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Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Yevamos 37

YEVAMOS 36 & 37 - sponsored by Hagaon Rav Yosef Pearlman of London, a living demonstration of love for and adoration of the Torah.



(a) We just learned that, according to Ravina, even Raban Shimon ben Gamliel will agree that, if a Kohen married a Yevamah whose baby died within thirty days, she does not require Chalitzah. Rav Ashi asked Rav Oshaya Brei de'Rav Idi whether, if a Kohen married a woman who was pregnant or feeding within twenty-four months, we will make the same concession for a Kohen and permit him to remain with her without a Get. Rav Oshaya Brei de'Rav Idi replied in the negative - because, whereas in the case of a Safek Nefel, for the sake of the Kohen, we rely on the opinion of the Chachamim, who consider the baby to be a proper person, in our Mishnah, according to Rebbi Meir, the woman requires a permanent Get, and according to the Chachamim, at least a temporary one. So on what grounds can we justify allowing her to remain with the man who transgressed because he is a Kohen?

(b) If someone betroths a woman within three months of her widowhood or divorce, and runs away, Rav Acha and Rafram argue over whether he needs to write her a Get or not. Writing a Get might *not* be necessary - because the very fact that he ran away indicates that he does not wish to remain with her for the full forbidden period, so a Get is not necessary.

(c) In fact, it is Rafram who takes the lenient view - because when an incident occurred, that was how he ruled.

(a) Rava asked Rav Nachman why a woman needs to wait three months, because, in case she is pregnant, we will not know whether the baby is a ninth-month baby from her first husband or a seventh-month baby from the second. Why should we not follow the majority of women, who give birth after nine months, he asked him? To which he replied - that, in his town, the women give birth at seven months, and not at nine.

(b) Rava did not like Rav Nachman's reply - because his town is not the majority of the world?

(c) Rav Nachman then explained that, seeing as the pregnancy of all women who give birth at nine months is discernible, we automatically rule that, this woman, whose pregnancy was not discernible, had lost her 'Rov'. We reject this explanation however - because if the pregnancy of *all* women who give birth at nine months *is discernible*, then, seeing as this woman's pregnancy was *not*, then how can we even consider the possibility that maybe the baby is a ninth-month baby from the first husband?

(d) So we amend Rav Nachman's words to read - seeing as the pregnancy of (not *all* women, but) of *most* women who give birth at nine months is discernible, we automatically rule that, this woman, whose pregnancy was not discernible, has lost her 'Rov'.

(a) If a man married a woman immediately after her husband died, and she gave birth at nine months, the Tana Kama of the Beraisa says that ...
1. ... that baby - is fit to marry a Kohen Gadol.
2. ... the next baby that is born to him - is a Mamzer mi'Safek.
(b) Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov says 'Ein Mamzer mi'Safek'. Abaye explains that, according to the Tana Kama, the second baby is a Safek Mamzer and forbidden to marry a Vaday Mamzer; Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov holds - that the second baby is not a Safek Mamzer but a Vaday Mamzer, and permitted to marry a Vaday Mamzer.

(c) Rava inverts the Machlokes - according to the Tana Kama, the second baby is a Vaday Mamzer and is permitted to marry a Mamzer, whereas, according to Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov, the second baby is a Safek Mamzer, and forbidden to marry a Vaday Mamzer.

(d) Abaye and Rava, explains the Gemara, argue about Rebbi Elazar - meaning that they are trying at all costs, to establish Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov (whose Mishnah is 'Kav ve'Naki' - not frequently mentioned, but when he is, it is Halachah). Consequently, those who consider Rebbi Elazar's Beraisa Halachah, establish Rebbi Elazar ben Ya'akov like him; whereas those who consider Hillel's Beraisa Halachah, establish Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov like him.

(a) Rebbi Elazar says 'Vada'an be'Vada'an Mutar ... S'feikan bi'S'feikan Asur' - because perhaps the one Safek is Kasher, and the other, Pasul, in which case one is bringing a Pasul into the Kehal Hashem.

(b) The three cases of S'feikan - are a Sh'tuki (whose mother shuts him up when he refers to her husband 'his father'); an Asufi (a waif whom they picked up in the street) and a Kuti.

(c) A Kuti is a Safek - because they are not particular about some of the major Halachos of Kidushin.

(d) When Rav Yehudah told Shmuel that Rav ruled like Rebbi Elazar - he retorted that, seeing as Hillel taught that all the Yuchsin are permitted to each other (as will be explained shortly), how can we rule like Rebbi Elazar?

(a) We just quoted Hillel, who says that all the ten Yuchsin are permitted to each other. From the following group, we must preclude ...
1. ... Kohani, Levi'i, Yisre'eili, *Chalali*?
2. ... *Kohani*, Levi'i, Yisre'eili, Chalali, Geiri, Charuri and Avadim Meshuchrurim.
3. ... *Levi'i, Yisre'eili*, Geiri, Charuri, Mamzeiri, Nesini, Shesuki and Asufi?
(b) In the above Machlokes between Abaye and Rava, it is Rava who follows the opinion of Rav (Rebbi Elazar), and Abaye, the opinion of Shmuel (Hillel).



(a) Abaye proves from another statement of Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov, where he says that, if a man has relations with many women or vice-versa, it will result in a man marrying his daughter, a brother, his sister, and a world full of Mamzeirim, because the Torah writes "u'Mal'ah ha'Aretz Zimah" - that he considers a Safek Mamzer like a Vadai Mamzer.

(b) According to Rava - "Zimah" is the acronym of 'Zu Mah Hi' (denoting a Safek Mamzer).

(c) Over and above this - Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov forbids a man to marry two wives in two countries, in case the son of one meets the daughter of the other and (without knowing that they share a common father, they) get married.

