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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Sanhedrin 15

SANHEDRIN 15 (20 Tishrei) - Dedicated by Al, Sophia and Jared Ziegler (of Har Nof, Jerusalem) in loving memory of Al's mother, Chaya bas Berel Dov Ziegler.



(a) According to Rav Gidal Amar Rav, 'ha'Erchin ha'Metaltelin bi'Sheloshah' of our Mishnah refers to someone who says 'Erech K'li Zeh Alai'. Although regular Erchin are confined to people - Rav Gidal Amar Rav also taught that seeing as everyone knows this (and based on the principle 'Ein Adam Motzi Devarav le'Vatalah'), someone who makes such a declaration, must intend to give its value to Hekdesh anyway.

(b) And he actually amends the Lashon of the Mishnah to read 'Erchin shel Metaltelin?

(c) Rav Chisda Amar Avimi explains 'ha'Erchin ha'Metaltelin' to mean - that someone designated Metaltelin to pay Hekdesh for Erchin that he had previously declared.

(d) And he too - amends the Mishnah to read 'Metaltelin shel Erchin'.

(a) Rebbi Avahu establishes the Mishnah when the owner declared 'Erchi Alai' (a regular case of Erchin), and the Tana merely draws a distinction between the two possible ways of paying - Metaltelin ( which require three judges to assess them), and Karka (which requires ten).

(b) Rav Acha from Difti queried Rebbi Avahu's explanation - on the grounds that if taking out of Hekdesh requires assessment (in order to prevent Hekdesh from losing), why should putting into Hekdesh require it?

(c) Ravina replied - that putting into Hekdesh too, requires assessment, to avoid Hekdesh assessing the object at too high a price and losing the difference.

(d) According to Rebbi Yehudah, one of the three assessors in the current case must be a Kohen. Rav Huna bar Nasan asks on the Tana Kama (who disagrees) - why the Torah then writes ''Kohen'' with regard to Erchin. This Kashya too, remains unanswered.

(a) Shmuel extrapolates the previous Halachah from the fact that the word "Kohen" appears ten times in the Parshah - once, for the intrinsic Halachah, and the other nine times, he says, serve as a 'Ribuy Achar Ribuy', which comes to include (rather than to exclude) nine non-Kohanim.

(b) Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Nasan queries this explanation however, on the grounds that, it would be more logical to interpret each pair of "Kohen" (as a Miy'ut and a Ribuy) independently, to exclude one non-Kohen and to include one from each pair, so that we ought to end up with five Kohanim and five non-Kohanim. Here again, we remain with a Kashya.

(a) We learned in our Mishnah that a person requires ten judges just like Karka. The problem with this is - since when does a person become Hekdesh?

(b) Rebbi Avahu answers this Kashya - by establishing the Mishnah in a case where someone says 'Dami Alai', in which case he is obligated to pay Hekdesh ...

(c) ... his value as an Eved Cana'ani, as we learned in a Beraisa.

(d) And we learn from the Pasuk "ve'Hisnachaltem Osam li'Veneichem Achareichem" - that Avadim have the Din of Karka, which explains why the Tana requires ten judges.

(a) Rebbi Avin asks what the Din will be if someone declares his fully-grown hair Hekdesh - whether, since it is still attached to the owner, it has a Din of Karka, and requires ten judges to be assessed, or whether, because it stands to be cut off, it has a Din of Metaltelin and requires only three.

(b) Human hair - which one may benefit from, can be used as a strainer or an ornament.

(c) We resolve Rebbi Avin's She'eilah from a Beraisa, where the Tana Kama says 'Ein Mo'alin be'Sa'aro', and Raban Shimon ben Gamliel - 'Mo'alin Bo'.

(d) The basis of their Machlokes is - exactly what Rebbi Avin's She'eilah is all about, whether fully-grown hair is considered attached (Tana Kama) or detached (Raban Shimon ben Gamliel).

(a) Rebbi Meir and the Chachamim argue in another Beraisa in a case where Reuven claims from Shimon ten laden vines and Shimon admits to five, where Rebbi Meir obligates the latter to swear ('a Shevu'as Modeh be'Miktzas'). The Chachamim exempt him from swearing - because the grapes are still considered attached, and one does not swear over Karka.

(b) Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina establishes the case - when the fruit is fully ripe and ready to pick?

(c) We reject the suggestion that this Machlokes is equivalent to the Machlokes between the Tana Kama and Raban Shimon ben Gamliel - because it is only here, we conclude, that Rebbi Meir considers attached hair to be Karka, but not in the case of the attached grapes, since they tend to deteriorate if they are left on the tree (unlike hair, which improves on the head).

(a) We know that an animal that raped a woman requires twenty-three judges to sentence it to death - from the Pasuk in Kedoshim "ve'Haragta es ha'Ishah ve'es ha'Beheimah" (which compares the animal to he woman).

(b) The Pasuk in Mishpatim "Kol Shochev Im Beheimah" cannot be talking about a man who lies with an animal - because we already know that from the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Ish Asher Yiten Shechovto bi'Veheimah Mos Yumas". It must therefore be talking about an animal that lies with the man.

(c) And from the fact that the Pasuk expresses itself in a Lashon of "Shochev in Beheimah" we learn - that an animal that lies with a man is compared to the man with whom it lay (to require a Beis-Din of twenty-three), just like it is in the case where the man lies with it.

(d) And we know that when a man lies with an animal, the animal too, requires twenty-three judges - from the continuation of the previous Pasuk "ve'es ha'Beheimah Taharogu".




