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Moed Katan 14

MOED KATAN 14, 15 - anonymously dedicated my an Ohev Torah and Marbitz Torah in Ramat Beit Shemesh, Israel.



(a) We learn the reason for the prohibition of shaving and washing one's clothes on Chol ha'Mo'ed from a similar Din with regard to the men of the Mishmar and the Ma'amad, who are forbidden to shave or to wash their clothes. They are nevertheless permitted to do so - on Thursday 'li'Ch'vod Shabbos'.

(b) Rabah bar bar Chanah in the name of Rebbi Elazar gives the reason for the prohibition of the men of the Mishmar and the Ma'amad shaving or washing their clothes - so that they should not enter their term of service unshaven and with dirty clothes (relying on the fact that they can always have a shave and wash their clothes once they are there).

(a) Rebbi Zeira asks whether someone who lost a precious article on Erev Yom-Tov is permitted to shave and to wash his clothes - because, unlike the other cases of Anus which our Mishnah permits, people do not know about his lost article. They will think that he deliberately postponed his haircut or washing his clothes until Chol ha'Mo'ed.

(b) Abaye takes it for granted - that he may not, because, otherwise of the principle of 'Lo P'lug' (i.e. 'people will say that everybody else's shaped cakes are forbidden, and Baytus' shaped cakes are permitted' - see Pesachim 37a.). In effect, Chazal permitted the exceptions mentioned in the Mishnah (because everyone knows about them, but not other cases of Anus).

(c) Rebbi Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan permits someone who has only one shirt, to wash it on Chol ha'Mo'ed - because when he stands in his belt (without his shirt) washing it, it is clear to all that he is an Anus (unlike other cases of Anus, where the fact that he is Anus is not evident for all to see).

(d) Rav Ashi poses Rebbi Zeira's She'eilah slightly differently. He asks whether an expert barber say, who lost an article on Erev Yom-Tov, may have a haircut or wash his clothes on Chol ha'Mo'ed - because an expert barber is a public man, and, when people come to him on Erev Yom-Tov for a haircut, they will all see that he lost an article and was an Anus; on the other hand, it is not as clear as the cases in our Mishnah, which *everyone* knows about.

(a) The author of our Mishnah, which permits someone who arrives on Chol ha'Mo'ed from overseas, to shave and to wash his clothes, cannot be Rebbi Yehudah - who forbids it because he should not have traveled on Yom-Tov (see Tosfos DH 'Masnisin').

(b) Rava qualifies their Machlokes. If someone arrived ...

  1. ... from a pleasure trip - even the Rabbanan concede that he may *not* have a shave or wash his clothes.
  2. ... from a business-trip for his basic livelihood - even Rebbi Yehudah concedes that he *may*.
  3. ... from a business-trip to become rich - that is when Rebbi Yehudah and the Chachamim argue.
(c) When Rebbi said 'Nir'in Divrei Rebbi Yehudah ke'she'Yatza she'Lo bi'Reshus, ve'Divrei Rabbanan ke'she'Yatza bi'Reshus'- meant that the Rabbanan agree with Rebbi Yehudah in the case of someone who went she'Lo bi'Reshus (for a pleasure-trip), and that Rebbi Yehudah agrees with the Rabbanan in the case of someone who went bi'Reshus (for his basic livelihood), as we just explained.
(a) Shmuel permits cutting the hair of a baby born on Chol ha'Mo'ed - on the grounds that there is no more blatant case of the release of a captive (which our Mishnah specifically permits) than the birth of a baby.

(b) Shmuel's statement implies that if the baby was born *before* Yom-Tov, it would be forbidden to cut his hair. Rebbi Pinchas queries Shmuel however, on the basis of the Beraisa, which permits anyone who is permitted to shave during Aveilus, to shave on Chol ha'Mo'ed. Consequently - seeing as we have already learned that one only tears K'ri'ah on a child, but apart from that, there is no Aveilus by a child (at all), and, if there is no Aveilus, (we can learn by inference) the prohibitions on Chol ha'Mo'ed do not apply either?

(c) One tears K'ri'ah for a Katan - in order to make people cry (for Kavod ha'Meis).




(a) The Kashya that we just asked on Shmuel who (permits cutting the hair of a baby born on Chol ha'Mo'ed, from the Beraisa which permits anyone who is permitted to shave on Chol ha'Mo'ed to shave during Aveilus) - is based on the inference that, whoever is forbidden to shave on Chol ha'Mo'ed is also forbidden to shave during Aveilus. But who said to make such an inference? Perhaps there are some people who are forbidden to shave on Chol ha'Mo'ed but who are nevertheless permitted to shave during Aveilus?

