ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kidushin 8
KIDUSHIN 7-10 - Dedicated by an admirer of the work of the Dafyomi
Advancement Forum, l'Iluy Nishmas Mrs. Gisela (Golda bas Reb Chaim Yitzchak
Ozer) Turkel, A"H.
(a) The Beraisa extrapolates from the Pasuk (in connection with an Eved
Ivri) "mi'Kesef Miknaso" - 'be'Kesef Hu Nikneh, ve'Eino Nikneh bi'Tevu'ah
(b) This cannot mean that ...
1. ... an Eved Ivri cannot be acquired with produce or vessels, because from
the Pasuk "Yashiv Ge'ulaso" we learn - the principle 'Shaveh Kesef
(c) Rav Yosef therefore interprets the Beraisa to mean - that even though
the Tevu'ah and the 'Keilim' are certainly worth a P'rutah, one cannot
purchase an Eved Ivri (or anything else) with them as long as they have not
2. ... he cannot be acquired with produce or vessels that are worth less
than a P'rutah - because then it would not be neccesary to teach us this
Chidush by 'Tevu'ah ve'Keilim' (Shaveh Kesef), seeing as the same applies
even to Kesef.
(d) Rabah iterprets it to mean - that one cannot acquire an Eved Ivri with
(a) According to Rav Nachman - one cannot use Peiros for Chalipin.
(b) In that case, Rav Nachman cannot learn like Rabah's interpretation of
the Beraisa - because since one cannot use produce as Chalipin to acquire
anything, why would the Tana need to preclude specifically the Kinyan of an
Eved Ivri using Tevu'ah.
(c) To avoid establishing Rav Nachman like Rav Yosef, we establish the
Beraisa to mean 'Kesef ve'Keilim' that are worth less than a P'rutah. We
resolve the problem that we had with this earlier (that in this case, what
is the Chidush of Kesef ve'Keilim) - by pointing out that whereas less than
a P'rutah is worthless, Tevu'ah and Keilim give immediate benefit, and the
Tana needs to inform us that, in spite of this, they do not acquire.
(a) According to the Tana of the Beraisa, if says to a Kohen ...
1. ... 'Eigel Zeh le'Pidyon B'ni; Talis Zeh le'Pidyon B'ni' - his son is not
(b) Rav Yosef explains the Reisha of the Beraisa to mean - that even though
the calf or the cloak is worth five Sela'im, his son is not redeemed because
it was not first assessed, a prooof for his opinion that one cannot acquire
with an object that has not been assessed.
2. ... 'Eigel Zeh be'Chamesh Sela'im le'Pidyon B'ni; Talis Zeh be'Chamesh
Sela'im le'Pidyon B'ni' - he is.
(c) He declines to explain the Beraisa to mean that the calf or the cloak
are really worth less than five Sela'im, but the father considers them to be
worth that amount - because it is beyond the power of the father to fix his
own price-tag to objects.
(a) Rabah establishes the Beraisa - when the Kohen accepted the calf or the
cloak for five Sela'im, even though it was not really worth that amount.
(b) We prove this interpretation to be correct from Rav Kahana, who once
said, after receiving a Sudar (a special head-gear worn by
Talmidei-Chachamim) as a Pidyon ha'Ben (see Tosfos DH 'Rav Kahana') - that
to him, it was worth five Sela'im.
(c) Rav Ashi qualify this Halachah - confining it to cases such as a Sudar
and Talmidei-Chachamim, to whom a Sudar was particularly precious.
(d) We bear this out with an episode with Mar bar Rav Ashi, who paid for a
Sudar worth ten Zuz far more than it was really worth. He paid - thirteen
Zuz for the Sudar that he bought from the mother of Rava from Kubi.
(a) Rebbi Elazar said that if someone betrothed a woman for a Manah, and at the time
of the Kidushin, he gave her a Dinar, she is Mekudeshes - provided he makes up the
(b) The reason for this is - because, since she accepted it, it is as if he said
'al-M'nas' (on condition that he gives her a Manah), and Rav Huna Amar Rebbi has
taught that 'al-M'nas' is akin to 'Me'achshav'.
(c) The Beraisa says that if someone was counting out the Manah that he promised to
give a woman as Kidushin - either of them may retract, right up to the last Dinar.
(d) We reconcile this with Rebbi Elazar (who considers her Mekudeshes immediately) -
by stressing that the Tana is speaking when he is counting out the money, in which
case it is clear that they both intend the Kidushin to take effect only after the
entire sum has been paid.
(a) The Seifa of the previous Beraisa states that in a case where he said
'Manah Zu', and the Manah was subsequently found to contain ...
1. ... a Dinar short or one copper Dinar - the Kidushin is invalid.
(b) Despite the fact that the Seifa speaks about 'Manah Zu' - this does not
imply that the Reisha speaks about a 'Manah S'tam', reinstating the Kashya
on Rebbi Elazar, because it is possible to explain that the Seifa merely
explains the Reisha.
2. ... a poor-quality Dinar - the Kidushin is valid.
(c) We try and prove that the Reisha as well as the Seifa must be speaking
about 'Manah Zu', because otherwise, having taught us that 'Manah S'tam' the
Kidushin is not valid, then 'Kal va'Chomer' 'Manah Zu' and the Seifa would
not be necessary. We refute this proof however - by explaining that the
Seifa comes to indicate that the Reisha speaks about 'S'tam', so that we
should not establish the Reisha by Manah Zu, and extrapolate that by Manah
S'tam, the Kidushin would be effective.