(d) This does not create a problem with Rav and Rav Nachman, who would marry a woman for a short time when they traveled overseas (despite the fact that they had a wife where they lived) - because, seeing as they were renowned sages, the mothers would publicise their names when their daughters were born, and there was no fear of their half-brothers not knowing who they were.

(a) Nor is there a problem with Rav and Rav Nachman from Rava's statement (that if a woman accepts a man's proposal for marriage, she needs to keep seven clean days) - because they used to arrange the short-term marriage through a Sh'li'ach well in advance of their arrival.

(b) Alternatively, the Rabbanan did not actually marry the women in question, but - based on the principle 'Eino Domeh Mi she'Yesh Lo Pas be'Salo le'Mi she'Ein Lo Pas be'Salo', they only designated them, in case they wanted to live with them later.

(c) The assumption that if they intended to live with them, they would not be able to, because of Rava's principle (that they will see blood), is incorrect - because, seeing as no definite marriage took place, Rava's principle did not apply (i.e. she would not develop a strong desire for him and would not therefore see blood).

(a) When the Safek (son of the first man or of the second one) and the Yavam both claim the inheritance of the dead man - the former argues that he is the son of the dead man, and therefore, the sole heir (since, if he is the dead man's son, there is no Din Yibum); whereas the Yavam claims that the Safek is *his* son, and that therefore, *he* is the Yavam, and the sole heir.

(b) Seeing as both of them have an equal claim (both are Safek heirs) - they divide the inheritance between them.

(a) In a case where the Safek and the sons of the Yavam both claim the inheritance of the dead man - the Safek claims to be his son (in which case, the Yavam was not really a Yavam at all), and is the sole heir; whereas the sons of the Yavam claim that the Safek is their brother, and that he therefore receives an equal portion to them in their uncle's inheritance.

(b) The Rabbanan suggested to Rav Mesharshaya that this was similar to the Mishnah in Nos'in al ha'Anusah, which talks about the Safek (seventh-month first husband, ninth-month second one) against the sons of the two husbands - where between them, they inherit him, but he does not inherit them (because each one can say to him 'Prove that you are our brother, before you take with us'!).

(c) The equivalent Din here would be - that the Safek (who receives a portion whosoever son he is) could say to them 'Prove that you are my brothers before you take with me'!).

(d) Rav Mesharshaya told them that the cases were not even similar - because whereas there (in Nos'in al ha'Anusah), each set of brothers *knows* exactly whose heir he is, here, the Safek does *not*, making him no less a Safek (Halachically) than they. Consequently, the amount that the sons of the Yavam agree is his due (as a brother of theirs) he takes at the outset; and as for the rest (the section over which they are arguing), they take half and he takes half.

(a) Rav Mesharshaya therefore compares the Mishnah in Nos'in al ha'Anusah to the Safek and the sons of the Yavam who both claim the inheritance of the *Yavam*. After the Safek has taken half the property of the dead man (see Tosfos DH 'Amar'), he claims that the sons of the Yavam must give him, either an equal share in their father's property (in which case, he will return his half of the first brothers property), or they the other half of their share in their uncle's property.

(b) He is interested in doing this - because the Yavam was far more wealthy than his brother.

(c) Rebbi Aba says 'Kam Dina' - which means that, having issued their initial ruling (placing half the property of the first brother in his possession), Beis-Din will not now retract from this ruling (see next answer).

(d) Rav Yirmiyah says - 'Hadar Dina', meaning that, having received half the inheritance of the first brother, he is now entitled to claim that he is an heir of the second brother, and Beis-Din will even reverse their initial ruling in support of his claim.

(a) If someone who owned a field that was surrounded by four other fields, goes overseas, and when he returns nobody remembers through whose field his path led, according to Admon, he may take the shortest route (which will be explained shortly). According to the Rabbanan - he will have to either pay whatever price he is asked for a route to his field, or to fly there through the air.

(b) We initially think that Admon is right - because we established the Mishnah in a case where the four fields that surround the field in the middle are all owned by one man.

(c) Rav Yehudah Amar Rav establishes our Mishnah when the four fields are owned by four owners (making us wonder how Admon could ever have said such a thing.

(d) When Rava says that if *four* came on the strength of *four* or on the strength of *one*, even Admon will agree - he means that if the man in the middle has to contend with four owners, even Admon will agree that each owner can push him on to the other three (in effect, meaning that he has no claim against them).

(a) The Machlokes is in a case when *one* man comes on the strength of *four*. Admon maintains that the man can claim a path 'mi'Mah Nafshach' (seeing as he is the sole owner of the four fields, and he cannot deny that, originally, he [the owner of the middle field] had a path leading to his field). According to the Rabbanan - the man who owns the *four* fields can counter by saying that if the claimant is silent, he will sell him a path for the going price (see Tosfos DH 'da'Amar'), but if not, he will return the four Sh'taros to their original owners, and then what will he do?

(b) We try to establish Rebbi Aba (in 10b.) like the Rabbanan - because they too, maintain 'Kam Dina', in spite of the claimant's argument of 'mi'Mah Nafshach'; and Rav Yirmiyah like Admon - because he holds 'Hadar Dina', because of it.

(c) However, we conclude ...

1. ... Rebbi Aba will say that even Admon agrees with him - because Admon only said his Din in the case of the fields, where the claimant had a definite claim (of a path to his field), whereas in our case, the Safek does not know for sure whether he is the heir of the first brother or of the second.
2. ... Rav Yirmiyah will say that, even the Rabbanan agree with him - because the owner of the four fields has the leverage of being able to return them to their original owner, which the sons of the Yavam in our case do not have.
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