(b) Rav Shisha B'rei de'Rav Idi quotes Shmuel differently, citing the Beraisa as a proof (instead of as a Kashya), which we refuted in the same way as we refuted it when it was previously brought in the form of a Kashya. According to *him* - Shmuel says that one is permitted to shave a Katan on Chol ha'Mo'ed, irrespective of whether he was born on Chol ha'Mo'ed or whether he was born before Yom Tov.

(a) An Aveil does not practice Aveilus on Yom-Tov or on Chol ha'Mo'ed - because *communal* Simchas Yom-Tov ("ve'Samachta be'Chagecha") overrides *private* Aveilus.

(b) Nor is there any difference whether the Aveilus began before Yom-Tov or on Chol ha'Mo'ed - if the Aveilus occurred first, then the Asei of communal Simchah cancels the private Asei of Aveilus, and if Yom-Tov fell first, then the Asei of Simchas Yom-Tov prevents that of Aveilus from taking effect.

(a) The Beraisa permits judging matters that involve either the death sentence, lashes or money-matters, on Chol ha'Mo'ed - but not on Yom-Tov.

(b) The Tana then adds - that if someone fails to comply with the Beis-Din's rulings, one even places a Niduy on him.

(c) This would certainly resolve the She'eilah of whether a Menudeh is obligated to practice his Niduy on Yom-Tov or not - because Beis-Din will place a *fresh* Niduy, then it is obvious that an existing one will certainly not be rescinded.

(d) Abaye refutes this proof however - on the grounds that the Tana is not referring to the actual Niduy, but to the discussion that precedes it (whereas the actual Niduy is placed only after Yom-Tov).

(a) Abaye proves his previous point (that one cannot possibly carry out the death-sentence on Yom-Tov) from a statement of Rebbi Akiva, who, based on the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Lo Sochlu al ha'Dam" says - that Sanhedrin who carried out the death-sentence, are obligated to fast for the remainder of that day (which would certainly constitute an infraction of Simchas Yom-Tov, were they to do so on Chol ha'Mo'ed).

(b) Abaye asks Rav Yosef further from 'Me'aneh es Dino' (the prohibition of leaving a death-sentence without a ruling, which causes the defendant undue suffering). Consequently, how can they examine his case on Chol ha'Mo'ed without issuing a final ruling? (See Tosfos DH 'Nimtza'as').

(c) Rav Yosef replies - that they first examine his case, then they go home and eat, before reconvening close to sunset, when they issue their final ruling and put him to death (just before nightfall).

(d) Abaye then asks from the Beraisa 'u'Menudeh she'Hitiru Lo Chachamim', implying that the Beis-Din rescinded every Niduy on Yom-Tov. Rava however (basing himself on the Lashon 'she'Hitiru *Lo* Chachamim' [rather than 'she'Hitiruhu Chachamim'] establishes the Beraisa exclusively by someone who asked the person whom he had hurt (the cause of his Niduy) for forgiveness, and this now comes before the Beis-Din on Chol ha'Mo'ed to rescind.

(a) We then ask whether a Metzora practices his Tzara'as on Yom-Tov - i.e. whether he is permitted to enter the walls of the town and cut his hair.

(b) Abaye tries to resolve this She'eilah from our Mishnah, which includes a Metzora *who is in the process of becoming Tahor* among those who are permitted to have a shave and wash their clothes on Yom-Tov - implying that a Metzora who is not in the process of becoming Tahor may *not* do so.

(c) We refute his proof however, by saying 'Lo Miba'i ... ' - meaning that the Tana considers it unnecessary to mention a Metzora who is *not* in the process of becoming Tahor, and it is only one who *is* that he needs to include, because we may otherwise have precluded him from having a haircut, since that requires a Korban, and we might suspected him of leaving his Korban for the last day of Yom-Tov, which is forbidden.

(d) Rava ...

1. ... resolves the She'eilah from a Beraisa, which includes a Kohen Gadol in the Dinim of Tzara'as from the Pasuk in Tazri'a "ve'ha'Tzaru'a" - because (vis-a-vis the Dinim of Avodah) a Kohen Gadol the whole year round is like an ordinary person on Yom-Tov, from which it is clear that a Metzora does practice his Tzara'as on Yom-Tov.
2. ... proves that a Kohen Gadol the whole year round is like an ordinary person on Yom-Tov - from the Mishnah in Zevachim) that a Kohen Gadol brings Korbanos even when he is an Onan, though he is not allowed to eat them (like an Onan on Yom-Tov).
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