ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous dafShabbos 112
(a) When our Mishnah permits opening the knot of one's undershirt - it
speaks when the undershirt has two cords with which to tie it - one beneath
the other. One might have thought, that since it is possible to remove it
when only *one* of the cords is untied, a woman will leave one of the cords
permanently tied, and only use the other - so the Tana needs to tell us
that this is not so.
(b) And the Chidush by the headdress, is in the case of a *wide* headdress,
which can be removed without being untied. There too, we might have thought
that the woman would leave it tied, and remove it as it is - so the Tana
needs to tell us that this is not so.
(c) A woman will not remove her belt without untying it, because untying it
is a more modest way of removing it.
(d) We can reconcile all three Beraisos ...
1. ... with regard to a shoe-lace - in the following manner: The Beraisa
which writes that one is *Chayav* for untying a shoelace - speaks about the
permanent knot which the shoe manufacturer initially made, when he affixed
the lace to the shoe.
The Beraisa which writes *Patur* - speaks about a lace which the Rabbanan
used to tie loosely round the leg - loosely, to enable them to remove the
shoe without untying it; and for tying a knot that is not untied every day,
but which is not permanent either, one is Patur. The knot was not
permanent, because, in the rain season, they would tie the shoe tightly, to
prevent it from getting caught in the mud and falling off.
And the Beraisa which rules *Mutar*, speaks about people like the B'nei
Mechuza, who were more fussy about their appearance, and who would tie
their shoes smartly around their legs, thus creating the need to be untie
2. ... with regard to the strap of a sandal - in the following manner: The
Beraisa which says *Chayav* speaks, like the Beraisa with the shoe, about
the permanent knot which the manufacturer made, when he initially affixed
the lace to the sandal - this Beraisa is speaking about Arab manufacturers,
who tended to fit the strap to the sandal.
The Beraisa which says *Patur* speaks about shoes made by other
manufacturers. These sandals came without fitted laces. The laces were
fitted by the owner, and were not permanent. They tended to leave the
straps for 'a week or a month', and would therefore be Patur (Aval Asur)
for tying them on Shabbos.
And the Beraisa which says *Mutar*, speaks about a sandal which is shared
by two people, and which therefore had to be untied regularly.
(a) When the strap of Rebbi Yirmiyah's sandal broke in a Karmelis, Rebbi
Avahu advised him to take a fresh reed - that is fit for animal food - to
tie his sandal with it, and to proceed.
(b) Abaye, on the other hand, was standing in a guarded place, when the
strap of his sandal broke, and since the sandal was safe where it was, Rav
Yosef did not permit Abaye to take a reed, since the sandal itself was
really Muktzah - as we shall now see.
(c) Abaye did not understand why the sandal should be Muktzah, seeing as he
was still able to use it, by changing it the other foot. How is that?
Because a sandal can be used on both feet. When the inside strap breaks, it
can be repaired and used; when it breaks on the outside, it does not look
nice when it is repaired, so one tends to turn the sandal round, and use it
on the other foot - with the repaired strap now on the inside.
(d) Rav Yosef explained to Abaye that *he* held like Rebbi Yochanan, who in
turn, followed the ruling of Rebbi Yehudah, who declared a sandal whose
outside strap broke, to be Muktzah.
(a) Rebbi Yehudah holds - that if the outside strap tears, the shoe is
(b) When Rebbi Yochanan rules that, just as they argue by Tum'ah, so they
argue by Shabbos, but not by Chalitzah - he cannot possibly mean that the
Chachamim argue with Rebbi Yehudah by Shabbos as well as by Tum'ah, but not by Chalitzah, where they will concede that a shoe with the outer strap
broken, is *not* a shoe, and the Chalitzah is Pasul, because we have learnt
in a Mishnah in Yevamos, that Chalitzah performed with the left shoe, is
Kasher (so why should the Rabbanan say Pasul?).
(c) Nor can he be coming to tell us that Rebbi Yehudah will argue with the
Chachamim by Shabbos, just like he argues by Tum'ah, but not by Chalitzah,
where he will concede that it *is* a shoe, and the Chalitzah is Kasher -
because, since the shoe is not considered a shoe with regard to Tum'ah and
Shabbos, why should it be considered a shoe with regard to Chalitzah
(unlike taking a right shoe off the left foot, which *is* basically a good
shoe - and is the case which Rebbi Yehudah and the Rabbanan dispute)?
