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Kidushin 63

KIDUSHIN 61-65 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.



(a) Rebbi establishes the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "Lo Sasgir Eed el Adonav" by someone who buys a slave with the express intention of setting him free. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak establishes the case - when, at the time of purchase, he stipulated that the slave will acquire himself retroactively from the moment of purchase.

(b) The Tana cannot be speaking when he actually set him free, and now wants to enslave him again - because then the Torah would not refer to him as 'Eved'.

(c) The Tana Kama in the Beraisa holds (like the Tana of our Mishnah) 'Harei At Mekudeshes Li Le'achar she'Esgayer, Le'achar she'Tisgayri ... ', Einah Mekudeshes'. Rebbi Meir says 'Mekudeshes'.

(d) We have proved from these two Beraisos - that both Rebbi and Rebbi Meir hold 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam'.

(a) Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar agrees with the Tana Kama. Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi agrees in principle with Rebbi Meir, but he modifies his opinion. He says - that the Rabbanan invalidated the Kidushin in the cases of 'le'Achar she'Yamus Ba'alech, le'Achar she'Tamus Achosech', because it will result in her sister or her husband's jealousy.

(b) Abaye did not add Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi to his list of those who hold 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' - because he is alias Rebbi, who already appears in the list.

(a) Rebbi Akiva says that if a woman declares a Neder forbidding to her husband whatever she produces (despite the fact that she is Meshubad to produce for him a certain amount of work per week) - the husband needs to unnul the Neder - in casse, he says, she produces in excess of her obligation (and on that excess, her Neder will take effect).

(b) This is no proof however, that Rebbi Akiva too, holds 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' (seeing as her work is not yet in the world) - because as Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua explains, Rebbi Akiva speaks when the woman said 'Yikadshu Yadai le'Oseihen' (and her hands are in the world).

(a) The Tana of our Mishnah validates the Kidushin in a case where a man stipulated that he would speak on her behalf to the governor, or that he would work for her for a day - on condition that he fulfils his condition.

(b) Resh Lakish establishes our Mishnah when he gave her a Perutah for the Kidushin which is necessary - because the Tana holds Yeshnah li'Sechirus mi'Techilah ve'Ad Sof' (the wages of an employee become payable as he works), in which the money that he is owed when he finishes his work has become a loan, and we apply the principle 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh, Einah Mekudeshes'.

(c) The Tana of the Beraisa invalidates the Kidushin of a man who betroths a woman with the benefit that a woman derived when he helped her mount a donkey or settle in a boat - but validates that of a man who betroths a woman with the benefit that she will derive when he helps her.

(d) The Tana there cannot be speaking when the man gave her a Perutah over and above the assistance he afforded her - because the Tana says 'bi'S'char she'Hirkavtich ... ' (and not 'al-M'nas').

(a) A second Beraisa rules that if a woman says to a man 'If you keep me company, or laugh to me or dance before me, I will become betrothed to you' - we assess the value of what he did, and if it is a Shaveh Perutah, she is Mekudeshas. Here too, the Tana cannot be speaking when he gave her a Perutah - because he speaks of assessing what the man did.

(b) To vindicate his interpretation of our Mishnah, Resh Lakish explains that the Tana of the Beraisa holds 'Einah li'Sechirus Ela li'be'Sof' (the wages of an employee only become payable when he finishes his work), in which case the money is not a loan.

(c) Rava explains that Resh Lakish infers his interpretation of our Mishnah from the Lashon 'Harei At Mekudeshes Li al-M'nas she'Adaber Alayich le'Shilton'. The Tana should otherwise have said ' bi'Schar she'Adaber ... ' (like the Lashon used by the Tana of the Beraisa).

(a) The Tana of our Mishnah says that, if a man betrothed a woman 'al-M'nas she'Yirtzeh Aba', the Kidushin is valid ...
1. ... as long as his father remains alive - provided the father gives his consent.
2. ... in the event that he dies.
(b) In the event that the man himself dies - the Tana suggest that one teaches the father to object (to exenpt his daughter-in-law from having to perform Yibum).

(c) The problem that we have in establishing the Mishnah when the father ...

1. ... actually gives his consent is - from the middle case 'Meis ha'Av, Harei Zu Mekudeshes'. Seeing as he failed to gave his consent, why should the Kidushin become valid with his death?
2. ... remains silent - from the Seifa ''Meis ha'Ben, Melamdin es ha'Av Lomar she'Eino Rotzeh'. Seeing as he already gave his consent, how can he now revoke it?
(a) Rebbi Yanai Amar Rebbi Yanai finally iterprets 'Rotzeh' in the the Metzi'a and the Seifa of the Mishnah ('Meis ha'Ben ... ') to mean - on condition that his father does not object.

(b) 'Ratzah ha'Av' cannot have the same connotations in the Reisha - because the fact that the father has the right to object any time in his lifetime renders the statement is meaningless.

