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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Kidushin 56

KIDUSHIN 56-57 - sponsored by a generous grant from an anonymous donor. Kollel Iyun Hadaf is indebted to him for his encouragement and support and prays that Hashem will repay him in kind.


(a) The Beraisa forbids the purchase of an animal with the money of Ma'aser Sheini.
To which location does this prohibition pertain?

(b) What do we learn from the Pasuk in Re'ei "ve'Tzarta ha'Kesef be'Yadcha"?

(c) What other reason might there be to explain the prohibition?

(a) If one did redeem Ma'aser Sheini be'Meizid with an animal, the Tana validates the transaction, and the animal is taken to Yerushalayim.
What does one do if he redeemed it be'Shogeg? What does 'be'Shogeg' mean in this context?

(b) How does Rebbi Yehudah qualify the Din re. someone who redeemed the animal be'Meizid?

(c) If his intention is to transfer the money of Ma'aser Sheini to Chulin, then 'Bein be'Shogeg, Bein be'Meizid Yachzeru Damim li'Mekomam'.
What is the reason for this in the case of ...

  1. ... Shogeg?
  2. ... Meizid?
(d) If he intends to transfer the Ma'aser money to Chulin, how can we say 'Bein be'Shogeg ... '?
(a) How does Rebbi Elazar reconcile this Rebbi Yehudah ('Yachzeru Damim li'Mekomam'), with Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah, who says (re. Ma'aser Sheini) 'be'Meizid Kidesh'?

(b) What does the Mishnah in Ma'aser Sheini say about purchasing a non-Kasher animal, Avadim or land with Ma'aser money? Is there any difference between whether he did it in Yerushalayim or outside?

(c) What happens if someone did so, in spite of the prohibition?

(d) Assuming that a regular woman does not know that Ma'aser Sheini does not go out to Chulin on account of her, any more than an ordinary person does not know that it does not go out to Chulin through a non-Kasher animal, Avadim or land - how do we adjust Rebbi Elazar's interpretation of 'be'Meizid Kidesh' in our Mishnah?

(a) The Mishnah in Ma'aser Sheini says 'Im Lakach, Yochal ke'Negdan'.
How does Shmuel establish the Mishnah, to explain why the Tana does not say 'Yachzeru Damim li'Mekomam', like the Tana of the Beraisa of 'Ein Lokchin Beheimah ... '?

(b) On what grounds do we object to the reasoning that (there where the seller did not flee) we penalize *him* (rather than the purchaser) on the grounds that 'It is not the mouse that steals, but the hole!'?

(c) Then on what grounds *do* we penalize specifically the seller?

Answers to questions



(a) Our Mishnah states 'ha'Mekadesh be'Orlah, bi'K'lai ha'Kerem, be'Shor ha'Niskal ... 'Einah Mekudeshes'.
What do all of these have in common?

(b) Why, if he sells them and betroths her with the money, is the betrothal valid?

(c) We learn the Isur Achilah from the Pasuk in Kedoshim "Areilim Lo Ye'achel".
What do we learn from "va'Araltem Orlaso"?

(d) Considering the insignificant benefit that one derives from sight (see Tosfos DH 'Minayin'), is painting with dyes extracted from the shells of Orlah included in the prohibition?

(a) How, by way of acronym, does Chizkiyah Darshen the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei (written in connection with Orlah) "*Pen Tikdash* ha'Mele'ah"?

(b) On what grounds do we refute Rav Ashi's acronym 'Pen Yihyeh Kodesh'?

(a) Seeing as it is obvious that a stoned ox is forbidden to eat, what do we learn from the Pasuk ...
  1. ... "Lo Ye'achel es Besaro"?
  2. ... "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki"?
(b) How does Shimon ben Zoma, in a Beraisa, interpret this latter phrase?
(a) Rebbi Avahu Amar Rebbi Elazar says that "Lo Ye'achel, Lo Sochal and Lo Sochlu" (wherever they occur) incorporate an Isur Hana'ah. Based on this D'rashah, how do we propose to establish "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" differently than before?

(b) Had we accepted this proposal, we would use "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" for something else (as we shall see shortly).
But what would we gain by accepting it?

(c) How do we refute the proposal? Why would Rebbi Avahu's principle not apply in that case?

(d) Why is that? What should the Torah have written (or not have written), had it meant to forbid Hana'ah only?

(a) According to the latter explanation, what do we learn from "es Besaro"?

(b) On what grounds do we reject the suggestion that "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" comes to forbid the animal if he Shechted it with a sharp strip of cane (which is a kind of Stoning), but not if he Shechted it with a knife?

(c) What does the Beraisa say about a piece of rock, a piece of glass and a strip of cane? What do they have in common?

(a) Now that we learn both the Isur Achilah and the Isur Hana'ah from "Lo Ye'achel", what do we learn from "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki"?

(b) Why would we have otherwise thought that the skin is permitted?

(c) One of the two other things that we may learn from "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" is that if a Shor Tam (that has not yet gored three times) kills a man, the owner is not obligated to pay half the value of the dead man (instead of the full value that he would have had to pay for the same damaged performed by a Shor Mu'ad [which already gored on three other occasions).
What is the second thing?

(d) According to them, from where will we learn the prohibition of deriving benefit from the skin?

(a) What do those who learn Hana'as Oro from "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" learn from "es Besaro"?

(b) What did Rebbi Shimon ha'Amsuni (or Nechemyah ha'Amsuni) desist from Darshening every "es" in the Torah?

(c) What did he reply when his Talmidim asked him what would happen to all the "esim" that he had Darshened until then?

(d) What did Rebbi Akiva Darshen from "*es* Hashem Elokecha Tiyra"?

Answers to questions

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