(d) Rav Ashi establishes the Reisha by 'Manah S'tam' - reconciling Rebbi
Elazar with the Beraisa by differentiating between Rebbi Elazar's case and
that of the Beraisa, where he is actually counting out the coins, and where
even Rebbi Elazar will agree that the woman does not intend the Kidushin to
take effect until the last P'rutah has been counted.
(a) The Tana of the Beraisa invalidated the Kidushin, if one Dinar was found
to be a copper one. And the reason that she did not see it (in which case
she would be Mekudeshes, because she accepted it) is - either because the
Tana is speaking at night-time, or that it was jumbled together with the
other coins in a way that she failed to notice it.
(b) He validates the Kidushin if one of the Dinrim was found to be a
poor-quality one - because, it is possible to spend it, since, unlike a
copper one, it is still official currency.
(a) If a man says to a woman 'Hiskadshi Li be'Manah', says Rava quoting Rav
Nachman, and leaves her a Mashkon (collateral), she is not Mekudeshes -
because 'Manah Ein Ka'an, Mashkon Ein Ka'an' (he did not give her the Manah,
and the Mashkon, which is not a gift, cannot replace it).
(b) We reconcile this with the Beraisa which says 'Kidshah be'Mashkon,
Mekudeshes', by citing Rebbi Yitzchak, who says - that a creditor acquires
the Mashkon given which he receives from the debtor.
(c) He extrapolates this from the Pasuk (in connection with returning
collateral each day, should the debtor need it) "u'Lecha Tihyeh Tzedakah" -
by pointing out that, if the creditor did not acquire the Mashkon, then why
would the Torah consider this to be Tzedakah?
(d) Rebbi Yitzchak's statement enables us to answer Rava's Kashya on Rav
Nachman from the Beraisa - because we can now establish the Beraisa by a
Mashkon which the man received from his debtor (whereas Rav Nachman is
referring to an article of his own which he gives to the woman as a Mashkon.
(a) The sons of Rav Chiya bar Avin had no money with which to pay for the
Shifchah they had purchased. As a Mashkon they gave the seller - a piece of
(b) The seller subsequently retracted - because the price of slaves went up.
(c) When they tried to stop him from retracting - Rebbi Ami ruled 'Manah Ein
Ka'an, Mashkon Ein Ka'an', validating the seller's retraction.
(a) The Beraisa rules that a woman who took the money that a man gave her
for Kidushin and threw it into the sea ... - she is not Mekudeshes (in which
case, she will be obligated to replace the money).
(b) We cannot extrapolate from there that had she thrown it back at him, she
would be Mekudeshes - because in that case, it would be obvious that she is
(c) What the Beraisa is therefore coming to tell us is that even here, where
we might have thought that really she accepted the Kidushin, and that she
only threw the money into the sea in order to test his degree of
(a) The Beraisa says that if a woman ...
1. ... instructed the man who offered her Kidushin money, to hand it to her
or his father - she is not Mekudeshes (because it is a form of rejection. It
is like saying 'Don't give it to me, give it to someone else!').
(b) The Tana needs to mention both *her* father and *his* father. It
2. ... who added 'al-M'nas she'Yekablum Li' - she is Mekudeshes.
1. ... her father - to teach us that even then, she is not Mekudeshes in the
(c) Another Beraisa makes the same distinction between 'T'neim' and ' ... al
M'nas', but when she instructs the man to give the money to a third person.
The Tana needs to repeat the Chidush both by 'Aba ve'Avicha' and by 'P'loni'
2. ... his father - to teach us that she is nevertheless Mekudeshes in the
1. ... by 'P'loni', because we would otherwise have thought that it is only
by 'Aba ve'Avicha' that she is Mekudeshes in the Seifa, because she can rely
on them to perform this Shelichus on her behalf (even without having asked
them), but not a stranger.
2. ... by 'Aba and Avicha', because we would otherwise have thought that it
is in the case of 'P'loni' that she is not Mekudeshes in the Reisha, because
there is no reason for her to want to give a stranger a gift, whereas by
'Aba and Avicha', she may wish to give them a gift, in which case she will
be Mekudeshes from the Din of Areiv.
(a) If the woman responds with instructions to place the Manah of Kidushin
on a rock she is not Mekudeshes, says the Tana in a Beraisa. She is however,
Mekudeshes if the rock belongs to her - because, as we have learned before,
her Chatzer acquired it on her behalf.
(b) Rav Bibi asks - whether she will be Mekudeshes if the rock belongs to
both of them. This She'eilah remains unanswered.
(c) If she responds with instructions to give the loaf of Kidushin to a dog,
she is not Mekudeshes. She will however, be Mekudeshes - if the dog is hers.
(d) Rav Mari asks what the Din will be if a dog is chasing her, and she asks
him to throw the loaf to the dog to save her. This She'eilah too, remains
unanswered. Despite the fact that she definitely benefits from what he did,
she might nevertheless not be Mekudeshes - because she can argue that he was
obligated to save her by Torah law anyway (as the Torah writes in Kedoshim
"Lo Sa'amod al Dam Re'eicha").
(a) If she told him to give the loaf of bread to a poor man - she would not
be Mekudeshes - because he is obligated to feed him anyway.
(b) And the same applies - even if the poor man is generally supported by