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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Sanhedrin 15

SANHEDRIN 15 (20 Tishrei) - Dedicated by Al, Sophia and Jared Ziegler (of Har Nof, Jerusalem) in loving memory of Al's mother, Chaya bas Berel Dov Ziegler.


(a) According to Rav Gidal Amar Rav, 'ha'Erchin ha'Metaltelin bi'Sheloshah' of our Mishnah refers to someone who says 'Erech K'li Zeh Alai'.
Since when does Erchin apply to anything other than people? On what principle is Rav Gidal Amar Rav's second ruling based?

(b) Then why does the Tana not say 'Erchin shel Metaltelin?

(c) How does Rav Chisda Amar Avimi explain 'ha'Erchin ha'Metaltelin'?

(d) Then why does the Tana not say 'Metaltelin shel Erchin'?

(a) Rebbi Avahu establishes the Mishnah when the person declared 'Erchi Alai' (a regular case of Erchin).
Then what is the distinction between Metaltelin and Karka that the Tana draws?

(b) What basic Kashya did Rav Acha from Difti ask Ravina on Rebbi Avahu's explanation?

(c) What was Ravina's reply?

(d) According to Rebbi Yehudah, one of the three assessors in the current case must be a Kohen.
What Kashya (that will remain unanswered) does Rav Huna bar Nasan ask on the Tana Kama?

(a) How does Shmuel extrapolate the previous Halachah from the fact that the word "Kohen" appears ten times in the Parshah?

(b) On what grounds does Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Nasan query this explanation, and remain with a Kashya?

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that a person requires ten judges, just like Karka.
What problem do we have with this?

(b) How does Rebbi Avahu answer this Kashya?

(c) What does the Beraisa say about someone who declares "Dami Alai"?

(d) What do we learn from the Pasuk in Behar (in connection with Avadim) "ve'Hisnachaltem Osam li'Veneichem Achareichem"?

(a) Rebbi Avin asks what the Din will be if someone declares his fully-grown hair Hekdesh.
What are the two sides of the She'eilah?

(b) What is the use of human hair anyway? Is one permitted to use it?

(c) We resolve Rebbi Avin's She'eilah from a Beraisa, where the Tana Kama says 'Ein Mo'alin be'Sa'aro'.
What does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel hold?

(d) What is the basis of their Machlokes? What have we now proved?

(a) Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim argue in another Beraisa in a case where Reuven claims from Shimon ten laden vines and Shimon admits to five, where Rebbi Meir obligates the latter to swear ('a Shevu'as Modeh be'Miktzas').
On what grounds do the Chachamim exempt him from swearing?

(b) How does Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina establish the case?

(c) On what grounds do we reject the suggestion that this Machlokes is equivalent to the Machlokes between the Tana Kama and Raban Shimon ben Gamliel? Why might Rebbi Meir concede to the Tana Kama of the previous Beraisa (that 'Ein Mo'alin Bo')?

(a) From where do we know that an animal that raped a woman requires twenty-three judges to sentence it to death?

(b) How do we know that the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Kol Shochev Im Beheimah" is not talking about a man who lies with an animal? Then what *is* the Pasuk talking about?

(c) What do we then learn from the fact that the Pasuk expresses itself using a Lashon of "Shochev im Beheimah"?

(d) And how do we know that when a man lies with an animal, the animal is sentenced to death, too?

Answers to questions



(a) What do we learn from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "ha'Shor Yisakel ve'Gam Be'Alav Yumas"?

(b) Abaye asked Rava what prompts the Tana to learn like this.
What would be the simple interpretation of the Pasuk?

(c) On what grounds do we initially reject Rava's answer (that to teach us this, the Torah could have omitted the word "Yumas", which now serves as the Tana's source)?

(d) What is wrong with this suggestion? Why would it not be possible to give the owner Sekilah?

(a) What do we ask next? If "Yumas" does not come to sentence the owner the more stringent death of Sekilah (stoning), what might it then come to teach us?

(b) This Kashya is not of course, valid according to those who hold that Chenek is more stringent than Cherev (the sword [the death-sentence of a murderer]). How do we reject it even according to those who hold that Chenek is more lenient, based on the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Im Kofer Yushas Alav"?

(c) On what grounds do we repudiate the previous Kashya? Why will the Pasuk "Lo Sikchu Kofer le'Nefesh Rotze'ach" not apply in this case?

(d) So what does Chizkiyah, as well as Tana de'Bei Chizkiyah, finally learn from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Mos Yumas ha'Makeh, Rotze'ach *Hu*"? How does this solve our problem?

(a) They asked whether Shor Sinai also required twenty-three judges, or whether three sufficed.
What is 'Shor Sinai'?

(b) What is the She'eilah?

(c) How did Rami bar Yechezkel resolve the She'eilah from the Pasuk in Yisro "Im Beheimah Im Ish Lo Yichyeh"?

(a) According to Resh Lakish, when Rebbi Eliezer in our Mishnah permits anyone to kill the six wild animals listed there, he refers specifically to when they killed someone.
In which point does he then argue with the Tana Kama?

(b) What does Rebbi Yochanan say?

(c) What is then the basis of their Machlokes?

(d) Rebbi Eliezer says 'Kol ha'Kodem le'Horgan Zachah'.
What are the ramifications of this statement, according to ...

  1. ... Rebbi Yochanan?
  2. ... Resh Lakish?
(a) Which opinion has the support of a Beraisa?

(b) What distinction does Rebbi Eliezer draw between an ox that killed and any other animal or wild animal?

(c) Rebbi Akiva disagrees with Rebbi Eliezer. He says 'Miysasan be'Esrim u'Sheloshah'.
In which point does his opinion differ from the Tana Kama ('ha'Ze'ev ve'Ari ... ve'ha'Nachash Miysasan be'Esrim-u'Sheloshah')?

(a) Our Mishnah requires twenty-three judges to judge a tribe.
On what grounds do we query the suggestion that the tribe sinned by desecrating Shabbos?

(b) If it is then talking about a tribe that served idols, under which heading will it fall?

(c) We query this however, from the Beraisa which discusses an Ir ha'Nidachas. According to Rebbi Yashiyah, it is only a town in this regard, if there are between ten and a hundred residents. A 'town' of less than ten residents is not considered a town.
But why is one of more than ten residents not an 'Ir ha'Nidachas'?

(a) How many residents does Rebbi Yonasan require for a town to be eligible for the title of 'Ir ha'Nidachas'?

(b) What is the basic difference between the punishment of the residents of an Ir ha'Nidachas and those of a town that is not an Ir ha'Nidachas?

(c) Based on this Beraisa, what is the problem with our Mishnah 'Ein Danin es ha'Sheivet Ela al-Pi Beis-Din Shel Shiv'im ve'Echad'?

Answers to questions

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