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Sanhedrin 27



(a) According to Abaye, an Eid Zomem becomes Pasul retroactively - meaning that any other testimony that he testified between the false testimony and the time that he is declared an Eid Zomem is void.

(b) Abaye learns this from the Pasuk "Al Ta'shes Yadcha Rasha", disqualifying a Rasha from testifying, and - seeing as he was a Rasha from the moment that he testified, all his subsequent testimonies are automatically invalid.

(c) Rava's reason for saying that he only becomes Pasul from the time that he becomes a Zomem is - the fact that Eid Zomem is a Chidush to begin with, and we follow the principle 'Ein Lecha Bo Ela Chidusho' (we take the Chidush at its minimum, without extending it further).

(d) What makes Eid Zomem a Chidush is - the fact that we believe the word of the second set of witnesses against the word of the first.

(a) In the second Lashon, Rava agrees with Abaye in principle. Nevertheless, the Rabbanan validate all his testimonies up to the time that he becomes an Eid Zomem - to spare the losses of those who may in the interim, have purchased fields on which the Eid Zomem signed, and who now stand to lose them (without having had any way of protecting themselves).

(b) One ramification of the two Leshonos will be in a case where each of the two witnesses was declared a Zomem by two witnesses - removing the aspect of Chidush. Consequently, according to the first Lashon, the witnesses will indeed be Pasul retroactively; whereas according to the second Lashon, they will still be Pasul only from now on, in order to safeguard the interests of the purchasers.

(c) The second difference between the two Leshonos is - there were the second set of witnesses did not declare the first set Zomemin, but testified that they were Pasul because they had stolen. Here too, it would not be a Chidush to believe them (since the second set could not possibly be believed to vindicate themselves), yet the interest of the purchasers would still need to be protected.

(d) Rebbi Yirmiyah mi'Difti cites Rav Papi, who rules like Rava, Rav Ashi, like Abaye. The Halachah is - like Abaye, as it is in the other five cases of 'Y.(A).L.K.G.M'.

(a) A Mumar who eats Neveilos for pleasure (including monetary gain [because it costs less]) is definitely Pasul from testifying. Abaye and Rava argue over a Mumar who does it to anger Hashem (incorporating one who just doesn't care). Rava's reason for validating such a person is - because it is not a Rasha de'Chamas (i.e. he does not sin specifically in order to gain anything, and is therefore not suspected of lying when there is nothing to gain).

(b) We ask on Rava from a Beraisa, which disqualifies someone who makes false Shevu'os. We presume that this incorporates Shevu'os Shav and Shevu'os Sheker. An example of ...

1. ... a Shevu'as Shav is - if someone swears that a pillar of stone is made of stone.
2. ... a Shevu'as Sheker is - if he swears that a pillar of stone is made of gold.
(c) What makes us think that the Tana incorporates such a Shevu'ah (and is not confined to a Shevu'ah that concerns money) is - the fact that he says "u'Mo'alin bi'Shevu'os" in the plural (incorporating Shevu'os Mamon and Shevu'as Shav [or Sheker]).

(d) Rava refutes the Kashya. In his opinion - the Tana speaks about Shevu'os Mamon exclusively, and he says 'Shevu'os' in the plural, because he is speaking about the public at large (and not because he is referring to different kinds of Shevu'os).

(a) We categorically prove from the Beraisa (at least for the moment) which lists only Gazlanin u'Malvei be'Ribis among the Pesulim of "Al Ta'shes Yadcha Eid, Al Tashes Chamas Eid" - that the Tana requires specifically a Shevu'ah concerning Mamon in order to invalidate a person from being an Eid (like Rava).

(b) This does not mean that Ochel Neveilos le'Te'avon is not disqualified either - because since the sins is performed out of pleasure or for financial gain, there is no difference between it and Gazlanin and Malvei be'Ribis.

(c) Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa disqualifies an Eid Zomem from testifying at all. Rebbi Yossi restricts this to an Eid Zomem in Diynei Nefashos, bit an Eid Zomem in Diynei Mamonos is not disqualified from testifying in cases of Diynei Nefashos (which are more stringent than Diynei Mamonos [and the witness is therefore not suspected of lying there too]).

(d) We attempt to equate ...

