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Sanhedrin 34



(a) Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah extrapolates from the Pasuk "Eid Echad Lo Ya'aneh be'Nefesh La'mus'' - 'La'mus Hu de'Eino Oneh, Aval Le'zakos Oneh' (that a witness may present evidence to prove the defendant's innocence).

(b) Resh Lakish explains that the Rabbanan disagree with Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah - on the basis of the witnesses prejudice. Should other witnesses arrive after the defendant has been sentenced, and declare the first witnesses Zomemin, they will be sentenced to death. Consequently, (seeing as they are unable to retract from their initial evidence) it will suit them for the defendant to be proclaimed innocent.

(c) The Rabbanan learn from the above Pasuk in Masei - that even the Talmidim who are sitting in Beis-Din are nor permitted to present evidence to prove the defendant's innocence.

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that in Diynei Nefashos, a judge who learns Z'chus is not permitted to switch to Chov. Rav qualifies this ruling, permitting him to switch - from the time of the 'G'mar-Din (when the judges come to pronounce judgment).

(b) The Mishnah in 'Hayu Bodkin' rules, that when on the following day, the judges resume the proceedings of the previous day - they are permitted to switch their opinions from Chov to Z'chus, but not from Z'chus to Chov.

(c) We reconcile Rav, who permits them to retract either way from the G'mar Din and onwards ...

1. ... with this Mishnah - by establishing the case by the continuation of the Masa u'Matan, but before the G'mar-Din.
2. ... with the Beraisa 'Danin Eilu Keneged Eilu ad she'Yir'eh Echad min ha'Mechayvin Divrei ha'Mezakin'. The reason that the Tana declines to present the reverse case ' ... ad she'Yir'eh Echad min ha'Mezakin Divrei ha'Mechayvin' is - because he is concerned with the side of merit (not because it doesn't apply).
3. ... with Rebbi Yossi be'Rebbi Chanina ('Echad min ha'Talmidim she'Zikah u'Meis ... '), who does not contend with the possibility that had the judge been alive, he would have retracted - because, when all's said and done, he didn't retract.
(d) And we amend what they sent from Eretz Yisrael 'le'Divrei Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina Mutza mi'Chelal Rabeinu' to read - 'le'Divrei Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina Eino Mutza mi'Chelal Rabeinu'.
(a) The Beraisa explains - that the two Sofrim of Beis-Din, who stood before them, one on the right and one on the left, would write the words of the Mezakin and of the Mechayvin.

(b) They wrote the words of the Mechayvin - because, should they give new reasons for their respective opinions, they would be obligated to wait another day before sentencing the defendant to death.

(c) We try and prove from the fact that they also wrote the words of those who declared him Zakai - that even at the time of the G'mar Din, a judge is not permitted to switch from Z'chus to Chov (a Kashya on Rav).

(d) We refute that suggestion however, on the grounds that they may well write the words of the Mechayvin - in order to compare their reasons, because if two judges condemn the defendant for different reasons, they are only considered to be one opinion, not two.

(a) The source for this is a statement by Abaye, who learns from the Pasuk "Achas Diber Elokim Shetayim Zu Shama'ti, Ki Oz l'Elokim" - that whereas one Pasuk can teach us many things, we do not find two Pesukim which teach us the same thing (see Ya'avatz).

(b) de'Bei Rebbi Yishmael learns from the Pasuk in Yirmiyah "u'che'Patish Yefotzetz Sela" that just as a hammer breaks the rock into many pieces, so too, does one Pasuk split up into many reasons (i.e. it contains many explanations).

(c) Rav Z'vid suggests that an example of the same Chidush from two Pesukim is to be found in the Mishnah in Zevachim. To explain the words of the Tana Kama 'Mizbe'ach Mekadesh es ha'Ra'uy Lo, Rebbi Yehoshua learns from the Pasuk "Hi ha'Olah al Mokdah", 'Kol ha'Ra'uy le'Ishim - Im Alah Lo Yeired'.

(d) And Raban Gamliel learns from the continuation of the same Pasuk "Hi ha'Olah al Mokdah al ha'Mizbe'ach" - 'Kol ha'Ra'uy la'Mizbe'ach, Im Alah Lo Yeired'.

(a) Rebbi Yehoshua learns from the word - "Mokdah", and Raban Gamliel from - "al ha'Mizbe'ach".

