ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 87
YEVAMOS 86-90 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi
publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.
(a) We learn from the Pasuk "*u'Bas* Kohen Ki Sihyeh Almanah u'Gerushah" -
that a bas Kohen whose son from a Levi died, leaving her with a son from a
Kohen to whom she was married before, is permitted to eat Terumah.
(b) This D'rashah is not confined to Rebbi Akiva, who always Darshens an
extra 'Vav' - because here, the entire word "u'Bas" is redundant.
(a) Rav Chisda Amar Ravina bar Shiloh learns from "Hi *bi'Terumas* Kodshim
Lo Socheil" the Din of the Beraisa - that a bas Kohen who returns to her
father's house to eat Terumah, is not permitted to eat Chazeh ve'Shok ('Hi
be'Moram min ha'Kodashim Lo Socheil').
(b) Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah learns it from "*mi*'Lechem Avihah
Tocheil" - "mi'Lechem" 've'Lo Kol Lechem', and food in general is called
'Lechem', like we find in Daniel "Beltshatzar Malka Avad Lechem Rav".
(c) Rami bar Chama asks whether we should not preclude a bas Kohen who
returns to her father's house from something quite different than Chazeh
ve'Shok - namely, the right of her father to nullify her vows (Hafaras
(d) Rava answers - that Tana de'Bei Rebbi Yishmael has already learned that
from another source.
(a) Tana de'Bei Rebbi Yishmael asks that if the Pasuk "ve'Neder Almanah
u'Gerushah Yakum Alehah" - refers to a divorcee, then it is obvious that
nobody can nullify her vows any more (i.e. *Hafaras* Nedarim, not *Hataras*
Nedarim), seeing as she is no longer under the jurisdiction of either her
father or her husband.
(b) He therefore establish the Pasuk - by a woman whose father or his
Sh'liach handed her over to the Sh'li'ach of her husband, and whose husband
then died or divorced her. And the Pasuk teaches us that, under these
circumstances, she is considered under the jurisdiction of her husband
regarding Hafaras Nedarim, and she does not return to her father.
Consequently, we do not need to learn this from "*mi*Lechem Avihah", as Rami
bar Chama suggested.
(c) Rav Safra precludes a Chozeres from Chazeh ve'Shok from the Pasuk
"mi'Lechem Avihah Tocheil" 'Lechem, ve'Lo Basar'.
1. Rav Papa precludes them from "mi'Lechem Avihah" - 'Lechem ha'Kanuy
le'Avihah', to preclude Chazeh ve'Shok, which is not the personal belongings
of the Kohen, but which he acquires from Hashem's table.
2. ... Rava precludes them from the Pasuk in Sh'mini "ve'Es Chazei
ha'Tenufah ... Tochlu Atah ... u'V'nosecha *Itach*" - at the time when they
are with you, but not once they are married and have left your jurisdiction.
(a) The Beraisa says that a bas Yisrael, who eats Terumah on account of her
son from her deceased husband, who was a Kohen - may also eat Chazeh ve'Shok
on his account.
(b) When Rav Mordechai quoted this Beraisa to Rav Ashi - he asked him how
this was possible, seeing as a bas Yisrael who eats on account of the son of
her first husband who was a Kohen is derived from "u'Bas Kohen" (as we
learned above), how can she be any better than the bas Kohen herself, who
does *not* go back to eat Chazeh ve'Shok?
(c) Rav Ashi replied - that all the Pesukim that come to exclude from eating
Chazeh ve'Shok, are written by a bas Kohen who returns to her father, and
not by a bas Yisrael who returns to eat from her son from a Kohen.
(a) The Tana learns from the Pasuk ...
