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Kidushin 64

KIDUSHIN 61-65 - Ari Kornfeld has generously sponsored the Dafyomi publications for these Dafim for the benefit of Klal Yisrael.

1) [line 1] NEDARIM
(a) The Torah empowers a person to create a prohibition, or obligation, upon himself through the means of his speech, as the verse states (Bamidbar 30:3), "If a man makes a "Neder" (vow) to Hashem, or swears a "Shevu'ah" (oath) to create a prohibition upon himself, he may not violate his word. As he spoke, he shall do." By pronouncing a Shevu'ah (pl. Shevuos) one can either prohibit an act that was formerly permitted, or make obligatory an act that was formerly voluntary. By pronouncing a Neder (pl. Nedarim), in contrast, one can only prohibit and not obligate, with the exception of Nidrei Hekdesh (vows to consecrate a sacrifice) which can also obligate a person (to bring the sacrifice he vowed). The description that follows deals exclusively with normal Nedarim ("Nidrei Isur") as opposed to Nidrei Hekdesh. (Regarding Nidrei Hekdesh, see below, entry #3.)
(b) A Neder differs from a Shevu'ah primarily in that when a person expresses a Neder, he must place a prohibition upon an object (e.g. "this loaf of bread is prohibited to me"). In contrast, when he expresses a Shevu'ah, he places a prohibition upon himself (e.g. "I am prohibited to eat this loaf of bread"), as the Gemara says in Nedarim 2b (see Insights to Nedarim 2:3). (It is not clear into which of these two categories *Nezirus* falls, see Insights to Nazir 4:1:(b):2.) There are several important consequences of this primary difference:

1. A Neder, which prohibits an object, can prohibit the object not only to oneself but to others as well, as long as the object belongs to the person who expressed the Neder.
2. A Shevu'ah can prohibit an action that is not related to any tangible object ("Davar she'Ein Bo Mamash") such as sleeping. In contrast, a Neder cannot take effect on an intangible object, because the prohibition must have an object upon which to take effect (Nedarim 16b; the Mishnah and Gemara there suggest many other practical consequences of this difference between Nedarim and Shevu'os.)
(c) A Neder can be made by "connecting" an object that is permitted to another object that is prohibited, such as a Korban. (Some Rishonim refer to this as "a Neder performed through Hatfasah." Some Rishonim maintain that this is an integral part of the expression of a Neder without which the Neder is not binding, see Insights to Nedarim 2:2). The Gemara explains that when making a Neder, one may only connect an object to a "Davar ha'Nadur," i.e. another object which has been prohibited either through a Neder or by becoming Hekdesh (consecrated). If one attempts to make a Neder by connecting an object to a "Davar ha'Asur," the Neder is not binding (Nedarim 14a). "Davar ha'Asur" in this context refers to an object which is not prohibited because of an Isur that a *person* placed upon it, but because of an Isur Torah that applied to it naturally (e.g. meat that was cooked with milk, or a non-kosher animal). According to some Tana'im, if a Neder is pronounced by connecting an object to an object of Hekdesh, the object of the Neder, too, becomes Hekdesh to the extent that one who benefits from it must bring a Korban Me'ilah (Nedarim 35a, see Background to Yevamos 88:6).
(d) One who violates a Neder transgresses a Mitzvas Aseh (Bamidbar ibid., Devarim 23:24) and a Mitzvas Lo Sa'aseh (Bamidbar ibid.) and is punished with Malkos, 39 lashes (RAMBAM Hilchos Nedarim 1:4-5).
(e) The Mishnah in Nidah Daf 45b discusses a girl who makes a Neder during her twelfth year or a boy during his thirteenth year (i.e. when they are termed "Samuch l'Ish". "Samuch," means *near* the age of normal physical maturity, or "Ish"). We must "further investigate" in order to determine whether or not the vows are Halachically binding. The investigation involves determining whether the child in question knows the significance of Nedarim, and that their laws were dictated by Hash-m. Even though, Halachically speaking, the actions of a minor normally have no legal ramifications, if the child in question passes the investigation he is called a "Mufla ha'Samuch l'Ish, and he has reached the "Onas Nedarim," the age at which his vows *are* binding.
(f) There is a disagreement among the Tana'im as to whether the vows of such a child are binding mid'Oraisa (and if an adult transgresses them he is punishable with Malkos), or only mid'Rabanan. In either case, the child himself is not punished with Malkos if he transgresses his own vow, since he is still a minor and exempt from all punishments.

