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Yevamos, 93

YEVAMOS 86-95 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.


QUESTION: The Gemara says that it is prohibited mid'Rabanan to separate Terumos and Ma'aseros on Shabbos because doing so involves "Tiltul Muktzah," handling Muktzah (because Tevel is Muktzah).

Why does the Gemara say that the reason is because of Tiltul? The Gemara in Beitzah (37a) implies that the reason is because of a Gezeirah to prevent one from conducting business transactions (Mekach u'Memkar), because when one is Makdish an item to Hekdesh, one thereby transfers its ownership to Hekdesh. Separating Terumos and Ma'aseros is also prohibited for that reason. RASHI in Beitzah (9a, DH Ochel v'Holech) gives another reason to prohibit it; he says that the act of separating Terumos makes the produce edible, and thus it is prohibited because it appears like one is fixing an item (Metaken). Why, then, does the Gemara here say that it is prohibited because of Tiltul? (REBBI AKIVA EIGER in GILYON HA'SHAS)

ANSWER: The TOSFOS YOM HA'KIPURIM (Yoma 83b) says that both prohibitions exist. The Isur of Metaken is necessary for a case when one does not need to pick up or handle the Tevel (such as when the fruit is already separated into two piles, and one merely has to designate one of the piles as the Terumah fruits), in which case there is no Tiltul.

Why, though, does the Gemara mention the smaller problem of Tiltul, if Metaken is all-encompassing and applies in every case?

The Gemara is saying that although the Isur d'Rabanan of Tiltul is a very strong Isur which is on par with an Isur d'Oraisa (as the TOSFOS YESHANIM says in Beitzah 3b), nevertheless it is only a d'Rabanan, and thus it cannot be what the Torah is referring to in the verse "Lema'an Tilmad l'Yir'ah." It goes without saying that the Isurim of Metaken and Mekach u'Memkar are certainly not what the Torah is referring to. The point the Gemara is making is that we should not think that Tiltul, which is Asur mi'Divrei Kabalah -- it is learned from verses in the Nevi'aim, (Shabbos 123b) -- is considered an Isur d'Oraisa. (M. Kornfeld -- see Insights to Yoma 83b.)


QUESTION: The Gemara discusses whether the testimony of a single witness is accepted to permit a woman to marry in cases other than that of the Mishnah (87b). The second version of the Gemara asserts that a single witness is certainly believed to say that the woman's husband died in order to allow her to do Yibum when her husband had no children. This is because a single witness is believed *more* than a woman is believed, and we know that a woman alone is believed to say that her husband died without children and thereby permit herself to do Yibum (114b). The question is only if a single witness is believed to testify that a woman does *not* have to do Yibum (by testifying that her Yavam died, or that her husband died before his children died), even though there is a Chazakah that she is obligated to do Yibum. In such a case, the woman is not believed, as the Mishnah later says.

The Gemara inquires whether the single witness should be believed because his testimony is "Avida Ligluyei" (will eventually become known), or whether he is not believed because the woman does not carefully attempt to verify the facts because she wants to exempt herself from Yibum, since she hates the Yavam.

Why does the Gemara ask specifically about the Halachah in this case -- when the single witness testifies against the Chazakah and says that the woman is *not* obligated to do Yibum? The same can be asked about a case where he testifies against a Chazakah that she is exempt from Yibum, testifying that she *is* obligated to do Yibum (such as by testifying that her husband died after his children died)! (TOSFOS DH Ki)


(a) TOSFOS first answers that the two questions are indeed identical, and the Gemara mentions the question of a witness permitting her to marry by exempting her from Yibum because it happens to be that this was the question that was posed due to an incident than occurred at the time.

(b) The RAMBAN and other Rishonim suggest that the Gemara chose the case of exempting her from Yibum in order to teach the point that even though exempting her from Yibum involves only a question of an Isur Lav (the Isur of Yevamah la'Shuk) and not an Isur Kares, and, in addition, even though the testimony of the single witness that the Yavam died is something that is "Avida Ligluyei" (will become known later) -- nevertheless it is not clear that the witness should be believed, because the woman might not check it out so carefully.

(c) TOSFOS and the RA'AVAD (cited by the Ramban) suggest another explanation. They say that although we find that a woman is not believed, without the testimony of witnesses, to permit herself to the Yavam (by saying that her child died before her husband died), it is not because she does not check it out. The love for a Yavam does not overcome the woman's common sense to persuade her to testify that her husband is dead without checking it out. Why, then, is she not believed? She is not believed because the reason to be lenient of "Mishum Iguna" does not apply, since there will be no "Igun" if she does not end up becoming permitted to the Yavam. If so, when there is a single witness testifying that she is permitted to the Yavam, the testimony of the witness *combined with* the fact that a woman checks the story out for herself provide enough reason to be lenient (even when there is no "Igun") and to allow her to theYavam.

On the other hand, when the woman testifies that she is *not* obligated to do Yibum, then not only is there no reason to be lenient because of "Iguna" (since she will not be left unable to marry; she can marry the Yavam), but we also suspect that she will not properly verify that she is really exempt. Since we suspect her of hating the Yavam, she will fail to investigate whether she is really exempt from Yibum, for her hate *can* overcome her common sense. The emotion of hate tends to be more powerful than the emotion of love.

Therefore, even when a single witness testifies on her behalf, his testimony cannot be accepted because we do not have the added factor that the woman checks out the facts for herself carefully. That is why the Gemara questions only what the Halachah is with regard to *exempting* her from Yibum.

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