ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Nedarim 30
(a) Rav Hoshaya asked whether - if a man gave a woman two P'rutos, saying
that with one of them he is betrothing her now, and with the other, after he
divorces her, the Kidushin is effective or not.
(b) Rav Avin and Rebbi Yitzchak b'Rivi attempted to resolve this She'eilah
from bar Pada - who holds 'Chozros ve'Kodshos', even though the Noder did
not issue a fresh declaration after redeeming them. The same will apply in
this case, they maintain, and the second Kidushin will take effect after the
divorce, even without a fresh Kidushin.
(c) We already learned above (Rebbi Yochanan's ruling) that if a third
person redeems the plants from Hekdesh, then even bar Pada, who holds
'Chozros ve'Kodshos, will agree that they do not become Hekdesh - and this
will apply even if the purchaser subsequently bought them back from him.
(a) Upon arousing himself from his nap, Rebbi Yirmiyah refuted Rav Avin and
Rebbi Yitzchak b'Rivi's proof - by comparing the case of Kidushei Ishah to a
third person, where, we have already learned, we do not say 'Chozros
(b) What gives a woman the Din of a third person in this regard is - the
fact that, the moment she leaves her husband jurisdiction, she is not like
the original owner of the plants, who had and who has the power to declare
them Hekdesh (because the Torah writes "Ki Yikach Ish Ishah", but rather,
she resembles Hefker. Kidushin can only be performed by the husband, and as
far as *he* is concerned, she is like a third person.
(c) This does not mean that Rebbi Yirmiyah considers her completely like a
third person, in which case he will resolve Rav Oshaya's She'eilah in the
opposite direction (and the second Kidushin will not take effect) - because
neither does she resemble a third person, seeing as she is the one to bring
herself into her husband domain, by giving her consent, in which case she is
somewhat similar to Hekdesh (and the second Kidushin ought to be valid).
(a) According to Rebbi Yirmiyah then, the She'eilah remains unresolved. In
the opinion of the Rashba however, Rebbi Ila (in Kesuvos and later in this
Masechta), does resolve it. Rebbi Ila says - that if someone declares a
field that he is about to sell Hekdesh for when after he re-purchases it
from the buyer, the field is then Hekdesh.
(b) Rebbi Yirmiyah did not quote Rebbi Ila - because he did not know about
(c) The Rambam too, agrees with the Rashba. This ruling will apply even to
the case of bar Pada, when a third person redeems the plants (where the
Hekdesh is not automatically effective) - to validate a specific Neder that
he made prior to the redemption, declaring them Hekdesh now after he buys
them from the purchaser.
(d) We reject the Rashba's proof from Kesuvos however - because there,
seeing as the owner could have declared the field Hekdesh *now* had he so
wished, the Hekdesh now for later is also effective; whereas in our case and
in the case of Kidushin, where he is 'Makdish ve'Chozer u'Makdish' or
'Mekadesh ve'Chozer u'Mekadesh' and where the second Hekdesh or Kidushin
could not be effective now (before the first one), it will not be effective
(a) Someone who forbids Hana'ah from sailors is permitted to benefit from
people who reside on dry land. But someone who forbids Hana'ah from people
who reside on dry land - may not benefit from sailors, because they reside
on dry land, too.
(b) Rav Papa and Rav Acha Brei de'Rav Ika argue over the Seifa of our
Mishnah 'Lo ke'Eilu she'Holchin me'Acco le'Yaffo, Ela be'Mi she'Darko
Lefaresh'. According to one of them, this refers to (the inference from) the
first case 'ha'Noder mi'Yordei ha'Yam, Mutar be'Yoshvei Yabashah', 'Ha
mi'Yordei ha'Yam Asur' - but only from long distance sailors who travel
overseas, not from ferry-boat men who only sail from Acco to Yaffo.
(c) According to the other, it refers to the second case 'ha'Noder
mi'Yoshvei Yabashah, Asur be'Yordei ha'Yam' - and not just ferry-boat men,
but even long-distance sailors.