2) [line 1] CHARAMIM
(a) There are two types of Charamim (a type of vow or pledge in which one pronounces "This object should be a Cherem"):

1. Chermei Kohanim, which are given to the Kohanim for their personal use and cannot be redeemed from the Kohen;
2. Chermei Gavo'ah, which are given to the Beis ha'Mikdash for the Bedek ha'Bayis and can be redeemed like any other Hekdesh.
(b) See previous entry, (e-f).

3) [line 1] HEKDESHOS
(a) A person may offer a Korban in the Beis ha'Mikdash as a voluntary sacrifice, as it states in Vayikra 1:2. Voluntary Korbanos may be Olos (which are burned entirely on the Mizbe'ach, see Vayikra 1:2-17, 6:1-6), Shelamim (parts of which are eaten, see Vayikra 3:1-17, 7:11-21, 7:28-37) or Menachos (flour offerings, see Vayikra 2:1-13, 6:7-11, 7:9-10).
(b) When a person states, "I pledge an Olah" ("Harei *Alai* Olah"), without singling out a specific animal, his pledge is called a Neder. When he sets aside an animal with which to fulfill his pledge, and the animal gets lost or dies, he must bring another in its place. If he states, "*This* animal is an Olah" ("Harei *Zo* Olah"), his pledge is called a Nedavah. If the animal gets lost or dies, he has no obligation to bring another in its place.
(c) See above, entry 1:e-f.

4) [line 1] ARACHIM (ERECH)
(a) Erech (= endowment valuation) refers to a special form of vow. If a person declares, "Erech Ploni Alay" ("I accept upon myself to give the endowment value of so-and-so [to Hekdesh]"), he must give the specific value that the Torah designates for the person's gender and age group as stated in Vayikra 27:1-8 (see below, (b)). It makes no difference at all whether the person is healthy or sick, strong or weak.
(b) The Erech that the Torah specifies for children between the ages of 1 month and 5 years is 5 Shekalim for males and 3 Shekalim for females (Vayikra 27:6). For youths and young adults between the ages of 5 years and 20 years, the Erech that the Torah specifies is 20 Shekalim for males and 10 Shekalim for females (Vayikra 27:5). For adults between the ages of 20 years and 60 years, the Erech that the Torah specifies is 50 Shekalim for males and 30 Shekalim for females (Vayikra 27:3-4). For adults over 60 years of age, the Erech that the Torah specifies is 15 Shekalim for males and 10 Shekalim for females (Vayikra 27:7).

5) [line 9] CHALAL
(a) The Torah (Vayikra 21:14) commands a Kohen Gadol not to marry a widow (Almanah), divorcee (Gerushah), prostitute ("Zonah" -- see Background to Gitin 79:22) or Chalalah. An ordinary Kohen (Hedyot) is permitted to marry a widow, but not any of the other women listed above. The child from one of the above-mentioned unions is invalidated from the Kehunah, and is called a "Chalal." The Rabanan also prohibited all Kohanim from marrying a Chalutzah (see Background to Kidushin 45:6), and made the children of a Kohen from a Chalutzah Chalalim mid'Rabanan.
(b) A Chalal may not serve in the Beis ha'Mikdash, and according to some sources he is Chayav Misah b'Yedei Shamayim if he does (MINCHAS CHINUCH 275:5). A Chalal does not eat Terumah or the Kodshim reserved for Kohanim (Terumos 8:1), and is not restricted with regard to the women that he is allowed to marry. Chalalim are not prohibited from coming into contact with corpses. Chalalim are not considered Kohanim with regard to the other privileges and restrictions pertaining to Kohanim, as well.
(c) A widow, divorcee or prostitute who has relations with a Kohen Gadol, and a divorcee or prostitute who has relations with a regular Kohen, becomes a "Chalalah." Female children born through such a union are also Chalalos. Also, any Jewish woman who has relations with a Chalal becomes a Chalalah (even though she is permitted to have relations with him).
(d) A Chalalah is prohibited to marry a Kohen. If she does marry (and have relations with) a Kohen, the Chalalah and the Kohen are punished with Malkos. A Chalalah may not eat Terumah. Although a Jewish woman who has living children from a Kohen normally eats Terumah, if she becomes a Chalalah she may no longer eat Terumah. Similarly, although the daughter of a Kohen normally eats Terumah until she becomes married to a non-Kohen, if she becomes a Chalalah she may no longer eat Terumah (Yevamos 69a).
(e) There is a Mitzvas Aseh for a Kohen Gadol to marry a Besulah (Vayikra 21:13). If he transgresses this Aseh and marries a Be'ulah (who is not an Almanah), the Tana'im argue as to whether the woman becomes a Chalalah and whether the child is a Chalal.

