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Nedarim 24



(a) The Mishnah in 'Konem Yayin' states that, if the Noder stipulated that, unless his friend accepts a Kur of wheat and two barrels of wine on behalf of his son, he (the Noder) will not accept any benefit from him, the Neder does not require Hatarah - because the Mudar can say that since the Madir only meant his Kavod, as far as he is concerned, he considers it as if he had received the wheat and the wine.

(b) We can infer from this Mishnah - that if not for that reason, the Neder would require nullification (in spite of the fact that it seems to be a case of Nidrei Ziruzin).

(c) We try to prove from there that the Rabbanan argue with Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov - because, we contend, *they* must be the author of the Beraisa. If it was Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov, then the Neder ought not to require Hatarah, any more than the case in our Mishnah, because it is Nidrei Ziruzin.

(a) We conclude that the author could just as well be Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov - who might well be inclined to agree that this is not a case of Nidrei Ziruzin, because the Noder can say 'I am not a dog, who only receives and does not give (in which case, he really *means* the Neder to be effective).

(b) Some say that we cannot apply the same S'vara in our Mishnah in the case of Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov ('Af ha'Rotzeh Lehadir es Chaveiro she'Yochal Etzlo ... '), because there the Neder comes to forbid Hana'ah on the *Mudar*, and not on the *Madir* (as it does in this case). According to others, it is not applicable - because it is only in this case, were the Noder is giving the Mudar *a large gift*, indicating that the Mudar must have once done him a big favor, that he will say 'I am not a dog ... '; whereas in our Mishnah he is merely inviting him for one meal, something that people do without necessarily giving something in exchange, and the Sevara 'I am not a dog ... ' will not apply.

(a) Rebbi Meir and the Rabbanan argue in another Beraisa in the reverse case to the previous one (when the Madir forbids the Mudar to have Hana'ah from him unless he gives *his* son a Kur of wheat and two barrels of wine). Like before, the Chachamim do not require Hatarah in this case - because this time it is the Noder who can say to the Mudar 'It is as if I received the wheat and the wine from you'.

(b) In spite of the inference, indicating that this is not a case of Nidrei Ziruzin, the author of this Beraisa too, be Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov. What makes this case different than the case in our Mishnah ('Af ha'Rotzeh Lehadir es Chaveiro she'Yochal Etzlo ... ') - is the fact that the Noder can claim 'I am not a king, who can keep on giving without receiving'.

(a) Rebbi Meir says in the last Beraisa - that the Mudar is forbidden to having any Hana'ah from the Madir until he gives his son the specified amount of wheat and wine.

(b) He argues in the previous Beraisa too - forbidding the Madir to have Hana'ah from the Mudar until the latter accepts the wheat and the wine on behalf of his son.

(c) The Din in that case, if ...

1. ... the Mudar claims that the Madir made the Neder with his honor in mind, and the Madir says that quite to the contrary, he had his own honor in mind will be - that the Neder will be valid (even according to the Rabbanan).
2. ... the Madir agrees with the Mudar that he made the Neder with the honor of the Mudar in mind, will be - that the Neder will not require Hatarah (even according to Rebbi Meir).
(d) Rebbi Meir argues with the Rabbanan - in a case of S'tam, which Rebbi Meir considers like the former case, and the Rabbanan like the latter.
(a) Both Beraisos speak when the sons (on whose behalf the wheat and wine are being given) are living with their father. If they are grown-up and no longer living with their father - then the Noder has *their* benefit in mind (not the Mudar or the Noder). Consequently, it would be up to the sons to say 'Hareini ke'Niskabalti' and not the fathers.

(b) The Rashba confines the possibility of saying 'Hareini ke'Niskabalti' (which render the Neder void) to the case under discussion (where the Neder requires the Mudar or the Noder to *give something*, and where it would in theory, have been possible to return the object anyway) - it will not pertain to a case where the Noder forbids Hana'ah on his friend in the event that he visits a certain place, because should he contravene the Neder and go there, how can one possibly say that it is as if he had not gone?

