ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Nazir 28
(a) We now know that a son cannot be Yotze with the Korban (even 'min
ha'Kalah el ha'Kalah' or 'min ha'Chamurah el ha'Chamurah') or even with the
money that his father left, and we learn from the Pasuk "Korbano al Chataso"
(written in connection with a Chatas Se'irah) - that a person cannot even
use the Korban that he himself designated, from one sin to another (even if
it is 'min ha'Kalah el ha'Kalah' or min ha'Chamurah el ha'Chamurah').
(b) We learn from "ve'Chiper ha'Kohen al Chataso" (written in connection
with the Chatas Kisbah) - that the same applies to *money* that he
designated for a specific sin.
(c) We need a special D'rashah for money, and cannot learn this from the
case of the Korban itself - because (based on the principle 'Ein Me'ilah Ela
be'Shogeg') if he did the same thing be'Shogeg (not realizing that what he
was using was already designated for another sin), he would be Mo'el in the
case of money and consequently Yotze too, but not in the case of the animal
(d) The basis of ...
1. ... the distinction between the animal and the money is - that an animal
of Kodshei Mizbei'ach cannot go out to Chulin (one of the characteristics of
Me'ilah) without being redeemed, whereas money, which is only Kedushas
2. ... the link between the Me'ilah and the Kaparah is - that once one is
Mo'el, the money goes out to Chulin (as we just explained), enabling a new
type of Hekdesh to take effect on it; whereas whatever does not go out to
Chulin, retains its original brand of Hekdesh, which in turn, prevents any
new one from taking effect.
(a) When we ask (with regard to 've'Eino Megalei'ach al Behemas Aviv') 'Mai
La'av Afilu Ba'alas Mum' - we are still trying to disprove Rav Shimi bar
Ashi, who stated above that all blemished animals of Kodshim are considered
S'tumin (which go to Nedavah), because, if that was so, why should the
Nazir's son not be able to use them for his Korban Nezirus (like he could
use his father's *money*)?
(b) We answer (like we answered earlier) 'Lo, Temimah' - from which we can
infer that he could indeed use his father's blemished animal.
(c) The problem that we have with that from the Beraisa 'Ma'os she'Hifrish
Aviv' is - why the Tana did not then speak about using the blemished animal
that his father left, rather than the money.
(d) We answer, like we answered above - that seeing as the blemished animal
stands to be sold, and with its money, to purchase another Korban, when the
Tana mentions 'the money', he incorporates the unblemished animal.
(a) According to the Tana Kama, once the blood of one of the Nazir's Korban
has been sprinkled, a Nezirah's husband can no longer annul his wife's
Nezirus - because that is what permits her to drink wine once again,. That
in turn, dispenses with the Inuy Nefesh of a Nezirah (the catalyst that
permits her Hafarah).
(b) The Tana Kama does not contend with the fact that the Nezirah still has
to shave her hair, making her ugly - because she can wear a wig.
(c) The ramifications of the Mishnah's ruling are - that she will still need
to shave and bring all her Korbanos.
(d) According to Rebbi Akiva, the criterion is not the sprinkling of the
blood, but the Shechitah of one of the three animals. According to ...
1. ... him - it is specifically the Chatas whose blood must be sprinkled.
This is because the reason that Rebbi Akiva forbids the Hafarah from then
on, is to prevent the Korban from being burned (a reason that would not
apply to the Olah and Shelamim, which will be sacrificed anyway).
2. ... the Tana Kama - it makes no difference which animal's blood has been
sprinkled, since any one of them permits the Nazir to drink wine.
(a) Tosfos is uncertain whether the Nezirus will be annulled if her husband
nevertheless annulled it - because this might fall under the category of
concessions which Chazal permit in spite of the Torah's prohibition (and
they are acting within their rights as long as the issue is 'Shev ve'Al
Ta'aseh' (the contravening is negative).
(b) Tosfos She'eilah remains unresolved.
(a) Everyone agrees however, that the Nezirah's husband can still annul his
wife's Nezirus if she is Tamei, even after the blood of one of her Korbanos
has been sprinkled - because, seeing as she is now obligated to count a new
term of Nezirus Taharah, her husband can claim that he cannot live with a
woman who abstains from wine.
(b) The reason for this concession is based on 'Inuy Nefesh'. Nevertheless,
the Tana talks about 'Nivul' (ugliness) - because we do sometimes find
'Nivul' being used in place of 'Inuy'.
(c) As far as the Tana Kama is concerned, Tosfos explain, the Tana would
have said 'Mishum Inuy' rather than 'I Efshi be'Ishah Menuveles', and it is
because of Rebbi Akiva that he uses the more complicated Lashon. What Tosfos
means is that - because in the Reisha, Rebbi Akiva permitted Hafarah, due to
Hefsed Kodshim rather than because of the prohibition of wine (because of
the short period of time that this involved). Consequently, it was necessary
to stress that, by Nezirus Tum'ah, where it is be a long time before she
would be permitted to drink wine, he too, considers it 'Inuy Nefesh'.
