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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Nedarim 87

NEDARIM 87 & 88 (First days of Sukos) - dedicated by Mrs. G. Turkel (Rabbi Kornfeld's grandmother), an exceptional woman who accepted all of Hashem's Gezeiros with love and who loved and respected the study of Torah. Tehei Nafshah Tzerurah bi'Tzror ha'Chaim.



(a) On the assumption that "Al" has the same connotations as "Osah" and "Lo", we will explain the Pasuk concerning the Mitzvah of Keri'ah "Al Shaul ve'Al Yehonasan B'no" - that, when tearing Keri'ah, one knows for whom one is tearing. (Presumably, the D'rashah is from the extra "Al" [since the Navi could have written "Al Shaul vi'Yehonasan B'no').

(b) We cannot learn from the Beraisa 'Amru Lo Meis Aviv ve'Kara, ve'Achar-Kach Nimtza B'no, Yatza Yedei Keri'ah', that "Al" (and subsequently "Osah" and Lo" too) does not come to teach us the above D'rashah - because when the Tana says 'Amru Lo Meis Aviv', he does not mean literally what he says, but that they told him that one of his relations died, only he thought that they had said that it was his father. The D'rashah only teaches us that he is not Yotze if he was told the wrong information, but not if he himself misunderstood what he was told.

(c) We know this answer to be correct - because it is borne out by another Beraisa, which explicitly makes this distinction.

(d) Consequently, if someone hears a woman make a Neder, and without knowing whether it was his wife or his daughter who made it, he annuls it, and then discovers that it was the one or the other - the Hafarah is valid.

(a) Rav Ashi differentiates between Toch K'dei Dibur and le'Achar K'dei Dibur. He says - that the Beraisa speaks when his father died within a Toch K'dei Dibur of the Keri'ah. Otherwise, the Tana of the Beraisa will agree that he is not Yotze with the Keri'ah.

(b) In spite of the fact that Rav Ashi is unlikely to disagree with a Beraisa, he offers a new answer - in order to avoid changing the literal meaning of the Beraisa (which the first answer was forced to do).

(c) In connection with someone who tore Keri'ah because he believed his relative to have already died, but the relative only died afterwards - the Beraisa rules that he must tear Keri'ah again.

(d) Rebbi Shimon ben Pazi Amar Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi comments - that that applies only if the relative died after 'K'dei Dibur', but not if he died 'Toch K'dei Dibur'.

(a) There are only four exceptions to the rule 'Toch K'dei Dibur ke'Dibur Dami': Megadef, Oved Avodas Kochamim - Kidushin and Geirushin.

(b) When we say that by these four 'Toch K'dei Dibur La'av ke'Dibur Dami' - we mean that if someone cursed Hashem, worshipped idols, betrothed or divorced a woman and then retracted within the time it takes to say 'Shalom Aleichem Rebbi u'Mori', his original act or statement still stands.

(c) In 'Yesh Nochlin', we only reckon two of them (Avodas Kochavim and Kidushin) - not because the Sugyos argue, but because Avodas Kochavim incorporates Megadef, and Kidushin incorporates Geirushin.

(d) These four cases are different than all other cases regarding Toch K'dei Dibur - because, whereas in other matters, people tend to allow themselves time to reconsider (the reason for saying 'Toch K'dei Dibur ke'Dibur Dami'), these four matters are so serious, that they will only act after careful consideration, leaving no room for retracting.

(a) The Ramban quoting Rabeinu Tam gives the source for 'Toch K'dei Dibur ke'Dibur Dami' - as being a Takanas Chachamim, to enable someone who is making a purchase when his Rebbe walks past, to greet him (and on account of that case, they extended it to all other areas of Halachah except for the above-mentioned four).

(b) We disagree with him - on the grounds that by Nedarim, for example, this means that the Rabbanan have revoked a Neder which min ha'Torah, would have taken effect, contravening the principle that the Rabbanan cannot positively uproot a Torah law.

