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Nedarim 35



(a) The Tana of a Beraisa cites a case where Reuven asks Shimon to lend him the cow that is standing before them, and Shimon responds by forbidding his cow or all his property on him with a Konem, should he owns any other cows. Should Shimon be found to possess other cows in his lifetime - the Neder is valid and the cow is forbidden to Reuven.

(b) If Shimon is found to possess other cows and then dies, Reuven is permitted to have benefit from the cow - because, we assume, the cow is no longer Shimon's.

(c) We reconcile this with Rava, who, in the previous case, forbade the loaf even after the Madir had given it to the Mudar - by establishing the Beraisa when the Mudar received the cow from a third person (who purchased it from Shimon first).

(d) Rav Ashi supports this answer from the Lashon 'Nitnah Lo' (instead of 'Nasnah Lo') used by the Tana. Despite the fact that 'Nitnah' is spelt the same way as 'Nasnah', Rav Ashi knew to read it 'Nitnah' - from tradition.

(a) Rava asked Rav Nachman 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos O Lo?'. The ramifications of Rava's She'eilah are - whether the person who transgresses the Konem needs to bring an Asham Me'ilos or not, and whether the has to pay the principle plus an extra fifth to Hekdesh for using it be'Shogeg.

(b) Rav Nachman resolve Rava's She'eilah from our Mishnah ('Makom she'Notlin Alehah S'char, Tipol Hana'ah le'Hekdesh') - from the fact that it was to *Hekdesh* that the owner had to pay the money.

(c) Otherwise - he would have had to throw the money into the Yam ha'Melach (as is the case with other things that are Asur be'Hana'ah.

(d) Rav Nachman's reply is by no means the last word on the matter - since we are now about to cite a Machlokes Tana'im.

(a) The Chachamim in a Beraisa rule 'Ein Me'ilah be'Konamos'. Rebbi Meir disagrees. He maintains 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos'. If there is Me'ilah however - then one is also permitted to redeem it.

(b) The distinction that Rebbi Meir makes between a Konem K'lali and a Konem P'rati is - that whereas the above is true of a Konem K'lali, a Konem P'rati cannot be redeemed (because, seeing as other people are not Mo'el, the Kedushah is not sufficiently strong for Pidyon to take effect.

(c) The Halachah is like Rebbi Meir - that 'Yesh Me'ilah be'Konamos'.

(a) Rav Acha Brei de'Rav Ivya asked Rav Ashi who will be Mo'el in a case where Reuven forbids a loaf of bread on Shimon and then gives it to him. Reuven might not be Mo'el, despite the fact that he is the one who declared the loaf Konem - because he did not derive any benefit from it.

(b) This is a disproof to the Rambam - who rules that someone who is Madir his friend and then provides him with a meal is Mo'el.

(c) Shimon might well not be Mo'el - because he can counter that he only intended to receive from Reuven something that is permitted, not something that is forbidden.

(d) This case will differ from a regular case of Me'ilah, where someone who takes something from the domain of Hekdesh into his own may well be Mo'el even though he too, is unaware that it is Hekdesh - because that only applies if he actually took it himself, whereas here, it is Reuven who gave it to him.

(a) Rav Ashi resolves Rav Acha's She'eilah. In fact - neither in the above case is Mo'el.

(b) This does not absolve Shimon from Me'ilah completely - because, should he then take the loaf out of Hekdesh's domain (by eating it or giving it to a third person), he will certainly be guilty of Me'ilah.

(c) The Yerushalmi asks - whether someone who forbade a loaf on himself with a Konem, may use it as fuel.

(d) The She'eilah remains unresolves.




(a) The Madir may ...
1. ... separate T'rumos and Ma'asros on behalf of the Mudar ...
2. ... and he may bring Kinei Zavin and Zavos and Kinei Yoldos ... on his or her behalf, should he (the Madir) happen to be a Cohen.
(b) He is permitted, on principle, to teach him Torah - because 'Mitzvos La'av Lehanos Nitnu' (the essence of a Mitzvah is not the pleasure that one derives from it, but the performance of the Mitzvah itself.

(c) This concession however - is restricted to teaching him Medrash, Halachos and Agados, but not Mikra (T'nach), as will be explained later in the Sugya.

