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Nazir 31

NAZIR 31 - Dedicated l'Iluy Nishmas Chaim Mordechai ben Harav Yisrael Azriel (Feldman) of Milwaukee (Yahrzeit: 19 Cheshvan) by the members of his family.



(a) Beis Shamai derive that 'Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh' 'Techilas Hekdesh from Sof Hekdesh. Sof Hekdesh - is Temurah (swapping another animal for a Korban).

(b) They learn from the Pasuk in Bechukosai "Vehayah Hu u'Semuraso *Yih'yeh* Kodesh" - 'Lerabos Shogeg ke'Meizid' (that if someone meant to say that the black animal standing in front of him should be a Temurah for his Olah, and by mistake, he said it about the white one that was standing next to it, the black one becomes a Temurah).

(c) Beis Hillel disagree with this - on the grounds that one cannot learn Techilas Hekdesh (the taking inception of Hekdesh) from Sof Hekdesh (from its extension).

(d) The problem that we have with this is a case of someone who declares an animal a Temurah from midday on - where it is obvious, even according to Beis Shamai, that the Temurah will take effect as from midday (because that is what he said, and we have a principle which requires 'Piv ve'Libo Shavin'). In that case, in our Mishnah how can Beis Shamai maintain that even if someone declares a black animal Hekdesh, it is a white one that will become Hekdesh?

(a) On the basis of the previous Kashya, Rav Papa changes our understanding of Beis Shamai. He now explains the case in our Mishnah 'Amar Shor Shachor she'Yeitzei mi'Beisi Rishon, Harei Hu Hekdesh, ve'Yatza Lavan' to mean - that if the owner of a number of black animals declared the first black animal to come out of the gate Hekdesh, then his words will take effect, even if a white one preceded it.

(b) This explanation also extends to the other two cases in our Mishnah. In the case of Dinar Zahav she'Ya'aleh be'Yadi Rishon, Harei Hu Hekdesh, ve'Alah shel Kesef' - he declared the first of his gold coins that he picked up, Hekdesh, but the first coin that he actually held in his hand was a silver one.

(c) Beis Hillel disagree on the basis of the Lashon used by the Noder. According to Beis Shamai, they maintain - he should have said 'Shor Shachor she'Yeitzei mi'Beisi ba'Rishon' (rather than 'Rishon').

(d) The Tana nevertheless refers to this as Hekdesh Ta'us, despite the fact that the Hekdesh takes effect exactly as he intended it to - because the Lashon is misleading (as Beis Hillel point out).

(a) Beis Shamai in the following Mishnah say that the designated Korban of a Nazir who then has his Nezirus annulled - must graze in the field until it obtains a blemish, when it goes out to Chulin.

(b) Beis Hillel attempt to prove from Beis Shamai's very own words - that 'Hekdesh Ta'us, Lo Havi Hekdesh' (otherwise, why should the animal not remain Kadosh?).

(c) This Mishnah presents Rav Papa with a Kashya - from Beis Hillel's words it is clear that Beis Shamai holds 'Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh' (so how can Rav Papa say that he doesn't)?

(d) Rav Papa resolves this problem. According to him - it is Beis Hillel who misunderstood Beis Shamai, thinking that his opinion was based on 'Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh' when really it wasn't.




(a) The following Mishnah speaks about six people traveling together when they see a man coming towards them. The first traveler declares that he is a Nazir if that person is Reuven - the second one, if he is not.

(b) The third traveler declares that he is a Nazir if one of the first two is a Nazir - the fourth one, if one of them is not. In fact, both mean the same thing, since the one is referring to the one who is right, the other, to the one who is wrong.

(c) The fifth traveler declares himself a Nazir if both of the first two are Nezirim - seeing as each one accepted Nezirus on the understanding that he was right.

(d) The sixth traveler declares that he is a Nazir if all the others are Nezirim.

(a) Beis Shamai hold that they are all Nezirim - because 'Nezirus be'Ta'us Nezirus.

(b) In that case, they will also hold 'Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh'. This case differ from that of someone who declares a Temurah to take effect from midday - inasmuch as there, the Noder certainly did not have in mind for the Hekdesh to take effect immediately, whereas here, each of the travelers intended to accept Nezirus, according to their mistake.

(c) Rav Papa reconciles his opinion (that Beis Shamai do not hold 'Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh') with that Mishnah - by conceding that from there it is indeed clear that Beis Shamai hold Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh, but not from our Mishnah (seeing as it is open to an alternative interpretation).

(a) Abaye establishes our Mishnah as we thought at first (that it is the white animal which is Hekdesh, even though the Noder specifically said 'the first black one'. He reconciles that with the case of someone who declares a Temurah to take effect from midday (where Beis Shamai agrees that we do not deviate from his words) - by changing the case in our Mishnah from the future to the past. What the Noder said was Shor Shachor she'Yatza mi'Beisi ... '. And when they tell him that it was not a black one but a white one, he retorts that, had he known that, he would have said so.

(b) In the equivalent case if the Noder made his declaration with reference to the future, and then, when they told him that it was a white animal that emerged first, he said that, had he known that, he would have specifically said 'a white one' - Abaye would say that his Neder is not effective. The reason for this is because then (bearing in mind that he is not a prophet) there is no justification for saying 'a black one'; whereas in the past, he said 'a black one', because he genuinely thought (mistakenly) that it was a black one that emerged first.

(c) This latter case differs from the case of Temurah, and from the Mishnah of the six travelers (where Beis Shamai hold 'Hekdesh Ta'us Hekdesh') - inasmuch as there, his mistake is based on a justifiable mistake, whereas here, there is no basis to think that it will a black animal that will emerge first (in which case he must have had some reason to mention the black one specifically).

