ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Nedarim 7
(a) We ask exactly the same She'eilah regarding Yad li'Tzedakah as we asked
by Pei'ah. Some Rishonim contend that this She'eilah presumes 'Yesh Yad
le'Pei'ah' - because we think that Pei'ah is more strict because basic
Pei'ah is obligatory, whereas the basic Tzedakah is not (when there are no
(b) We reject that contention on the grounds that there is the same
obligation to give Tzedakah (when there are poor) as there is to give
Pei'ah. Alternatively, just as he is not obligated to give more than his
minimum obligation (which comprises the case of Yad), he is not obligated to
give more than his minimum obligation of Pei'ah either.
(c) We ask whether 'Yesh Yad li'Tzedakah' after the She'eilah whether 'Yesh
Yad le'Pei'ah' - as two independent She'eilos, not because one is dependent
on the other.
(d) We learned the Hekesh from Pei'ah to Korbanos from "me'Imach" - and the
Hekesh from Tzedakah to Korbanos from "be'Ficha" (mentioned in the same
Pasuk in Re'ei).
(a) We also ask whether 'Yesh Yad le'Hefker' or not. We might say that just
as Yesh li'Tzedakah, Yesh Yad le'Hefker, since usually, when people declare
their property Hefker, they do so for the benefit of the poor (Tosfos DH
'Hefker'). On the other hand, Hefker might be different - because Hefker,
unlike Tzedakah, is fit for the rich as well as for the poor (in which case,
it does not incorporate a Mitzvah like Tzedakah does, and is therefore not
similar to the Neder of Korbanos).
(b) Ravina asks whether 'Yesh Yad le'Beis ha'Kisei'. The She'eilah is -
whether, if someone designates a room as a bathroom and then, regarding
another room, he adds 've'ha'Dein' without saying 'Nami', the second room
also has the Din of a bathroom as regards Davenning there (even before he
has actually used it for that purpose).
(c) We reconcile this She'eilah with Ravina himself, who elsewhere, is
unsure whether 'Hazmanah' (mere designation) is effective by a bathroom in
the first place - by connecting the two She'eilos: assuming that 'Hazmanah
*is* effective, what will be the Din regarding Yad.
(d) Rav Papa did not ask about Yad li'Shevu'ah - because the Torah
explicitly compares it to Nedarim, when it writes "Ki Yidor Neder O Hishava
(a) By Kidushin, we rule Yesh Yad, le'Chumra (like every S'feika d'Oraysa).
We reject the contention of the Rishonim that by Pei'ah and Tzedakah too, we
go le'Chumra, and say Yesh Yad - on the grounds that they are a Safek Mamon,
in which case we will apply the principle 'Safek Mamon le'Kula' ('ha'Motzi
me'Chaveiro, Alav ha'Re'ayah').
(b) The Sugya in Yoma rules that - bakers do not have to separate Safek
Ma'aser Rishon and Ma'aser Ani (because of 'Safek Mamon le'Kula'), whereas
they are obligated to separate Ma'aser Sheini and take it to Yerushalayim
(because it is a Safek Isur).
(c) The Halachah in the case of ...
1. ... Yad le'Hefker - will be that the Yad is not valid, because 'Safek
2. ... Yad le'Beis ha'Kisei - 'Ein Yad', because even if Zimun would be
effective, it would only be mi'de'Rabbanan, and 'S'feika de'Rabbanan,
(a) 'Menudeh Ani Lach, Rebbi Akiva Hayah Chochech ba'Zeh Lehachmir'.
'Chochech' either means - scratched himself (like a person tends to do when
he is not sure of something, or it is from the word 'Cheich' (palate), in
which case it is a colloquial term meaning that he gave taste to his palate,
and ruled stringently.
(b) If the Noder subsequently transgresses ...
1. ... even if he added 'she'Ani Ochal Lach', says Abaye - he will not
receive Malkos because that is the case over which Rebbi Akiva and the
(c) We can derive from Abaye's statement - that ordinarily, one does receive
Malkos for Yados.
2. ... if he did not - then even Rebbi Akiva will agree that his Neder is
not valid at all (like Shmuel learned above on 4b.).
(a) We establish the Machlokes between Rebbi Akiva and the Rabbanan by
'Menudeh Ani Lach' - the Rabbanan maintain that Menudeh is a Lashon of Niduy
exclusively, whereas according to Rebbi Akiva, it can also be an expression
of keeping away from someone (incorporating any form of Isur).
(b) They will both hold by ...
1. ... 'Nedina Minach' - that the Neder is valid, provided one adds the
Lashon 'she'Ani Ochal Lach', because 'Nedina' implies keeping away from the
(c) Rav Chisda will soon state that nobody contends with Rebbi Akiva's
opinion. The other reason to rule like the Rabbanan is - the principle
'Halachah ke'Rebbi Akiva me'Chaveiro, ve'Lo me'Chaveirav'.
2. ... 'Meshamtana Minach' - that the Neder is not valid at all, because it
implies a Lashon of Shamta exclusively.
(d) Consequently, the sole case of all those in this Sugya where the Neder
is valid - is that of 'Nadina Minach, she'lo Ochal Lach'.
(a) Rav Chisda disagrees with the case over which Rebbi Akiva and the
Rabbanan argue. The man who came before him had made the Neder - 'Meshamtana
mi'Nechsei de'Brei de'Rav Yirmiyah bar Aba'.
