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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Kidushin 19

KIDUSHIN 19 (4 Sivan) - Dedicated by Rabbi Kornfeld's father, Mr. David Kornfeld, in memory of the members of his family who perished at the hands of the Nazi murderers in the Holocaust and whose Yahrzeit is observed today: his mother (Mirel bas Yakov Mordechai), brothers (Shraga Feivel, Aryeh Leib and Yisachar Dov, sons of Mordechai), grandfather (Reb Yakov Mordechai ben Reb David [Shpira]) and aunt (Charne bas Yakov Mordechai [wife of Reb Moshe Aryeh Cohen]).


(a) Resh Lakish asked whether a man can give his Amah Ivriyah to his son who is a Katan for Yi'ud, seeing as the Torah writes "ve'Im li'V'no Yi'adenah", and a Katan fits into the heading of "B'no".
What is the other side of the She'eilah? Why might such a Yi'ud not be valid?

(b) Based on the Pasuk in Kedoshim "ve'Ish Asher Yin'af es Eishes Ish", what does the Tana of the Beraisa Darshen from ...

  1. ... "ve'Ish"?
  2. ... "es Eishes Ish"?
(c) How do we counter Rebbi Zeira's proof from the latter D'rashah that there is no such thing as 'Ishus' by a Katan?

(d) So how does Rav Ashi establish the case in the Beraisa? Why might we otherwise have thought that whoever comits adultery with his wife should be Chayav Miysah?

(a) We resolve Resh Lakish's She'eilah with a statement by Rebbi Ayvu Amar Rebbi Yanai.
What does Rebbi Ayvu Amar Rebbi Yanai say concerning the Yi'ud of a Katan?

(b) We initially interpret 'Ein Yi'ud Ela le'Da'as' (which appears to be dredundant) as the reason for 'Ein Yi'ud Ela be'Gadol'.
What alternative interpretation do we offer to explain this additional phrase?

(a) What does the Beraisa quoted by Abaye Brei de'Rebbi Avahu learn from "Asher Lo Ye'adah" in support of the previous (alternative) explanation?

(b) According to whom does Abaye Brei de'Rebbi Avahu establish the Beraisa in order to explain it?

(c) On what grounds does Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak refute this? How does he then explain the Beraisa?

(d) What difference does it make Halachically, whether it is the original money that forms the Kidushin or the last P'rutah's-worth of work?

(a) We finally quote the source of Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah.
What does he learn from the Pasuk "Asher Lo Ye'adah ve'Hefdah"?

(b) What do the Rabbanan (who are not quoted in the Beraisa) say?

(c) What is the reasoning behind Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah's ruling?

(d) What does Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak say?

5) How does Rava Amar Rav Nachman extrapolate from Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah that ...
  1. ... a man can instruct his daughter to accept her own Kidushin, even if she is a Ketanah?
  2. ... a man can betroth a woman with a loan, provided she gave him a Mashkon?
Answers to questions



(a) According to the Chachamim of Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah, may the master ...
  1. ... make Yi'ud with the Amah Ivriyah after the six years have terminated?
  2. ... still treat her like an Amah Ivriyah once he has made Yi'ud with her?
(b) What will be the Din if a man says to a woman 'Hiskadshi Li me'Achshav le'Achar Sheloshim', and someone else betroths her during those thirty days?
To whom will she be betrothed when the thirty days elapse?

(c) From whose opinion does the Tana of the Beraisa derive this 'Mashal'?

(d) What is the Tana teaching us with this Mashal? Is it not obvious that we can extrapolate it from the opinion of the Rabbanan?

(a) In a second Beraisa, Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah rules that if someone sells his daughter and then betroths her to somebody else, the father can laugh at the master and she is betrothed to the second man.
What do the Chachamim say?

(b) What 'Mashal' does the Tana give, this time in support of Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah?

(c) What is the Tana teaching us with this Mashal? Is it not obvious that we can extrapolate it from the opinion of Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah?

(a) In a third Beraisa, Rebbi Meir rules that if a man sells his daughter on condition that the master will not make Yi'ud, his condition is valid. What do the Chachamim say?

(b) What does Rebbi Meir say with regard to someone who betroths a woman on condition that he is exempt from 'She'er K'sus ve'Onah'?

(c) On what basis does Rebbi Yehudah differentiate between food and clothing on the one hand, and Bi'ah on the other?

(d) How does Chizkiyah reconcile the apparent contradiction in Rebbi Meir, by citing the Pasuk in Mishpatim "ve'Chi Yimkor Ish es Bito *le'Amah*"?

(a) What do the Chachamim learn from "le'Amah"?

(b) Why can we not learn this from a 'Kal va'Chomer' from the fact that he can betroth her to Pesulin (Bedi'eved)?

(a) Rebbi Eliezer disagrees with the Tana Kama.
What does he learn from "Im Ra'ah be'Einei Adonehah Asher Lo Ye'adah"?

(b) What does he then learn from "le'Amah"?

(c) Why does he need "le'Amah" for this? Why can he not learn it from the fact that he can sell her to Pesulin?

(d) If Rebbi Meir learns 'Mochrah li'Pesulin' from the same source as Rebbi Eliezer, why does he learn from "le'Amah" that the father's condition not to make Yi'ud is valid.
Why does he not learn "Mochrah li'K'rovim', like Rebbi Eliezer?

Answers to questions

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