(d) We therefore amend Rebbi Yochanan's statement to say 've'Chen
la'Chalitzah' - just like the shoe is not a shoe with regard to Tum'ah and
Shabbos, so too, is it not a shoe with regard to Chalitzah, and the
Chalitzah is Pesulah. In any event, Rebbi Yochanan has come to explain
Rebbi Yehudah, proving Rav Yosef's contention, that he holds like him.
(a) The Gemara asks on Rebbi Yochanan from a S'tam Mishnah in Kelim, which
reads 'Sandal she'Nifsekah Achas me'Oznav, ve'Tiknah, Tamei Medras'. Since
Rebbi Yochanan always rules like a Stam Mishnah, which appears to declare
the sandal *Tamei* in all cases, how can he then rule like Rebbi Yehudah,
that if the strap breaks on the outside, the sandal is *Tahor*?
(b) If we were to establish the Mishnah by a sandal whose inside strap tore
(but if it was the outside strap, it would be Tahor), then why does the
Tana need to continue 'Nifsekah Sheni'ah' etc.? Since Sheni'ah must mean
the *outside* strap, the sandal would be Tahor (according to Rebbi Yehudah)
- even if the first strap had *not* torn.
(c) Therefore, the Gemara establishes the Beraisa by a sandal with *four*
straps, in which case, both of the straps referred to in the Beraisa, refer
to the *outside* straps.
(d) No! It is not unanimously agreed that Rebbi Yochanan holds like Rebbi
Yehudah. In Ravin's opinion, it is *Rav* who holds like Rebbi Yehudah.
Rebbi Yochanan holds like the Chachamim.
(a) The Reisha of the above Beraisa says 've'Tiknah (even though the sandal
is Tamei Medras whether one repaired it or not), because of the Seifa,
which teaches that if the second strap tears, the shoe is Tahor from Medras
- even if in the meantime, the first strap had been repaired.
(b) When the second strap of the sandal tears, it is no longer fit to be
used as a sandal, which is why the Tum'as Medras departs. However, the
sandal is still fit to be used for other things (I am not clear why), so it
retains the Tum'ah that it received when touching itself whilst it was
(a) Chizkiyah asked what the Din will be if a wooden vessel has a hole the
size of a k'Zayis, which is repaired, and then another hole the size of a
k'Zayis is made next to the spot where the first hole was (but after it was
already repaired). And this happened a few times, until the total area that
is holed is more than that of a pomegranate (which renders a private wooden
vessel Tahor). Do we contend with the repairs that were effected each time,
before the new hole appeared - in which case, the vessel will remain Tamei;
or do we ignore them, in which case, it will be Tahor.
'If the previous generations are angels', Rebbi Zeira quoted Rava bar
Zimuna as saying, 'then *we* are human beings; and if *they* are human
beings, then *we* are donkeys - but not even like the donkeys of Rebbi
Chanina ben Dosa or of Rebbi Pinchas ben Yair'.
(b) Rebbi Yochanan resolved Chizkiyah's Sha'aleh from the above Mishnah in
Kelim: If we can apply the argument 'Panim Chadashos Ba'u le'Kahn' (thereby
ignoring the repaired strap of the sandal), *there*, why should we not also
apply it *here* - and the vessel will be Tahor.
(c) Chizkiyah was duly impressed with Rebbi Yochanan's answer. He declared
that Rebbi Yochanan is not a human being (only an angel). Others quote him
as saying that Rebbi Yochanan is indeed a human being.
(a) When the Tana of our Mishnah permits knots in flasks of wine and oil
(whose tops bend and can be tied - he is speaking in a case when they have
*two* ropes. The Chidush is that we do not say he is Mevatel one of the
knots permanently, and will only use the other one.
(b) A Shal'acha is a spout. Here too, we might have thought that he intends
to use only the spout, and is Mevatel the knot.
(c) And when Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov permits tying a rope across the
entrance to a stable - he is speaking when there are *two* ropes there, and
we might have thought that he is Mevatel one of them, and only intends to
use the other one. In all of these cases, the Tana teaches us that all of
the above knots are regularly tied and untied, so they are permitted.