

Previous daf

Yevamos 87

YEVAMOS 86-90 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.



(a) We learn from the Pasuk "*u'Bas* Kohen Ki Sihyeh Almanah u'Gerushah" - that a bas Kohen whose son from a Levi died, leaving her with a son from a Kohen to whom she was married before, is permitted to eat Terumah.

(b) This D'rashah is not confined to Rebbi Akiva, who always Darshens an extra 'Vav' - because here, the entire word "u'Bas" is redundant.

(a) Rav Chisda Amar Ravina bar Shiloh learns from "Hi *bi'Terumas* Kodshim Lo Socheil" the Din of the Beraisa - that a bas Kohen who returns to her father's house to eat Terumah, is not permitted to eat Chazeh ve'Shok ('Hi be'Moram min ha'Kodashim Lo Socheil').

(b) Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah learns it from "*mi*'Lechem Avihah Tocheil" - "mi'Lechem" 've'Lo Kol Lechem', and food in general is called 'Lechem', like we find in Daniel "Beltshatzar Malka Avad Lechem Rav".

(c) Rami bar Chama asks whether we should not preclude a bas Kohen who returns to her father's house from something quite different than Chazeh ve'Shok - namely, the right of her father to nullify her vows (Hafaras Nedarim).

(d) Rava answers - that Tana de'Bei Rebbi Yishmael has already learned that from another source.

(a) Tana de'Bei Rebbi Yishmael asks that if the Pasuk "ve'Neder Almanah u'Gerushah Yakum Alehah" - refers to a divorcee, then it is obvious that nobody can nullify her vows any more (i.e. *Hafaras* Nedarim, not *Hataras* Nedarim), seeing as she is no longer under the jurisdiction of either her father or her husband.

(b) He therefore establish the Pasuk - by a woman whose father or his Sh'liach handed her over to the Sh'li'ach of her husband, and whose husband then died or divorced her. And the Pasuk teaches us that, under these circumstances, she is considered under the jurisdiction of her husband regarding Hafaras Nedarim, and she does not return to her father. Consequently, we do not need to learn this from "*mi*Lechem Avihah", as Rami bar Chama suggested.

(c) Rav Safra precludes a Chozeres from Chazeh ve'Shok from the Pasuk "mi'Lechem Avihah Tocheil" 'Lechem, ve'Lo Basar'.

1. Rav Papa precludes them from "mi'Lechem Avihah" - 'Lechem ha'Kanuy le'Avihah', to preclude Chazeh ve'Shok, which is not the personal belongings of the Kohen, but which he acquires from Hashem's table.
2. ... Rava precludes them from the Pasuk in Sh'mini "ve'Es Chazei ha'Tenufah ... Tochlu Atah ... u'V'nosecha *Itach*" - at the time when they are with you, but not once they are married and have left your jurisdiction.
(a) The Beraisa says that a bas Yisrael, who eats Terumah on account of her son from her deceased husband, who was a Kohen - may also eat Chazeh ve'Shok on his account.

(b) When Rav Mordechai quoted this Beraisa to Rav Ashi - he asked him how this was possible, seeing as a bas Yisrael who eats on account of the son of her first husband who was a Kohen is derived from "u'Bas Kohen" (as we learned above), how can she be any better than the bas Kohen herself, who does *not* go back to eat Chazeh ve'Shok?

(c) Rav Ashi replied - that all the Pesukim that come to exclude from eating Chazeh ve'Shok, are written by a bas Kohen who returns to her father, and not by a bas Yisrael who returns to eat from her son from a Kohen.

(a) The Tana learns from the Pasuk ...
1. ... "ve'Shavah el Beis Avihah" - that a Shomeres Yavam Kohenes does not return to her father to eat Terumah (because she is still tied to the Yavam).
2. ... "ki'Ne'urehah" - that the same applies if she is pregnant.
(b) We query the need for this latter Derashah from a 'Kal va'Chomer' from Yibum to make 'Ubar ki'Yelud' - because if in a case when we do not consider the child from her first husband like a child from her second one (to exempt a Yevamah from performing Yibum if her second husband died without children), nevertheless, the fetus that she is carrying is considered like a live child to exempt her from Yibum; there where the child from her first husband is considered like a child from her second one (to forbid her to return to her father's house to eat Terumah, on account of her child from her first husband), then her fetus should certainly be considered like a live child, to prevent her from eating Terumah.

(c) We refute it on the basis of 'Asah Meisim ka'Chayim' - meaning that we cannot learn the prohibition of eating Terumah from the exemption from Yibum, because Yibum has a unique Din, inasmuch as even though the child on whose account she was exempt from Yibum died, she remains Patur, whereas if the child on whose account she is forbidden to eat Terumah dies, she becomes permitted to eat.

(d) In spite of having written ...

1. ... "ve'Zera Ein Lah" (to teach us that if a bas Kohen has children, she may not return to her father's house to eat Terumah), the Torah nevertheless needed to write "ki'Ne'urehah" - because we might otherwise have thought that, in the latter case, where they are still one body, she may.
2. ... "ki'Ne'urehah", it needed to write "ve'Zera Ein Lah" - because we might otherwise have thought that, in the latter case, where her body remains unchanged, she may.



(a) In the case of a bas Kohen who had a son from her first husband who was a Yisrael, he prevents her from returning to her father's house, even if she subsequently married someone else who died, yet if that son died, we do not consider him as if he was alive. Nevertheless, we do not say that, in our case, seeing as a baby from her first husband does *not* exempt her from Yibum from her second one, we should certainly not consider her son to be alive (to obligate her to perform Yibum or at least Chalitzah, if her son dies) - because of the Pasuk in Mishlei "Derachehah Darkei No'am" (meaning that it is not nice to reinstate the obligation to perform Yibum once she has been exempted from it, because, if she married le'Shuk, performing Chalitzah now would cause her husband to loathe her).