(d) Beis Hillel say 'Eino Nazir'.

7) Abaye explains the Mishnah, which says 'Dinar Zahav she'Ya'aleh Rishon ... ', and 'Chavis shel Yayin she'Ta'aleh Risho nah ... ' (in the future) - by amending it to 'Dinar Zahav she'Alah Rishon ... ', and 'Chavis shel Yayin she'Alsah Rishonah ... '.


(a) When Rav Chisda says ...
1. ... 'Uchma be'Chivra Lakya' - he means that a black ox in a herd of white ones devalues the herd.
2. ... 'Chivra be'Uchma Lakya' - he means that white spots on a black ox devalues the ox.
(b) The problem with that from our Mishnah, where Beis Shamai declare the white ox Hekdesh is - that on the assumption that a person tends to be Makdish begrudgingly, we take for granted that the Noder had in mind a black one. In that case, why is the white one Hekdesh (bearing in mind that we are explaining our Mishnah like Abaye).

(c) To conform with his opinion - Rav Chisda explains that a person is actually generously.

(d) we reject his answer however, from the middle case of 'Dinar shel Zahav' from which it is clear (from the fact that the silver coin is Hekdesh) that a person tends to be Makdish begrudgingly.

(a) Having concluded that a person tends to be Makdish begrudgingly way ...
1. ... we establish the Seifa of 'Chavis' (seeing as oil is generally more expensive than wine) - in the Galil, where wine is more expensive than oil.
2. ... Rav Chisda establishes the Reisha, where Beis Shamai considers the white ox Hekdesh even though in his opinion, it is more valuable - by the majority of oxen (where black oxen are more valuable than white ones), whereas his statement is confined specifically to oxen from Karmuna.
(b) Based on these facts, the Tana of our Mishnah needs to state all three cases (Tosfos). He mentions the case of ...
1. ... the coins (the middle case) - to establish that a person is Makdish begrudgingly.
2. ... the oxen (the Reisha) - to teach us the Din by all oxen other than those of Karmuna (according to Rav Chisda).
3. ... the barrels (the Seifa) - to teach us that although the Din is confined to the Galil, we do not go after the majority of the world. Note: see also the commentaries on the Mishnah.
(a) Rav Chisda also said that a black ox is good for its skin, and a red one for its meat - A white one is good for plowing.

(b) This appears to clash with his previous statement (that a black ox among white ones lessens their value) - because if it more valuable as far as its skin is concerned, it does not seem logical that the white ones are so superior as regards plowing that it completely negates the black ones advantage.

(c) We resolve these two statements by qualifying the first one, like we did earlier - by confining Rav Chisda's earlier statement to oxen from Karmuna, where the white ones are better than the black ones in all regards; whereas his second statement pertains to all other oxen.

(d) Rav Chisda will expalin our Mishnah, which considers black oxen superior - by ordinary oxen, as we explained earlier, because the advantage of better skin outweighs that of better plowing.

(a) If the Chacham declined to annul the Nezirus, the Noder continues to count his Nezirus from the time of the declaration. As we learned earlier, Beis Shamai holds that the designated Korban of a Nazir who then has his Nezirus annulled - must graze in the field until it obtains a blemish, when it goes out to Chulin. When Beis Hillel attempted to prove from Beis Shamai's own words that he holds 'Hekdesh Ta'us Eino Hekdesh' - Beis Shamai retorted whether Beis Hillel did not agree that if someone mistakenly declared the ninth animal that entered the pen, the tenth, the tenth, the ninth and the eleventh, the tenth, that all of them are Ma'aser Beheimah (proving that 'Hekdesh Ta'us, Hekdesh').

(b) Beis Shamai agree with Beis Hillel in the earlier case that 'Hekdesh Ta'us Eino Hekdesh' - because seeing as the Neder has been annulled, it turns out that the ox was not Hekdesh at all, in which case, this cannot even be called 'Hekdesh Ta'us'.

(c) We learned in Perek 'Mi she'Amar' that, assuming that the Chatas of a Nezirah was hers, it must die (whereas here we say that it grazes). This may be because a husband only negates his wife's Nedarim from now on (but not from their inception, or it may be because the Tana there is Rebbi Elazar ha'Kapar, who requires that she brings a Chatas anyway (as we discussed there). In fact, even Rebbi Elazar ha'Kapar might agree that even the Chatas grazes - because, even if we say that a husband annuls his wife's Nedarim retroactively, they are nevertheless effective for one moment (since he annuls them even without Charatah), whereas in our case, where it was a Chacham who annulled the Nezirus, it is uprooted from its inception.

(a) Beis Shamai attempt to prove from Ma'aser Beheimah that Hekdesh Ta'us, Hekdesh, as we just explained. Even if the reason by Ma'aser Beheimah is because of Hekdesh Ta'us, only the three animals in question are Ma'aser, and not the eighth or the twelfth - because it is either the tenth animal that can be Hekdesh or one that one called the tenth (Tosfos).

(b) Rav Papa, who learns that, at this stage, Beis Shamai hold 'Ta'us Hekdesh Eino Ta'us', explain Beis Shamai's answer (where he clearly holds 'Hekdesh Ta'us, Hekdesh') - as nothing more than a response to Beis Hillel, who think that they hold 'Hekdesh Ta'us, Hekdesh'.

(c) Beis Hillel counter Beis Shamai's proof from Ma'aser Beheimah - by pointing out that, based on the fact that the eighth or the twelfth animals are not Ma'aser, it is evident that the reason there is not because of 'Hekdesh Ta'us', but is a 'Gezeiras ha'Kasuv' (from which we cannot learn any other cases).

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