(a) They asked whether Cohanim who perform the Avodah are the Sheluchim of the people or of the Torah - the difference being whether a Cohen who is Madir a Yisrael, may subsequently bring his Korbanos or not.

(b) Even assuming that they are the Torah's Sheluchim, the Madir is not forbidden to bring the Mudar's Korbanos anyway because, as a result of their actions, a Zav and a Zavah ... become permitted to eat Kodshim - because that Hana'ah is only indirect (G'rama).

(c) In Kidushin, we conclude that they must be the Torah's Sheluchim - because if they were Yisrael's, how would it be possible for a Sheli'ach to achieve something on behalf of someone who is unable to achieve it himself?

(d) Nevertheless, in our Sugya, we leave the She'eilah unresolved - because *we* are only concerned with finding a source for the Halachah in a Mishnah or Beraisa.

(a) We counter the proof (that the Cohanim are the Sheluchim of the Torah) from our Mishnah, which permits the Madir to bring 'Kinei Zavin ve'Zavos ... ' on behalf of the Mudar - by pointing out that the Tana restricts his concession to 'Kinei Zavin ve'Zavos ... ' (the Mechusrei Kaparah), whose Din differs inasmuch as they can be brought even without Da'as (the knowledge of the owner). Consequently, the Cohen who brings them will not be acting as their Sheli'ach, even if normally, he would be Yisrael's Sh'liach.

(b) Rebbi Yochanan learns from the Pasuk in Shemini "Zos *Toras* ha'Zav" that the Korbanos of a Mechusar Kaparah (as opposed to Korbanos that come to atone) do not require Da'as - because "Toras" comes to include even a Zav Katan, who does not have Da'as, and on whose behalf his father brings his Korbanos.

(c) We cannot then infer the opposite. We cannot infer that the Madir is forbidden to bring other Korbanos on behalf of the Mudar - because it may well be that the Tana specifies the Korbanos of Mechusrei Kaparah to teach us that the Madir is *even* permitted to bring *their* Korbanos, even though he is permitting them to eat Kodshim (and not to preclude other Korbanos).

(a) In the Beraisa that Rav Bibi cited in front of Rav Nachman, the Tana obligates a Ketanah, a woman who is pregnant and a woman who is feeding to use a cloth during Tashmish. A Ketanah is obligated to do so - because of the possibility that she becomes pregnant, in which case she is bound to die.

(b) The Sugya in Yevamos, which concludes that she is danger of dying, but not that she is bound to - holds that 'Children are as good as signs of maturity (and perhaps even better)', meaning that bearing a child determines a girl to be a Gedolah (even if she is still a Ketanah in age) at least as much and perhaps even more, that the growth of two pubic hairs.

(c) Based on the Pasuk (also in Shemini) "Zos Toras ha'Yoledes", this now poses the Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan (who Darshened "Zos *Toras* ha'Zav" to include a Ketanah) - What will he now Darshen from "Zos *Toras* ha'Yoledes" (seeing as we just proved that a Ketanah cannot give birth)?

(d) In fact - he Darshens from "Zos *Toras* ha'Yoledes", that a Shotah (who also has no Da'as) is obligated to bring a Korban Yoledes, and that her husband must bring it on her behalf.

(a) We base Rebbi Yochanan's D'rashah on a statement of Rebbi Yehudah in a Beraisa - where he says that a man is obligated to bring all of his wife's obligatory Korbanos on her behalf.

(b) If not for Rebbi Yehudah's statement, we would not be able to establish Rebbi Yochanan's D'rashah - because if the husband would not be obligated to bring his wife's Korbenos Chovah, to whom would the Torah be speaking when obligating a Shotah to bring the Korban Yoledes? To the Shotah?

(a) Despite the fact that whatever a woman owns belongs to her husband (which means that she is actually poor), her wealthy husband is obligated to bring the Korban Olah ve'Yored of a wealthy person on her behalf.

(b) The source of the husband's obligation - lies in her Kesuvah, where her husband specifically obligates himself to cover all her obligations.

(c) He is not however - obligated to bring ...

1. ... her Nedarim and Nedavos - because Rebbi Yehudah specifically referred to 'Korbenos Chovah'. Nor does he need to bring ...
2. ... the Korbenos Chovah that she was already obligated to bring from before, should he divorce her - because in the receipt that she writes him upon receiving her Kesuvah, she foregoes all outstanding obligations up to that time.
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