(b) And, using the reverse logic, we do not consider Meisim ka'Chayim to forbid a Chozeres to eat Terumah even if her son died - because the Torah writes "ve'Zera Ein Lah", and she hasn't!

(c) Nor do we learn from a 'Kal va'Chomer' (from the fact that 'Asah Meisim ka'Chayim' by Yibum) that a son from her first husband will exempt a Yevamah from Yibum should her second husband die without children - because the Torah writes "u'Bein Ein *Lo*" (stressing the husband), and he hasn't!

(d) And by the same token, we do not learn a 'Kal va'Chomer' to permit a bas Kohen whose second husband died without children, to return to her father's house and eat Terumah, even though she had children from her first one - because the Torah writes *"ve'Zera Ein Lah"* - and she has!

***** Hadran Alach Yesh Mutaros *****

***** ha'Ishah Rabah *****


(a) A woman is permitted to marry on the testimony of one witness who testified that her husband died.

(b) If she does, and her husband returns - she has to leave both men.

(c) She is not considered an O'nes - because she should have made more extensive enquiries.

(d) The children that she subsequently bears from either man are Mamzeirim - those of the second are Mamzeirim d'Oraysa; those of the first, Mamzeirim de'Rabbanan.

(a) She is not entitled to claim her Kesubah or any of the Tena'ei Kesubah.

(b) If either husband is a Kohen - he is not permitted to bury her.

(c) Nor do they retain the right to receive whatever she finds or produces, and to nullify her vows.

(a) She will ...
1. ...become Pasul to marry a Kohen (even should both men die) if she is a bas Yisrael - because she is a Zonah.
2. ... lose her right to eat Ma'aser, if she is a bas Levi and Terumah de'Rabbanan, if she is a bas Kohen - on the basis of a K'nas (a penalty for being careless).
(b) If both men die without children, and each one has a brother - then each brother is obligated to perform Chalitzah.


1. Rebbi Yossi says - that she does receive her Kesubah from her husband.
2. Rebbi Elazar says - that her first husband is entitled to her findings, what she produces, and has the right to nullify her vows.
(d) Rebbi Shimon too, disagrees with the Tana Lama with regard to Yibum - according to him, the brother of her first husband may even perform Yibum too, and any children that she bears from him are not Mamzeirim.
(a) 'Niseis she'Lo bi'Reshus Beis-Din, Muteres Lachzor Lo'. 'she'Lo bi'Reshus' means - through two witnesses (since, once their testimony is substantiated, she will not require Beis-Din's sanction to get married).

(b) Marrying through the ruling of the Beis-Din with one witness is more lenient than marrying independently through two witnesses - inasmuch as she is then Pasul from a Korban (because an individual ho acts on the ruling of Beis-Din is Patur from a Korban).

(c) A woman who marries through two witnesses is not considered an O'nes to be Patur from a Korban - because she should not have been in such a hurry to get married. She should have waited a while to ascertain that her husband is really dead.

(d) Even if the Beis-Din gave her their consent to get married - she is only Patur from a Korban if she gets married and her husband returns, but not if she commits adultery.

(a) The Reisha of our Mishnah must be speaking when the woman got married through the testimony of *one* witness and not of *two*) - because, seeing as the Seifa ('Niseis she'Lo bi'Reshus Beis-Din, Muteres Lachzor Lo') is speaking about *two* witnesses (as we just saw), the Reisha must be speaking about *one*.

(b) We also see from a Mishnah in ha'Ishah Basra that one witness is believed to authorize a woman to marry. The Tana says there that one witness may even quote another witness in these matters (although that is not acceptable by a testimony which is min ha'Torah).

(c) Even a woman is believed in this issue ...

1. ... even if she quotes - another woman ...
2. ... an Eved or a Shifchah.
(d) We deduce from the Mishnah in K'risus 'Eid Echad Omer Achalta Cheilev, *ve'Hu Omer Lo Achalti*, Patur' that one witness is believed - implying that if he had remained silent, the witness would have been believed - mi'd'Oraysa, otherwise, how would he be permitted to bring a Korban to the Azarah (since, if he would not be believed min ha'Torah, he would be bringing Chulin to the Azarah).
(a) We learn from the Pasuk "O Hoda *Eilav* Chataso" - that if he only discovers that he is Chayav a Chatas through a witness, but he does not know about it himself, he remains Patur from bringing it. This can only be speaking when he contradicts the witness, because if he remains silent, why is that not included in "O Hoda Eilav"?

(b) The Pasuk cannot be speaking in a case when there are two witnesses - because if so, why would we need a Pasuk to teach us that when he does not condradict two witnesses, he is obligated to bring a Korban? Is this not obvious?

(c) We try to prove from here that one witness is believed.

(d) We retract from this proof however - because who says that the Chatas that he brings is on account of the testimony of the witness? Maybe it is because the defendant was silent, and silence is considered admission.

(a) The Seifa of the Mishnah in K'risus states that if two witnesses testify that someone ate Cheilev, and he denies it, he is Patur from bringing a Korban. Rebbi Meir disagrees - because if two witnesses can bring him to Misah with their testimony, then how much more so can they obligate him to bring a Korban.

(b) The Tana Kama counters - that he could have confessed at having eaten it, adding that he did so deliberately (in which case he would have been Patur from a Korban). Consequently, we have to believe him with a 'Migu' (see Tosfos 88a DH 'u'Mah').

(c) We prove from here - that if the Rabbanan hold in the Seifa (of the Mishnah in K'risus) that even *two* witnesses are not believed, then how much more so *one*.

Next daf


For further information on
subscriptions, archives and sponsorships,
contact Kollel Iyun Hadaf,