1. ... Abaye (who disqualifies a Mumar Ochel Neveilos le'Hachis) with Rebbi Meir, since like Rebbi Meir, who disqualifies him from a more lenient testimony to a more stringent one, as we just explained, so too, does Abaye disqualify a Mumar Ochel Neveilos le'Hachis (who only perpetrates evil against Hashem) from testifying in money-matters, where he is perpetrating evil against man as well as Hashem.
2. ... Rava with Rebbi Yossi - since both permit a witness who has permitted a smaller evil, to testify in a case where false testimony would entail a larger one.
(a) We decline to equate the two Machlokes completely, as we just suggested, though we do concede that Abaye cannot hold like Rebbi Yossi. Rava however, could hold like Rebbi Meir as well - because Rebbi Meir might well agree that a Mumar Ochel Neveilos le'Hachis is not Pasul - since (unlike his own case, where an Eid Zomem of money is both evil to Hashem and evil to man [which he considers the main criterion]) he is only evil to Hashem, but not to man.

(b) Like in the previous case (of 'Eid Zomem le'Mafre'a Hu Nifsal') we rule like Abaye, and as for the Beraisa which we just cited to disprove Abaye (since it does not include Ochel Neveilos le'Hachis among the Pesulim) - we are now able to establish its author as Rebbi Yossi, who does not disqualify witnesses from a more lenient case to a more stringent one, whereas Abaye holds like Rebbi Meir, as we just explained.

(c) And we reconcile this with the principle 'Rebbi Meir ve'Rebbi Yossi, Halachah ke'Rebbi Yossi' - by confining that principle to where there is no S'tam Mishnah like Rebbi Meir, as there is here (as we shall soon see).

(a) The crime that bar Chama committed was - either murder or manslaughter.

(b) When the Resh Galusa instructed Rebbi *Acha* bar Ya'akov (Rabeinu Chananel) to verify the facts, and that if he was convinced of his guilt, he should poke out his eyes - he meant this literally (due to the principle 'Beis-Din Makin ve'Onshin she'Lo min ha'Din'.

(c) Alternatively, he might have meant - that they take his money to pay the Yorshin, or place him in Cherem.

(d) He did not order the death-sentence - because it was no longer practiced (since forty years before the Churban of the second Beis-Hamikdash).

(a) bar Chama countered the two witnesses who testified that he did indeed kill someone - by bringing two witnessed who testified that one of them had stolen in their presence (though independently, in front of one of them, a Kav of barley, in front of the other, the handle of a spear).

(b) Rav Acha bar Ya'akov prepared to punish bar Chama (according to the instructions of the Resh Galusa) in spite of the fact that Rebbi Meir invalidates witnesses from a more lenient sin to a more strict one - because Rebbi Yossi validates them for a more stringent case.

(c) Rav Papi objected to Rav Acha bar Ya'akov's intended ruling - on the grounds that this case was different, because Rebbi had learned a S'tam Mishnah in favor of Rebbi Meir (which we will not set about identifying).




(a) We cite the Mishnah in Nidah 'Kol ha'Ra'uy la'Dun Diynei Nefashos Ra'uy la'Dun Diynei Mamonos'. The Tana must be speaking - when the person concerned is suspect because he already testified falsely in Diynei Mamonos.

(b) The author cannot be Rebbi Yossi - because according to him, an Eid Zomem in money-matters is eligible to judge Diynei Nefashos, but not Diynei Mamonos.

(c) We nevertheless establish him as the possible author - by confining the Mishnah to cases of P'sul Yuchsin (such as in the Mishnah that we will learn shortly).

(d) We even prove this from the Seifa 'Yesh Ra'uy la'Dun Diynei Mamonos ve'Ein Ra'uy la'Dun Diynei Nefashos', which must be speaking about P'sulei Yuchsin, because if it were speaking about someone who is suspect - he must be referring to someone who became an Eid Zomem in Diynei Nefashos, but surely there, everyong agrees that he is Pasul to judge Diynei Mamonos (so how can the Tana say otherwise).

(a) So we cite our Mishnah (which is more detailed in Rosh Hashanah) 'Eilu Hein ha'Pesulin, ha'Mesachek be'Kuvya ... Zeh ha'Kelal - Kol Eidus she'Ein ha'Ishah Kesheirah Lah, Af Hein Ein Kesheirin Lah'.

