(Permission is granted to print and redistribute this material
as long as this header and the footer at the end are included.)


prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

Previous daf

Yevamos 36

YEVAMOS 36 & 37 - sponsored by Hagaon Rav Yosef Pearlman of London, a living demonstration of love for and adoration of the Torah.



(a) According to the Beraisa that we just learned, the Tzarah is forbidden to get married, because the baby may live - implying that if we knew that the baby will die, she would be permitted (proving that the Chalitzah of a Me'uberes is valid (a Kashya on Resh Lakish)!

(b) Resh Lakish amends the Beraisa to read 'Shema *Lo* Yehei ha'V'lad ben Kayama, u'Bi'as Me'uberes *Lo* Sh'mah Bi'ah, va'Chalitzas Me'uberes *Lo* Sh'mah Chalitzah'. The Tana nevertheless need to add the fact that the baby does not exempt (from Yibum and Chalitzah) until it is born - because otherwise, we would go after the majority of women, who give birth to a baby that lives, permitting her to marry anticipating that this will be the case.

(c) Rebbi Elazar was impressed with Resh Lakish's opinion - which explains why he set out to find a Mishnah in support of it.

(a) The Mishnah in ha'Ishah Basra says that a woman whose husband and Tzarah went overseas, and they came and told her that her husband had died - may neither get married nor make Yibum, in case the Yevamah is pregnant?

(b) Rebbi Elazar attempts to vindicate Resh Lakish from there - because (whereas Yibum is understandable, seeing as the baby may live, in which case she have transgressed the Isur of Eishes Ach) why should she not make Chalitzah, unless the Tana holds that the Chalitzah of a pregnant woman or her Tzarah is not valid (like Resh Lakish)?

(c) Even Rebbi Yochanan will agree that the woman is forbidden to get married, even after performing Chalitzah - within nine months, in case the baby lives, and, as we learned above, the baby does not exempt the Yevamah from Yibum until it is born.

(d) The text 'Tachlotz be'Toch Sheloshah ve'Tinasei le'Achar Sheloshah' is unacceptable - because how can we permit her to marry after three months, when the baby may well live, and we just learned that if that is so, it is only the baby that will permit her to get married, but only from the moment that he is born?

(a) We reject Rebbi Elazar's proof on the grounds that even Resh Lakish would be forced to agree that, strictly speaking, it should be possible for the woman to marry after nine months. In that case, why should she not perform Chalitzah before nine months and get married after nine months?

(b) The Tana's reason for forbidding her to do so - is because of Abaye and Chinena, the sons of Avin, who explained that perhaps the baby will live, in which case, the Chalitzah will be invalidated retroactively, and she will require a public announcement to permit her to marry a Kohen. The problem with this is that there may be people who were present at the Chalitzah but not at the announcement, and, if we subsequently permit her to marry, those people will think that a Chalutzah may marry a Kohen.

(c) Abaye rejects even this explanation, establishing the Beraisa like Rebbi Yochanan - by pointing out that the Beraisa says nothing about not performing Chalitzah, only marriage and Yibum; so who said that the Yevamah is forbidden to perform Chalitzah (like Rebbi Yochanan)?

(d) We finally quote a Beraisa that vindicates Resh Lakish. The Beraisa says that a Yavam who performs Chalitzah with a Me'uberes, and who then loses her baby - still requires Chalitzah from the brothers.

(a) In addition to our case, Rava quotes two other cases where the Halachah is like Resh Lakish against Rebbi Yochanan.

(b) One of the two cases concerns someone who distributes his property among his children. The Mishnah in Bava Basra makes a distinction between whether he uses a Lashon of Yerushah - in which case the distribution is invalid, or whether he does not - in which case it is.

(c) As long as he mentions Matanah, the Tana adds, the distribution stands (even though the basic text of the Sh'tar is one of Yerushah) - and it makes no difference in which part of the Sh'tar he mentions it, at the beginning, in the middle or at the end.

(d) In the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan (in Bava Basra), as long as the father mentions Matanah once, the entire distribution stands. Resh Lakish however, says - that the distribution only stands if the Lashon of Matanah pertains to each person.




