ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kidushin 59
KIDUSHIN 59 - dedicated by Marsha and Lee Weinblatt in memory of her mother,
Esther Friedman (Esther Chaya Raizel bas Gershom Eliezer) and father, Hyman
Smulevitz (Chaim Yisachar ben Yaakov).
The Tana of ...
1. ... our Mishnah prefers 'ha'Omer la'Chaveiro' (to 'ha'Omer
li'Shelucho') - to teach us that even in the case of a casual Sheli'ach
(where the sender does not perhaps rely on him to the same extent as he
would on an appointed one), he is still considered a trickster.
2. ... the Tana in ha'Ish Mekadesh' prefer 'ha'Omer li'Shelucho (Tzei
ve'Kadesh Li Ishah P'lonis be'Makom P'loni ... ') rather than 'ha'Omer
la'Chaveiro' - to teach us that, even in the case of an appointed Sheli'ach,
the woman is not Mekudeshes if he found her in another place (because the
sender meant specifically in that place), and we do not say that he only
intended to indicate the place where he is like to find her.
(a) In spite of our Mishnah ...
1. ... Ravin Chasida betrothed for himself the woman whom his son had sent
him to betroth on his behalf - because the parents declined to give their
consent to their daughter marrying his son.
(b) Neither of them first informed his sender of his intentions - because
both felt that by the time they made the round trip, they would have lost
their respective opportunities.
2. ... Rav purchased the field that Rabah bar bar Chanah had sent him to
purchase on his behalf - because the owners were tough characters who were
willing to sell him the field (because they happened to respect him, but not
to Rabah bar bar Chanah).
(a) Rebbi Aba caused Rav Gidal to complain about him to Rebbi Zeira (who
passed on the complaint to Rebbi Yitzchak Nafcha) - by purchasing the piece
of land that he (Rav Gidal) was negotiating for.
(b) The Din of 'Ani ha'Mehapech ba'Chararah' (a poor man who is turning over
a cake in order to acquire it from Hefker - see also Tosfos DH 'Ani') is -
that if someone else acquires it, he is called a Rasha.
(c) Rebbi Aba explained to Rebbi Yitzchak Nafcha - that he had been unaware
that Rebbi Zeira was in the process of negotiating the purchase of that
piece of land.
(d) In the end, Rebbi Aba declared the field Hefker and Rebbi Zeira declined
to take it (so it became known as 'the land of the Rabbanan'). Rebbi Aba
would not just sell the field to Rebbi Zeira - because it was his first
purchase of land, and it is a bad omen to sell one's first land purchase.
(a) In the case in our Mishnah where a man said to a woman 'Hiskadshi Li
le'Achar Sheloshim Yom' (and where no second man betrothed her in the
middle), Rav and Shmuel rule that the Kidushin becomes valid after thirty
days, even if the money is no longer in existence.
(b) The reason they give for this is because the money is neither like a
loan nor is it like a deposit. If no money was left and it was considered
1. ... a loan - then the Kidushin would not be valid, because 'ha'Mekadesh
be'Milveh Einah Mekudeshes'.
(c) Rav and Shmuel's reason for saying that the Kidushin is in fact, valid,
in this case is - because the money is neither of these, but rather money
given to her as Kidushin money, in which case there is no reason to
invalidate the Kidushin.
2. ... a deposit - then we learned in the previous Perek, that if nothing of
the deposit remains at the time when the Kidushin is meant to take effect,
the Kidushin is not valid.
(a) According to Rebbi Yochanan, if, in the Reisha of our Mishnah, another
man did not betroth her, the Mekadesh has the right to retract. Resh Lakish
says - that he does not.
(b) The basis of their Machlokes is - whether one Dibur or Machshavah can
negate another (Rebbi Yochanan) or not (Resh Lakish).
(c) Resh Lakish will reconcile his ruling in the case of Kidushin with the
1. ... in Terumos, which empowers the owner to negate the Sheli'ach he sent
to separate Terumah on his behalf, as long as he has not yet performed his
Shelichus - by restricting it (his ruling) to Kidushin, where the Dibur is
backed by the act of handing the woman the Kidushin (and is therefore
considered a Ma'aseh).
2. ... in Gitin, which empowers the husband to negate the Shelichus of the
Sheli'ach ha'Get, even though he performed the act of handing the Get to the
Sheli'ach - by differentiating between his ruling and this case, inasmuch as
the Get did not yet reach the woman's hands, and is therefore not considered
(a) When the Tana of the Beraisa states 'Kol ha'Keilim ...
1. ... Yordin li'Yedei Tum'asan be'Machshavah', he means - that vessels that
are basically complete, but still require the final touches to render them
salable, become subject to Tum'ah the moment the owner decides to use them
as they are.
(b) According to Rebbi Yochanan, Machshavah is not sufficient to take the
vessel out of its status of Tum'ah in this case - because, with re. to
matters concerningTum'ah, the Torah considers Machshavah a Ma'aseh, as we
shall now see.