6) [line 11] BENOS YISRAEL MIKVEH TAHARAH L'CHALALIN - women who are the daughters of non-Kohanim are like a Mikveh Taharah for Chalalim, i.e. a child that is born to her from a Chalal is a Kosher Yisrael and not a Chalal

7) [line 12] MAMZER
(a) There are prohibited marital relations that invalidate the ensuing offspring and render them Mamazerim. The Tana'im argue as to the nature of these prohibited relations. According to Rebbi Yehoshua, they must be relations that are punishable by Misas Beis Din (see Background to Kidushin 32:16). Rebbi Shimon ha'Timni rules that all relations that are punishable by Kares, even if they are not punishable by Misas Beis Din, produce a Mamzer (fem. Mamazeres). According to Rebbi Akiva, even relations that are prohibited by a Lav produce a Mamzer (Yevamos 49a). Other Tana'im argue regarding the opinion of Rebbi Akiva. There are those who assert that he rules that only relations prohibited by a Lav produce a Mamzer. Others hold that even those prohibited by an Aseh produce a Mamzer (except for a Kohen Gadol who has relations with a non-virgin -- Kesuvos 30a). The Halachah follows the opinion of Rebbi Shimon ha'Timni, that only relations punishable by Kares produce a Mamzer (Yevamos ibid.)
(b) A Mamzer is prohibited to marry into the community of HaSh-m, that is, Jewish people of unsullied lineage. He may, however, marry a Mamzeres and a Giyores (MISHNAH Kidushin 69a). The Tana'im and Amora'im argue as to whether a Safek Mamzer is prohibited mid'Oraisa to marry both a Mamzeres and a Jewess of unsullied lineage, because of the doubt, or whether he is permitted mid'Oraisa to marry either of them, since he is not included in the category of Mamzer that the Torah prohibited (Yevamos 37a, Kidushin 73a, 74a).

(a) There are women whom the Torah prohibits to certain men. However, if these men transgress a Torah prohibition and are Mekadesh (betroth) them the Kidushin are valid. Other women are prohibited to the extent that even if the men are Mekadesh them, the Kidushin are not valid.
(b) The Tana'im argue, based upon differing interpretations of the verses of the Torah (Kidushin 67b-68a), with which women Kidushin are valid and with which women Kidushin are not valid.

1. According to most of the Tana'im, Kidushin are valid with women who are prohibited only with a Lav and/or an Aseh. Kidushin are not valid with women who are prohibited with an Isur Kares (such as the Arayos that the Torah prohibits in Parshas Acharei Mos, Vayikra 18:6-23).
2. Rebbi Akiva and other Tana'im are more stringent, ruling that Kidushin are not valid even with those women who are prohibited with an Isur Lav. The Tana'im argue further with regard to the opinion of Rebbi Akiva, as to whether Kidushin are not valid only with some of the Chayavei Lavin (those women who were never permitted to the man in question), or with all of them. Additionally, one Tana claims that according to Rebbi Akiva, Kidushin are not valid with Isurei Aseh either (see previous entry).
(c) Another result of the above-mentioned argument applies to Mamzerim. According to the opinion that rules that only Kidushin with Chayavei Kares are not valid, the children of Chayavei Lavim are not Mamzerim. According to Rebbi Akiva and those Tana'im who rule that Kidushin with Chayavei Lavim are not valid either, the children of Chayavei Lavim are also Mamzerim.
(d) According to all opinions, Kidushin may not be effected with a Nochri maidservant or a Nochris, even though the prohibition against marrying them is not a Isur Kares, since the institution of Kidushin does not exist with regard to these women (see Insights to Yevamos 45:1).

See above, entry #5.

10) [line 19] U'NETZO'ACH - (a) let us prevail upon; (b) according to the reading *U'NETZAVE'ACH* - and let us shout out against

11) [line 20] KOL SHE'EIN LO BI'AH B'YISRAEL, HA'VELAD MAMZER - all marital unions among the people of Yisrael where marital relations are not completely permitted result in a child who is a Mamzer

12) [line 23] CHAYAVEI ASEH
See above, entry #5:e.

13) [line 23] V'TISBERA!? - Do you really think so?!

