REVIEW QUESTIONS ON GEMARA AND RASHI
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Sotah 18
(a) On what grounds does Rava invalidate a Megilas Sotah that is written on two
(b) And what does he learn from the Pasuk "Ve'asah Lah ha'Kohen es Kol ha'Torah
(a) "Ve'asah Lah" implies that the Megilas Sotah must be written for that particular
Sotah (and not for another one).
Why does Rava think that two Megilos might not be
Kasher if they are placed in the same cup of water even if they were written for two
(b) And assuming that ...
- ... the erasing needs to be performed for the actual Sotah, why might we even invalidate two Megilos that were written separately and placed into two cups, if they were then poured into one cup?
- ... each Sotah needs to drink her own cup, why might we even invalidate the previous case, if they subsequently poured the water into two cups before the two Sotos drank it?
(a) Rava also asks whether the Sotah will have performed her obligation if she placed
a fibrous substance into the cup, and then sucked the water that it had absorbed
(according to the explanation of the Aruch), or if she drank the water from a straw.
Why might she have not fulfilled her obligation in both of these cases?
(b) What does Rav Ashi say about a case where some of the Mei Sotah spilled?
(a) On what basis does Rava reject Rav's contention that when the Torah writes two
Shevu'os, one pertains to before the Megilah is written, and the other, to
(b) So how does Rava explain the two Shevu'os?
(c) Rava then rejects Rav Amram Amar Rav, who defines a Shevu'ah with an Alah as
'Mashbi'eini Alayich she'Lo Nitmeis, she'Im Nitmeis Yavo'u Bach', on the grounds that
in that case, the Alah and the Shevu'ah are unconnected.
So how does he define a
Shevu'ah with an Alah?
(d) Rav Ashi rejects Rava's explanation because, in that case, there is only an Alah,
but no Shevu'ah.
So how does he amend Rava's definition to resolve all problems?
(a) Following the Alah and the Shevu'ah, the Sotah would respond with 'Amen, Amen',
to cover both of the them, and to cover any man other than the one about whom her
husband warned her.
What does the Tana of our Mishnah mean when he adds that the
two Amens also cover 'Arusah u'Nesu'ah, Shomeres Yavam u'Kenusah'? How many cases is
he referring to?
(b) What else does the double Amen imply, according to the Tana Kama?
(c) What does Rebbi Meir add to this list?
(a) What is the earliest period covered by the second Amen (according to everyone),
and which is the latest (according to Rebbi Meir)?
Answers to questions
(b) If a divorced woman secludes herself with another man, and her husband then
remarries her, why will the second Amen (by a subsequent Kinuy and S'tirah) not cover
(c) Why does living with another man not forbid a divorcee to return to her
(a) Based on the previous statement, what does Rav Hamnuna prove from the fact the
Tana of our Mishnah includes Shomeres Yavam u'Kenusah?
(b) In Eretz Yisrael however, they refuted Rav Hamnuna's proof. According to them,
she is not forbidden to the Yavam through merely having had relations with another
How do they then justify our Mishnah mentioning Shomeres Yavam u'Kenusah? Who
must be the author of our Mishnah according to them?
(c) Rebbi Yirmiyah asked whether the second Amen also covers the previous marriage,
either his own or his brother's.
Why can we not learn this from our Mishnah, which
explicitly says 'Arusah u'Nesu'ah, Shomeres Yavam and K'nusah' (suggesting that the
warning when she is already married to the Yavam covers a seclusion that took place
when she was married to his brother)?
(d) How do we then resolve Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah?
(a) When Rebbi Meir says that the husband's warning covers future acts of seclusion,
does he mean that the water works retroactively (see Poras Yosef)?
(b) Rav Ashi asks whether a man's warning to his wife can take effect for when he
divorces her and remarries her.
How do we resolve this She'eilah from our
(a) What does the Tana Kama of the Beraisa learn from the Pasuk "Zos *Toras*
(b) What does Rebbi Yehudah learn from "*Zos*"?
(c) How does Rebbi Yehudah then establish the testimony of Nechunyah Chofer Shichin
that a woman can drink twice?
(d) What do the Rabbanan say?
(a) What problem do we have with the Tana Kama and the latter Rabbanan?
***** Hadran Alach Hayah Meivi *****
(b) When does everybody agree that a woman ...
(c) Consequently, they argue when there is one husband and two adulterers or two
husbands and one adulterer. The Tana Kama includes all cases from "Toras" and
excludes only the case of one husband and one adulterer from "Zos".
- ... cannot drink twice?
- ... can drink twice?
Which case/s do
we include from "Toras" and exclude from "Zos" according to ...
(d) The Tana Kama evidently maintains that "Toras" is more all-inclusive than "Zos"
is exclusive, and the Rabbanan hold the opposite.
- ... the latter Rabbanan?
- ... Rebbi Yehudah?
According to Rebbi Yehudah, the
Torah left it to the Chachamim to Darshen as they saw fit. On what grounds did they
find it more logical to Darshen "Zos" to exclude one husband and two adulterers from
drinking twice rather than two husbands and (even) one adulterer?
Answers to questions