ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Makos 23
MAKOS 21-24 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications
for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.
(a) Rav Sheishes in the name of Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah learns from the
juxtaposition of the Pasuk ...
1. ... "Arba'im Yakenu" to that of "Lo Sachsom Shor be'Disho" - that the
sinner is lashed with a strap of calf leather.
(b) We know that the Pasuk "es Chag ha'Matzos Tishmor" refers to the
prohibition of Melachah on Chol ha'Mo'ed - because we already have Pesukim
in Emor for the first and last days of Yom-Tov.
2. ... "Lo Sachsom Shor be'Disho" to that of "Ki Yeishvu Achim Yachdav" -
that there are times when we force the Yavam to make Chalitzah (even when he
wants to make Yibum), such as when he is a leper (and the Yevamah is
repelled by him).
3. ... "Elohei Maseichah Lo Sa'aseh Lach to that of "es Chag ha'Matzos
Tishmor" - that if someone despises Chol-ha'Mo'ed (by treating it like a
weekday), it is as if he had served Avodah-Zarah.
4. ... "la'Kelev Tashlichun Oso" to that of "Lo Sisa Sheima Shav" (which we
can also read as "Lo Sashi ...), Al Tashes Yadcha Im Rasha Liheyos Eid
Chamas" - that someone who speaks or accepts Lashon ha'Ra and someone who
testifies falsely in Beis-Din, deserve to be thrown to the dogs (who knew
how to hold their tongues in Egypt).
(c) To explain why they attached a strap of donkey hide to the strap of calf
hide, that Galile'an Darshened in front of Rav Chisda - the Pasuk in
Yeshayah "Yada Shor Koneihu, *ve'es Chamor Eivus Be'alav*" that 'the one who
does recognize the feeding-trough of its master will come and punish the one
who doesn't' (see Agados Maharsha).
(a) Rava refutes Abaye's ruling that (based on the fact that the strap had
to reach the beginning of the sinner's stomach) each sinner required a
made-to-measure whip - on the grounds that this would result in quite a
stockpile of whips in Beis-Din's storeroom!
(b) According to Rava therefore - they had one whip, with a strap that could
be adjusted by tying and untying the end, according to the required length.
(c) The source that Rav Kahana quotes for our Mishnah, which prescribes one
third of the Malkos in front, and two thirds, at the back is - the Pasuk in
Ki Seitzei "K'dei Rish'aso le'Fanav", implying one lot at the front, and two
at the back.
(d) From the fact that the Torah writes "ve'Hipilo ha'Shofet", rather than
"ve'Yateihu" (which means "and he shall bend him"), Rav Chisda Amar Rebbi
Yochanan learns - that the strap had to be doubled (as if it had written
've'Hichpilo' [and he shall double it]).
(a) The Tana Kama of the Beraisa requires the floggers to be weak in body
but strong in mind (so as to temper the judgment with mercy). According to
Rebbi Yehudah - the reverse was also acceptable.
(b) We learn from "Lo Yosif" "Pen Yosif" - that if the flogger administers
even one stroke too many, he transgresses two La'avin (as does anybody else
who strikes a fellow-Jew).
(c) Rava supports Rebbi Yehudah's view from there - because, if the flogger
was 'strong in mind', he would not require such a warning.
(d) The Rabbanan counter this argument however - with the principle "Ein
Mezarzin Ela li'Zerezin" ('the Torah only warns those who are careful to
(a) When administering the lashes - the flogger would raise the whip with
both hands, but would strike the sinner using only one hand, in order to
apply full force, as our Mishnah prescribes.
(b) The leading Dayan read the Pesukim - the second Dayan would keep count,
whilst the third one would order the flogger to administer the stroke.
(c) Based on the ruling of a Beraisa with regard to the reading of the
Pesukim, 'Mitzvah Letzamtzem' means - that the Dayan who read the Pesukim
had to synchronize his reading, to finish together with the conclusion of
the Makos (which meant adjusting his speed according to the number of
strokes that the sinner was due to receive).
(d) Our Mishnah 've'Chozer li'Techilas ha'Mikra' - speaks when he did not
manage to achieve this, finishing the Pesukim before the flogging was over.
(a) "Pen Yosif" incorporates even a case where the flogger adds strokes to a
total assessment that is less than the full quota of thirty-nine lashes. The
Torah adds "Al Eileh" - to teach us that the flogger transgresses even if he
adds just one stroke more than the sinner is due to receive ...
(b) ... and the Torah writes "Makah Rabah" - to teach us that the initial
Malkos are considered a great beating and must be delivered with full force
(see also Cheishek Shlomoh).
