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prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem

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Kidushin 20



(a) One Beraisa states 'Mochrah le'Aviv, ve'Ein Mochrah li'V'no'. The second Beraisa says - 'Ein Mochrah Lo le'Aviv, ve'Lo li'V'no'.

(b) The author of the second Beraisa is - the Rabbanan (who hold 'Ein Mochrah li'Kerovim').

(c) We reconcile the first Beraisa too, with the Rabbanan - on the grounds that, even though the master cannot perform Yi'ud with his granddaughter, his son (the girl's uncle) can. According to the Tana of this Beraisa, the Rabbanan concede that the sale is valid as long as Yi'ud is possible.

(a) When Tana Kama of the Beraisa, commenting on the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Im be'Gapo Yavo, be'Gapo Yeitzei", says 'be'Gufo Nichnas, be'Gufo Yeitzei' - he means that the Eved Ivri goes free with his entire body, and not for the removal of one the twenty-four limbs (like an Eved Cana'ani does).

(b) From the Pasuk "Lo Seitzei ke'Tzeis ha'Avadim" - we know that an Amah Ivriyah does not go free like an Eved Cana'ani, but this could mean that in the event that her master removed a limb, she goes out but, unlike an Eved Cana'ani, she is also compensated for the limb.

(c) Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov explains "be'Gufo" like the Tana Kama, but he interprets it to mean - that if he came in single, he goes out single (without being permitted to live with a Shifchah Cana'anis for the duration of his stay).

(a) With regard to a Nimkar le'Akum whose value changed during his years of service, we learn from the Pasuk ...
1. ... "mi'Kesef Miknaso - that, if his value went up from one Manah to two hundred Zuz, he only needs to refund the difference at the (original) lower price.
2. ... "K'fi Shanav" - that, if his value went down from two hundred Zuz to one Manah, he still only needs to refund the difference at the current (lower) price.
(b) We learn from "Sachir" "Sachir" that the same applies to a Nimkar le'Yisrael. We might have thought that it does not, and that we do not learn the latter from the former with a 'Binyan Av' - because the former has a distinct advantage (in favor of the Eved Ivri) inasmuch as he can be redeemed by relatives.

(c) When Abaye was in particularly high spirits, he would claim to be like ben Azai in the main streets of Teverya - who was exceptionally sharp, and who claimed that everyone was no more than a garlic peel compared to him, except for 'this bald man' (Rebbi Akiva).

(d) A certain Talmid-Chacham, who had a problem with the two previous D'rashos, took him up on that - and asked him why the Tana Darshened the two Pesukim to the Eved Ivri's advantage (to pay the lesser amount), when he could just as well have learned the exact opposite ("mi'Kesef Miknaso" when the price went down; "K'fi Shanav" when it went up), to make him pay the higher amount.

(a) Abaye answered him from a Beraisa which discusses the Pasuk in Re'ei "Ki Tov Lo Imach", from which the Tana extrapolates 'Imach be'Ma'achal, Imach be'Mishteh', that the master should feed the Eved Ivri the same food and drink as he himself eats, and the same with regard to his sleeping conditions.

(b) When he concludes 'Kol ha'Koneh Eved Ivri, ke'Koneh Adon le'Atzmo' - he is referring to a situation where he only has one cushion, he has no choice but to give it to the Eved Ivri (see Tosfos).

(c) We refute Abaye's proof - on the grounds that the Pasuk speaks exclusively with regard to food and drink, so that the Eved Ivri should not feel prejudiced against, but when it comes to redemption, we might have thought that, since he was sold on account of his sins, he deserves to be penalized him, to make him pay for them.

(d) Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina in a Beraisa says - that someone who dealt with Avkah shel Shevi'is (did business with Sh'mitah produce, a relatively minor transgression, because it is only an Asei), is heading for a series of punishments, as we shall now proceed to explain.

(a) Based on the sequence of Pesukim, the punishment that follows having to sell ...
1. ... one's movables, should he not do Teshuvah is - having to sell his (inherited) fields.
2. ... one's fields, is - having to sell one's house.
(b) We attribute the change from 'Lo Hirgish', the first two times, to 'Lo Ba'as le'Yado' the third time, to a statement by Rav Huna. 'Lo Hirgish' implies that he might have realized that he had sinned, but the punishment came because he failed to do so - whereas 'Lo Ba'as le'Yado' means that the punishment was bound to come, because there was no chance that he would realize that he sinned.

