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Kidushin 47

KIDUSHIN 46-47 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.



(a) We learned in our Mishnah that, if the woman ate the dates as she received them, they do not combine to make up a Perutah. Rava qualifies this, by differentiating between 'be'Zu, be'Zu, be'Zu' and 'be'Eilu' - which is different because then all the dates are hers immediately and she is simply eating what belongs to her.

(b) The Tana of the Beraisa rules in a case where a man said 'Hiskadshi Li ba'Alon, be'Rimon u've'Egoz' or 'Hiskadshi be'Eilu - Im Yesh be'Chulan Shaveh Perutah, Mekudeshes, ve'Im La'av Einah Mekudeshes.

(c) An 'Alon' - is an acorn, which some people would roast like chestnuts and eat.

(a) The difference between the Reisha of the Beraisa, where the man said 'ba'Alon, be'Rimon *u've'Egoz'* (rather than 'O be'Egoz') and the Seifa 'be'Zu, be'Zu, be'Zu' is - that the former speaks when he specifically said 'be'Eilu'.

(b) We establish the Reisha when he said 'be'Eilu', in spite of the fact that the Tana continues with the case of 'Hiskadshi Li be'Eilu' - because the latter case is not an independent case at all, but comes to qualify the previous one.

(c) The Tana adds in the Seifa the case of - 'be'Zu, Natlaso ve'Ochlaso ... ', which he did not include in the Reisha.

(d) This proves - Rava's distinction between 'be'Zu, be'Zu, be'Zu' and 'be'Eilu'.

(a) The problem from the previous Beraisa on Rav and Shmuel, who established the case in our Mishnah 'Haysah Ocheles Rishonah Rishonah' on the Reisha ('Hiskadshi Li bi'Temarah Zu, Hiskadshi Li be'Zu') is - that the Tana of the Beraisa does not include a case of P'rat like 'Hiskadshi Li ... ' in our Mishnah. Consequently, we cannot establish the Beraisa in the same way as we did the Mishnah (and we will have a proof for Rebbi Ami's interpretation of our Mishnah).

(b) We answer by establishing the Tana of the Beraisa like Rebbi - who considers 'k'Zayis u'k'Zayis' as much a P'rat as 'k'Zayis k'Zayis'.

(c) We are now referring to - the Seifa de'Seifa of the Beraisa 'be'Zu, Notlaso ve'Ochlaso be'Zu Natlaso ve'Ochlaso, ve'Od be'Zu ve'Od be'Zu Einah Mekudeshes ad she'Yehei ... ', the author of which is Rebbi.

(d) This explain the Beraisa according to Rav and Shmuel - who will now learn the Beraisa in the same way as they learn the Mishnah (that in event, since he used a Lashon of P'rat, she is only Mekudeshes if any one of the dates is worth a Perutah), and our Tana presents the case of 'Achlaso' to teach us that even though she benefited immediately, she is not betrothed as long as the date that she ate was not worth a Perutah.

(a) Rav corroborates what we learned earlier 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh Einah Mekudeshes'. The reason for this ruling is - because a loan is meant to spend ('Milveh le'Hotza'ah Nitnah'), in which case, the money already belongs to the woman, and the man is not giving her anything.

(b) We suggest that this is the Machlokes Tana'im in the Beraisa 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh Mekudeshes; ve'Yesh Omrim Einah Mekudeshes'. The Tana Kama's reason is - because a loan is not for spending (unless one receives express permission to do so) but to invest (in a way that it remains available to the owner should he want it).

(c) We refute this suggestion however, on the basis of the Seifa - which validates a sale under the same circumstances, even according to the Tana Kama.

(d) Because if a loan is to spend, then on what grounds would such a sale be valid (seeing as the purchaser did not give the seller anything)?

(a) When Rav Nachman quoting Huna our Chaver establishes the Beraisa in a different case - he means that the Beraisa speaks (not about money that the man had previously lent the woman, or the seller, the purchaser, but) the Dinar that is still outstanding, since the man paid the woman one Dinar short of the Manah that he promised her.

(b) The basis of the Machlokes between the Tana Kama and Yesh Omrim is - whether the woman is too embarrassed to claim the outstanding Dinar (the Rabbanan), in which case the Kidushin is invalid, or not (Yesh Omrim).

(c) In a case where a man agrees to give a woman a Manah, but only hands her a Dinar - Rebbi Elazar rules that the Kidushin is valid and that he remains obligated to pay the difference.

(d) In fact, Rebbi Elazar can hold even like the Tana Kama - because the reason that the woman is too embarrassed to claim the outstanding sum is due to the relatively small sum involved; whereas here, where the bulk of the amount still owing is substantial, he maintains, she will be only too ready to claim her debt.

(a) The Tana Kama of the Beraisa rules in the case where a man betrothed a woman with the Pikadon that she is safekeeping for him, and she then discovered that it was either stolen or lost, that she is betrothed, provided goods to the value of at least a Perutah remain. In the case of a Milveh however - she will be betrothed even if nothing remains (with the benefit that she derives from the fact that he is now foregoing his claim on her.

(b) Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar in the name of Rebbi Meir says - that Milveh is no different than Pikadon in this regard.

(c) We can extrapolate from their words - that if the money of the loan is still intact, one can betroth with a loan.

(d) This is a Kashya on Rav, who says that one cannot.




