ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 25
(a) It possible to rule both like Rav (who establishes a Kol [a rumor] only
when there are witnesses, and like Rebbi (who establishes it even when there
are not) - by establishing Rav by a Kol that was canceled by a second Kol
stating that the first one was false (though this is not the opinion of Rav
himself - see Mahadura Basra).
(b) Abaye heard from his wise foster-mother that a Kala de'Lo Pasik means
that it lasts for one and a half days. Dumi de'Masa mean - rumors that are
no more than conjectures.
(c) The Kol must have been constant during that time and must *not* have
stopped in the middle - unless it was stopped out of fear, in which case we
will take it seriously even if it *did*.
(d) The man concerned must also have no enemies - otherwise one can assume
that it is his enemies who spread the Kol in the first place.
(a) The Mishnah says in Nedarim that someone may never take his wife back if
he divorces her because of ...
1. ... vows that she took whilst they were married - since we are afraid
that, if he could do so, then she may nullify those vows after she
re-marries and has children from her second husband, and that her ex-husband
will then claim that, had he known that her vows could be nullified, he
would never have divorced her. In so doing, he nullifies the Get he gave her
retroactively, rendering the sons from her second husband Mamzeirim.
Consequently, we tell him to check before divorcing her whether her vows
cannot be nullified, because once he has divorced he, he will be unable to
take her back.
(b) Rabah bar Rav Huna objected to Rabah bar Rav Nachman's comparison of
these two cases to that of our Mishnah, when a man who is suspected of
adultery is forbidden to marry the woman concerned and is obligated to
divorce her should he marry her illegally (and that, in these cases too,
even if he took her back, he must immediately divorce her) - on the grounds
that, in our Mishnah, it was the Beis-Din who forced the husband to divorce
the woman in the first place (as Rav learned above) and that may be the
reason that even if the suspected adulterer married her, he must divorce her
immediately; whereas in the two cases in question, it was the husband who
divorced her of his own volition.
2. ... a bad name that she has acquired for herself - because we are afraid
that, after she marries again, a second Kol will negate the first one, and
her ex-husband will then present the same argument as in the previous case.
(c) Rabah bar Rav Nachman justified his comparison - by establishing the
Mishnah too, by when the husband divorced his wife of his own volition (not
(d) Despite the fact that the cases now appear similar, we nevertheless
conclude that they are not, and that in the two cases currently under
discussion, he *may well be permitted* to remain with his wife if he
actually took her back illegally, even though in the case in our Mishnah he
is *not* permitted to do so) - because in the case in our Mishnah, by
marrying the woman with whom he had an affair, he substantiates the Kol,
whereas in the other two cases, perhaps the husband took his wife back
because he discovered that the Kol in either case was unfounded.
(a) Someone who brings a Get from overseas to Eretz Yisrael is obligated to
state 'be'Fanai Nichtav u've'Fanai Nechtam' - because the Sofrim in Chutz
la'Aretz were not expert in writing Gitin accurately.
(b) He is not permitted to marry the woman whose Get he brought, after her
divorce - because, seeing as she is becoming divorced through him, it would
very much as if he was helping the divorce to become effective, in order to
(c) The Tana also prohibits a witness who testifies that a woman's husband
died, or that he (either alone or together with others) killed him, from
marrying the man's wife. According to Rebbi Yehudah - he is believed to say
that he killed him together with others (as will be explained in the Sugya),
but not to say that he killed him on his own.
(a) Our Mishnah forbids the witness who brings the Get from Chutz la'Aretz
to marry the woman, from which we can infer that if he brings it from one
town in Eretz Yisrael to another, he may - because (due to the fact that the
Sofrim in Eretz Yisrael were experts in writing Gitin, the Sh'li'ach who
brought the get did not need to testify that the Get was written and sealed
in his presence.
(b) The real reason that Chazal permitted a woman to get married on the
basis of the testimony of only one witness (who testified that her husband
died) - is because the woman is then expected to make extensive enquiries of
her own before getting married again.
(c) The reason that the man who brings a Get in Eretz Yisrael is permitted
to marry the woman after the divorce, whereas the witness who testifies that
her husband died, is not (despite the fact that, in neither case, do we
really rely on the single witnesses' testimony) - is because in the former
case, there is a document which bears out his testimony (so that his
testimony does not even appear to be instrumental in the woman's divorce),
whereas in the latter case, she becomes free to marry entirely on the basis
of the witnesses' testimony, and it looks as if it is entirely through him
that she is getting married.
