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Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Nedarim 7



(a) We ask exactly the same She'eilah regarding Yad li'Tzedakah as we asked by Pei'ah. Some Rishonim contend that this She'eilah presumes 'Yesh Yad le'Pei'ah' - because we think that Pei'ah is more strict because basic Pei'ah is obligatory, whereas the basic Tzedakah is not (when there are no poor).

(b) We reject that contention on the grounds that there is the same obligation to give Tzedakah (when there are poor) as there is to give Pei'ah. Alternatively, just as he is not obligated to give more than his minimum obligation (which comprises the case of Yad), he is not obligated to give more than his minimum obligation of Pei'ah either.

(c) We ask whether 'Yesh Yad li'Tzedakah' after the She'eilah whether 'Yesh Yad le'Pei'ah' - as two independent She'eilos, not because one is dependent on the other.

(d) We learned the Hekesh from Pei'ah to Korbanos from "me'Imach" - and the Hekesh from Tzedakah to Korbanos from "be'Ficha" (mentioned in the same Pasuk in Re'ei).

(a) We also ask whether 'Yesh Yad le'Hefker' or not. We might say that just as Yesh li'Tzedakah, Yesh Yad le'Hefker, since usually, when people declare their property Hefker, they do so for the benefit of the poor (Tosfos DH 'Hefker'). On the other hand, Hefker might be different - because Hefker, unlike Tzedakah, is fit for the rich as well as for the poor (in which case, it does not incorporate a Mitzvah like Tzedakah does, and is therefore not similar to the Neder of Korbanos).

(b) Ravina asks whether 'Yesh Yad le'Beis ha'Kisei'. The She'eilah is - whether, if someone designates a room as a bathroom and then, regarding another room, he adds 've'ha'Dein' without saying 'Nami', the second room also has the Din of a bathroom as regards Davenning there (even before he has actually used it for that purpose).

(c) We reconcile this She'eilah with Ravina himself, who elsewhere, is unsure whether 'Hazmanah' (mere designation) is effective by a bathroom in the first place - by connecting the two She'eilos: assuming that 'Hazmanah *is* effective, what will be the Din regarding Yad.

(d) Rav Papa did not ask about Yad li'Shevu'ah - because the Torah explicitly compares it to Nedarim, when it writes "Ki Yidor Neder O Hishava Shevu'ah".

(a) By Kidushin, we rule Yesh Yad, le'Chumra (like every S'feika d'Oraysa). We reject the contention of the Rishonim that by Pei'ah and Tzedakah too, we go le'Chumra, and say Yesh Yad - on the grounds that they are a Safek Mamon, in which case we will apply the principle 'Safek Mamon le'Kula' ('ha'Motzi me'Chaveiro, Alav ha'Re'ayah').

(b) The Sugya in Yoma rules that - bakers do not have to separate Safek Ma'aser Rishon and Ma'aser Ani (because of 'Safek Mamon le'Kula'), whereas they are obligated to separate Ma'aser Sheini and take it to Yerushalayim (because it is a Safek Isur).

(c) The Halachah in the case of ...

1. ... Yad le'Hefker - will be that the Yad is not valid, because 'Safek Mamon le'Kula'.
2. ... Yad le'Beis ha'Kisei - 'Ein Yad', because even if Zimun would be effective, it would only be mi'de'Rabbanan, and 'S'feika de'Rabbanan, le'Kula'.
(a) 'Menudeh Ani Lach, Rebbi Akiva Hayah Chochech ba'Zeh Lehachmir'. 'Chochech' either means - scratched himself (like a person tends to do when he is not sure of something, or it is from the word 'Cheich' (palate), in which case it is a colloquial term meaning that he gave taste to his palate, and ruled stringently.

(b) If the Noder subsequently transgresses ...

1. ... even if he added 'she'Ani Ochal Lach', says Abaye - he will not receive Malkos because that is the case over which Rebbi Akiva and the Rabbanan argue.
2. ... if he did not - then even Rebbi Akiva will agree that his Neder is not valid at all (like Shmuel learned above on 4b.).
(c) We can derive from Abaye's statement - that ordinarily, one does receive Malkos for Yados.
(a) We establish the Machlokes between Rebbi Akiva and the Rabbanan by 'Menudeh Ani Lach' - the Rabbanan maintain that Menudeh is a Lashon of Niduy exclusively, whereas according to Rebbi Akiva, it can also be an expression of keeping away from someone (incorporating any form of Isur).

(b) They will both hold by ...

1. ... 'Nedina Minach' - that the Neder is valid, provided one adds the Lashon 'she'Ani Ochal Lach', because 'Nedina' implies keeping away from the person.
2. ... 'Meshamtana Minach' - that the Neder is not valid at all, because it implies a Lashon of Shamta exclusively.
(c) Rav Chisda will soon state that nobody contends with Rebbi Akiva's opinion. The other reason to rule like the Rabbanan is - the principle 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Akiva me'Chaveiro, ve'Lo me'Chaveirav'.

(d) Consequently, the sole case of all those in this Sugya where the Neder is valid - is that of 'Nadina Minach, she'lo Ochal Lach'.




(a) Rav Chisda disagrees with the case over which Rebbi Akiva and the Rabbanan argue. The man who came before him had made the Neder - 'Meshamtana mi'Nechsei de'Brei de'Rav Yirmiyah bar Aba'.