(c) Our Mishnah already cited the Machlokes between the Chachamim and Rebbi
Yehudah whether a man who wets himself is Patur from Malkos or not. The
Beraisa repeats the Machlokes, but adds the opinion of Rebbi Meir, who is
the strictest of all - and who says that even a woman is only Patur if she
(d) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak reconciles Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah and in
the Beraisa, with Rebbi Yehudah in a second Beraisa 'Echad ha'Ish ve'Echad
ha'Ishah be'Re'i' - by interpreting the latter statement to mean that both a
man and a woman have the same Din should they sully themselves (leaving us
to infer perhaps, that their Din will differ in the event that they wet
(a) When the Beraisa exempts the sinner from Malkos if he disgraced himself
'Bein ba'Rishonah, Bein bi'Sheniyah' - it means that he is Patur even before
the first stroke (provided the flogger had already raised his hand, though
(b) In the equivalent two cases in a case where the strap broke, the Tana
rules - that he is only Patur if it broke after he had received at least one
stroke, but not earlier.
(c) And we reconcile this with Shmuel, who exempts him even if he escapes
and runs out of Beis-Din after having been bound to the post - by confining
Shmuel's ruling specifically to where he ran out of Beis-Din (but not to
where the strap broke [where the element of embarrassment is less]).
(d) The Beraisa rules that if Beis-Din assess that the sinner will disgrace
1. ... immediately after receiving lashes - he is Patur.
(e) The Tana extrapolates this from the Pasuk "Vehikahu Lefanav ... Veniklah
Achicha le'Einecha" - implying that we contend with embarrassment which is
caused directly by the Malkos, but not which comes about indirectly, at a
2. ... after he has left the Beis-Din - he is Chayav.
(a) Rebbi Chananyah ben Gamliel in our Mishnah learns from the Pasuk
"*Veniklah Achicha le'Einecha" that if someone who is Chayav Kareis receives
Malkos, he is Patur from Kareis. His source is - the Pasuk "*Veniklah
Achicha le'Einecha" (which implies that once the sinner has received Malkos,
he is a brother of every other Jew, and is not therefore subject to any
(b) Based on the principle that 'Hashem's measure of good is stronger than
His measure of punishment, the same Tana learns from the fact that a person
who commits adultery is Chayav Kareis - that if he were to perform a
Mitzvah, he would certainly gain life for himself.
(c) Rebbi Shimon learns this from the Pasuk by Chayvei K'risus itself. He
interprets the Pasuk (that follows "Venichresu ha'Nefashos ha'Osos") "Asher
Ya'aseh Osam ha'Adam va'Chai Bahem" - to mean that if a person who is faced
with the opportunity to sin abstains from doing so, then he will live as if
he had actually performed a Mitzvah.
(a) And Rebbi Shimon bar Rebbi learns from the Pasuk "Rak Chazak Levilti
Achol ha'Dam ... " - that if a person receives reward for desisting from
drinking blood (which is abhorrent to begin with), then how much more so
will he be rewarded for desisting the urge to steal or to commit adultery,
he will earn for himself and his descendants merit ...
(b) ... until the end of time.
(c) Rebbi Chananya ben Akashya interprets the Pasuk "Hashem Chafetz Lema'an
Tzidko Yagdil Torahve'Yadir" to mean - that Hashem gave us Mitzvos, which we
would have kept anyway (such as not to eat insects and carcasses), in order
to reward us for abstaining from eating them (for His sake).
(a) According to Rebbi Chananyah ben Gamliel learned in our Mishnah, Chayvei
Kerisus who receive Malkos are exempt from Kareis. Rebbi Yochanan says -
that the Rabbanan argue with Rebbi Chananyah ben Gamliel.
(b) Rav Ada bar Ahavah Amri Bei Rav attempts to prove Rebbi Yochanan's
statement from the Mishnah in Megilah 'Ein Bein Shabbos le'Yom ha'Kipurim
Ela she'Zeh Zedono bi'Yedei Adam, ve'Zeh Zedono be'Hikares' - implying that
Yom Kipur is not punishable at the hand of Beis-Din.
(c) Rav Nachman refutes this proof by establishing the Mishnah like Rebbi
Yitzchak (whom we cited earlier) - who holds that Chayvei Kareis are not
subject to Malkos.
(d) Rav Ashi dismisses the proof even assuming the author is the Rabbanan -
by interpreting the statement 'she'Zeh Zedono bi'Yedei Adam ... ' - to mean
that whereas the major punishment of Shabbos is at the hand of Beis-Din, the
major punishment of Yom Kipur is at the Hand of Hashem (which does not
preclude the possibility of the latter being punishable at the hand of
Beis-Din as well).
(e) Rav Ashi cannot mean that the Chiyuv Kareis precedes the Chiyuv Malkos,
and will remain intact unless the sinner has received Malkos - because,
seeing as the two punishments run concurrently, that is simply not true.
(a) The problem Rav Yosef has with Rav Ada bar Ahavah Amar Rav's ruling like
Rebbi Chananyah ben Gamliel is - how he can possibly know this, seeing as he
had not visited the Heavenly Court to find out (meaning that whether a
person receives Kareis or not, is surely a Divine decision, of which we can
have no knowledge).