(b) Both Tana'im learn that if something that is Pasul is brought on the Mizbe'ach, it remains there. This does not incorporate everything however - only something that was Pasul before it entered the Azarah ('Pesulo ba'Kodesh') Something that was Pasul when it entered the Azarah (such as species that are not eligible to be brought as a Korban or animals that are T'reifah) may not remain on the Mizbe'ach.

(c) In fact, Rebbi Yehoshua and Raban Gamliel argue, as the Mishnah itself points out. The Mishnah presents two things as their bone of contention blood - and Nesachim (wine) ...

(d) ... since on the one hand, both blood and Nesachim are fit to go on the Mizbe'ach (like Raban Gamliel), but on the other, they are not fire-offerings (like Rebbi Yehoshua), since neither were placed on the Ma'arachah (the area where the sacrifices were burned).

(a) So Rav Papa cites a Beraisa as an example of two Pesukim that teach us the same Chidush. To explain the Pasuk in Tetzaveh "Kol ha'Noge'a ba'Mizbe'ach Yikdash", Rebbi Yossi Hagelili learns from the Pasuk there "ve'Zeh Asher Ta'aseh al ha'Mizbe'ach, Kevasim ... " - that whatever is fit to go on the Mizbe'ach becomes sanctified by touching it.

(b) Yeast, honey, wild deer and Chulin are all examples of things that are not fit to go on the Mizbe'ach, and do not therefore become sanctified through contact with it.

(c) Rebbi Akiva learns from the word "Olah" in the same Pasuk - that just an Olah is fit to go on the Mizbe'ach, so too does anything that is fit to go on the Mizbe'ach becomes sanctified by having contact with it, but not things that are not.

(d) Here too Rav Papa supposes that both Tana'im learn the same thing from their respective Pesukim. We refute this suggestion however, on the basis of a statement by Rav Ada bar Ahavah, who said 'Olas ha'Of Pesulah Ika Beinaihu' - by which he meant that they argue over a Pasul Olas ha'Of, which will become sanctified according to Rebbi Akiva (since an Olas ha'Of too, falls under the category of Olah), but not according to Rebbi Yossi Hagelili, since it is not similar to "Kevasim".




(a) Rav Ashi finally finds a case of the same Chidush from two Pesukim. He cites a Beraisa where Rebbi Yishmael learns from the Pasuk "Dam Yechashev la'Ish ha'Hu Dam Shafach" 'Le'rabos es ha'Zorek'. Rebbi Yishmael is coming to include - sprinkling the blood of a Korban outside the Azarah to the basic Isur of Shechting an animal of Kodshim there.

(b) Rebbi Akiva learns from the Pasuk there "O Zevach" - 'Le'rabos es ha'Zorek' (the same Chidush as Rebbi Yishmael).

(c) We attempt to refute Rav Ashi's explanation by citing Rebbi Avahu, who says 'Shachat ve'Zarak Ika Beinaihu' - meaning that the difference between the two D'rashos lies in a case where one both Shechted the animal and sprinkled its blood outside the Azarah be'Shogeg, in which case one will Chayav to bring one Chatas, according to Rebbi Yishmael, two, according to Rebbi Akiva.

(d) According to Rebbi ...

1. ... Yishmael, one is Chayav only one Chatas - due to the fact that he learns Zorek from the Pasuk of Shochet, which contains one La'av and one Kareis.
2. ... Akiva, is one Chayav two Chata'os - because "O Zevach" is written in connection with the Ha'ala'ah (sacrificing outside the Azarah), by which Kareis is mentioned independently.
(a) We answer this by citing Abaye, who learns from the Pasuk "Sham Ta'aleh Olosecha ve'Sham Ta'aseh ... " - that all the Asiyos are one (since the Torah does not state an independant La'av by the sacrificing, relying only on this Pasuk to compare Ha'ala'ah to Shechitah in this regard).

(b) Abaye ignores the fact that the Torah mentions two Kerisus - since there is only one La'av (as we just explained) ...

(c) ... "Hishamer Lecha Pen Ta'aleh Olosecha be'Chol Makom Asher Tir'eh" (in Re'ei, written by Ha'ala'ah as clearly stated by the Torah).

