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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
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Sanhedrin 31



(a) Initially, we establish the Neherdai, who even accept a discrepancy in the testimony of the two witnesses concerning a black Manah and a white Manah - like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korcha

(b) However, we reject that, on the grounds - that even Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah only accepts two independent witnesses as long as they do not contradict each other (which they do here).

(c) So we establish the Neherdai like Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, who says in a Beraisa - that if one out of pair of witnesses testifies that Reuven lent Shimon a Manah, and the other, that he lent him two, their testimony ...

1. ... is void - according to Beis Shamai.
2. ... is Kasher - and we accept the testimony of the lesser one, according to Beis Hillel, because two Manah incorporates one (i.e. since they both agree on one Manah).
(d) Whereas in the same case, only where one *pair of witnesses* says one Manah, and the other pair says two - he maintains that Beis Shamai agree with Beis Hillel (that 'Yesh bi'Chelal Masayim Manah).
(a) In a case where one witness testified that Reuven owes Shimon a barrel of wine, and the other one, that he owes him a barrel of oil - Rebbi Ami ruled obligated Reuven to pay barrel of wine out of the barrel of oil (meaning the lesser of the two).

(b) Even after establishing it like Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, we ask - that even Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar accepts the testimony of the lesser witness, only because two Manah incorporates one, which is not the case here.

(c) To answer this Kashya - we establish the case (not by a barrel of wine and a barrel of oil, as we thought until now, but) by the value of a barrel of wine and of a barrel of oil.

(d) Rebbi combined the testimonies of one witness who testified that Reuven lent Shimon a Manah in the upper-attic, and the other witness, who testified that he lent him a Manah in the lower-attic - because he held like Rebbi Yeshoshua ben Korchah (who combines witnesses even when they refer to two different loans).

(a) We quote the Pasuk "Holech Rachil Megaleh Sod" with regard to the Din in our Mishnah - forbidding the judges to divulge their individual opinions, on which we previously quoted the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Lo Seichel Rachil be'Amecha".

(b) Rebbi Ami expelled a certain Talmid from the Beis-Hamedrash, coupled with the announcement 'Dein Galya Raza!' - for divulging something that had been said in the Beis-Hamedrash ...

(c) ... twenty-two years earlier.

(a) When the Tana of our Mishnah says 'Kol Z'man she'Meivi Re'ayah, Soser es ha'Din', he means - that even after losing his case, he can still bring fresh evidence to overturn the Beis-Din's previous ruling.

(b) According to the Tana Kama, if Beis-Din order a litigant to bring all his proofs within thirty days, then he must do so. Raban Shimon ben Gamliel however, maintains - that seeing as it is not always possible to lay his hands on the testimony so fast, proofs that he presents later are also acceptable.

(c) The Tana Kama and Raban Shimon ben Gamliel repeat their Machlokes in a case - where one litigant, after declaring that he has no more witnesses or proofs, turns up in Beis-Din with fresh witnesses or proofs.

(d) The Tana say in a case where one of the litigants, realizing that he is about to lose his case, suddenly produces two witnesses, or pulls out documentary evidence from his belt - that they are not acceptable.

(a) Rabah bar Rav Huna rules like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel - in the first case in our Mishnah (where Beis-Din ordered him to bring all his proofs within thirty days) ...

(b) ... and he adds that the Halachah is not like the Chachamim - to teach us that even if Bedieved, Beis-Din ruled like the Chachamim, they must rescind that ruling.

(a) With regard to the second Machlokes between the Chachamim and Raban Shimon ben Gamliel in our Mishnah, Rabah bar Rav Huna quoting Rebbi Yochanan - issues the same dual ruling, but this time, in favor of the Chachamim.

(b) There too, we ask why Rabah bar Rav Huna finds it necessary to add 'Ein Halachah ke'Raban Shimon ben Gamliel'. But this time we answer - that it is in this case (of Re'ayah Acharonah) exclusively, that he rules not like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, to exclude the cases of 'Areiv' and 'Tzidon' (as we learned in Bava Basra), which Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan adds to the list.

(c) We could not give the same answer as we gave previously - because having ruled like the Chachamim, it is obvious that this applies even Bedieved (where we are hardly likely to follow the opinion of a Yachid).

(a) When Rav Nachman asked that child in court (see Tosfos DH 'Chayveih') whether he had any witnesses or proofs - he replied in the negative.

(b) After Rav Nachman obligated him to pay - he left the courtroom in tears, and people who saw him volunteered information of which the child had been unaware.

(c) Rav Nachman relented in spite of Rebbi Yochanan's previous ruling - because it is common for a child not to be conversant in his father's affairs.

(a) That woman - had been given the Sh'tar that she claimed had been paid for safe-keeping.

(b) When Rav Nachman believed her, Rav suggested that this was because he held like Rebbi - who holds 'Osiyos Niknos bi'Mesirah' (in which case he believed the woman because she could have claimed that the Sh'tar was hers).

(c) Rav Nachman rejected Rava's suggestion, on the grounds that even according to the Chachamim of Rebbi he would have believed her - with a 'Migu' that she could have burned it.

(d) According to the second Lashon, Rav Nachman did not believe her (like the Chachamim of Rebbi). Nor did she have a 'Migu de'I Ba'i Kalsah' - because a 'Migu' does not help against a Sh'tar that has been substantiated by Beis-Din.




(a) The Beraisa rules that if a Simpon (a receipt) is produced by ...
1. ... the debtor - it is Kasher, provided he verifies the signatures.
2. ... a third party (unsigned) or if it appears after the signatures on the Sh'tar-Chov itself - it is Kasher.
(b) The reason for this latter ruling is - because seeing as it is the creditor who holds the Sh'tar, he would never have allowed a receipt to be written on it, unless the debt really was paid.