(c) We might also have explained - that the Reisha and the Seifa comprises a Machlokes Tana'im, whether 'al-M'nas she'Yirtzeh Aba' denotes that he remains silent (the Tana od the Reisha), or that he does not object (the Metzi'a and the Seifa).

(d) We learn from Rebbi Yanai - that it is preferable to establish two sections of a Mishnah in two different ways but according to one Tana. rather than explaining them uniformly but according to two different Tana'aim.

(a) In order to avoid the whole problem - Rav Yosef bar Ami establishes the entire Mishnah - when the man said 'al-M'nas she'Yirtzeh Aba mi'Ka'an ve'Ad Sheloshim Yom'.

(b) Rav Yosef bar Ami explain ...

1. ... the Reisha - when he either failed to protest within thirty days (Mekudeshes), or he did indeed protest (Einah Mekudeshes).
2. ... the middle case - when the father died during the thirty days, without having protested.
3. ... the Seifa - when the son died during the thirty days, before the father managed to protest.



(a) Our Mishnah says that if a father forgot to whom he betrothed his daughter, and ...
1. ... a man claims to be the Chasan - he is believed.
2. ... two men claim that they are the ones - both are obligated to give her a Get.
(b) They are permitted to reach an agreement between them - that one of them gives her a Get, and the other one marries her.

(c) Rav qualifies the Reisha of our Mishnah. the sole claimant ...

1. ... is believed to give a Get - on the grounds that 'Ein Adam Chotei ve'Lo Lo' (a person will not cause others to sin if he gets nothing out of it).
2. ... not believed to marry her - because we suspect that his Yetzer ha'Ra got the better of him.
(d) The reason that ...
1. ... Rav Asi disagrees with Rav. He believes him even if he wants to marry her - because he would not dare make such a claim if it were not true, in case the father recognizes that he is not the one and confronts him.
2. ... we rule like Rav Asi in this case is - because he has a Beraisa that supports him.
(a) The Beraisa that we cite in support of Rav Asi rules that, in a case where, after the sole claimant marries her, a second claimant turns up and claims to be the lucky man - his claim is ignored (since the first claimant married her be'Heter.

(b) If it is the woman who betrothed herself and forgot to whom - then the man who claims that he is the one, is not believed, says the Beraisa - because in such a case, the man, knowing that the woman will support any man who claims to have married her, is willing to try his luck.

(c) Rav Asi concedes to Rav that the man is not believed if it was the woman who claims that she became betrothed but could not remember to whom, for reasons that we be clarified shortly.

(d) Rav reconciles his opinion with the Seifa of the Mishnah, where the Tana believes one of the two men even with regard to marrying her - because there where there is another person, the one who sticks to his guns, would be afraid to do so (if it were not true), because of the fear that the father might recognize that the second man is really the Chasan.

(a) We know that the father is believed at all - from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei (in connection with Motzi Shem Ra) "es Biti Nasati la'Ish ha'Zeh".

(b) According to Rav Asi, the father is even believed to the extent that, should his daughter subsequently commit adultery, Beis-Din will sentence the adulterer and her to stoning for adultery (even though there are no other witnesses). Rav disagrees with him because, he says - the Torah only believes him with re. to forbidding her to marry anybody else, but no more.

(c) Rav Asi concedes to Rav that they are not stoned - if it was the woman who claimed that she was betrothed but forgot to whom.

(a) What seems strange about Rav Asi's opinion re. these two rulings is - that if, there where the father says that he betrothed her, and where we do not take him too seriously (inasmuch as we believe whoever claims that she is betrothed to him), yet we stone on the basis of his testimony; there where it is the woman herself who claims that she is betrothed, and whom we take more seriously (inasmuch as we do not believe whoever claims that she is betrothed to him), we should certainly stone on the basis of her testimony.

(b) Rav Asi himself explains the paradox. The reason that we believe the father to the point of stoning via his testimony, but not the daughter, is because the Torah grants this credibility to the father alone.

(c) Despite the fact that the woman is not believed with re. to the Chiyuv Miysah, she is nevertheless believed with re. to the fact that she is betrothed - because of the principle 'Shavyah Anafshah Chatichah de'Isura' (When someone claims that something is forbidden to him, it becomes forbidden to him because of Neder).

(d) Rav Chisda, who does not differentiate between the father and the daughter, follows his own reasoning elsewhere, where he says that a father who testifies that his son is nine years old, and his daughter three - (the respective ages when their Bi'ah is first considered Bi'ah) is believed with re. to bringing a Korban, should a relative commit incest with either of them.

(a) The Beraisa supports Rav Chisda. The two areas in which a man who testifies that his son is thirteen or his daughter twelve is ...
1. ... believed, besides validating their Nedarim and regular Hekdesh - are those of Charamim (a type of Hekdesh) and Erchin
2. ... not believed - are Malkos and (other) punishments.
(b) The Beraisa speaks - even when they have already produced Simanei Gadlus (see also Tosfos DH 'B'nei').

(c) Simanim that appear before one reaches the age of Gadlus - are considered to be no more than a wart.

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