(c) The Rashba's opinion however - is not unanimous. There are some who hold that if the Noder or the Mudar say that the initial Neder was made in order to satisfy the wishes of whichever party, and he no longer minds whether he goes or not, it is as if his wish has been fulfilled.

(a) Mar Keshisha Brei de'Rav Chisda infers from the Mishnah later, which presents Nidrei Onsin as when someone forbids his property on his friend unless he eats by him, and he or his son falls ill (preventing him from fulfilling the condition) - that had the O'nes not occurred, the Neder would be valid.

(b) He attempts to prove from there that the Rabbanan argue with Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov - because Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov would consider this to be a case of Nidrei Ziruzin.

(c) We reconcile the Mishnah with Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov however, by establishing the case 'de'Zamina Adrei li'Mezamna' - meaning that it is the Mudar who asks the Madir to invite him, and then, when he condescends, he asks him to reinforce his promise with a Neder.

(d) This is not a case of 'Nidrei Ziruzin' - because it is not the Noder who is trying to convince the Mudar to eat by him, but who is simply complying with the Mudar's request, which has nothing to do with Nidrei Ziruzin.

(a) In a Beraisa, Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov considers Nidrei Ziruzin a case of someone who forbids on himself any Hana'ah from his friend, unless his friend comes to eat by him fresh bread and a hot drink, and his friend flatly refuses. Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov uses the Lashon 'Yeser al Kein - because he considers this to be an extension of Nidrei Ziruzin, which he holds despite the S'vara of 'La'av Kalba Ana ... ' (assuming the S'vara for this to be because a person simply does not like receiving without giving - see 8d.), which we originally thought overrides that of Nidrei Ziruzin.

(b) The Rabbanan disagree with Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov. According to them - the Neder stands.

(c) We have now resolved at least one of the two She'eilos that we originally asked - having ascertained that the Rabbanan do indeed argue with Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov.

(d) We know that the Rabbanan argue even in the original case of Nidrei Ziruzin (despite the fact that the S'vara of 'La'av Kalba Ana' does not apply there) - because 've'Lo Hodu Lo Chachamim' implies that they argue with him completely.




(a) Rav Huna rules like Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov. This pertains even to the first case (our Mishnah) maybe because of a tradition that the Amora'im had. Alternatively - he is more like to have referred to the Mishnah than to a Beraisa, because the Amora'im were more conversant with the Mishnahs than they were with the Beraisos.

(b) On the other hand, it might make no difference whether Rav Huna's ruling pertains to the Beraisa or to our Mishnah - because the purpose of the first She'eilah was to lead on to the second one, because if they do argue, perhaps the Halachah is like them (seeing as they are in the majority). Now that Rav Huna has ruled like Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov in the Beraisa, it no longer makes any difference whether they agree in our Mishnah or not.

(c) We just concluded that, at the end of the day, Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov classifies a Neder as Nidrei Ziruzin even against the S'vara of 'La'av Kalba Ana ... '. In the case of such a Neder against the S'vara 'La'av Malka Ana, however - he abides by what we originally said (that 'La'av Malka Ana ...' overrides Nidrei Ziruzin).

(a) We just made a distinction between Nidrei Ziruzin against the S'vara of 'La'av Kalba Ana ... ' (where Nidrei Ziruzin overrides the S'vara) on the one hand, and against the S'vara of 'La'av Malka Ana ... ' (where it is the S'vara which overrides Nidrei Ziruzin. This is the case if the reason for 'La'av Kalba Ana ... ' is because a person simply does not like receiving without giving. If however, we ascribe it to the size of the Matanah (a Kur of wheat and two barrels of wine - as we explained above) - then there is no reason to retract from the S'vara of 'La'av Kalba Ana ... ' (seeing as, the last Beraisa that we quoted [where the Noder forbade Hana'ah on himself, unless his friend came to eat by him fresh bread and a hot drink] deals only with a *small gift* and there is no reason for it to override Nidrei Ziruzin). Consequently, both S'varos 'La'av Kalba Ana ... ' and La'av Malka Ana' still apply, and the Neder will stand (even according to Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov).

