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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Yevamos 25



(a) It possible to rule both like Rav (who establishes a Kol [a rumor] only when there are witnesses, and like Rebbi (who establishes it even when there are not) - by establishing Rav by a Kol that was canceled by a second Kol stating that the first one was false (though this is not the opinion of Rav himself - see Mahadura Basra).

(b) Abaye heard from his wise foster-mother that a Kala de'Lo Pasik means that it lasts for one and a half days. Dumi de'Masa mean - rumors that are no more than conjectures.

(c) The Kol must have been constant during that time and must *not* have stopped in the middle - unless it was stopped out of fear, in which case we will take it seriously even if it *did*.

(d) The man concerned must also have no enemies - otherwise one can assume that it is his enemies who spread the Kol in the first place.

(a) The Mishnah says in Nedarim that someone may never take his wife back if he divorces her because of ...
1. ... vows that she took whilst they were married - since we are afraid that, if he could do so, then she may nullify those vows after she re-marries and has children from her second husband, and that her ex-husband will then claim that, had he known that her vows could be nullified, he would never have divorced her. In so doing, he nullifies the Get he gave her retroactively, rendering the sons from her second husband Mamzeirim. Consequently, we tell him to check before divorcing her whether her vows cannot be nullified, because once he has divorced he, he will be unable to take her back.
2. ... a bad name that she has acquired for herself - because we are afraid that, after she marries again, a second Kol will negate the first one, and her ex-husband will then present the same argument as in the previous case.
(b) Rabah bar Rav Huna objected to Rabah bar Rav Nachman's comparison of these two cases to that of our Mishnah, when a man who is suspected of adultery is forbidden to marry the woman concerned and is obligated to divorce her should he marry her illegally (and that, in these cases too, even if he took her back, he must immediately divorce her) - on the grounds that, in our Mishnah, it was the Beis-Din who forced the husband to divorce the woman in the first place (as Rav learned above) and that may be the reason that even if the suspected adulterer married her, he must divorce her immediately; whereas in the two cases in question, it was the husband who divorced her of his own volition.

(c) Rabah bar Rav Nachman justified his comparison - by establishing the Mishnah too, by when the husband divorced his wife of his own volition (not like Rav).

(d) Despite the fact that the cases now appear similar, we nevertheless conclude that they are not, and that in the two cases currently under discussion, he *may well be permitted* to remain with his wife if he actually took her back illegally, even though in the case in our Mishnah he is *not* permitted to do so) - because in the case in our Mishnah, by marrying the woman with whom he had an affair, he substantiates the Kol, whereas in the other two cases, perhaps the husband took his wife back because he discovered that the Kol in either case was unfounded.

(a) Someone who brings a Get from overseas to Eretz Yisrael is obligated to state 'be'Fanai Nichtav u've'Fanai Nechtam' - because the Sofrim in Chutz la'Aretz were not expert in writing Gitin accurately.

(b) He is not permitted to marry the woman whose Get he brought, after her divorce - because, seeing as she is becoming divorced through him, it would very much as if he was helping the divorce to become effective, in order to marry her.

(c) The Tana also prohibits a witness who testifies that a woman's husband died, or that he (either alone or together with others) killed him, from marrying the man's wife. According to Rebbi Yehudah - he is believed to say that he killed him together with others (as will be explained in the Sugya), but not to say that he killed him on his own.

(a) Our Mishnah forbids the witness who brings the Get from Chutz la'Aretz to marry the woman, from which we can infer that if he brings it from one town in Eretz Yisrael to another, he may - because (due to the fact that the Sofrim in Eretz Yisrael were experts in writing Gitin, the Sh'li'ach who brought the get did not need to testify that the Get was written and sealed in his presence.

(b) The real reason that Chazal permitted a woman to get married on the basis of the testimony of only one witness (who testified that her husband died) - is because the woman is then expected to make extensive enquiries of her own before getting married again.

(c) The reason that the man who brings a Get in Eretz Yisrael is permitted to marry the woman after the divorce, whereas the witness who testifies that her husband died, is not (despite the fact that, in neither case, do we really rely on the single witnesses' testimony) - is because in the former case, there is a document which bears out his testimony (so that his testimony does not even appear to be instrumental in the woman's divorce), whereas in the latter case, she becomes free to marry entirely on the basis of the witnesses' testimony, and it looks as if it is entirely through him that she is getting married.