1. ... "ve'Shavah el Beis Avihah" - that a Shomeres Yavam Kohenes does not
return to her father to eat Terumah (because she is still tied to the
(b) We query the need for this latter Derashah from a 'Kal va'Chomer' from
Yibum to make 'Ubar ki'Yelud' - because if in a case when we do not consider
the child from her first husband like a child from her second one (to exempt
a Yevamah from performing Yibum if her second husband died without
children), nevertheless, the fetus that she is carrying is considered like a
live child to exempt her from Yibum; there where the child from her first
husband is considered like a child from her second one (to forbid her to
return to her father's house to eat Terumah, on account of her child from
her first husband), then her fetus should certainly be considered like a
live child, to prevent her from eating Terumah.
2. ... "ki'Ne'urehah" - that the same applies if she is pregnant.
(c) We refute it on the basis of 'Asah Meisim ka'Chayim' - meaning that we
cannot learn the prohibition of eating Terumah from the exemption from
Yibum, because Yibum has a unique Din, inasmuch as even though the child on
whose account she was exempt from Yibum died, she remains Patur, whereas if
the child on whose account she is forbidden to eat Terumah dies, she becomes
permitted to eat.
(d) In spite of having written ...
1. ... "ve'Zera Ein Lah" (to teach us that if a bas Kohen has children, she
may not return to her father's house to eat Terumah), the Torah nevertheless
needed to write "ki'Ne'urehah" - because we might otherwise have thought
that, in the latter case, where they are still one body, she may.
2. ... "ki'Ne'urehah", it needed to write "ve'Zera Ein Lah" - because we
might otherwise have thought that, in the latter case, where her body
remains unchanged, she may.
(a) In the case of a bas Kohen who had a son from her first husband who was
a Yisrael, he prevents her from returning to her father's house, even if she
subsequently married someone else who died, yet if that son died, we do not
consider him as if he was alive. Nevertheless, we do not say that, in our
case, seeing as a baby from her first husband does *not* exempt her from
Yibum from her second one, we should certainly not consider her son to be
alive (to obligate her to perform Yibum or at least Chalitzah, if her son
dies) - because of the Pasuk in Mishlei "Derachehah Darkei No'am" (meaning
that it is not nice to reinstate the obligation to perform Yibum once she
has been exempted from it, because, if she married le'Shuk, performing
Chalitzah now would cause her husband to loathe her).
***** Hadran Alach Yesh Mutaros *****
(b) And, using the reverse logic, we do not consider Meisim ka'Chayim to
forbid a Chozeres to eat Terumah even if her son died - because the Torah
writes "ve'Zera Ein Lah", and she hasn't!
(c) Nor do we learn from a 'Kal va'Chomer' (from the fact that 'Asah Meisim
ka'Chayim' by Yibum) that a son from her first husband will exempt a Yevamah
from Yibum should her second husband die without children - because the
Torah writes "u'Bein Ein *Lo*" (stressing the husband), and he hasn't!
(d) And by the same token, we do not learn a 'Kal va'Chomer' to permit a bas
Kohen whose second husband died without children, to return to her father's
house and eat Terumah, even though she had children from her first one -
because the Torah writes *"ve'Zera Ein Lah"* - and she has!
***** ha'Ishah Rabah *****
(a) A woman is permitted to marry on the testimony of one witness who
testified that her husband died.
(b) If she does, and her husband returns - she has to leave both men.
(c) She is not considered an O'nes - because she should have made more
(d) The children that she subsequently bears from either man are Mamzeirim -
those of the second are Mamzeirim d'Oraysa; those of the first, Mamzeirim
(a) She is not entitled to claim her Kesubah or any of the Tena'ei Kesubah.
(b) If either husband is a Kohen - he is not permitted to bury her.
(c) Nor do they retain the right to receive whatever she finds or produces,
and to nullify her vows.
(a) She will ...
1. ...become Pasul to marry a Kohen (even should both men die) if she is a
bas Yisrael - because she is a Zonah.
(b) If both men die without children, and each one has a brother - then each
brother is obligated to perform Chalitzah.
