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Kidushin 65

KIDUSHIN 61-65 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.



(a) If a man claims that he betrothed a woman and she denies it, she is free to marry his relatives. *He* is forbidden to marry hers however - due to the principle 'Shavyah Anafshei Chatichah de'Isura' (by virtue of his admission, he made her a piece of Isur, so to speak).

(b) The same will apply in the reverse case. However, where the woman denies the man's claims, but counters that he betrothed her daughter, the Tana permits him to marry the daughter's relatives (who are not also close relatives of her mother), and vice-versa - because the Torah does not grant a mother the right to testify re. her daughter's status) like it does, a father.

(c) He is not required to give her a Get either (because if he was, he would no longer be permitted to marry her relatives).

(d) In the reverse case, where the man claimed that he betrothed the daughter, and the mother counters that it was her whom he betrothed and not her daughter - then the man is forbidden to marry the daughter's relatives, and the woman, his relatives (and that is all).

2) Having taught us ...
1. ... that the man is not believed to forbid his relatives on the woman he claims he betrothed, the Tana nevertheless finds it necessary to repeat this Halachah in the case of the woman - because we would otherwise have thought that, in the Reisha, *she* is not forbidden to *his* relatives only because, seeing as he does not have much to lose by claiming that he betrothed her, we suspect him of lying. She on the other hand, who becomes forbidden to the whole world, would not make such a claim, unless it was not true. Consequently, if not for the Seifa, we would have forbidden him on her relatives.
2. ... these two cases, the Tana finds it necessary to repeat this Halachah in the case of the daughter - to teach us that not even the Chachamim believed the mother re. her daughter (like the Torah believed the father).
3. ... these three cases, the Tana teaches us the final case ('Kidashti es Bitech, ve'Hi Omeres Lo Kidashta Ela Osi') - only because of the others (since it would otherwise be the only case omitted by the Tana), even though it does not come to teach us anything.
(a) With reference to the second case (of 'Hi Omeres Kidashtani ... '), Shmuel says that we ask him to give her a Get (to enable her to marry). The problem with Rav, who says that we force him to do so is - that seeing as by doing so, he will become forbidden to all her relatives, it is illogical for Chazal to issue such a decree.

(b) Consequently, when Rav said 'Kofin', he was really complementing Shmuel's statement. In the event that he gave the Get of his own accord, Rav added, then we force him to give her a Kesuvah.

(c) When Rav's Talmidim quoted him as saying 'Kofin u'Mevakshin' - the meant that 'Mevaksin', but if he gave her a Get without being asked, then 'Kofin' (to pay her Kesuvah [because the fact that he gave her a Get without being asked indicates that he really did betroth her]).

(a) Rav Yehudah made a statement 'ha'Mekadesh be'Eid Echad, Ein Chosheshin le'Kidushav'. Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel adds 'va'Afilu Sh'neihem Modim' - because of the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Davar" "Davar" from Mamon, which teaches us that Kidushin are only valid when there are two witnesses.

(b) The alternative interpretation of Rav Yehudah's statement is - that the Kidushin is invalid only if they themselves deny it, but should they concur with the witnesses testimony, then he is believed.

(c) When they asked Rav Yehudah which of the two he had in mind - he wavered, answering once like this and once like that (because he himself, was not certain).

(a) Rava attempts to refute Rav Nachman's ruling from our Mishnah, where the Tana forbids the woman's relatives on the man (and vice-versa). What makes him think that the Tana must be speaking about Kidushin that took place with one witness is - that if there were two, why would she be permitted to his relatives? And if there were none, why would he be forbidden to her relatives? So the Reisha of the Mishnah must be speaking when there is one witness with whom the man concurs and the woman doesn't.

(b) We reject this proof however, on the grounds that the Tana coould equally well be speaking when according to the man, there were really two witnesses. Nevertheless, there is room for doubt whether he did betroth her or not - because the Tana speaks when the witnesses had gone away and could not be contacted.

(c) According to Beis-Shamai in the Mishnah in Iduyos, if a man who divorced his wife, stays with her overnight in a hotel, she does not require a second Get. According to Beis Hillel - she does.

(d) What makes us think that the Tana must be speaking when there is one witness (a Kashya on Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel) - is the fact that, if there were two witnesses, why would Beis Shamai not require a Get, and if there were none, why would Beis require one?

(a) The Tana says there in the Seifa, that if they were divorced from the Eirusin - even Beis Hillel will concede that no Get is necessary.

(b) Based on this Seifa, we refute the Kashya on Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel - because, if there was one witness (and his testimony was acceptable), what difference would it make whether they were divorced after the marriage or after the betrothal?

(c) So we establish the Mishnah in Iduyos when there were Eidei Yichud (but no Eidei Bi'ah). Beis Shamai hold - that Eidei Yichud are not synonymous with Eidei Bi'ah, whereas according to Beis Hillel, they are.