(d) The same distinction - results in the fact that even women who are not believed to testify that the woman's husband died, are believed to bring a woman's Get from one town to another.

(a) According to Rav Yosef, if a man testifies together with a second witness that someone raped him, he is believed to have the man stoned, but not if he claims that he was a willing partner - because according to his own testimony, he is a Rasha, and a Rasha is not believed to testify, (as the Torah writes in Mishpatim).

(b) We refute the suggestion that our Mishnah, which believes the witness who testified that he killed the woman's husband, is different because we are lenient by Eidus Ishah, on the basis of Rav Menasheh - who said that a Gazlan de'Rabbanan (such as a gambler and all of the cases listed in the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah) is Kasher to testify to permit a woman to get married, whereas a Gazlan d'Oraysa is Pasul (demonstrating that Eidus Ishah is no different than other area of Halachah).

(c) According to Rav Yosef, Rav Menasheh will then hold like Rebbi Yehudah, who does not believe the witness who testifies that he killed the woman's husband. We reconcile Rav Menasheh with the Rabbanan however, by establishing their opinion in our Mishnah like Rava (who disagrees with Rav Yosef, and ) - who says that, seeing as a person is a close relative to himself, he is not believed in testimony that concerns himself. Consequently, when he testifies that someone had relations with him with his consent, he is believed regarding his main testimony, but not what he testifies with regard to himself.

(d) We apply the principle 'Hoda'as Ba'al-Din ke'Mei'ah Eidim Dami' - with regard to money matters, but not to fines, punishments (e.g. Malkos) or invalidating oneself).




(a) It does not follow that Rav Yosef, who maintains that a person who claims that someone had relations with him with his consent, disqualifies himself, holds like Rebbi Yehudah - because he maintains that Chazal were lenient with regard to Eidus Ishah (because of Igunah), in which case, he can hold like the Rabbanan in our Mishnah.

(b) In his opinion - Rav Menasheh, who does not make any concessions by Eidus Ishah, holds like Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah.

(a) Rebbi Yehudah's distinction between 'Haragti' and 'Haragnuhu' is senseless. When he says that 'Haragnuhu' is believed - he means, not that they killed the man together with others (which is no different than saying that he killed him on his own), but that he was with the murderers when they killed him.

(b) In the Beraisa that supports this explanation, when the Rabbanan quoted him the story of the robber who, as he was being taken out to be killed, testified that he had killed the wife of Shimon ben Kohen, concluding that the Rabbanan of that time believed him - Rebbi Yehudah retorted that what the robber had said was that he was with the robbers when they killed him.

(c) In spite of the fact that according to Rebbi Yehudah, the robber had only participated in the robbing, but not in the murder, he received the death-penalty - because it was a court of Nochri judges who had judged him, who had failed to clarify his guilt before sentencing him.

(a) A Chacham who was unable to find justification for nullifying a woman's vow, as a result of which her husband divorced her, is forbidden to marry her. A Dayan, on the other hand, in whose presence a girl made Miy'un or Chalitzah, is subsequently permitted to marry her - because they require a Beis-Din of three, which is above suspicion.

(b) We infer from our Mishnah, that had the same Chacham managed to nullify the woman's vow, he would have been permitted to marry her in the event of her husband subsequently dying or divorcing her. This cannot be referring to one of three Dayanim, who are permitted to do so in any case, but to a single Dayan - who is permitted to nullify vows on his own, provided he is an expert in that field.

(a) The Tana of our Mishnah permits a Dayan in whose presence a girl made Miy'un or Chalitzah to marry her, because a Beis-Din of three is beyond suspicion. As a matter of fact, *two* witnesses are not suspected of lying either.

(b) The reason that our Mishnah mentions three, is to teach us that Miy'un and Chalitzah require a Beis-Din of *three* (to preclude the opinion that permits even one of *two*).

(a) If a Chacham or a witness who brought a Get from overseas *did* marry the woman concerned, Rav Kahana rules that he must divorce her immediately. Rav Ashi says - that he is permitted to remain with her.

(b) The Beraisa backs Rav Ashi's ruling. Rav Ashi also cites a Mishnah which rules that someone about whom a rumor has spread that he had relations with a Shifchah or a Nochris who was subsequently set free or converted - is forbidden to marry her, but that, if he did, he may remain married to her.

(c) Someone who married a divorced woman under similar circumstances however, must divorce her immediately - because, since her husband only divorced her on account of this man, it is particularly ugly for him to then go and marry her (or to remain with her).

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