(b) Rav Chisda ruled that nobody contends with the opinion of Rebbi Akiva
(and that the Neder was therefore invalid).
(c) This proves that Rav Chisda argues with Rav Papa in the previous Sugya -
who maintained that even Rebbi Akiva agreed that Meshamtana was a Lashon of
(a) Rebbi Ila Amar Rav rules that a Niduy that is made in the presence of
the Menudeh, can only be released in his presence. We learn the reason from
the Yerushalmi - which requires a Neder that was made in the presence of the
Mudar Hana'ah to be nullified in his presence - because otherwise, the Mudar
Hana'ah, not knowing that the Neder has been nullified, will suspect people
who subsequently give him benefit, of contravening the Neder.
(b) The initial reason that we gave was - because it is comparable to
something that is undertaken by ten people, which can only be canceled in
conjunction with all of them. We reject that comparison, however.
(c) If one released the Niduy not in front of the Menudeh, Bedieved, the
Niduy is released.
(d) It will be permitted even Lechatchilah, to release it even not in the
man's presence - if one makes a point of informing him (immediately) that
the Niduy has been released (and the same will apply to the Yerushalmi's Din
(a) According to Rav Chanin Amar Rav, someone who hears his friend mention
the Name of Hashem in vain should declare a Niduy on him.
(b) And when he says that should he fail to do so, then he himself 'will be
in Niduy' - he means that he deserves to be placed in Niduy, but not that a
Niduy is automatically effective.
(c) This is tied up with the fact that the unwarranted mention of Hashem's
Name leads to poverty. We learn this from the Pasuk "Ki Meisu Kol ha'Anashim
ha'Mevakshim es Nafshecha" - because Misah sometimes refers to poverty.
(d) Hashem say this Pasuk in connection with Dasan and Aviram - who had
become poor, and whose influence with Par'oh therefore, no longer posed a
threat to Moshe. Hashem cannot have been referring to one of the three other
connotations of death. He cannot have meant ...
1. ... that they were blind - because Dasan and Aviram later said to Moshe
'ha'Einei ha'Anashim Haheim Tenaker' (proving that they were not).
2. ... that they had Tzara'as - because the Torah writes in Devarim (in
reference to Dasan and Aviram) 'be'Kerev Kol Yisrael", and had they been
Metzora'im, they would have been sent outside the camp.
3. ... that they had no children - because that would not have been a reason
for them to have lost their influence with Par'oh.
(a) We also find poverty compared to death - with regard to the many places
in Shas where Chazal 'placed their eyes on somebody', which means either
death or poverty.
(b) Even though the Yerushalmi obligates Niduy for any form of misconduct
performed in front of others, and we find cases of Niduy for sowing seeds
among the vines (Kidushin), or for hitting one's grown-up son (Mo'ed
Katan) - it is only for the mention of Hashem's Name, which is a
particularly grave sin, that the person who fails to declare a Niduy on the
culprit, deserves himself to be placed in Niduy.
(a) When Rav Huna heard a woman taking Hashem's Name in vain - he declared a
Niduy on her, which he immediately released in her presence.
(b) Besides the obligation to place a Niduy on someone who abuses the name
of Hashem - Rebbi Aba also extrapolated from Rav Huna that a Niduy that is
declared in the presence of the Menudeh can only be released in his
presence, and that it can be released immediately.
(c) Shmuel in Eilu Megalchin requires a minimum Niduy of thirty days for
brazenness. According to the Rif, this is a dispute between the two Sugyos.
Tosfos reconciles them - by differentiating between the Niduy there, which
is a real Niduy (for brazenness), and the Niduy here, which is only meant to
serve as a deterrent, to stop the culprit from doing it again (though this
seems to clash with what we just explained, that this Niduy is more
stringent than all other cases of Niduy).
(a) According to Rav Gidal Amar Rav, a Talmid-Chacham who places himself in
Niduy is also permitted to release the Niduy. We might have thought
otherwise - because of the principle 'Ein Adam Matir es Atzmo mi'Beis
(b) Mar Zutra the Chasid demonstrated this - when, before placing a Niduy on
a Talmid who deserved it, would first place one on himself; then, after
releasing the Talmid's Niduy, he would go home and release his own.
(c) The Rashba restricts Rav Gidal Amar Rav's Halachah to cases like that of
Mar Zutra, where the Niduy is only Midas Chasidus. The problem with this
from the Kashya 'P'shita' (which the Rashba it appears, did not have in his
text) is - that it would have been more appropriate to ask 'Amai' (Why,
rather than 'P'shita')?, seeing as we have not yet cited the case of Mar
Zutra (and in most cases, the Talmid-Chacham cannot release his own Niduy).
(a) Mar Zutra released his Niduy immediately upon arriving home - so that
the members of his family should be permitted to approach him, from which we
can extrapolate that members of a Menudeh's family are obligated to adhere
to all the laws of Niduy that pertain to him.
(b) The Ra'avad however, makes a distinction between the man's wife and the
other members of his family - inasmuch as a wife, who is like part of
himself, is not affected by the Niduy of her husband and is permitted to
(c) There no proof for the Ra'avad from the Sugya in Mo'ed Katan, which asks
whether Tashmish ha'Mitah is prohibited to a Menudeh (implying that his wife
is permitted to approach him) - because that She'eilah might be confined to
a Menudeh who is only forbidden to people of another town, but not to those
of his own (including his wife).