2. ... lose her right to eat Ma'aser, if she is a bas Levi and Terumah
de'Rabbanan, if she is a bas Kohen - on the basis of a K'nas (a penalty for
1. Rebbi Yossi says - that she does receive her Kesubah from her husband.
(d) Rebbi Shimon too, disagrees with the Tana Lama with regard to Yibum -
according to him, the brother of her first husband may even perform Yibum
too, and any children that she bears from him are not Mamzeirim.
2. Rebbi Elazar says - that her first husband is entitled to her findings,
what she produces, and has the right to nullify her vows.
(a) 'Niseis she'Lo bi'Reshus Beis-Din, Muteres Lachzor Lo'. 'she'Lo
bi'Reshus' means - through two witnesses (since, once their testimony is
substantiated, she will not require Beis-Din's sanction to get married).
(b) Marrying through the ruling of the Beis-Din with one witness is more
lenient than marrying independently through two witnesses - inasmuch as she
is then Pasul from a Korban (because an individual ho acts on the ruling of
Beis-Din is Patur from a Korban).
(c) A woman who marries through two witnesses is not considered an O'nes to
be Patur from a Korban - because she should not have been in such a hurry to
get married. She should have waited a while to ascertain that her husband is
(d) Even if the Beis-Din gave her their consent to get married - she is only
Patur from a Korban if she gets married and her husband returns, but not if
she commits adultery.
(a) The Reisha of our Mishnah must be speaking when the woman got married
through the testimony of *one* witness and not of *two*) - because, seeing
as the Seifa ('Niseis she'Lo bi'Reshus Beis-Din, Muteres Lachzor Lo') is
speaking about *two* witnesses (as we just saw), the Reisha must be speaking
(b) We also see from a Mishnah in ha'Ishah Basra that one witness is
believed to authorize a woman to marry. The Tana says there that one witness
may even quote another witness in these matters (although that is not
acceptable by a testimony which is min ha'Torah).
(c) Even a woman is believed in this issue ...
1. ... even if she quotes - another woman ...
(d) We deduce from the Mishnah in K'risus 'Eid Echad Omer Achalta Cheilev,
*ve'Hu Omer Lo Achalti*, Patur' that one witness is believed - implying that
if he had remained silent, the witness would have been believed -
mi'd'Oraysa, otherwise, how would he be permitted to bring a Korban to the
Azarah (since, if he would not be believed min ha'Torah, he would be
bringing Chulin to the Azarah).
2. ... an Eved or a Shifchah.
(a) We learn from the Pasuk "O Hoda *Eilav* Chataso" - that if he only
discovers that he is Chayav a Chatas through a witness, but he does not know
about it himself, he remains Patur from bringing it. This can only be
speaking when he contradicts the witness, because if he remains silent, why
is that not included in "O Hoda Eilav"?
(b) The Pasuk cannot be speaking in a case when there are two witnesses -
because if so, why would we need a Pasuk to teach us that when he does not
condradict two witnesses, he is obligated to bring a Korban? Is this not
(c) We try to prove from here that one witness is believed.
(d) We retract from this proof however - because who says that the Chatas
that he brings is on account of the testimony of the witness? Maybe it is
because the defendant was silent, and silence is considered admission.
(a) The Seifa of the Mishnah in K'risus states that if two witnesses testify
that someone ate Cheilev, and he denies it, he is Patur from bringing a
Korban. Rebbi Meir disagrees - because if two witnesses can bring him to
Misah with their testimony, then how much more so can they obligate him to
bring a Korban.
(b) The Tana Kama counters - that he could have confessed at having eaten
it, adding that he did so deliberately (in which case he would have been
Patur from a Korban). Consequently, we have to believe him with a 'Migu'
(see Tosfos 88a DH 'u'Mah').
(c) We prove from here - that if the Rabbanan hold in the Seifa (of the
Mishnah in K'risus) that even *two* witnesses are not believed, then how
much more so *one*.