(c) So we see that a third party is believed to validate (or to invalidate) a Sh'tar that he is holding (a Kashya on Rav Nachman's second Lashon).

(d) Rav Nachman has nothing to say - and we remain with a Kashya on him.

(a) When Rav Dimi Amar Rebbi Yochanan ...
1. ... permits a litigant to bring proofs or to withdraw 'ad she'Yistatem Ta'anosav', he appears to mean - that he is believed only until he says 'Ein Li Re'ayah ... ', like the Tana Kama.
2. ... then adds 've'Yomar Kirvu Ish P'loni u'Peloni ve'Ye'iduni', he appears to mean - that he is only not believed if the witnesses were available at the time that he said 'Ein Li Eidim', but that if he brought in fresh witnesses later, they would be accepted, like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel.
(b) We try and solve the discrepancy by establishing the entire Beraisa like - Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, and by explaining the Seifa ('ad she'Yomar Kirvu P'loni u'Peloni') as the interpretation of the Reisha ('ad she'Yistatem Ta'anosav').

(c) And we refute this suggestion, which would establish Rebbi Yochanan like Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, by citing Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan - who says 'Kol Makom she'Shanah Raban Shimon ben Gamliel be'Mishnaseinu Halachah Kamoso, Chutz ... *ve'Re'ayah Acharonah'*.

(d) So we re-quote Rebbi Yochanan, this time presented by Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah. Assuming that the litigant said 'Ein Li Eidim, in Li Re'ayah', Rebbi Yochanan will nevertheless accept ...

1. ... witnesses - provided they came from overseas, on their own initiative.
2. ... documentary evidence - provided the leather sack containing them is produced by a third party (since in both cases, it is feasible that the litigant was previously unaware of their existence).
(a) The 'Makom ha'Va'ad' is - the place where the Talmidei-Chachamim meet to discuss Halachah (which is where the Beis-Din sit [Rashi end of Perek]). The advantage of having one's case judged there is - that a tough litigant will be subdued in the presence of so many Talmidei-Chachamim, and will obey the court ruling without fuss.

(b) Rebbi Elazar objected to Rav Dimi quoting Rabbi Yochanan that one litigant can force the other (who is causing trouble) to take their case to the Makom ha'Va'ad - because it makes no sense to force one litigant to spend a Manah in travel expenses, in order to retrieve the Manah that he lent the debtor.

(c) Rav Safra agreed with Rebbi Elazar. They both ruled - that one litigant could force the other to judge in their home town. (d) Should ...

1. ... Beis-Din encounter difficulties with regard to the Halachah - they then send them to the Makom ha'Va'ad in writing for a solution.
2. ... the litigant request their reason for having obligated him, in writing - then they conform with his request.
(a) In a case of a Yavam and a Yevamah - it is the Yevamah who goes to the town of the Yavam (and not vice-versa).

(b) Rebbi Ami adds 'Afilu mi'Teverya le'Tzipori' - meaning that this is the Din even though the town of the Yevamah is more prominent than that of the Yavam (like Teverya vis-a-vis Tzipori).

(c) Rav Kahana extrapolate this from the Pasuk "ve'Kar'u Lo Ziknei Iyro" - which he Darshens "Lo", 've'Lo Lah'.

(d) Ameimar justified to Rav Ashi his statement 'Hilchesa, Kofin Oso ve'Dan be'Makom ha'Va'ad', in spite of Rebbi Elazar, who just ruled 'Kofin Oso ve'Dan be'Iyro' - by establishing his own ruling by the creditor, whereas Rebbi Elazar speaks about the debtor.

(e) And Ameimar bases his ruling - on the principle 'Eved Loveh le'Ish Malveh'.

(a) When they referred to Mar Ukva the Dayan as 'li'de'Ziv Leih ke'Bar Bisya', they may have meant that his face shone like that of Moshe Rabeinu, who was brought up by Bisyah, the daughter of Par'oh. They might also have meant to say (not 'ke'Bar Bisya', but) - 'ke'bar Beiseih', meaning like Moshe about whom the Torah writes "be'Chol Beisi Ne'eman Hu".

(b) Mar Ukva's face might have shone as a result of his wisdom. According to Seifer Hagadah, the shine was a form of halo in he shape of a Menorah. This in turn, was the result of the episode where he once became ill from longing for a married woman with whom he had fallen in love. Now it once happened that she needed to borrow money from him, and as a result, she landed at his mercy. And it was after he took control of himself and let her go in peace that he recovered. That was when the halo appeared.

(a) The gist of Mar Ukva's complaint against his brother Yirmiyah was - either that he had castrated him or that he had somehow caused him harm monetarily (see also Rabeinu Chananel).

(b) The problem with the Beis-Din's wording was - that 'Imru Lo' suggested that the Beis-Din of Bavel (where Mar Ukva lived) should judge the case, whereas 'Hisi'uhu ve'Yir'eh Paneinu bi'Teverya' was a clear call for the litigants to travel to Eretz Yisrael.

(c) In fact, it was necessary to call Mar Ukva and his brother to come to them - because the claim involved Diynei K'nasos, which can only be enforced in Eretz Yisrael.

(d) Yet they first asked the Beis-Din in Bavel to deal with the case - (in the hope that Yirmiyah would accept their ruling [Rabeinu Chananel]), in deference to Mar Ukva.

***** Hadran Alach 'Zeh Borer' *****

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