(d) This second opinion, which says nothing about the Reisha with regard to
Yordei ha'Yam who only sail from Acco to Yaffo - presumably does not
differentiate, and they too, are considered sailors and included in the
Neder (even though, the first opinion ruled leniently).
(a) 'Those who travel from Acco to Yaffo' might pertain only to those who do
so regularly, says the Rashba - or it might pertain to those who happened to
have been traveling on that route at that particular moment.
(b) The Yerushalmi cites the Machlokes Tana'im in the last Perek of this
Masechta, where if a woman undertakes to become a Nazir from the time that
she marries, Rebbi Yishmael holds that her husband may annul her Neder, and
Rebbi Akiva holds that he may not. The basis of their Machlokes is - whether
we go after the time when the Neder takes effect (Rebbi Yishmael) or after
the time when the Neder is made (Rebbi Akiva). The Halachah is like Rebbi
(c) The Yerushalmi proves from here - that someone who forbade Hana'ah from
sailors after thirty days, whether people who become sailors during the
thirty-day period are included in the Neder or not is a Machlokes Tana'im.
(d) Whether people who go on cruises are considered sailors in this regard
or not - constitutes an unresolved She'eilah in the Yerushalmi (and we rule
(a) Someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from 'Ro'ei ha'Chamah' is not
permitted to benefit from blind people because he was really referring to
all living creatures whom the sun sees - in which case, his Neder comes to
preclude fish and animal fetuses, which are permitted to him.
(b) He cannot have meant what he said - because then he ought to have said
'me'Ro'in' (rather than 'me'Ro'ei ha'Chamah').
(a) Someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from black-haired people is
forbidden to receive any benefit from both bald people and from white-haired
people. He may however - receive benefit from women (whose hair is always
covered - and regarding whom the title 'covered-haired' is more apt) and
small children (whose hair is always uncovered - and regarding whom the
title 'uncovered-hair' is more apt).
(b) We know that ...
1. ... he did not mean to preclude bald people - because then he would have
said 'Ba'alei Sei'ar').
2. ... white-haired people - because now that 'Shechorei Rosh' does not
preclude bald people, it does not preclude white-haired people either.
(a) Someone who declares an Isur Hana'ah from 'Yilodim', is permitted to
receive benefit from Noladim (because 'Yilodim' implies those who have
already been born, but not those who have yet to be born). Someone who made
a Neder forbidding Hana'ah from 'Noladim' on the other hand, may not receive
benefit from Yilodim, according to the Chachamim - because 'Noladim'
incorporates both those who are born already and those who have yet to be
(b) The problem with the statement 'Rebbi Meir Matir Af be'Yilodim' is -
that if the Noder is permitted to receive benefit *also* from the Yilodim,
then who is included in the Neder?
(c) In fact, there are words missing in our Mishnah, which reads - 'Rebbi
Meir Omer, Af ha'Noder min ha'Noladim, Mutar be'Yilodim'.
(a) We can prove from the Pasuk ...
1. ... "Sh'nei Banecha ha'Noladim Lecha be'Eretz Cana'an" - that 'Noladim'
means those who have already been born.
(b) We reconcile this with Rebbi Meir, who considers 'Noladim' to mean
specifically people who will be born - by differentiating between Lashon
Torah and Lashon B'nei Adam (in other words, even though the Torah refers to
both as "Noladim", in colloquial language, 'Noladim' refers to people who
have yet to be born.
2. ... "Hinei Ben Nolad le'Veis David Yoshiyahu Sh'mo" - that it also means
those who have yet to be born.
(c) According to the Chachamim (who also agree with the principle
'bi'Nedarim Holchin Achar Leshon B'nei Adam'), people tend to apply the term
'Noladim' to those who have been born as well as to those who have yet to be
born (just like the Torah does).
(a) The Chachamim in the Seifa of our Mishnah say 'Lo Niskaven Ela be'Mi
she'Darko Lehivaled' - to preclude fish and Sheratzim, which do not give
birth, but lay eggs.
(b) This is not a third opinion - but merely an explanation of the Tana Kama
of Rebbi Meir (who does not preclude someone who is already born from the