(a) If a married man dies childless and has brothers who survive him, his widow or widows may not remarry until one of her husband's brothers performs Yibum (levirate marriage) or Chalitzah (levirate release) with one of them, as it states in Devarim 25:5-10. Chazal learn from the verses that if there are a number of brothers, there is a preference for the oldest brother to perform Yibum or Chalitzah (Yevamos 24a).
(b) Yibum is a type of marriage. Unlike ordinary Kidushin, though, it can be accomplished only through Bi'ah and not through Kesef or Shtar (see Background to Kidushin 2:1:II:b). Nevertheless, the Rabanan instituted that one should precede Yibum with an act similar to Kidushei Kesef or Shtar, which is known as Ma'amar (see Background to Nedarim 74:4).
(c) If the live brother does not wish to marry the dead brother's widow, he must perform Chalitzah. To do so, he appears before a Beis Din of three and states, "I do not want to marry her," after which his sister-in-law approaches him before the elders, takes off his right sandal and spits in front of him. She then declares, "This is what shall be done to the man who will not build up a family for his brother." After this process is completed, she is free to marry whomever she wants.
(d) The *connection* of the live brother or brothers to the dead man's widow or widows, which prevents the widows from marrying without Yibum or Chalitzah, is called "Zikah," and a widow who is thus prevented from remarrying is called a "Zekukah." Another name for a widow who awaits Yibum or Chalitzah is a "Shomeres Yavam." It is forbidden for a woman to have relations with anyone other than the Yavam while she is a Shomeres Yavam. This is known as the prohibition of "Yevamah la'Shuk" - "a Yevamah [who is prohibited] to anyone from outside [her husband's siblings]. If she transgresses this prohibition and has relations with a man other than the Yavam, she has violated a Lo Sa'aseh (Devarim 25:5) and both she and her suitor are punished with Malkos. Some Tana'im and Amora'im maintain that if she accepts Kidushin from someone while she is a Shomeres Yavam, the Kidushin is not legally binding (Yevamos 92b, Sotah 18b).

15) [line 34] KOL D'CHEN (KAL VA'CHOMER)
(a) In the Introduction to the Sifra (the Halachic Midrash to Vayikra), Rebbi Yishmael lists thirteen methods that Chazal use for extracting the Halachah from the verses of the Torah. One of them is called a Kal va'Chomer (an argument a fortiori, also known as "Din" in the language of the Gemara), by which a Halachic inference is made from a Halachah of lesser consequence to a Halachah of greater consequence, or vice versa.
(b) Unlike a Gezeirah Shavah (see Background to Gitin 41:13), the Kal va'Chomer inference need not be received as a tradition from one's teacher, since it is based upon logic. And unlike a Hekesh (see Background to Gitin 41:12), it can be refuted based on logical grounds.

16) [line 36] MUCHZAK (CHAZAKAH - the situation as it stood until now, i.e. an assumption that is legally reliable)
(a) One of the most confusing aspects of the subject of "Chazakah" is that the term "Chazakah" is used to describe so many unrelated laws. Just about any logical clarification of a doubt (and more) is referred to by this name. In our Sugya, it is referring to the rule that when doubt arises as to whether the status of a certain person/object has changed, we assume that is has not changed.

1. Such a "Chazakah" may be used in regard to a purely Halachic status (such as Tamei/Tahor or Mutar/Asur), or in regards to a physical status that effects the Halachah (such as an animal not being a Tereifah, or a Mikvah not lacking the necessary amount of water). In our Sugya, the Chazakah of having children and the Chazakah of not having brothers work independently to exempt the woman from the obligation of Yibum or Chalitzah.
2. A Chazakah may work forward in time (Chazakah D'Ikara), proving what will be, or backwards in time (Chazakah D'Hashta), proving what was.
(b) The word Chazakah is sometimes used to refer to what is actually a Ruba d'Leisa Kaman (see Background to Yevamos 119:6), such as "Chazakah Sheli'ach Oseh Shelichuso" (Chulin 12a). This is not the Chazakah we are discussing here.
(c) Another Chazakah proves that if a man or woman have acted as brother and sister for a long enough time, it is accepted as strong enough evidence of their kinship to cause them to be executed for having forbidden relations with each other (Kidushin 80a). This too, is not the subject of our Sugya.


17) [line 2] MAH LI L'SHAKER? - (lit. "Why should I lie?") a legal device with which a person's claim is believed because had he wanted to lie, there was a lie that he could have used that would have been more readily believed by Beis Din

A girl is a Ketanah (minor) until she has two pubic hairs after she enters her twelfth year. During the following six months she is a Na'arah (maidenhood). When six months elapse she becomes a Bogeres (adult).