(a) If a woman forbids figs and grapes on herself, and her husband *upholds* just the Neder on figs - the entire Neder stands.

(b) Should he *annul* the Neder on figs only, the Neder is not annulled until he annuls the Neder on the grapes as well. This means - either that the entire Hafarah is not effective, but the part on the figs is, or simply that it is not effective at all, because one cannot annul only part of a Neder.

(c) The Tana says that if a woman says 'Konem Te'einah she'Ani To'emes, va'Anavah she'Ani To'emes' - it is considered to be two Nedarim.

(d) This does not mean that her husband cannot annul them simultaneously (because a husband can in fact annul simultaneously, as many Nedarim as his wife makes,). What it means is - that if he upheld only one of the two, he would still be permitted to annul the other one, and vice-versa.




(a) The author of our Mishnah (who says that the a woman's Neder is not annulled until her husband annuls the entire Neder) is Rebbi Yishmael, who argues in a Beraisa with Rebbi Akiva - who says that since the Torah writes "Iyshah Yekimenu ve'Iyshah Yeferenu", just as "Yekimenu" implies even a part of the Neder, so too does "Yeferenu".

(b) They both agree that 'Iyshah Yekimenu' implies even part of the Neder, whereas 'Iyshah Yeferenu' implies only the entire Neder (because otherwise, the Torah should have written "Yafer Mimenu" [though it is unclear why we cannot say the same thing by "Iyshah Yekimenu"]). The basis of their Machlokes is - whether the Torah is comparing Hafarah to Hakamah (Rebbi Akiva) in this regard, or not (Rebbi Yishmael). Note: We saw already on the previous Amud that this Hekesh cannot be applied in all cases.

(c) Rebbi Chiya bar Aba cites a third opinion, the Chachamim - who (reverses the Hekesh, and) say that the Torah compares Hakamah to Hafarah, permitting the husband to uphold part of the Neder, just like he can annul part of it.

(d) We can extrapolate from the Chachamim's words, that when the Tana in our Mishnah said 'Hafer la'Te'einim, Eino Mufar', he means that the entire Neder is not Mufar, but the part concerning figs, is (as opposed to saying that it is not annulled at all) - because that is inherent in the words 'Mah she'Hafer, Hafer' (or 'Hufar').

7) We change the text of the Chachamim quoted by Rebbi Yochanan to read 'Mah Hafarah, Mah she'Hafer, Lo Hafer (or 'Hufar')' - on the basis of the Tosefta, which states with regard to this very case 'Asurah Bein bi'Te'einim Bein ba'Anavim'.

8) The author of our Mishnah ('Konem Te'einah she'Ani To'emes, va'Anavah she'Ani To'emes Harei Eilu Sh'nei Nedarim') must be Rebbi Shimon who says (about someone who says to five claimants 'Shevu'ah she'Ein Lecha be'Yadi, ve'Lo Lecha, ve'Lo Lecha ... ' - that it is only considered one Shevu'ah until he mentions 'Shevu'ah' by each claimant.


(a) If a husband concedes that he had known about Nedarim, but that he had been unaware that he had the authority to annul them - he remains permitted to annul the Neder from the moment he discovers that he has, until nightfall.

(b) Should he concede that he was even aware of his authority to annul Nedarim, but not that the Neder that his wife had made was in the category of Nedarim that were subject to Hafarah, Rebbi Meir forbids him to annul it. This seems to mean that he cannot annul it at all - since, although partial knowledge is not considered knowledge (that will authorize him to annul the Neder, it is considered "Yom Sham'o".

(c) The Rabbanan permit him to annul the Neder on that day, because partial knowledge is considered full knowledge.

(d) Others explain that what Rebbi Meir means is that he cannot annul the Neder on the following day, but up until the night-time of the day that he discovers that the Neder concerned is subject to nullification, he remains permitted to annul it (even though it was no longer the day on which his wife declared it. According to this ...

