ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kidushin 13
KIDUSHIN 13 (27 Iyar) - Dedicated by Gitle Bekelnitzky in honor of the
Yahrzeit of her father, Zev ben Ephraim v'Chaya Krause
(a) We just cited Rava, who extrapolates from the case brought in the
Beraisa that silence after having accepted the money is construed as
indifference, but not as consent, that the same applies to Kidushin.
1. The people of Pum Nahara in the name of Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua
queries Rava's comparison on the grounds that this Din will not pertain to
the latter, even though it pertains to the former - because it is only by a
Pikadon that we translate silence as indifference, seeing as (for fear that
he would be held liable if he threw the article back at the depositor), the
trustee had no option but to remain silent; whereas in the case of Kidushin,
the woman (not having undertaken to look after the mat), had the option of
throwing it back at the man, in the knowledge that she would be held liable
even if it became damaged in the process.
(b) When Rav Acha bar Rav (presumably, this should read 'Rav Acha bar Rava')
asked Ravina what the Din would be in such a case, the latter replied - that
since he (Rav Acha bar Rav), and the people of his town, had heard of Rav
Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua's query, they should go by it. As far as he was
concerned, the people of his town had not heard about it, in which case they
would follow the ruling of Rava.
2. Rav Acha'i queried this distinction - on the grounds that one cannot
expect all women to be so conversant with the Halachah, and that
consequently, Rava's inference was justified.
(a) When, instead of returning the bandages that he had grabbed from that
woman unconditionally, the man asked her whether she would agree to become
betrothed to him in exchange for their return - she greeted his proposal
with silence, though she did accept the bandages.
(b) Rav Nachman ruled - that despite the principle 'Shesikah ke'Hoda'ah'
('Silence is construed as consent'), she is not Mekudeshes, because she was
only accepting what was rightfully hers (borne out by her initial demand for
(c) Rava queried Rav Nachman from a Beraisa which, in a similar case,
rules - that she is Mekudeshes.
(d) The Tana also speaks about betrothing her with Gezel, Chamas or
Geneivah. The difference between Gezel and Chamas is - that whereas one
retains the former without paying for it, the latter, one retains but pays
(a) In order to conform with the Tana - Rav Nachman establishes the Beraisa
when the man who grabbed the money from the woman was already unofficially
engaged to her.
(b) The Tana of another Beraisa says that when a man said 'Kinsi Sela Zeh
she'Ani Chayav Lach', and later added 'Hiskadshi Li Bo', be'Sha'as Matan
Ma'os Ratz'sah Mekudeshes, Lo Ratz'sah, Einah Mekudeshes'. By 'le'Achar
Matan Ma'os' he rules - 'Afilu Ratz'sah Einah Mekudeshes'.
(c) We cannot interpret 'Lo Ratz'sah' to mean that she declined to accept
his offer (insinuating that if she was silent, the Kidushin would be
valid) - because that would be obvious, and the Tana should rather have just
said S'tam Mekudeshes (and every child would know that if she declined to
accept the offer of Kidushin, she is not Mekudeshes).
(d) So 'Lo Ratz'sah' must mean that she was silent, and nevertheless the
Tana rules 'Einah Mekudeshes' - because we interpret her silent acceptance
to mean that she merely wants her money back (like Rav Nachman).
(a) The Rabbanan gathered to collect the sayings of Rav Asi after his
death - in order to preserve them (that they should be forgotten).
(b) A certain Rav Ya'akov quoted Rav Asi Amar Rav as saying - that the same
as one cannot acquire a woman with less than a Shaveh P'rutah, so too, can
one not acquire Karka with less than a Shaveh P'rutah.
(c) Rav Ya'akov established the Beraisa which rules that Karka can be
acquired for less than a P'rutah - by Kinyan Chalipin, but not by Kinyan
(a) When the Navi Hoshei'a writes "Alah ve'Chachesh ve'Ratzo'ach ve'Ganov
ve'Na'of *Paratzu, ve'Damim be'Damim Naga'u*" - he means 'to add sin upon
sin by conceiving children from the wives of their friends' (often the
result of people who deal with Gitin and Kidushin without being familiar
with the Halachos) as Targum Yonasan translates it.
(b) The significance of the fact that it is Rav Yosef who cited the Targum -
is that he was an expert on Targum Yonasan.
(c) Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan extrapolates from the continuation of that
Pasuk that dealing with Gitin and Kidushin when one is not conversant with
the Halachos is a worse sin than those perpetrated by the generation of the
flood - from the fact that the fish there died too, a tragedy that did not
occur by the Dor ha'Mabul.
(d) We learn from the Pasuk ...
1. ... "Ki Mipnei Alah Avlah ha'Aretz" - that the punishment described by
the Navi pertains even to someone who is guilty of contravening even just
one of the sins listed in the Pasuk (and not necessarily all of them).
