ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kidushin 74
KIDUSHIN 72-75 - sponsored by a generous grant from an anonymous donor.
Kollel Iyun Hadaf is indebted to him for his encouragement and support and
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(a) The Tana believes the owner of an article which he sold to testify that
he sold it to Reuven and not to Shimon - provided he still has the article
in his possession (because once he has handed the owner to the purchaser, he
is no longer believed).
(b) If he had handed over the article to the purchaser, we would still need
him to testify who purchased it - in a case where they came into Beis-Din
both holding it.
(c) If it did not concern the owner who bought the article, he would not be
believed. His concern is based on the fact - that should he change his mind
and give the article to the wrong person, he would stand to be cursed with a
'Mi she'Para' (that is due to anyone who retracts from a sale without sound
(d) We cannot ascertain who the purchaser is by determining which of them
paid him - because the Tana is speaking when they both paid, one with the
owner's consent, the other, who simply pushed the money inti his hand
against his will.
(a) The Tana believes a Dayan to say which of the litigants he vindicated
and which he obligated to pay - only as long as the litigants are still in
his presence, but once they take their leave, he is no longer believed,
because he has no further interest in remembering it.
(b) We cannot just see which of the two litigants is holding the document of
merit - because the Tana speaks when the document got torn up.
(c) It is not possible for the Dayan himself or even another Dayan to
litigate all over again (which would be preferable to believing the Dayan) -
because we are speaking in a case of 'Shuda de'Dayna' (when the Halachah is
based on the whim of the Dayan).
(d) 'Shuda de'Dayna' would be for example, a case where before he died,
someone said 'All my property should be given to Tuvya', and two Tuvya's
turned up to claim the money.
(a) Rav Nachman rules that the midwife, the father and the mother are
believed to testify that a baby is a Bechor, though he does not give them
all the same time-period. He believes ...
1. ... the midwife - immediately (since she is the only person who knows who
the baby is at that stage).
(b) The father is believed forever - because the Torah writes in Ki Sietzei
"Ki es ha'Bechor ben ha'Senu'ah Yakir".
2. ... the baby's mother - during the first seven days (since at that stage,
*she* is the only person who knows).
3. ... the baby's father.
(c) The Chachamim in a Beraisa confine the father's credibility to
testifying that his son is a Bechor. Rebbi Yehudah extends it - to
testifying that he is a ben Gerushah or a ben Chalutzah.
(a) When Aba Shaul calls a Shesuki 'Beduki', he means - that we ask the
mother whose child he is and we believe what she says.
(b) Raban Gamliel (and Rebbi Eliezer) says in the Mishnah in Kesuvos that if
a pregnant woman claims that she is pregnant from such and such a Kohen -
she is believed.
(c) Rebbi Yehoshua does not believe her - and Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules
(d) Rebbi found it necessary to repeat Aba Shaul's ruling, even though he
has already taught us that of Raban Gamliel (and does not simply add in
Kesuvos 've'Chein Amar Aba Shaul') - because Raban Gamliel confines his
ruling to the woman herself, he does not believe her concerning her
daughter, who is Pasul from the Kehunah, whereas Aba Shaul does.
(a) This answer goes according to those who confine Raban Gamliel's ruling
to the woman herself, but not to her child. Those who extend Raban Gamliel
ruling to her child, explain that Rebbi finds it necessary to cite Aba
Shaul - because Raba Gamliel's ruling is confined to an umarried woman,
where most of the town are permitted to her, whereas Aba Shaul believes the
woman even if she is an Arusah (and most people in the town are forbidden to
her) or where most people are forbidden to her for other reasons.
(b) Rava rules like Aba Shaul.
(a) The Tana Kama of our Mishnah permits all those who are forbidden to
enter the Kahal to intermarry. Rebbi Yehudah says - 'Asur'.
(b) Rebbi Elazar - permits those who are Vaday Pasul with those who are
Vaday Pasul, but forbids those who are a Safek to marry those who are a
Vaday (in case the Safek is Kasher).
(c) He forbids a Safek to marry a Safek too (in case one of them is Kasher
and the other, Pasul).
(d) The three cases of Safek are Shesuki, Asufi and Kuti.
(a) The problem with explaining ...
1. ... the Tana Kama of our Mishnah literally (that Mamzeirim, Nesinim,
Shesukim and Asufim are permitted to intermarry) is - that Rebbi already
taught us this in the previous Mishnah.
(b) Neither can Rebbi Yehudah be referring to a Ger marrying a Mamzeres
(which we already know he forbids) - because we are talking about those who
are Pasul to enter the Kahal, which does not incorporate Geirim.
2. ... Rebbi Yehudah wth re. to the case of Vaday intermarrying with the
Safek - is that he would then be saying the same as Rebbi Elazar in the
Seifa (who clearly comes to argue with the previous Tana'im, not to mimick
(c) So we attempt to interpret 'Kol ha'Asurim Lavo be'Kahal' - to mean 'Kol
ha'Asurim Lavo bi'Kehal Kehunah', which does incorporate Geirim (since a
Kohen is forbidden to marry a Giyores), and we are referring even to a
Giyores who converted before she turned three.