(b) Alternatively, the Tana Kama might have used this Lashon, even according
to the Rabbanan - to balance Rebbi Meir (or Rebbi), who uses the same Lashon
(a) Rebbi Meir (or Rebbi) is more lenient than the Chachamim. He permits the
husband to annul his wife's Nezirus even after the blood of one of her
Korbanos has been sprinkled - because, in his opinion, the husband can argue
that he does not want a wife who shaves her head (making herself ugly);
whereas the Rabbanan do not consider that Inuy Nefesh, since she is able to
wear a wig.
(b) Rebbi Meir (or Rebbi) disagrees with the Rabbanan's argument - because
(unlike modern Sheitels) the wigs of those days were crudely made and were
not clean, in which case, the husband would dismiss such a possibility.
(c) Rebbi Eliezer too, permits him to annul his wife's Nezirus even after
the blood of her Korban Taharah has been sprinkled, but because she is not
yet permitted to drink wine - because, according to him, it is the shaving
that permits her to drink wine, and not the sprinkling of the blood of her
Korban (like the Chachamim).
(a) The Beraisa says that if the lambs of Shavu'os, which were Shechted
she'Lo Lishman or before or after their specified time - the blood is
nevertheless sprinkled and the body of the Korban eaten (by the Kohanim).
(b) She'Lo Lishman means - not for the sake of the lambs of Shavu'os.
(c) On Shabbos however, the blood should not be sprinkled (mi'de'Rabbanan).
Should the Kohen nevertheless sprinkle it - the Korban is Kasher and the
limbs and fat-pieces are burned on the Mizbei'ach.
(d) Rebbi Zeira asks from this Beraisa on Rebbi Akiva (who forbade the
annulment of the woman's Nezirus after the Shechitah of one of her Korbanos
[because of the loss of her Korban]) - why he considers the Korban lost,
since there too, the Kohen should be able to go ahead and sprinkle the blood
(a) Rebbi Zeira did not ask from the Mishnah earlier, which permits the
designated Olah and the Shelamim of a Nezirah (whose husband annulled her
Nezirus) to be brought she'Lo Lishman - since there, the husband annulled
his wife's Nezirus before the Shechitah, in which case the Shechitah, like
the Zerikah stand to be performed she'Lo Lishmah; whereas we are speaking
when both stood to be performed Lish'mah (only the Shechitah was
subsequently performed she'Lo Lish'mah - as is the Beraisa of Kivsei
Atzeres) - Tosfos.
(b) We prove from the case of the lambs of Shavu'os that in our case too,
one should be able to sprinkle the Korban she'Lo Lish'mah - irrespective of
the fact that there, both the Shechitah and the Zerikah are performed she'Lo
Lish'mah, whereas here, the blood will be sprinkled she'Lo Lish'mah, even
though the Shechitah was performed Lish'mah Tosfos).
(c) We reconcile this with the Sugya in Menachos, where we suggest that one
may not sprinkle the blood of the lambs of Shavu'os which were Shechted
Lish'mah, and the bread got lost after the Shechitah, implying that one may
only sprinkle the blood she'Lo Lish'mah if the Korban was also Shechted
she'Lo Lish'mah - by restricting the case to there to where the bread got
lost, because the validity of the Korban is dependent upon the bread.
Otherwise, it makes no difference whether the animal was Shechted Lish'mah
or she'Lo Lish'mah (Tosfos).
(a) The Mishnah states that a father can declare his son a Nazir - but not a
(b) The son has the right to object.
(c) The Tana might mean that, even though the son has the right to object,
when his father makes the declaration, he does not need to consult him
first. Alternatively, he might also mean - that he instructs his son to
declare himself a Nazir (Tosfos - though it is not then clear how the son
can possibly object [see following question]).
(a) The Tana permits the son himself or any of his relatives to object and
stop the Nezirus - on the same day.
(b) The Tana presents two cases to say - that can they object, not only by
way of action (by shaving his head), but even just verbally (following the
principle 'Lo Zu, Af Zu').
(c) Puberty ('Sh'tei Sa'aros') also negates the son's Nezirus.
(d) The Tana may well not have included this in our Mishnah because, unlike
the two cases that he does include, it will even stop the Nezirus once it
has begun (though, according to some, *they* do too). The Tana might also
have omitted it, either because he does want to get involved in a
Machlokes - or because he is only concerned with man-made ways of stopping
the Nezirus, not natural ones.
(a) According to Rebbi Yochanan, the source that only the father may declare
his son a Nazir and not the mother is a Halachah le'Moshe mi'Sinai.
According to Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina Amar Resh Lakish - it is order to
educate him in the performance of Mitzvos.
(b) If the source is a Halachah le'Moshe mi'Sinai, then the same Halachah
precludes women from this particular right, whereas if is a branch of
Chinuch - she is precluded because, in the opinion of Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi
Chanina Amar Resh Lakish, a woman is not obligated to educate her son
(implying that, according to Rebbi Yochanan, she is).