(a) We reject the suggestion that the Rabbanan and Rebbi Meir argue over whether 'Milveh le'Hotza'ah Nitnah' or not, because that would leave us with a problem with the Reisha ('Hiskadshi Li be'Pikadon') where the Tana requires at least one Perutah to remain. The problem assuming that ...
1. ... the woman accepted liability - would be that in that case the Tana would merely be duplicating the same case twice, since there would then be no difference between this case and that of Milveh.
2. ... she did not - would be that in the Seifa, the Tana should simply have switched from a a case where she did not accept respomsibility to one where she did, but still by Pikadon?
(b) So we first amend the Beraisa and then establish it in a different case (as we did with the previous Beraisa). The case of ...
1. ... Pikadon now speaks - when she did accept responsibility.
2. ... Milveh now reads - 'u've'Milveh Af-al-Pi she'Nishtayer Mimenu Shaveh Perutah, Einah Mekudeshes' (because 'Milveh le'Hotza'ah Nitnah'.
(c) Rabah learned the interpretation of the Machlokes Tana'im from the Rabbanan in *Bei Rav* - which means simply the Beis-Hamedrash.
(a) The Rabbanan de'Bei Rav established the Machlokes by whether 'Milveh bi'Reshus Ba'alim le'Chazarah' - meaning that the owner has the right to retract (and withdraw the loan), which explains why Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar in the name of Rebbi Meir permits him to retract, or not (the Rabbanan).

(b) Both Tana'im agree - that 'Milveh le'Hotza'ah Nitnah', and that consequently, once the borrower has spent any of the money (and perhaps already from the time that he takes it with the intention of spending it), all the money belongs to him, and the owner no longer has the right to retract.

(c) When they said 've'Hu ha'Din le'Onsin, they meant - that the same Machlokes will apply as to whether the borrower will be obligated to pay for Onsin that occurred before he had used any of the borrowed money.

(d) Rabah disagrees with the latter statement. It is obvious to him that the borrower is Chayav Onsin even before he has spent any of the money - 'Kal va'Chomer' from a Sho'el who is liable to pay for Onsin immediately, even though he is expected to return the article to the owner intact; in that case, a borrower, who is permitted to spend the money, should certainly be liable for Onsin.

(a) Rav Huna rules that if someone borrows an ax for ten days, he only acquires it from the moment he chops with it - meaning that the owner is entitled to retract until such time as he begins to use it.

(b) Even the Rabbanan (who hold that someone who borrows money acquires it immediately) will concede this on the grounds - that borrowing an article (which will be returned intact), is different that borrowing money (which, due on the ruling 'Milveh le'Hotza'ah Nitnah', is not).

(a) 'ha'Omer le'Ishah Hiskadshi Li bi'Sh'tar Chov O she'Hayah Lo Milveh be'Yad Acheirim ve'Hirshah Aleihem, Rebbi Meir Omer Mekudeshes'. The Chachamim say - 'Einah Mekudeshes'.

(b) We initially reject the suggestion that Sh'tar Chov means Sh'tar Chov da'Acheirim - because that would then be synonymous with the other case in the Beraisa ('she'Hayah Lo Milveh be'Yad Acheirim ve'Hirshah Aleihem').

(c) In that case, it means - the Sh'tar Chov that he has on her (and which he now returns to her as Kidushin). In that case, Rebbi Meir holds 'ha'Mekadesh be'Milveh Mekudeshes', and the Chachamim, 'Einah Mekudeshes' (proving that Rav's opinion is based on a Machlokes Tana'im).

(d) We finally justify establishing the case of Sh'tar Chov by Sh'tar Chov da'Acheirim - because what we in fact, have here is (not just one, but) two Machlokes Tana'im, one by a Milveh bi'Sh'tar and one, by a Milveh she'be'Al Peh (as we will now explain).

(a) We establish the Machlokes by Sh'tar Chov as being the same Machlokes as Rebbi and the Rabbanan. Rebbi holds 'Osiyos Niknos bi'Mesirah' (one can acquire an outstanding debt with nothing more than the receipt of the original Sh'tar). The Rabbanan require a new Sh'tar of sale, as well as the handing over of the original Sh'tar to the purchaser.

(b) Alternatively, neither Rebbi Meir nor the Rabbanan hold like Rebbi (see Tosfos DH 'de'Kuli Alma'), and they argue over the new Sh'tar of sale that the seller wrote, but without inserting 'Acquire it together with all its Shibudim', as required by Rav Papa.

(c) The Chachamim, who rule 'Einah Mekudeshes' - hold like Rav Papa (or more correctly, Rav Papa holds like the Rabbanan).

(a) Alternatively, both Tana'im hold like Rav Papa, and they argue over Shmuel, who says that if someone sells a Sh'tar Chov and then waives the debt, the debt is canceled - because the obligation of the debtor to the purchaser stems from the seller (he is claiming the seller's personal debt [one that is independent of the Sh'tar]), which no longer exists once he foregoes it.

(b) In the event of the creditor's death, Shmuel adds - even his heirs can waive the debt.

(c) The Chachamim say, 'Hiskadshi Li bi'Sh'tar Chov, Einah Mekudeshes' - because they hold like Shmuel, in which case, the woman does not bank on receiving the money, in which case the Kidushin is invalid; whereas Rebbi Meir holds 'Mekudeshes' - because he does not agree with Shmuel's Din.

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