(b) This latter opinion is that of the Ramban, whose opinion we corroborate from the Mishnah in 'Konem Yayin' ('Konem she'Eini Neheneh Lach im I Ata Notel le'Bincha Kur she Chitin ... Harei Zeh Yachol Lehatir es Nidro ... ' that we quoted above). This is because - according to the first explanation (which maintains that, according to Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov, Nidrei Ziruzin overrides the S'vara of 'La'av Kalba Ana ... '), the author of this S'tam Mishnah must be the Rabbanan (who do hold of Nidrei Ziruzin). Then how can we rule like Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov - who argues with the Rabbanan in a Beraisa, in face of a S'tam Mishnah?

(a) 'Nidrei Hava'i: Amar Im Lo Ra'isi be'Derech ha'Zeh ke'Olei Mitzrayim, Im Lo Ra'isi Nachash ke'Koras Beis ha'Bad', and the fruit that he forbade if he did not witness these spectacles, is permitted. The Tana finds it necessary to insert *two* cases in our Mishnah - because the first case is one of exaggeration (since people tend to speak of a large gathering of people in this way); whereas the second case is simply impossible (seeing as there is no such thing as a snake that is Taruf - which will explained later in the Sugya).

(b) The Chidush of the second statement is - that even though he certainly did not see such a sight, the fruit is nevertheless permitted (which we would not know from the first case, where, based on the presumption that people tend to exaggerate, his Shevu'ah is Emes). The reason for this is that, had he really meant to forbid the fruit, then he would have done so without connecting them to the snake that he claims to have seen.

(c) The Tana states that although Nidrei Hava'i are void, Shevu'os Hava'i are not (according to our version of the Beraisa). He cannot be referring to when someone says 'Shevu'ah Im Lo Ra'isi be'Derech ha'Zeh Mida'am' - because he is not forbidding anything with those words, in which case it is not a Shevu'ah.

(d) Abaye establishes the Beraisa - when he says, 'Shevu'ah she'Ra'isi ba'Derech ha'Zeh Mida'am.'

(a) Shevu'os Hava'i are more stringent than Nidrei Hava'i - on the grounds that Shevu'os are more stringent than Nedarim, as we learned above.

(b) The Tana of our Mishnah does not include the case of ' ... Im Lo Ra'isi Gamal ha'Porei'ach be'Avir' (which it does mention in Shevu'os) - because it has already presented the case of ' ... Im Lo Ra'isi ke'Koros Beis ha'Bad', to which it is similar (and the Tana is only interested in presenting one example of each of the two cases of Nidrei Hava'i, as we explained above).

(a) Rava disagrees with Abaye's explanation on two scores: firstly because it would then be obvious that the Shevu'ah will be void (just like Nidrei Hava'i - according to the text in the Beraisa that compares Shevu'os Hava'i to Nidrei Hava'i). His second bone of contention with Abaye is - that, according to Abaye, the case of Shevu'os Hava'i is quite different than that of Nidrei Hava'i, whereas the Tana stated that in the case where the one is valid, the other is not (implying that they both speak in the same case).

(b) So Rava establishes the Beraisa - when he forbids the fruit on himself with a Shevu'ah ' ... Im Lo Ra'isi be'Derech ha'Zeh ke'Olei Mitzrayim ... '.

(a) According to the alternative text, the fruit (which he connected to his Shevu'ah) is actually permitted. This does not mean that he will not receive Malkos at all - because, in the case of she'Lo Ra'isi Nachash ke'Koros Beis ha'Bad' (which is impossible), he will receive Malkos for making a Shevu'os Shav.

(b) The Tana is then coming to teach us - that even though, by permitting the fruit (a sign that it as not his intention to do so, but to stress what he saw), he will receive Malkos for a Shevu'as Shav (which he would not by a Neder Shav), we nevertheless permit it. This is due to the fact that he cannot have meant to forbid the fruit, because if he had, he would not have connected his Shevu'ah to what he saw (as we explained above).

(c) According to either text, the Shevu'ah ' ... Im Lo Ra'isi ke'Olei Mitzrayim' is considered a valid Shevu'ah. We do not assume that he is referring to a nest of ants that he came across - because Nedarim and Shevu'os follow the vernacular (as we shall now see), and it is not the norm to refer to a nest of ants in this way.

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