(d) Beis Hillel will concede that no Get is necessary if they were divorced from the Eirusin - because, since there has not yet been Bi'ah, we no longer assume that the Yichud is necesssarily synonymous with Bi'ah.




(a) Various Amora'im agree with Rav Nachman Amar Shmuel ('ha'Mekadesh be'Eid Echad Ein Chosheshin le'Kidushav, va'Afilu Sh'neihem Modim'). In the first Lashon, Rabah bar Rav Huna issues this ruling; in the second Lashon, he quotes Rav. Both Leshonos conclude 'Bei Dina Rabah Amri ... ', which, according to ...
1. ... the first Lashon - refers to Rav.
2. ... the second Lashon - refers to Rebbi.
(b) The Tana of the Beraisa cites a case where two men arrive from overseas accompanied by a woman and goods, and each man claims the woman to be his wife, the other man, his slave and the goods, his. The woman claims - that the goods are hers, and the two men, her slaves.

(c) The Tana rules that she requires two Gitin, and may then claim her Kesuvah from the goods (seeing as, one way or the other, she is entitled to at least that).

(d) Rav Achdevu'i bar Ami tries to prove from here - that one witness is effective (because otherwise, why would she require a Get)? And it must be speaking when each man has the support of one witness and not two, because if they had two witnesses, how would she be able to claim that they were her slaves and the goods were hers (see Rashash)?

(a) We refute the current interpretation of the Beraisa however - on the grounds that, if they each had only one witness, it would be a case of 'Eid Echad be'Hakchasahah' (a clash of two contradictory witnesses) in which case we disregard both of their testimonies (what's more, even if the woman alone were to contradict one witness, his testimony would be acceptable only to make her swear, and that is no applicable here).

(b) We conclude - that in fact, the woman is free to marry anyway (even if each man were to have one witness). She requires a Get from each man however, in order to claim her Kesuvah from the goods.

(c) And the Tana is coming to corroborate the opinion of Rebbi Meir, who holds in Kesuvos that Metaltelin are Meshubad towards a woman's Kesuvah (whereas according to the Chachamim, she may only claim Karka).

(d) The rest of the goods are placed in custody until Eliyahu comes?

(a) Rav Kahana (the contemporary of Rav Ashi) holds 'Ein Chosheshin le'Kidushav', because he learns the 'Gezeirah-Shavah "Davar" "Davar" from Mamon; Rav Papa, holds 'Chosheshin'. Rav Ashi asks on Rav Kahana that, if that is the case, we ought to say that, just as (based on the Pasuk "Asher Yomar Ki Hu Zeh") admission eliminates the need for witnesses ('Hoda'as Ba'al-Din, ke'Me'ah Eidim Dami'), the same should apply by Kidushin, too.

(b) Rav Kahana refutes Rav Ashi's query however - on the grounds that 'Hoda'as Ba'al-Din' can only be effective when it does not cause a loss to others, and this is not the case here, where both sets of relatives become affected by their admission. Note that, in that case, there where there are no close relatives, such as in the case of a Ger and a Giyores, one witness ought to be believed.

(a) Mar Zutra and Rav Ada Saba divided the property of their father Rav Mari bar Isar without witnesses. They came before Rav Ashi (not because they were disputing the division - in fact, their mutual trust was absolute, but) because they wanted to know whether the division was Halachically binding, or whether it was considered no more than arbitrary.

(b) Rav Ashi replied 'Lo Ibru Sahadi Ela le'Shikra' (when it comes to money matters, 'witnesses are only needed to counter whoever denies the transaction').

(a) Abaye rules that if one witness testifies that a person ate Cheilev (be'Shogeg), and the accused remains silent, he is believed - to obligate him to bring a Chatas.


1. He is believed - because his silence is considered to be admission ('Shesikah ke'Hoda'ah Damya', and it is as if he himself had volunteered the information).
2. We might otherwise have thought that he is not believed, due to the Pasuk "O Hoda Eilav Chataso", from which we extrapolate 've'Lo she'Hodi'uhu Acheirim' (meaning that he does not bring a Chatas when he is forced to bring it through the testimony of two witnesses, whose claim he vehemently denies).
(c) And he proves it from a Mishnah in K'riysus - where the Tana, in a case where someone rejects the testimony of one witness who testifies that he ate Cheilev, rules that he is believed.

(d) Abaye proves his ruling from there - by extrapolating that, had he remained silent following the witness' testimony, he would have been obligated to bring a Korban.

(a) Abaye rules that in a case where someone rejects the testimony of one witness who testifies that his Tahoros became Tamei - he is believed.

(b) The ramifications of this ruling are - that he is permitted to eat his Taharos be'Chezkas Taharah.

(c) And he proves it from a Mishnah in Taharos, where the Tana says - that in a case where someone rejects the testimony of one witness who testifies that his Taharos became Tamei - he is Tahor (see Maharsha and Rashash).

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