(d) When we say 'de'Lo ke'Rebbi Shimon ben Yochai', we refer to his ruling -
that a Giyores who is less than three years old is permitted to marry a
Kohen, since she is a bas Bi'ah, because her Besulim returns. Consequently,
she does not have the Din of a Zonah.
(a) What makes us (try to) establish our Mishnah even by a Giyores who
converted before she turned three, not like Rebbi Shimon - is the fact that
the alternative would force us to infer that a Giyores who converted before
she was three, and who was permitted to marry a Kohen, was forbidden to
marry a Mamzeres. But that cannot be, because Rebbi Shimon himself permits
her to marry a Giyores (because he holds 'Kehal Geirim Lo Ikri Kahal).
(b) And we know that our Tana too holds 'Kehal Geirim Lo Ikri Kahal' -
because otherwise, on what basis would he permit a Giyores who converted
after she turned three to marry a Mamzer?
(c) We refute the current proposal from two angles. We know that ...
1. ... all Pesulei Kehunah (Almanah, Gerushah ...) are forbidden to marry a
Kohen, yet they are also forbidden to marry a Mamzer?
2. ... a Ger is permitted to marry a bas Kohen, yet he is also permitted to
marry a Mamzeres?
(a) Rav Nasan bar Hoshaya then attempts to interpret the Tana Kama like
Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov, and what the Tana means is 'Kol she'Kohen Asur
Lisa es Bito, Mutarin Zeh ba'Zeh' - referring to a Ger, whose daughter would
be forbidden to marry a Kohenes (were he to marry a Giyores).
(b) He says specifically a Ger whose daughter would be forbidden were he to
marry a Giyores (like Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov). He does not refer even to
a Ger who married a Yisre'elis, because it is only according to Rebbi
Yehudah that his daughter would also be forbidden to marry a Kohen (as we
shall see later), and since Rebbi Yehudah is the author of the Seifa, he
cannot also be the author of the Reisha.
(c) We reconcile this interpretation of the K'lal 'Kol ha'Asurin ... ' with
the case of a Chalal who married a bas Yisrael, whose daughter is forbidden
to marry a Kohen, yet she is forbidden to marry a Mamzeres - by establishing
our Mishnah like Rebbi Dustai ben Yehudah, who holds 'B'nos Yisrael Mikveh
Taharah le'Chalalin' (and according to whom therefore, the daughter of a
Chalal who married a bas Yisrael may marry a Kohen).
(d) Here again, we refute this proposal from two different angles. We know
1. ... a Chalal who married a Chalalah is forbidden to marry a Kohen, yet he
is also forbidden to marry a Mamzer?
2. ... a Ger who married a bas Yisrael, whose daughter is permitted to marry
a Kohen, yet he is permitted to marry a Mamzeres.
(a) Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah then attempts to establish (the
Machlokes between the Tana Kama and Rebbi Yehudah in) our Mishnah by a
'Mamzer me'Achoso, u'Mamzer me'Eishes Ish' - meaning that our Mishnah refers
to a case of someone who marries his sister (Chayvei K'riysus); the Tana
Kama holds that the child is a Mamzer (and may therefore marry a Mamzeres or
any of the Pesulim), whereas according to Rebbi Yehudah, it is only the
child of a man who committed adultery with a married woman (whose parents
transgressed a Chiyuv Miysas Beis-Din) who is a Mamzer (but not the child
born to Chayvei K'riysus).
(b) We refute this explanation too, based of a Mishnah in Yevamos. Rebbi
Akiva declares the product of anyone who has transgressed "Lo Yavo" (i.e. al
Chayvei La'avin) a Mamzer. Shimon ha'Teimani holds 'Yesh Mamzer me'Chayvei
K'riysus;, and Rebbi Yehoshua, 'Kol she'Chayavin Alav Miysas Beis-Din'.
(c) This refutes Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah's interpretation of our
Mishnah - according to which the Tana Kama and Rebbi Yehudah would merely be
arguing over exactly the same point as Shimon ha'Teimani and Rebbi Yehoshua.
(a) So Rava finally establishes our Mishnah by a Ger Amoni u'Mo'avi, and the
Tana is coming to teach us - that even though a regular Ger is forbidden to
marry a Mamzeres, a Ger Amoni (who is Pasul to marry into the Kahal), may.
(b) And when he writes 've'Rebbi Yehudah Oser' - he is (not stating a second
opinion, but is) merely pointing out that the author of the Reisha is Rebbi
Yehudah (because he is the one who forbids a Ger to marry a Mamzeres, due to
the fact that he holds 'Kehal Geirim Ikri Kahal').
(a) The Tana of the Beraisa disqualifies a Kohenes, a Leviyah and a
Yisre'elis from the Kehunah through the Bi'ah of a Ger Amoni, Mo'avi,
Mitzri, Nasin, Chalal or Mamzer. To achieve this, the 'man' must be at least
nine years old, because the Bi'ah of a boy below that age is not considered
(b) Rebbi Yossi says 'Kol she'Zar'o Pasul, Posel ... '. Raban Shimon ben
Gamliel says - 'Kol she'Atah Nosei Bito, Atah Nosei Almenaso ... '.