(a) Rebbi Acha bar Papa learns from the Pasuk ...
1. ... "ve'Shaftu es ha'Am be'Chol Eis" - that the G'mar- Din in Diynei Mamonos must take place by day.
2. ... "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav" - that the Techilas-Din (incorporating the Shakla ve'Tarya) can take place by night.
(b) According to Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa, the Pasuk (in connection with the Kohanim) "ve'Al Phi Yih'yeh Kol Riv ve'Chol Naga" compares ...
1. ... Ribin (Diynei Mamonos) to Nega'im - regarding judging by day, and the disqualification of someone who is blind (even in one eye, as we shall see) from judging.
2. ... Nega'im to Ribin - regarding the disqualification of relatives.
(c) And he learn from the Pasuk "ve'Huva el Aharon ha'Kohen O el Achad mi'Banav ... " - that we do not compare Nega'im to Ribin with regard to requiring a Beis-Din of three (since it is clear from the Pasuk that one will suffice).

(d) The author of our Mishnah cannot be Rebbi Meir, who learns from Nega'im that even G'mar-Din must take place by day, whereas the Tana of our Mishnah permits G'mar-Din by night as well.

(a) We learned in a Mishnah in Nidah 'Kol ha'Kasher la'Dun Kasher Le'ha'id; ve'Yesh she'Kasher Le'ha'id, ve'Ein Kasher La'dun'. According to Rebbi Yochanan - the Seifa is referring to someone who is blind in one eye.

(b) Despite the fact that Rebbi Yochanan rules 'Halachah ki'S'tam Mishnah', he did not protest when a blind man was judging in his vicinity - because he relied on our Mishnah (also a S'tam Mishnah), which permits a blind man to judge.

(c) Our Mishnah permits G'mar-Din by night (even though Rebbi Meir forbids it, as we learned earlier), from which we can extrapolate that a blind man is permitted too.

(d) We conclude that Rebbi Yochanan chooses to rule like our Mishnah for one of two reasons, one of them, because it is the opinion of the Rabbanan, whilst the Mishnah is the opinion of Rebbi Meir - the other, because it is a S'tam in its rightful place (which deals with similar issues, whereas the S'tam in Nidah, is talking about other issues, citing this Halachah only because it belongs in one of the lists there).

(a) Rebbi Meir learns from the Pasuk "ve'Shaftu es ha'Am be'Chol Eis" - that Beis-Din are permitted to judge on a cloudy day.

(b) We might have thought otherwise, because of a Mishnah in Nega'im - which forbids a Kohen to examine Nega'im in the morning, at dusk, in a house or on a cloudy day.

(c) A Kohen may not examine Nega'im ...

1. ... in the above cases - because things look brighter then than they really are, and the Kohen is likely to proclaim someone a Metzora, who is really Tahor.
2. ... at mid-day - because then things look paler than they really are, and the Kohen is likely to declare Tahor someone who is really a Metzora.
(a) We equate Rebbi Meir's interpretation of the Pasuk "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav" like the Beraisa cited by Rabah bar Chanina in front of Rav Nachman. The problem Rav Nachman has with the initial version of the Beraisa 'be'Yom Atah Mapil Nachalos, ve'I Atah Mapil Nachalos ba'Laylah' is - that this suggests that if someone dies at nighttime, his heirs will not inherit him.

(b) So he suggested amending the Beraisa to - 'be'Yom Atah Mapil *Din* Nachalos ... '.

(c) When Rabah bar Chanina heard Rav Nachman's amendment, he commented - that this was precidely what he had meant.

(d) The source for this lies in the Pasuk in Pinchas (written in connection with the laws of inheritance) "ve'Haysah li'Venei Yisrael le'Chukas Mishpat" from which the Beraisa learns - that the distribution of inheritance is considered Mishpat (meaning that it requires three Dayanim, and now that the Torah requires it to be done by day, we learn Techilas Din by all Diynei Mamonos from it).

(a) The above also conforms with a ruling by Rav Yehudah Amar Rav, who stated that if ...
1. ... three people paid a sick person a visit - they have the option of acting as judges and distributing the property, or of merely transcribing the Shechiv-Mera's instructions, in their capacity as witnesses.
2. ... two people who did the same thing - can only act in the latter capacity.
(b) Rav Chisda qualifies the first half of Rav Yehudah's statement - by restricting it to when they arrived in the day, but if they arrived in the night, when there is no judgment, they can only act as witnesses, but not as judges ...

(c) ... because they are witnesses - and 'a witness cannot be a judge'.

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