(a) We learn from the Pasuk "ha'Shor Yisakel ve'Gam Be'Alav Yumas" - that a Shor ha'Niskal, like its owner who performed a similar act, requires twenty-three judges to sentence it to death.

(b) Abaye asked Rava what prompts the Tana to learn like this. The simple interpretation of the Pasuk would be - that the owner is Chayav Miysah for his animal's killing.

(c) We initially reject Rava's answer that to teach us this, the Torah could have omitted the word "Yumas", which now serves as the Tana's source - on the grounds that, had the Torah indeed omitted it, we would have thought that the owner, like his animal, is sentenced to stoning.

(d) This suggestion is not in fact feasible - because if a person does not receive Sekilah for murder, how can he receive Sekilah for his ox's killing?

(a) We the ask that if "Yumas" does not come to sentence the owner to the more stringent death of Sekilah (stoning), perhaps it comes to teach us - that he receives the lighter punishment of Chenek (strangulation).

(b) This Kashya is not of course, valid according to those who hold that Chenek is more stringent than Cherev (the sword [the death-sentence of a murderer]). And we reject it even according to those who hold that Chenek is more lenient, based on the Pasuk "Im Kofer Yushas Alav" - which teaches us that he is able to escape death by paying 'Kofer', clashing with the Pasuk in Mas'ei "ve'Lo Sikchu Kofer", which teaches us that one cannot escape the death-sentence by paying Kofer.

(c) We nevertheless conclude that the Pasuk "ve'Lo Sikchu Kofer le'Nefesh Rotze'ach" will not apply in this case - because it is restricted to a murder that the person committed, but not to a killing committed by his ox.

(d) So Chizkiyah, as well as Tana de'Bei Chizkiyah, finally learns from the Pasuk "Mos Yumas ha'Makeh, Rotze'ach *Hu*" - what we just explained 'al Retzichaso Atah Horgo, ve'I Atah Horgo al Retzichas Shoro', leaving "Yumas" superfluous, as we explained initially (to compare the death of the ox to that of his master, as we learned in our Mishnah).

(a) They asked whether Shor Sinai also required twenty-three judges, or whether three sufficed. 'Shor Sinai' - refers to any ox that might have ascended Har Sinai, for which it would have been stoned to death, as the Pasuk writes in Yisro.

(b) The She'eilah is - whether, or not, that ox required twenty-three judges to sentence it to death, or not.

(c) Rami bar Yechezkel resolves the She'eilah from the Pasuk "Im Beheimah Im Ish Lo Yichyeh" - comparing the errant animal, to an errant man (whom, we know, required twenty-three judges).

(a) According to Resh Lakish, when Rebbi Eliezer in our Mishnah permits anyone to kill the six wild animals listed there, he refers specifically to when they killed someone. He argues with the Tana Kama inasmuch as he permits anyone to kill them, even without the sanction of a Beis-Din of twenty-three.

(b) According to Rebbi Yochanan - Rebbi Eliezer permits anyone to kill them - even if they did not kill anyone.

(c) The basis of their Machlokes is twofold - a. whether a wild animal that has not yet killed is tamable and b. whether it has an owner (Rebbi Elazar) or not (Rebbi Yochanan).

(d) Rebbi Eliezer says 'Kol ha'Kodem le'Horgan Zachah'. The ramifications of this statement, according to ...

1. ... Rebbi Yochanan are - that the person who kills them may keep the skin.
2. ... Resh Lakish are - that he has earned himself a good deed (but not the skin, which belongs to the owner).
(a) The Beraisa supports - Resh Lakish.

(b) Rebbi Eliezer draws a distinction between an ox that killed, which always requires a Beis-Din of twenty-three - and any other tame or wild animal, which anyone may kill, from the moment they kill someone.

(c) Rebbi Akiva disagrees with Rebbi Eliezer. He says 'Miysasan be'Esrim u'Sheloshah'. His opinion tallies with the Tana Kama ('ha'Ze'ev ve'Ari ... ve'ha'Nachash Miysasan be'Esrim-u'Sheloshah') - except for in the Din of a snake, where he concedes to Rebbi Eliezer.

(a) Our Mishnah requires twenty-three judges to judge a tribe. We query the suggestion that the tribe sinned by desecrating Shabbos - on the grounds that the Torah in Shoftim only differentiates between an individual and many who sinned, with regard to Avodah-Zarah (exclusively.

(b) If, as e conclude, it is then talking about a tribe that served idols, it will fall under the heading of - 'Ir ha'Nadachas'.

(c) We query this however, from the Beraisa which discusses an Ir ha'Nidachas.
According to Rebbi Yashiyah, it is only a town in this regard, if there are between ten and a hundred residents. A 'town' of less than ten residents is not considered a town, and one of more than ten residents is not an Ir ha'Nidachas - because it falls under the category of Tzibur (which has a Din of its own regarding bringing a Par He'elam Davar).

(a) For a town to be eligible to be an Ir ha'Nidachas, Rebbi Yonasan requires - between a hundred and the majority of the town.

(b) The residents of an Ir ha'Nidachas are sentenced to Hereg - whereas those of a town that is not an Ir ha'Nidachas receive Sekilah.

(c) Based on the previous Beraisa, the problem with our Mishnah 'Ein Danin es ha'Sheivet Ela al-Pi Beis-Din Shel Shiv'im ve'Echad' is - that either way, on what grounds does our Mishnah require seventy-one judges for an entire tribe (since it exceeds both a hundred residents and the majority of the town)?

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