(b) Rav Chisda ruled that nobody contends with the opinion of Rebbi Akiva (and that the Neder was therefore invalid).

(c) This proves that Rav Chisda argues with Rav Papa in the previous Sugya - who maintained that even Rebbi Akiva agreed that Meshamtana was a Lashon of Shamta exclusively.

(a) Rebbi Ila Amar Rav rules that a Niduy that is made in the presence of the Menudeh, can only be released in his presence. We learn the reason from the Yerushalmi - which requires a Neder that was made in the presence of the Mudar Hana'ah to be nullified in his presence - because otherwise, the Mudar Hana'ah, not knowing that the Neder has been nullified, will suspect people who subsequently give him benefit, of contravening the Neder.

(b) The initial reason that we gave was - because it is comparable to something that is undertaken by ten people, which can only be canceled in conjunction with all of them. We reject that comparison, however.

(c) If one released the Niduy not in front of the Menudeh, Bedieved, the Niduy is released.

(d) It will be permitted even Lechatchilah, to release it even not in the man's presence - if one makes a point of informing him (immediately) that the Niduy has been released (and the same will apply to the Yerushalmi's Din of Neder).

(a) According to Rav Chanin Amar Rav, someone who hears his friend mention the Name of Hashem in vain should declare a Niduy on him.

(b) And when he says that should he fail to do so, then he himself 'will be in Niduy' - he means that he deserves to be placed in Niduy, but not that a Niduy is automatically effective.

(c) This is tied up with the fact that the unwarranted mention of Hashem's Name leads to poverty. We learn this from the Pasuk "Ki Meisu Kol ha'Anashim ha'Mevakshim es Nafshecha" - because Misah sometimes refers to poverty.

(d) Hashem say this Pasuk in connection with Dasan and Aviram - who had become poor, and whose influence with Par'oh therefore, no longer posed a threat to Moshe. Hashem cannot have been referring to one of the three other connotations of death. He cannot have meant ...

1. ... that they were blind - because Dasan and Aviram later said to Moshe 'ha'Einei ha'Anashim Haheim Tenaker' (proving that they were not).
2. ... that they had Tzara'as - because the Torah writes in Devarim (in reference to Dasan and Aviram) 'be'Kerev Kol Yisrael", and had they been Metzora'im, they would have been sent outside the camp.
3. ... that they had no children - because that would not have been a reason for them to have lost their influence with Par'oh.
(a) We also find poverty compared to death - with regard to the many places in Shas where Chazal 'placed their eyes on somebody', which means either death or poverty.

(b) Even though the Yerushalmi obligates Niduy for any form of misconduct performed in front of others, and we find cases of Niduy for sowing seeds among the vines (Kidushin), or for hitting one's grown-up son (Mo'ed Katan) - it is only for the mention of Hashem's Name, which is a particularly grave sin, that the person who fails to declare a Niduy on the culprit, deserves himself to be placed in Niduy.

(a) When Rav Huna heard a woman taking Hashem's Name in vain - he declared a Niduy on her, which he immediately released in her presence.

(b) Besides the obligation to place a Niduy on someone who abuses the name of Hashem - Rebbi Aba also extrapolated from Rav Huna that a Niduy that is declared in the presence of the Menudeh can only be released in his presence, and that it can be released immediately.

(c) Shmuel in Eilu Megalchin requires a minimum Niduy of thirty days for brazenness. According to the Rif, this is a dispute between the two Sugyos. Tosfos reconciles them - by differentiating between the Niduy there, which is a real Niduy (for brazenness), and the Niduy here, which is only meant to serve as a deterrent, to stop the culprit from doing it again (though this seems to clash with what we just explained, that this Niduy is more stringent than all other cases of Niduy).

(a) According to Rav Gidal Amar Rav, a Talmid-Chacham who places himself in Niduy is also permitted to release the Niduy. We might have thought otherwise - because of the principle 'Ein Adam Matir es Atzmo mi'Beis ha'Asurim'.

(b) Mar Zutra the Chasid demonstrated this - when, before placing a Niduy on a Talmid who deserved it, would first place one on himself; then, after releasing the Talmid's Niduy, he would go home and release his own.

(c) The Rashba restricts Rav Gidal Amar Rav's Halachah to cases like that of Mar Zutra, where the Niduy is only Midas Chasidus. The problem with this from the Kashya 'P'shita' (which the Rashba it appears, did not have in his text) is - that it would have been more appropriate to ask 'Amai' (Why, rather than 'P'shita')?, seeing as we have not yet cited the case of Mar Zutra (and in most cases, the Talmid-Chacham cannot release his own Niduy).

(a) Mar Zutra released his Niduy immediately upon arriving home - so that the members of his family should be permitted to approach him, from which we can extrapolate that members of a Menudeh's family are obligated to adhere to all the laws of Niduy that pertain to him.

(b) The Ra'avad however, makes a distinction between the man's wife and the other members of his family - inasmuch as a wife, who is like part of himself, is not affected by the Niduy of her husband and is permitted to approach him.

(c) There no proof for the Ra'avad from the Sugya in Mo'ed Katan, which asks whether Tashmish ha'Mitah is prohibited to a Menudeh (implying that his wife is permitted to approach him) - because that She'eilah might be confined to a Menudeh who is only forbidden to people of another town, but not to those of his own (including his wife).

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