(b) The author of that Mishnah cannot therefore be Rebbi Yossi - because according to him, they are eligible to judge Diynei Nefashos even though a woman is not.

(c) So we now have a S'tam Mishnah like Rebbi Meir - a proof that the Halachah is like him, even though he argues with Rebbi Yossi.

(d) bar Chama reacted to Rav Papi's proof - by kissing Rav Papi'a feet and paying his head-tax for a whole year.

(a) The Tana in the Mishnah that we just discussed also inserts 'Avadim'. Our Tana omits it - because he is only concerned with Pesulim de'Rabbanan (as we learned earlier), whereas Avadim are Pasul min ha'Torah (like women).

(b) Our Mishnah then lists the relatives that are disqualified from testifying. These include a brother and both a paternal and a maternal uncle - as well as ...

1. ... one's sister's husband and the husband of his father's sister ...
2. ... the husband of one's mother's sister and ...
3. ... his father, father-in-law and brother-in-law?
(c) The Tana includes a sister's husband in the list - because of the princi ple 'Ba'al ke'Ishto' (which renders him on a par with his own brother).

(d) This Tana draws no distinction between the relatives of one's father and those of one's mother, as we just saw.

(a) He also includes Giyso ...
1. ... the husband of one's wife's sister, and ...
2. ... 'Chorgo' - one's stepson.
(b) The difference between Chorgo and those mentioned previously is - that whereas in the case of the latter, their sons and sons-in-law are disqualified too, Chorgo alone is forbidden.

(c) Having taught Ba'al Imo, the Tana nevertheless mentions Chorgo, which is the same relationship in reverse - because that is the style he follows in the vast majority of cases in this Mishnah.

(d) The Tana also incudes both Achi Aviv and ben Achiv and most other dual relationships of this nature. The distinction that 'ben Achi Ishto' and 'Chasno' share in common is - that they are the only two cases that the Tana omits, despite having mentioned their opposite numbers (the husband of his father's sister and his father-in-law, respectively).

(a) Rebbi Yossi ascribes this ruling to Rebbi Akiva. The Mishnah Rishonah however, disqualifies Dodo and ben Dodo, because they are fit to inherit him. The Mishnah Rishonah disagrees with Rebbi Akiva - by the mother's relatives (such as Achi Imo and Ba'al Achoso), who are not fit to inherit him.

(b) This does not mean however, that *he* is permitted to testify for his mother's brother, bearing in mind that (although the latter is not fit to inherit him) he is fit to inherit the latter (as we learned in Bava Basra).

(c) The Tana - permits an ex-son-in-law, say, whose wife died before he had witnessed the incident that he wants to testify on, to testify for or against his ex-father-in-law.

(a) Rebbi Yehudah considers a son-in-law, whose wife died, leaving behind children - like a current son-in-law with regard to testifying or judging.

(b) He also disqualifies a witness who loves or hates the litigant, from testifying. Regarding the former, the Tana cites a best man. For the latter, he gives the example - of one person who did not speak to the other for three days, out of hatred.

(c) The Rabbanan say - that a Yisrael is not suspect of giving false testimony due to like or dislike.

(d) The Rabbanan will concede though - that when it comes to judging, someone who loves or hates one of the litigants is disqualified from judging him.

(a) The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk ...
1. ... "Ish be'Chet'o Yamus" - that each person dies for his own sins, and not for the sins of his fathers or children.
2. ... "Lo Yumsu Avos al Banim, u'Vanim Lo Yumsu al Avos" - that fathers cannot die by the testimony of their sons, nor vice-versa. And from the Torah's use of the plural form ''Avos" and "Banim", he learns - that the Torah comes to include other relationships that result from the fact that the ''Avos" must be brothers, as we shall see shortly.
(b) We reconcile "Ish be'Chet'o Yamus" with the Pasuk "Poked Avos al Banim" - by establishing the latter by when the children continue in the ways of their sinful fathers.

(c) From the Pasuk "ve'Chashlu Ish be'Achiv" we learn - that one man stumbles over the sins of the other, which teaches us the principle 'Kol Yisrael Areivim Zeh ba'Zeh'.

(d) We reconcile this with "Ish be'Chet'o Yamus" - by establishing it when they have the power to stop one another from sinning, but don't.

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