(b) Abaye counters Rav Yosef's objection however, with a statement of Rebbi
Yehoshua ben Levi, who said - that Mikra Megilah, She'eilas Shalom be'Shem
and Ha'va'as Ma'aser - were all instituted by Beis-Din shel Matah, but were
condoned by Beis-Din shel Ma'alah (which Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi seems to
had privy knowledge).
(c) Abaye therefore attributes the Amora'im's knowledge in both cases - to
their interpretation of the Pesukim (all of which will have been quoted by
the Sugya's end).
(a) Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi learns from the Pasuk "Kiymu ve'Kiblu
ha'Yehudim" - that they accepted in Heaven what they had decreed on earth
(i.e. the decree of Mikra Megilah [in spite of the general prohibition of
adding Mitzvos to those of the Torah]).
(b) 'She'ilas Shalom be'Shem' may refer to the concession to use Hashem's
real Name when greeting someone. It might also mean - an obligation to greet
with the Name of Hashem (like we do when we say "Shalom Aleichem" [since
Shalom is a Name of Hashem]).
(c) Even though Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi learns this from the Pasuk "ve'Hinei
Bo'az Bo mi'Beis-Lechem Vayomer la'Kotzrim Hashem Imachem", he nevertheless
needs to quote the Pasuk in Shoftim "Hashem Imcha Gibor he'Chayil" - because
from there we learn that Hashem agreed with the decree.
(d) And he learns from the Pasuk "Havi'u es Kol ha'Ma'aser el Beis ha'Otzar
... " - that they instituted that all Ma'asros should be brought to one of
the rooms in the Beis-Hamikdash, instead of the Kohanim and the Levi'im
having to go to the granaries to fetch it (because the people used to give
their Ma'asros to Kohanim and Levi'im who were unworthy.
(a) Ezra, who instituted this Takanah, also penalized the Levi'im - by
granting the Kohanim (who were also basically Levi'im) equal rights to
(b) And he further extended the Takanah of Ma'asros - by incorporating fruit
and vegetables (other than the seven species) in the Din of Ma'asros (see
(c) Rami bar Rav (or Rebbi Chiya Amar Rav) learns from the conclusion of the
previous Pasuk "Vaharikosi Lachem B'rachah ad B'li Dai" - that if Yisrael
would then proceed to give their Ma'asros properly, then they would receive
so much B'rachah that their lips would wither from announcing 'enough'.
(a) Two of the Batei-Din listed by Rebbi Elazar in which Ru'ach ha'Kodesh
appeared were those of Sheim and of Shmuel. The third, was - that of
(b) Yehudah declared "Tzadkah Mimeni" (admitting that Tamar was telling the
truth, and that she was pregnant from him, and that, under the
circumstances, she was not guilty of adultery). We know that Tamar had not
in fact, committed adultery with someone else too, and that it was not from
him that she was now pregnant - because "Mimeni" was actually said, not by
Tamar, but by the Shechinah who appeared in the Beis-Din of Shem.
(c) 'Mimeni Yatz'a Kevushim' means - that the entire episode of Yehudah and
Tamar was orchestrated by Hashem, who forced Yehudah to react to Tamar the
way he did (or that Peretz and Zerach, from whom would descend David and
Melech ha'Mashi'ach, were destined to 'capture the world').
(d) Hashem did that - in order to reward Tamar for the Tzeni'us (modest
behavior) that she displayed in her father-in-law (Yehudah)'s house.
(a) Yisrael responded to Shmuel's challenge that he had never robbed or
taken anything from any Jew - by corroborating his statement.
(b) Following Shmuel's request "Vayomer Eid Hashem ve'Eid Meshicho ... ", we
know that "Vayomer Eid" refers to the Shechinah - because "Vayomer" is in
the singular (and had the Pasuk referred to K'lal Yisrael, as it would seem,
it should have written "Vayomru").
(c) In the court-case with Shlomoh Hamelech, where Shlomoh gave the baby to
the mother who said not to kill the baby, from which Pasuk does Rebbi Elazar
extrapolate that the mother did not say that just to impress Shlomoh (and
not because she really meant it) - because "Hi Imo" was acually said by the
Shechinah (and not by Shlomoh).
(d) Rava disagrees with all of the above proofs. He establishes ...
1. ... "Tzadkah Mimeni" as the words of Yehudah - by pointing out that,
based on the fact that her pregnancy had only just become noticeable,
Yehudah could have made a simple calculation going back three months in time
to work out that he was the man from whom Tamar was pregnant.
(e) And Rebbi Elazar's source that the Shechinah appeared on those three
occasions was - the tradition that was handed down to him from his Rebbes.
2. ... "Vayomer, Eid" as the words of Yisrael, even though it is written in
the singular - because the Pasuk sometimes refers to K'lal Yisrael in the
singular in this way (such as the Pasuk in Yeshayah "Yisrael Nosha ba'Hashem
3. ... "Hi Imo" as the words of Shlomoh - by ascribing Shlomoh's knowledge
to a combination of the two women's statements. Because it was the
combination of the first woman agreeing to cut up the child and the second
woman refusing, that convinced him that the second woman really was the