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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Nedarim 34


(a) We already explained the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Makom she'Notlin S'char, Tipol Hana'ah le'Hekdesh', with regard to the case when the property of the finder is forbidden to the owner (and when the finder foregoes the S'char). What Kashya do we now ask on the one who permits returning the article even when it is the property of the owner that is forbidden on the finder (according to Rabosai)?

(b) Why can we not answer that it speaks when the owner wants to pay, but the finder has no option but to refuse payment (seeing as the owner's property is forbidden to him)?

(c) Alternatively, the owner will even be permitted to pay the *finder*, because it is similar to a bad sale (that we discussed above on 31a.). What is the connection between our case and that of 'a bad sale'?

(d) We answer the initial Kashya 'a'Chada ka'Tani'.
What does this mean?

(a) According to the second Lashon, Rav Ami and Rav Asi both agree that when the property of the *owner* is forbidden to the *finder*, the finder is permitted to return the lost article.
In light of P'rutah de'Rav Yosef, why should that be?

(b) They argue when it is the property of the *finder* that is forbidden to the *owner*.
What is then the reason of the one who forbids it (despite the fact that he is only giving him what is already his)? Why is this worse than paying his debt for him?

(c) According to the one who establishes 'Machzir Lo Aveidaso' when it is the property of the owner which is forbidden to the finder, how will this case then differ basically from the other cases in our Mishnah 'Shokel Lo es Shiklo u'Porei'a Lo es Chovo ... (ve'Torem Lo es Terumasav' - in the next Mishnah)?

(d) How come that the Tana differentiates rather than confine himself to a standard set of cases?

(a) What problem does the Seifa of our Mishnah ('Makom she'Notlin Alehah S'char, Tipol Hana'ah le'Hekdesh') pose on the second Lashon?

(b) How do we resolve this problem?

(c) What is the Halachah regarding when the property of the owner is forbidden to the finder? May the finder return his lost articles?

Answers to questions



(a) What does Rava say about someone who, after declaring a Hefker loaf Hekdesh, picks it up to eat it?

(b) Why does he refer specifically to a *Hefker* loaf, rather than a loaf that belongs to him?

(c) Why does he not acquire the loaf anyway, seeing as the Chachamim gave each individual the four Amos in his immediate vicinity (in the Reshus ha'Rabim) in order to acquire?

(d) How can Hekdesh acquire it, without the Makdish having acquired it first?

(a) Had he picked up the same loaf to bequeath it to his sons, he would only have acquired it commensurate with the Hana'ah that he receives.
What will that Hana'ah comprise in this case?

(b) Why is he not Mo'el completely, like he is in the first case?

(a) Rav Chiya bar Avin asked Rava what the Din will be in a case when someone declared in front of his friend 'Kikri Alecha' and then presented him with the loaf.
What are the two sides of the She'eilah?

(b) Will this She'eilah extend to a case where the Madir sold the loaf to a third person?

(c) Why can we not infer from the Mishnah in 'ha'Shutfin' which we just quoted that if the Noder had not sold the loaf to a third person, but given it to the Mudar, that it would be forbidden?

(d) The Tana in the Mishnah later permits the Mudar to benefit from the Madir's food only if the Madir first gave it to a storekeeper or through a third person.
Why can we not resolve Rav Chiya bar Avin's She'eilah from there?

(a) Rava replied that it is obvious that he meant to forbid the loaf forever.
Why did he consider it so obvious?

(b) On what grounds does Rav Chiya bar Avin disagree with Rava? Why is it not so obvious after all?

Answers to questions

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