2. ... there " ... ve'Ratzo'ach ve'Ganov ve'Na'of Paratzu" (and not
"*u*'Partzu') - that it is not only the sin of a false oath that is
punishable on its own, but also any of the others, including that of
(a) We learned in a Mishnah in Kinin that if a Yoledes brought her Chatas
and died, her heirs must bring her Olah. Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel establishes
the Mishnah when the woman had already designated the Olah during her
lifetime. Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan says - that they have to bring it
anyway, whether she designated it or not.
(b) The basis of their Machlokes is - whether Shibuda d'Oraysa (Rav Asi Amar
Rebbi Yochanan), or de'Rabbanan (Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel).
(c) 'Shibuda d'Oraysa' means - that all the property of a person is
automatically Meshubad to pay his debts (irrespective of whether they are
self-obligated or Torah orientated).
(d) According to Rav and Shmuel, the creditor can claim from Meshubadim in
the case of a written loan - because he specifically designated his property
himself (in the Sh'tar).
(a) Rav and Shmuel say - that one cannot claim an oral loan from the orphans
or from purchasers.
(b) Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish disagree, and permit claiming from
either - because they hold 'Shibuda d'Oraysa; whereas Rav and Shmuel hold
'Shibuda La'av d'Oraysa'.
(c) Shmuel and Rebbi Yochanan seem to repeat their Machlokes twice. They
find it necessary to present their dispute in the case of ...
1. ... the Korban of a Yoledes - because we would otherwise have thought
that in this case, even Shmuel will agree with Rebbi Yochanan, because it is
(d) In spite of the fact that ...
2. ... a loan - because we would otherwise have thought that in this case,
even Rebbi Yochanan will agree with Shmuel, because it is not.
1. ... in principle, we rule like Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish, we
nevertheless conclude that one cannot in fact, claim an oral loan from
purchasers - because since the debt does not have a Kol, the purchaser has
no way of anticipating that he might lose the property after having bought
it, the Rabbanan safeguarded him from losing on the deal.
2. ... min ha'Torah, we hold 'Shibuda d'Oraysa', the creditor nevertheless
loses his right to claim from the purchaser - because (unlike the purchaser,
as we just explained) he has the option of writing a Sh'tar when lending the
(a) We know that a woman acquires herself by means of a Get from the Pasuk
"ve'Kasav Lah Sefer K'riysus". We repudiate the suggestion that she acquires
herself with the death of her husband ...
1. ... because of the S'vara 'Hu Asrah, ve'Hu Sharsah' - by citing the
precedent of many instances of Arayos (e.g. Eishes Aviv), who forbid a man
on their relatives, yet they do those relatives do not become permitted with
the death of the one who forbade them.
(b) We attempt (unsuccessfully) to reinstate the proof from the latter
Halachah - by rejecting the notion that although there is no La'av, there is
an Asei, and by arguing that 'mi'Mah Nafshach', if the Torah removes the
La'av, then she should be completely permitted!
2. ... because the Torah writes by a Yevamah that when she has no children
she is prohibited to marry - because rather than inferring that if she has
children, she is permitted to marry, perhaps we will infer that if she has
children, she is even forbidden to the Yavam as well.
3. ... from the fact that the Torah forbids an Almanah to a Kohen Gadol,
insinuating that she is permitted to others because maybe the La'av becomes
permitted, but the Asei of "ve'Shilchah mi'Beiso" (and not through any other
means) will remain.
(c) We substantiate the disproof, from Pesulei ha'Mukdashin which the owner
1. The La'av that becomes permitted there is - "Lo Sagoz bi'Vechor
(d) We finally learn that the death of her husband permits her to marry,
from the Pasuk (concerning those who are sent home from the battlefront) -
"Pen Yamus ba'Milchamah, ve'Ish Acher Yikachenah".
2. The Asei that comes into effect is - "Tizbach ('ve'Lo Gizah')
"ve'Achalta" ('ve'Lo li'K'lavecha') "Basar" ('ve'Lo Chalav"), from which we
see that it is feasible for the Torah to permit a La'av, but to retain a
partial prohibition based on an Asei.
(a) Rav Ashi ...
1. ... explained to Rav Shisha Brei de'Rav Idi that "Ish Acher" referred to
in the previous Pasuk does not refer to the Yavam - because a Yavam is not
(b) He does not cite the following Pasuk "Lo Yuchal Ba'alah ha'Rishon Lashuv
Lekachtah" (implying that somebody else may marry her) - because there too,
it is possible that although there is no La'av, an Asei remains.
2. ... brings another disproof (apparently to the previous contention that
although there is no La'av forbidding an Almanah to remarry, there is an
Asei) from the Pasuk there "u'Senei'ah ha'Ish ha'Acharon ve'Kasav Lah Sefer
K'riysus ... O Ki Yamus ha'Ish ha'Acharon" - which, by comparing Miysah to
Gerushin, permits her completely at the death of her husband.