(a) The third case where Rava rules like Resh Lakish concerns a Mishnah in Bava Kama which states 'ha'Kosev Kol Nechasav li'V'no le'Achar Moso' - meaning that he writes 'from today and until after my death' bequeathing all his property to his son immediately, but retaining the 'Peiros' (all current benefits) for himself until then.

(b) Neither of them is permitted to sell the property as long as the father is still alive.

(c) If ...

1. ... the father did sell the property - the sale is valid (i.e. the Peiros) until his death.
2. ... the son sold it - the sale will take effect only after his father's death.
(d) If the son sold it during his father's life-time and then died, Rebbi Yochanan maintains that the sale is not valid (even after the father's death), whereas according to Resh Lakish, it is. The reason of ...
1. ... Rebbi Yochanan is because - he holds (the) 'Kinyan Peiros (of the father) ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', thereby rendering his son's sale invalid.
2. ... Resh Lakish is because, in his opinion - 'Kinyan Peiros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', so it does not interfere with the son's sale.
6) The Tana of our Mishnah considers the son's sale valid from the time of the father's death, says Rebbi Yochanan, only because the son is still alive, and the son sold any rights that he would later obtain (which he did when his father died).


(a) The Seifa of our Mishnah rules that if, after the Yavam performed Yibum, the baby turned out to be a still-born, he is permitted to remain with her. Rebbi Eliezer disagrees - in his opinion, we obligate him to divorce her.

(b) We will learn later that a man is forbidden to marry a woman who is pregnant from her previous husband, or who is feeding his baby, for a period of twenty-four months. The Chachamim rule in a case where a man *did* marry one of the above women - that he must send her away until the twenty-four months expire, when he may take her back.

(c) Rava tries to equate Rebbi Meir, who says that he must divorce her and may never take her back, with Rebbi Eliezer (in a.) - because they both hold that the sinner deserves to get punished for entering into a Safek Isur Eishes Ach or for marrying a woman who is forbidden to him.

(d) Abaye disagrees with Rava's equation.

1. Rebbi Eliezer's ruling might be confined to our Mishnah, he says, but will not apply to the case of Rebbi Meir - where he only transgressed an Isur de'Rabbanan.
2. ... Rebbi Meir's ruling might well be confined to the Din of marrying a woman who is pregnant from her previous husband, or who is feeding his baby (which are de'Rabbanan), but not to our case - which is anyway an Isur d'Oraysa, and do not require reinforcement (and we sometimes find that the Chachamim were more stringent by *their* commands than they were by the *Torah's*).
(a) The Chachamim of Rebbi Meir (in the Beraisa) obligate the man to send his wife away ('Yotzi') but, after the twenty-four months have expired, he may take her back. Rava interprets 'Yotzi' to mean - that he must give her a Get.

(b) Mar Zutra actually infers this from the Lashon 'Yotzi' - when the Tana could have said 'Yafrish' ('that he should separate').

(a) We infer from Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says in a Mishnah in Shabbos 'Kol she'Shahah be'Adam Sheloshim Yom, Eino Nefel' - that if the baby died within thirty days, he is a Safek Nefel.

(b) The ramifications of this ruling with regard to the Din of Yibum - are that, if the baby died within thirty days, his mother requires Chalitzah but not Yibum.

(c) Raban Shimon ben Gamliel's Din will not apply - in a case when we know for sure that the baby is a ninth-month baby, in which case he is never a Safek.

(a) Ravina Amar Rava says that, if, in the above case, the baby died within thirty days, and the mother accepted Kidushin from a man from the Shuk: if her husband is a Yisrael, she requires Chalitzah, but if he is a Kohen (who will subsequently be forbidden to take her back) - she does not.

(b) Rav Mesharshaya Amar Rava says - that, even if her husband is a Kohen, she still requires Chalitzah.

(c) Ravina explained that - the night before, Rava had indeed said what Rav Mesharshaya quoted him as saying; in the morning however, he retracted from his initial stance, in the way that *he* had quoted him.

(d) When Ravina told him that, Rav Mesharshaya retorted - 'Having permitted this case, may you go on to permit Cheilev, too'.

Next daf


For further information on
subscriptions, archives and sponsorships,
contact Kollel Iyun Hadaf,