1. ... Rebbi Meir's reason is - because he considers the knowledge that his wife's Nedarim can be annulled, and that she made Nedarim, complete knowledge.
2. ... the reason of the Rabbanan, who even permit him to annul the Neder on the following day, because his partial knowledge of the previous day is not considered knowledge.
(a) Rebbi Yehudah, in a Beraisa, Darshens the Pasuk (with regard to someone who killed be'Shogeg) "be'Lo Re'os" to preclude a blind man. We initially think that he interprets "be'Lo Re'os" to mean - that the 'murderer' did not see his victim, implying that normally, he was able to see, and it is only on that occasion that he did not.

(b) Rebbi Meir says 'Lerabos es ha'Suma', we initially think - because seeing as the murderer does partially realize when a person enters his vicinity, he is no different than a person who can see (because he considers a partial knowledge like complete knowledge).

(c) Assuming the first explanation in our Mishnah (that according to Rebbi Meir, the husband who has only partial knowledge, cannot annul his wife's Neder at all, whereas according to Rebbi Yehudah, he can), the discrepancy that now appears between the opinion in our Mishnah and the opinion in the Beraisa ...

1. ... according to Rebbi Meir is - that whereas in our Mishnah he holds partial knowledge is not considered knowledge, in the Beraisa he holds that it is.
2. ... According to Rebbi Yehudah (assuming the Rabbanan in our Mishnah to be Rebbi Yehudah) is - that whereas, in our Mishnah he holds that partial knowledge is considered knowledge, in the Beraisa he holds that it is not.
(a) According to the second Lashon (that according to Rebbi Meir, the husband who has only partial knowledge, can nevertheless annul the Nedarim after he discovers that they are subject to Hafarah, up until nightfall), whereas according to the Rabbanan [Rebbi Yehudah], he can even annul the Nedarim on the following day), there is no discrepancy between what the latter says in the Beraisa and what he says in our Mishnah - because, in both cases, he holds that partial knowledge is not considered to be full knowledge.

(b) The two rulings however, appear to clash - because whereas in the Reisha of our Mishnah he does not consider a partial knowledge to be knowledge, which is why he agrees 'Yafer', in the Beraisa, he does. When, in the Seifa of our Mishnah, he says 'Lo Yafer', that is because he does not consider a case where the husband knows that he has the authority to annul Nedarim (even though he does not know which nedarim) to be a partial knowledge, but full knowledge.

(c) Even though it initially appears that Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah learn their respective opinions from their understanding of the words "be'Lo Re'os" (rendering it a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv), in which case there would be no contradiction between their respective opinions there and those in our Mishnah regarding Nedarim (which are based on S'varos) - this is not really the case. The Pasuk "be'Lo Re'os" is really ambiguous, and each Tana explains it according to his own logic, creating a contradiction between their two sets of opinions.

(a) We answer 'Hacha me'Inyana di'Kera (ve'Hacha me'Inyana di'Kera'). In fact, each one learns from a different word in the Pasuk in Shoftim "va'Asher Yavo es Re'eihu ba'Ya'ar".
1. ... Rebbi Yehudah learns from "Ya'ar" that a blind person is automatically included in the Chiyuv Galus (explaining why he needs "be'Lo Re'os" to preclude him) - because "Ya'ar" implies anyone who enters it, even a blind person.
2. ... Rebbi Meir learns from "bi'V'li Da'as" that he is automatically Patur - because a blind man can never kill someone with full knowledge, since he cannot see where the victim is.
(b) Rebbi Meir holds intrinsically - that a partial knowledge is not considered knowledge.

(c) The principle that enables us to learn that a blind person is Chayav from Galus from the two P'sukim "bi'V'li Da'as" and "be'Lo Re'os" is - 'Ein Mi'ut Achar Mi'ut Ela Lerabos'.

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