(d) The same distinction - results in the fact that even women who are not
believed to testify that the woman's husband died, are believed to bring a
woman's Get from one town to another.
(a) According to Rav Yosef, if a man testifies together with a second
witness that someone raped him, he is believed to have the man stoned, but
not if he claims that he was a willing partner - because according to his
own testimony, he is a Rasha, and a Rasha is not believed to testify, (as
the Torah writes in Mishpatim).
(b) We refute the suggestion that our Mishnah, which believes the witness
who testified that he killed the woman's husband, is different because we
are lenient by Eidus Ishah, on the basis of Rav Menasheh - who said that a
Gazlan de'Rabbanan (such as a gambler and all of the cases listed in the
Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah) is Kasher to testify to permit a woman to get
married, whereas a Gazlan d'Oraysa is Pasul (demonstrating that Eidus Ishah
is no different than other area of Halachah).
(c) According to Rav Yosef, Rav Menasheh will then hold like Rebbi Yehudah,
who does not believe the witness who testifies that he killed the woman's
husband. We reconcile Rav Menasheh with the Rabbanan however, by
establishing their opinion in our Mishnah like Rava (who disagrees with Rav
Yosef, and ) - who says that, seeing as a person is a close relative to
himself, he is not believed in testimony that concerns himself.
Consequently, when he testifies that someone had relations with him with his
consent, he is believed regarding his main testimony, but not what he
testifies with regard to himself.
(d) We apply the principle 'Hoda'as Ba'al-Din ke'Mei'ah Eidim Dami' - with
regard to money matters, but not to fines, punishments (e.g. Malkos) or
(a) It does not follow that Rav Yosef, who maintains that a person who
claims that someone had relations with him with his consent, disqualifies
himself, holds like Rebbi Yehudah - because he maintains that Chazal were
lenient with regard to Eidus Ishah (because of Igunah), in which case, he
can hold like the Rabbanan in our Mishnah.
(b) In his opinion - Rav Menasheh, who does not make any concessions by
Eidus Ishah, holds like Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah.
(a) Rebbi Yehudah's distinction between 'Haragti' and 'Haragnuhu' is
senseless. When he says that 'Haragnuhu' is believed - he means, not that
they killed the man together with others (which is no different than saying
that he killed him on his own), but that he was with the murderers when they
(b) In the Beraisa that supports this explanation, when the Rabbanan quoted
him the story of the robber who, as he was being taken out to be killed,
testified that he had killed the wife of Shimon ben Kohen, concluding that
the Rabbanan of that time believed him - Rebbi Yehudah retorted that what
the robber had said was that he was with the robbers when they killed him.
(c) In spite of the fact that according to Rebbi Yehudah, the robber had
only participated in the robbing, but not in the murder, he received the
death-penalty - because it was a court of Nochri judges who had judged him,
who had failed to clarify his guilt before sentencing him.
(a) A Chacham who was unable to find justification for nullifying a woman's
vow, as a result of which her husband divorced her, is forbidden to marry
her. A Dayan, on the other hand, in whose presence a girl made Miy'un or
Chalitzah, is subsequently permitted to marry her - because they require a
Beis-Din of three, which is above suspicion.
(b) We infer from our Mishnah, that had the same Chacham managed to nullify
the woman's vow, he would have been permitted to marry her in the event of
her husband subsequently dying or divorcing her. This cannot be referring to
one of three Dayanim, who are permitted to do so in any case, but to a
single Dayan - who is permitted to nullify vows on his own, provided he is
an expert in that field.
(a) The Tana of our Mishnah permits a Dayan in whose presence a girl made
Miy'un or Chalitzah to marry her, because a Beis-Din of three is beyond
suspicion. As a matter of fact, *two* witnesses are not suspected of lying
(b) The reason that our Mishnah mentions three, is to teach us that Miy'un
and Chalitzah require a Beis-Din of *three* (to preclude the opinion that
permits even one of *two*).
(a) If a Chacham or a witness who brought a Get from overseas *did* marry
the woman concerned, Rav Kahana rules that he must divorce her immediately.
Rav Ashi says - that he is permitted to remain with her.
(b) The Beraisa backs Rav Ashi's ruling. Rav Ashi also cites a Mishnah which
rules that someone about whom a rumor has spread that he had relations with
a Shifchah or a Nochris who was subsequently set free or converted - is
forbidden to marry her, but that, if he did, he may remain married to her.
(c) Someone who married a divorced woman under similar circumstances
however, must divorce her immediately - because, since her husband only
divorced her on account of this man, it is particularly ugly for him to then
go and marry her (or to remain with her).