(c) Rav Huna said - 'Keivan she'Avar Adam Aveirah ve'Shanah Bah, Na'asis Lo ke'Heter'.

(d) The initial text 'Hutrah Lo' is startling - inasmuch as however many times a person sins, the sin does not become permitted.

(a) The next punishment listed in the Pasuk is that of being forced to borrow on interest. The Tana (note, that Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina was actually an Amora) first adds the case of selling his daughter - because it is logical that a person is better off selling off his daughter, where his debt is automatically paid off little by little, as the six years progress, than borrowing on interest, where the debt will increase with time, should he fails to pay it off.

(b) The final set of punishments deal with various cases of a man selling himself - of which there are four: to a fellow Jew, to a Ger Toshav, to a Nochri and to Avodas-Kochavim itself (which the Beraisa describes as "le'Eiker" (because in time to come it will be uprooted from the world - Tosfos).

(c) When Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina says 'Nimkar la'Avodas Kochavim', he means - that he is sold to work for Avodas Kochavim, to chop wood and perform other chores (not to worship it, for which he is obligated to give up his life rather than do that).

(d) In any event, we see that the Nimkar le'Akum is the result of his sins. Abaye tries to reestablish his explanation (that we should be lenient with regard to his redemption price, like we are lenient with him regarding food and drink) - by pointing out that the Torah itself indicates that it wishes to be lenient in this regard too, when it writes "Acharei Nimkar, Ge'ulah Tihyeh Lo, Echad me'Echav Yig'alenu", as Tana de'Bei Rebbi Yishmael points out.




(a) We query Rava's comparison to Tana de'Bei Rebbi Yishmael - on the grounds that on the one hand, the Torah permits the Nimkar le'Akum to be redeemed to prevent him from being influenced by the Nochri society, but on the other, it is possible that the Torah will nevertheless penalize him for having sinned, by making him pay the higher price.

(b) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (or Rav Nachman, see Maharshal) finally explains the Tana who is lenient with the Eved Ivri regarding his redemption, based on the two Pesukim "Im Od Rabos ba'Shanim ... mi'Kesef Miknaso. ve'Im Me'at Nish'ar ba'Shanim ... K'fi Shanav". He explains "Rabos ba'Shanim" to mean - that his price increased during the years (on which the Pasuk concludes "mi'Kesef Miknaso"), and "Me'at Nish'ar ba'Shanim" - that his price decreased (on which the Pasuk concludes "K'fi Shanav").

(c) We reject ...

1. ... the simple meaning of the Pasuk (that it speaks when more or less than six years remain) - in that this cannot be correct, since an Eved Ivri is set to work for six years, no more and no less (see Rashash).
2. ... the suggestion that if the majority of years remain, then he pays "mi'Kesef Miknaso", whereas if only a minority of years remain, he pays "K'fi Shanav" - because the Torah would then have written (not "im Od Rabos *ba'Shanim* ... ve'Im Me'at Nish'ar *ba'Shanim*", but) "Im Od Nish'ar *Shanim* ... ve'Im Me'at Nish'ar *Shanim*".
(d) Rav Yosef declared - that Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak (or Rav Nachman) had Darshened the Pesukim like Moshe on Sinai.
(a) We learn from the Pasuk (in connection with a S'dei Achuzah) "u'Matza K'dei Ge'ulaso" - that one cannot redeem half of a S'dei Achuzah that one declared Hekdesh (either all or nothing).

(b) Rav Huna bar Chinena asked Rav Sheishes whether the same will apply to a Nimkar le'Akum (to redeem himself for half the amount of years) from "Ge'ulaso" "Ge'ulaso" - or whether we will only learn from there le'Kula (as will be explained shortly) but not le'Chumra (because the Torah has indicated that it is lenient with regard to the redemption of a Nimkar le'Akum, as we just concluded). Note, that "Ge'ulaso" "Ge'ulaso" is not a 'Gezeirah-Shavah', but merely an indication (similar to a 'Binyan Av' - see Tosfos. Rashi, on the other hand hand 21a. DH 'O Dilma' refers to it as a 'Gezeirah-Shavah').

(c) Rav Sheishes replied with the Pasuk "ve'Nimkar bi'Geneivaso" - which we Darshened earlier "ve'Nimkar" 'Kulo ve'Lo Chetzyo'. In that case, here too, where the Torah writes "Nig'al" we ought to Darshen "Nig'al" 'Kulo ve'Lo Chetzyo'.

