THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
Ask A Question about the Daf
YEVAMOS 5 - generously sponsored by Lee and Marsha Weinblatt of Teaneck,
N.J. -- may Hashem protect them and all that is theirs!
1) EXPOUNDING "SEMUCHIN" TO TEACH "ASEH DOCHEH LO TA'ASEH"
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the source for the principle of "Aseh Docheh
Lo Ta'aseh" at length. It proposes that the source that an Aseh is Docheh a
Lo Ta'aseh is derived from the proximity of the prohibition of wearing
Kil'ayim with the command to make Tzitzis for one's garment. The proximity
(Semuchin) of those two verses teaches that one may place threads of wool in
a garment of linen in order to make Tzitzis, the Mitzvas Aseh of Tzitzis
thereby being Docheh the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim.
2) THE TEACHING OF THE VERSE OF "ROSHO"
The Gemara concludes that this is a valid source for "Aseh Docheh Lo
Ta'aseh" according to d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael. According to d'Vei Rebbi
Yishmael, there is an extra phrase in the verse of Kil'ayim which gives us
license to apply Semuchin and to learn that the Aseh of Tzitzis is Docheh
the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim. According to the Rabanan, however, there is no
extra phrase (because they require the phrase "Tzemer u'Pishtim" to teach
that the Isur of Kil'ayim applies only to a mixture of wool and linen and
not to any other mixture). Hence the Gemara asks that according to the
Rabanan, what is the source for the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh,"
since we can only apply Semuchin if there is an extra phrase.
What is the Gemara's question? Only Rebbi Yehudah requires that there be an
extra phrase ("Mufneh") in order to expound Semuchin -- the Rabanan who
argue with d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael can simply hold like the Rabanan who argue
with Rebbi Yehudah and do not require an extra phrase in order to expound
(a) TOSFOS (DH l'Rabanan) says that the Gemara is just asking this question
to cover all possibilities, just in case the Rabanan hold like Rebbi
(b) The RITVA (and ME'IRI) answers that the Rabanan -- who argue with Rebbi
Yehudah and apply Semuchin even when there is no extra phrase -- do not go
so far as to extend the law derived from Semuchin to other cases through a
Binyan Av, unless there is an extra phrase. When there is no extra phrase,
the law derived through Semuchin applies only to the specific case mentioned
in the verse, and cannot be applied to other cases.
(c) TOSFOS HA'ROSH in the name of RABEINU MEIR explains that even if the
Rabanan hold that we do expound Semuchin, perhaps in this case the Semuchin
does not teach us that one is able to put Tzitzis of wool on a garment on
linen. Perhaps according to the Rabanan (who do not rule that any time the
verse says "Beged" it refers to Tzemer and Pishtim only) the Semuchin
teaches a different Halachah altogether -- the Halachah of Rava, that
Tzitzis of wool or linen may be used for a garment of any material (while
Tzitzis made of any other material may only be used for a garment made of
the same material), but Tzitzis of linen may not be used for a garment of
wool, but only for a garment of linen (or another non-wool material).
QUESTION: The Gemara cites the verse, "Rosho" ("On the seventh day he shall
shave off all of his hair, [and the hair of] *his head*") (Vayikra 14:9),
and says that it teaches that the Mitzvas Aseh for a Metzora to shave his
hair is Docheh the Lo Ta'aseh of cutting off the hair of the corners of
one's head ("Hakafas ha'Rosh"). The Gemara suggests that this is the source
for the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh." The Gemara (5b) concludes
that there is another source for "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" -- the verses that
teach that the Mitzvas Aseh of Tzitzis is Docheh the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim.
If we have a source, without the verse of "Rosho," that teaches that an Aseh
is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh, then why do we need the verse of "Rosho" at all? We
already know that an Aseh is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh, and thus we should simply
apply that principle to the situation of a Metzora who has a Mitzvas Aseh to
shave his entire head, even though there is a Lo Ta'aseh that prohibits
shaving one's entire head. If an Aseh is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh in the case of
Tzitzis and Kil'ayim (where the Lo Ta'aseh applies to everyone), then
certainly in the case of a Metzora -- where the Lo Ta'aseh against shaving
the entire head does not apply to everyone (women are not included in the
prohibition) -- the Aseh should be Docheh the Lo Ta'aseh! (The Gemara in
Nazir 58a actually implies that according to the Tana of "Rosho," the source
for "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" is *not* derived from the verses regarding
Tzitzis, but from the word "Rosho" in this verse. Our Sugya, however,
clearly rejects this approach.)
(a) TOSFOS (DH Mah l'Lav) answers that the verse of "Rosho" is needed to
teach another Halachah, and not the Halachah of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh." It
teaches that shaving the entire head is considered "Hakafah" ("Hakafas
ha'Rosh Shmei Hakafah") and it would have been prohibited had it not been
for the Mitzvas Aseh.
(b) Alternatively, without the verse of "Rosho," we might have thought that
the second verse quoted by the Gemara, the verse of "Zekano," is not
referring to the Mitzvah of a Kohen who was a Metzora to shave his hair, but
rather it is referring to a regular person who was a Metzora, and it is not
teaching a new Halachah of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh va'Aseh" in the case of a
Kohen. We might have thought that the verse of "Zekano" is talking about a
case where there is only a Lo Ta'aseh, and thus the Aseh is certainly Docheh
the Lo Ta'aseh, and it is not talking about a case where there is both an
Aseh and a Lo Ta'aseh not to shave. However, now that we have the verse of
"Rosho," we know that "Zekano" is referring to the case of a Kohen Metzora,
and it is teaching that an Aseh is Docheh both an Aseh and a Lo Ta'aseh.
3) A POTENTIAL SOURCE FOR "ASEH DOCHEH LO TA'ASEH SHE'YESH BO KARES"
QUESTION: The Gemara searches for a source for the principle that "Aseh
Docheh Lo Ta'aseh she'Yesh Bo Kares." Since we find that the Torah went out
of its way, in the case of Tzitzis made from Kil'ayim, to specifically teach
that an Aseh is Docheh a normal Lo Ta'aseh (one that does not have Kares),
we should be able to infer that an Aseh is *not* Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh that
has Kares! Why does the Gemara attempt to prove that an Aseh *is* Docheh a
Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares, when we apparently have evidence that it is *not*
Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares?
(a) TOSFOS (6a, middle of DH Ta'ama) explains that we might have thought
that perhaps the verse of Tzitzis does not teach that an Aseh is Docheh a Lo
Ta'aseh. The verse might be teaching the Halachah of Rava, that it is
permitted to use Tzitzis of wool or linen for a garment of any type of
material (according to the Rabanan, and for both woolen and linen garments
according to Rebbi Yishmael, who holds that only those garments are
obligated in Tzitzis.) Without the verse, one would have thought that
Tzitzis must be made of the same material from which the garment is made.
That is why the Gemara thought that perhaps we do not expound the verse of
Tzitzis with regard to Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh. Thus, we are free to find
another source that says that an Aseh is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares.
(b) TOSFOS suggests further that perhaps the Aseh of Tzitzis is a weaker
Aseh, because it does not apply to everyone (women are exempt from the
Mitzvah of Tzitzis). Therefore, we need a verse to teach that nonetheless it
is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh (of Kil'ayim). (This answer does not explain why the
Gemara thought that it could learn from Milah that an Aseh is Docheh a Lo
Ta'aseh that has Kares; Milah is also a Mitzvah that does not apply to
everyone, and yet it is Docheh a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares, and if so,
certainly the Mitzvah of Tzitzis should be able to be Docheh a normal Lo