19) [line 9] BITI HA'GEDOLAH - (the next two cases in the Mishnah refer to daughters who are minors, even though some of them are called "Gedolah")

20) [line 8] SHTEI KITEI VANOS - two groups of daughters (from two wives, to whom he was married at different times)

21) [line 20] HA KETANOS BICHLAL - [we can infer from the Mishnah that the daughters who are] minors are included [in the doubt as to which of his daughters was betrothed]

(a) The Amora'im argue with regard to the Halachah of Kidushin "she'Ein Mesurin l'Vi'ah," whether the Kidushin are valid or whether we say that any Kidushin that does not lead to a state where marital relations are permitted are not Kidushin at all and there is no need for a Get (a bill of divorce).
(b) For example, Reuven was Mekadesh one of two sisters (or one of a mother/daughter pair or one of a mother/granddaughter pair) without specifying which woman he was Mekadesh. He handed one Perutah of Kidushin to the two of them simultaneously (e.g. they both appointed the same agent to accept Kidushin for them, and Reuven gave a Perutah to him to be Mekadesh one of them), stating that he wants to be Mekadesh "one of them," without specifying which one. According to the opinion that the Kidushin are valid, one of the two women become married to him, and since it is not known which is the married one both women need a Get mi'Safek (because of the doubt involved). According to the other opinion, no Get is required at all, since Reuven is prohibited from having relations with either of them because of the doubt. (One of them is his wife and the other is the sister -- or daughter or granddaughter -- of his wife; therefore the possibility exists that any one of them is his wife's sister -- or daughter or granddaughter -- who is prohibited to him mid'Oraisa).
(c) This Halachah only applies to Chayavei Kerisus, where the Isur stems from the Kidushin of the first woman, such as a man who is Mekadesh one of two sisters (as described above). It does not apply to a man who is Mekadesh a woman who is prohibited to him because of a Lo Sa'aseh (Chayavei Lavin). Even though he is prohibited from having marital relations with her, the Kidushin is called Kidushin *ha'Mesurin* l'Vi'ah, since in this case the prohibition against marital relations does not stem from the Kidushin (TOSFOS to Kidushin 51a DH Kidushin).

23a) [line 23] V'HA BOGROS KETANI - but the Mishnah writes "Bogros" (adult daughters) in the plural!
b) [line 24] BOGROS D'ALMA - [it means] Bogros (adult daughters) in general (but in the specific case that the Mishnah is discussing, the man only has one adult daughter)

24) [line 26] SHAVISEI SHALI'ACH - [where] she appointed him (her father) as her agent [to accept Kidushin]

25) [line 30] KIDUSHAI LACH - "my Kidushin [money] will go to you (my father)"

26a) [line 30] MITZVAH D'RAMYA ALEI - a Mitzvah that is incumbent upon him
b) [line 31] MITZVAH D'LO RAMYA ALEI - a Mitzvah that is not incumbent upon him

27) [line 35] MACHIS INISH NAFSHEI LI'SEFEIKA - a person places himself (lit. lowers himself) into a situation of doubt
(a) There are a number of ways for a person to cause an object to become prohibited through his speech, e.g. by prohibiting a particular food with a Neder, Nezirus or Shevu'ah or by performing a Kidushin and prohibiting a woman to others. The Tana'im argue as to whether or not a person intends for such a statement to cause a "Safek Isur" (i.e. a prohibition due to doubt) when his statement leaves room for doubt.
(b) According to the opinion that maintains "Lo Machis Inish Nafshei li'Sefeika," a person does not want his statement to create a Safek Isur. His statement, therefore, will only create clear Isurim. Whenever there is a doubt as to whether a certain object is included in his statement, the object will not be included. According to the opinion which maintains the opposite, "Machis Inish Nafshei li'Sefeika," a person does not mind if his statement creates a Safek Isur. Therefore when there is a doubt as to whether a certain object is included in his statement, the object will be included.
(c) For example, the opinion that maintains "Lo Machis Inish Nafshei li'Sefeika" holds that a person who makes a Neder to prohibit himself from a food until *Penei* ha'Pesach must keep the Neder only until the onset of Pesach. Similarly, the person who has two sets of two daughters and states that he married off his older daughter ("ha'Gedolah") only refers to his *oldest* daughter. The Tana who argues rules that the Neder must be kept until the end of Pesach because of the doubt that all of the days of Pesach might be included in his statement, and that all daughters need Gitin (bills of divorce) because of the doubt (except for the younger of the younger set of daughters).

28) [line 39] MUCHLEFES HA'SHITAH - their opinions (in the Mishnah from Nedarim 60a) were mistakenly interchanged and should be switched

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