(d) Abaye did not accept Rav Sheishes ruling. He remained doubtful as to whether a Nimkar la'Akum can be redeemed in part or not.

(a) Assuming that he can be redeemed, says Abaye, that can lead to a Kula and a Chumra. The case of le'Kula is - when he sold himself for a hundred Zuz, and after he paid fifty for half his redemption, his price rose to two hundred. On the assumption that he can redeem himself in halves, the fifty Zuz that he paid redeemed half of him, and the other fifty, which has now become a hundred, is all he will need to pay for the remaining half. Whereas if he had not been able to redeem himself in halves, then, seeing as he is now worth two hundred Zuz, he would remain obligated to pay the remaining hundred and fifty Zuz (in addition to the fifty which the Nochri already has).

(b) The problem with this is - from the Pasuk "mi'Kesef Miknaso" from which we Darshened above that, when the Eved Ivri's price increases, we only contend with his sale price, and not with his current one.

(c) To resolve this problem" - we reestablish Abaye's case when he was sold for two hundred Zuz, went down in price to one hundred (which is when he redeemed half of himself), and then went up again to two hundred (in which case, whether we follow the Pasuk 'mi'Kesef Miknaso' or that of 'K'fi Shanav', his value will be two hundred Zuz).

(d) The case le'Chumra according to Abaye, speaks when he was sold for two hundred Zuz - he paid one hundred Zuz and then his price dropped to one hundred. If he is able to redeem himself in halves, then he still owes the Nochri another fifty Zuz; but if not, then the Nochri simply keeps the hundred, which is a deposit by him, and the Eved Ivri owes him nothing.

(a) Someone who sells a house in a walled city can redeem it - up to one year.

(b) Rav Huna bar Chinena asked Rav Sheishes whether we learn "Ge'ulaso" "Ge'ulaso" from S'dei Achuzah that someone who sells a house in a walled city cannot redeem it in parts. The other side of the She'eilah is - that where the Torah writes "Kedei Ge'ulaso", one cannot redeem it in parts, and where it does not, one can (See Tosfos "Ge'ulaso" "Ge'ulaso", to which we referred earlier).

(c) Rav Sheishes replied with a D'rashah of Rebbi Shimon, who learned from the Pasuk "Im Ga'ol Yig'al" - that one may borrow and redeem a house in a walled city that one sold, and that one may redeem it in parts.

(d) Rebbi Shimon's reasoning (derived from the differences between someone who sells a S'dei Achuzah and someone who declares it Hekdesh) is - that whenever the Torah is strict at one end, it is lenient at the other, always leaving the owner a chance to cut his losses.

11) If someone sells a S'dei Achuzah, it returns to him in the Yovel, but he cannot redeem it in halves. According to Rebbi Shimon, the equivalent Din in the case of ...
1. ... someone who declares a S'dei Achuzah Hekdesh is - that it goes to the Kohanim in the Yovel, and that he can (therefore) redeem it in halves.
2. ... someone who sells a house in a walled city is also - that he only has one year to redeem it, and that he can (therefore) redeem it in halves.
(a) The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk "Im Ga'ol Yig'al" - that someone who declares Hekdesh a S'dei Achuzah - may redeem it in halves.

(b) According to this Tana, we would otherwise have said - that if someone who sells a S'dei Achuzah, who, despite the fact that when the Yovel arrives, it returns to him, yet he cannot redeem it in halves, then someone who declares it Hekdesh, in which case it goes to Hekdesh when the Yovel arrives, should certainly not be able to redeem it in halves.

(c) The Tana queries the 'Kal va'Chomer' however - inasmuch as someone who *sells* a S'dei Achuzah has the added disadvantage of not being able to redeem it for two years (whereas someone who *declares it Hekdesh* can redeem it immediately).

(d) He counters this Pircha however, from the Din by someone who sells a house in a walled city - who can redeem it immediately, yet he cannot redeem it in halves (reinstating the need for the Pasuk "Im Ga'ol Yig'al", and at the same time posing a Kashya on Rav Sheishes, who quoted Rebbi Shimon as saying that one can).

13) To answer the Kashya on Rav Sheishes, we establish the author of the Beraisa as the Rabbanan (whereas Rav Sheishes stated his ruling strictly according to Rebbi Shimon). The basis of their Machlokes is - whether one Darshens the reasons for Mitzvos and Halachos, to apply them in other situations according to those reasons.

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