2. ... ve'Ein Olin mi'Yedei Tum'asan Ela al-Yedei Ma'aseh', he means - that
having reached that stage, they will not revert to their original status (of
unfinished vessels which are not subject to Tum'ah), unless he actually
begins the job of completing them.
(c) From the fact that the Torah writes (in connection with preparing a food
for Tum'ah) "ve'Chi Yutan Mayim al Zera", without a 'Vav' (as if it was
writing "ve'Chi Yiten" ... ") - Rav Papa learns that as long as the owner is
pleased with the seeds becoming wet, it is as though he had actually poured
the water himself (and this S'vara extends to all matters re. the Machshavah
(a) Rav Z'vid learns the Machlokes between Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish on
the Mishnah in Asarah Yuchsin, where it is the woman who negates the
Shelichus of her Sheli'ach (and not on connection with our Mishnah) -
because, in his opinion, Rebbi Yochanan will agree in the case of our
Mishnah (where the Dibur is backed by the act of handing the woman the
Kidushin [and is therefore considered a Ma'aseh]), that the second Dibur
cannot negate the first one, as we explained earlier according to Resh
(b) According to Rav Z'vid's version of the Machlokes, the entire Sugya
repeats itself, except for the Kashya from the Mishnah in Terumos (where the
initial answer that we gave is no longer relevant). Resh Lakish now explains
that the Tana denies the owner the right to negate his Sheli'ach - because
he is speaking when the denial took the form of actually separating Terumah
himself, which is a Ma'aseh (and certain has the power to negate the Dibur
of the Shelichus).
(c) When we rule like Rebbi Yochanan - we do so even according to the
original Lashon (that pertains to our Mishnah) where the act of handing the
Kidushin to the woman was also performed.
(a) Rav Sheishes holds that once the husband negates the Sheli'ach ha'Get,
the Get itself becomes invalid - Rav Nachman declares the Get valid for
(b) We reconcile our previous ruling like Rebbi Yochanan (re. 'Asi Dibur
u'Mevatel Dibur'), with the fact that we rule like Rav Nachman here - on the
grounds that, in the latter case, he only negated the Shelichus, not the Get
(and even Rebbi Yochanan will agree that the Get remains Kasher).
(a) Re. the second case in our Mishnah (where the man said 'Harei At
Mekudeshes Li le'Achar Sheloshim Yom ... '), Rav says 'Mekudeshes le'Sheini
le'Olam'. Shmuel says - until thirty days, when the second Kidushin falls
away and the first one takes effect.
(b) The problem that Rav Chisda has with Shmuel's opinion is - that there
are no grounds for the second Kidushin to fall away.
(c) Rav Yosef resolves this problem by citing Rav Yehudah, who establishes
the Machlokes on the Seifa (on the case of 'me'Achshav u'Lachar Sheloshim').
The opinion ...
1. ... of Rav is - that she remains Safek Mekudeshes to both men from the
moment the second one betrothed her.
(d) The reasoning of ...
2. ... of Shmuel is - that she remains Safek Mekudeshes to both only until
the termination of the thirty-day period, at which stage, the first Kidushin
1. ... Rav is - because he is uncertain whether, 'u'le'Achar Sheloshim Yom'
was to be a clause pertaining to 'me'Achshav' (in which case, the first
Kidushin will take effect then) or whether he meant to retract from
'me'Achshav' altogether (in which case, the second Kidushin will negate the
first from the moment it is performed).
2. ... Shmuel is - because he considers the 'u'le'Achar Sheloshim Yom' to be
a clause (which, when fulfilled, will negate the second Kidushin.
(a) The Chachamim in a Beraisa say 'me'Hayom u'le'Achar Miysah, Get ve'Eino
Get'. Rebbi says - 'ka'Zeh Get'.
(b) The basis of their Machlokes is - whether 'u'le'Achar Miysah' is a Safek
(the Rabbanan [like Rav]), or a clause (Rebbi [like Shmuel]).
(c) The reason that according to the Rabbanan, the Get might not be valid
is - because, if 'u'le'Achar Miysah' is a retraction, we will apply the
principle 'Ein Get le'Achar Miysah'.
(d) Despite the fact that Rav and Shmuel repeat the same basic Machlokes as
that of the Rabbanan and Rebbi ...
1. ... Rav did not say 'Halachah ke'Rabbanan - because then we would confine
the possibility that it is a retraction to the case of Get (where it is
natural for the husband to want to delay the separation), whereas by
Kidushin, where he probably wants to marry her as soon as possible, Rav
would concede to Shmuel that it is a clause).
2. ... Shmuel did not say 'Halachah ke'Rebbi' - because then we would
confine his ruling that it is a clause to the case of Get, because everyone
knows that a Get cannot take effect after the husband's death, but in the
case of Kidushin, he will concede to Rav that maybe it is a retraction.