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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Nedarim 85


(a) We just suggested that Rebbi (who obligates the person who ate his friend's Tevel to pay for all that he ate), holds 'Tovas Hana'ah Mamon', and Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah (who exempts him from paying for all the Ma'asros), 'Tovas Hana'ah Eino Mamon'. We try to repudiate this proof by establishing that both opinions hold 'Tovas Hana'ah Eino Mamon', and that their Machlokes is based on 'Matanos she'Lo Hurmu'.
What will they then be arguing about?

(b) We reject this however, on the grounds that Rebbi's opinion will then make no sense.
Why not?

(c) According to Abaye, the Machlokes between Rebbi and Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah is based upon whom Chazal penalized.
What are the two opinions?

(d) What will they hold regarding the She'eilah of Tovas Hana'ah Mamon? Is it Mamon or isn't it?

(a) According to Rava, our Mishnah holds 'Tovas Hana'ah Mamon', which explains why Kohanim and Levi'im not included in the Neder must receive the T'rumos and Ma'asros. How does he then explain the 'Reisha', which permits Kohanim and Levi'im to receive them, in spite of his Neder?

(b) What does the Rashba learn from Rava's explanation, regarding others benefiting from fruit that the owner forbade on himself?

(c) What will be the Din in the event that the owner then has his Neder revoked?

(d) Nevertheless, says the Rashba, in our case, we do not forbid Kohanim and Levi'im to benefit from the T'rumos and Ma'asros that the owner forbade, on the assumption that he might have his Neder revoked.
What precedent does the Rashba cite for this lenient ruling?

(a) On what grounds do we query the Rashba's ruling (obligating whoever ate the fruit to pay for it, once the Noder has his Neder revoked)?

(b) And on what grounds do we refute his proof from the Mishnah in Kesuvos (permitting the woman to marry again, despite the possibility that the Neder will be revoked)?

(c) Otherwise, were we to accept the Rashba's theory, we would not authorize anyone to eat the fruit that was forbidden through a Neder in the first place.
Why not?

(a) If a woman declares 'Konem she'Ani Osah ...
  1. ... al-Pi Aba'; ... al-Pi Avicha'; ... al-Pi Achi'; ... ve'al-Pi Achicha', why is her husband not permitted to annul it?
  2. ... she'Ani Osah al-Picha', her Neder does not require Hafarah.
    Why not?
(b) Rebbi Akiva and Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri disagree with the Tana Kama. According to Rebbi Akiva, the Neder requires Hafarah because she may produce more than the amount fixed by the Chachamim.
Why is the Tana Kama not similarly concerned?

(c) Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri agrees with the Tana Kama regarding a wife's extra products.
Then on what grounds does the Neder require Hafarah?

(d) The Tana Kama might disagree with Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri on the grounds that Hafarah of a husband (even when it is made during the marriage) cannot take effect after he divorces his wife. For which other reason might he argue with him?

Answers to questions



(a) Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri in our Mishnah (who says 'Yafer').
What important principle can we deduce from this ruling?

(b) If a man declares his wife's work Hekdesh, the Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Kesuvos permits her to eat what she produces. This might speak even when her husband is currently sustaining her, due to the principle stated by Rav Huna.
Which principle?

(c) Anything extra that she produces, Rebbi Meir considers Hekdesh.
When does it become Hekdesh?

(d) On what grounds does Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar consider it Chulin?

(a) Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar in the Mishnah in Kesuvos. How does this seem to clash with his ruling here?

(b) How do we initially try to resolve the apparent contradiction in Shmuel?

(c) We refute this suggestion on three scores: Because then he should either have said 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri be'Ha'adafah' or 'Ein Halachah ke'Rebbi Akiva'.
What is the third possibility?

(d) To which two points would 'Ein Halachah ke'Rebbi Akiva' refer?

(a) Rav Yosef differentiates between Hekdesh, where Shmuel holds 'Ein Adam Makdish Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam', and Konamos.
Why should Konamos differ from Hekdesh in this regard?

(b) Abaye queries Rav Yosef. He concedes that one can forbid one's friend's fruit on himself, but not that he should be able to forbid something that is not yet in the world.
Why is that?

(c) On what logical basis does Abaye compare forbidding ...

  1. ... his friend's things on himself to forbidding his things on his friend?
  2. ... something that is not yet in the world to forbidding his friend's things on his friend?
(d) How does Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehudah finally establish our Mishnah in a way that renders it a 'Davar she'Ba le'Olam'?
(a) What do we mean when we query Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua's explanation on the grounds that the hands themselves are Meshubad to her husband? Does this have anything to do with the She'eilah of 'Adam Makdish Davar le'Olam'?

(b) How do we answer this Kashya?

(c) What problem do we have with our answer?

Answers to questions

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